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Introduction

Journalistic work has long been viewed as something that is done by people in stable full-time employment who earn an income that sustains their living. However, the standard career in journalism is a thing of the past for many (Deuze & Witschge, 2018). As business models of news organizations have become unsustainable, newsrooms across the sector and countries have started to downsize their employed journalistic staff in the past 20 years (Örnebring & Ferrer-Conill, 2016; Salamon, 2019). Likewise, for years, journalism educators have prepared their students that the journalistic job market is highly competitive. More recently, they have started to equip them with an entrepreneurial mind- and skill-set (Sivek, 2014; Solomon, 2016). As recent research illustrates, aspiring journalists have long internalized the uncertainty of the job market and are thankful for full-time employment (Gollmitzer, 2014; Nölleke et al., 2022; Singer & Broersma, 2020). Moreover, it appears that such economic constraints leading to the casualization of work are especially prominent in Western media systems (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019b). Thus, while freelancers and contract workers have always occupied the journalistic field of the 20th century, they have increased in number in the past twenty years, and not all are freelancing by choice (Antunovic et al., 2019; De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Salamon, 2019).

New technologies have contributed to this increase of freelancers and journalistic contributors without full-time employment. Internet and Communication Technology (ICTs) facilitate remote work, and more and more affordable recording and editing technology allow individuals to produce high-quality audio and audio-visual content (Kus et al., 2017; Nicey, 2016). Thus, personal ICTs expedite the ‘workforce flexibility’ proposed by Sennett (1998) and pervade time spent out of the workplace as correspondence, pitching of drafts, and project work can be done virtually and independently of spatiotemporal settings (Deuze, 2007). Moreover, theoretically, ICTs enable anyone with enough stamina to produce journalistic content for news organizations (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; T. J. Thomson, 2018), opening journalistic production for individual and semi-professional newcomers and blurring the boundaries of journalism (Carlson & Lewis, 2015; Kus et al., 2017).

This has led to a plethora of contributors and – especially in digital journalism – decreasing or non-existent remuneration (Cohen, 2019; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Rosenkranz, 2019). More and more freelancers cannot live off their journalistic work

alone, and many supplement their income by pursuing other work. As Cohen (2012, p. 151) concludes, these freelancers perceive their journalistic work as a “luxury to indulge in when time and money permit”. Journalistic work is rendered a “passion project” (Deuze & Witschge, 2020, p. 83), reminiscent of other cultural work like music, literature, and art (M. Scott, 2012; Umney & Kretsos, 2015). While some turn to service jobs like cleaning to “stay on the job” (Abrahamian, 2018), most turn to other communication work, public relations or copy editing (Meyen & Springer, 2009).

These developments have four larger implications for journalism and the journalistic field. First, citizen and other non-employed journalists, in general, are perceived as a de-professionalization of journalism as they are not aware of long-held norms and routines (Deuze & Fortunati, 2011; Tara Marie Mortensen, 2014). Second, research suggests that precarious journalists are not able to fulfil the profession’s key functions to society like investigative and watchdog journalism as they lack the resources for long-term reporting and legal protection (Gollmitzer, 2014; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012). Third, in line with this, only those with enough financial resources to sustain longer periods without journalistic work can continue working as journalists – and consequently, this might lead to an elitist wave of young journalists who can afford to pursue their dream job through years of uncertainty and underpaid work (Deuze & Witschge, 2017). That poses complications for the diversity of the journalistic field, namely the representation of society as a whole, including minorities and journalists with working-class and low-income backgrounds. And finally, fourth, freelancers working in journalism and other communication work threaten the taken-for-granted separation between commercial and societal interests, even more so when journalists work in both areas on the same topic (Fröhlich et al., 2013; Koch & Obermaier, 2014; Ladendorf, 2012).

While the impact of technological and economic transformations on journalists’ work, norms and role perceptions has long been investigated, a comprehensive understanding of how these forces shape the work of freelancers and other journalistic contributors without full-time employment is still missing. Moreover, both economic and technological influences have been exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (Cruciata, 2020; Fishman & Lierheimer, 2021; Schaefer, 2020). By investigating journalists in five European countries, this doctoral thesis thus contributes to our knowledge of how economic and technological forces shape the work of this growing population in the journalistic field.

Journalistic work beyond the newsroom

Western journalism research has long diagnosed journalism as a profession and institution under crisis and much of journalism scholarship of the past twenty years focuses on the changes in journalistic norms and role perceptions brought about by economic and technological transformations (Örnebring, 2018a). Yet, empirical research and especially large-scale and longitudinal surveys have primarily focused on journalists in standard employment working in traditional, text-focused newsrooms and in hard news beats like politics (Hanitzsch & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2009). Scholars have criticized these practices as they construe “an assumed homogeneity of the profession” (Deuze & Witschge, 2018, p. 168), and more focus has been given, for example, to other journalistic beats (Hanusch, 2014, 2019). Still, survey research works with narrow definitions of journalists as research objects, leaving out a vast group of journalistic workers who do not fit the tight demarcations of minimum pay or workload. For example, large scale survey studies have continuously excluded anyone who did not either a) spend the majority of their working time with journalistic work or b) earn the majority of their salary with journalistic work (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, 2020; Weaver et al., 2006; Weischenberg et al., 2006), creating a “methodological artefact” (Pöttker, 2008, own translation).

While journalism in Western democracies has been chiefly a profession with low entry barriers, employment, education, and training have established some form of journalistic professionalism in the 20th century (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). However, the increase of journalistic work outside the traditional setting of the newsroom have made questions of what it takes to be considered a journalist and what can be considered journalism rampant (Deuze, 2007; Örnebring et al., 2018). Assumptions rendering everything and everyone outside legacy news work marginal or divergent exclude many producers who regularly contribute to news production. Moreover, as addressed before, journalism is heterogeneous and exists in various genres (e.g., news article, feature, column) focusing on different topics (current affairs, social issues, lifestyle) and even embracing different ideals (e.g., neutral reporting, local journalism, constructive journalism). Instead of focusing on markers of organizational professionalism (Örnebring, 2009) when studying journalistic producers, we should instead perceive journalism as a social field in which different actors are stratified according to their relative resources and power.

From a field-theoretical perspective, the heterogeneity of the profession is grounded in the uneven distribution of resources and the struggle over meaning and recognition. Still, social fields originate through differentiation from other social arenas by establishing a “shared sense of how the field contributes to society and how the field shapes society’s own vision of reality” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 112), distinguishing the field from other social field and legitimizing it as a singular entity despite being heterogeneous within (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 223). As such, agents participating in the journalistic field share a set of implicitly and commonly communicated rules like professional norms or ethical conduct. These rules, in Bourdieusian terms called *doxa* (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164), develop through historical struggle, which might explain why there is not one journalistic culture when we think of journalistic fields (Benson 2006).

At the same time, social fields are situated within the larger social space and susceptible to external influences. As a concept, fields can be thought of as a space with an autonomous and a heteronomous pole distinguishing between agents with high field-specific resources or high external resources like economic or political capital in the case of the journalistic field (Benson & Neveu, 2005). Agents at the heteronomous pole are thus more susceptible to external influences and introduce external logic to the field, contributing to the struggle over its meaning. For example, that web analytics are increasingly normalized in journalistic practice can be viewed as a shift from external influences that has been incorporated into the journalistic field by more heteronomous actors (Tandoc, 2014). Field theory thus allows us to investigate how an increasing economic logic or a focus on technology in the broader social space shapes journalistic work by looking at those who might be most affected by these changes: Freelancers, entrepreneurial journalists, and bloggers.

Atypical journalistic work and what we know about it

I approach this diverse group of freelancers and other journalistic contributors through the lens of atypical work. Atypical work, in general, refers to 1) employment limited in time, such as fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work; 2) work that is less than part-time labour or marginal employment; and 3) new forms of self-employment or pseudo-self-employment such as (flat-rate) freelance, casual and subcontracted work (Schweiger, 2009). In the journalistic field, atypical employment thus comprises freelancers, entrepreneurial journalists, and workers on temporary or short-rolling, flat-rate or

otherwise contingent contracts (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Deuze, 2007; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Hummel et al., 2012). From a legal perspective, freelancers are self-employed contractors who work for multiple media outlets “without a long-term commitment to any of them”, independently producing finished pieces (Walters et al., 2006, p. 6). However, colloquially, freelancing is also sometimes used for those working on short-time contingent contracts or a flat-charge (Cohen, 2012; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012). As such, atypically employed journalists – or, in short, atypical journalists¹ – can either work from home with rare contact to the news organization or as hot-deskers within the organization.

Whereas the casualization of work is a general trend of post-Fordist societies (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Kalleberg, 2009), cultural production is especially prone to these changes and historically had a leading-edge role (Henninger & Gottschall, 2007). Continuous lay-offs of traditional journalists, as well as the decrease of new permanent positions, raise the numbers of competing freelance journalists, both young and old (Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Sherwood & O'Donnell, 2018). Moreover, union work and collective payment agreements have lost importance, creating a growing gap between salaries of “high-earning stars on the journalistic firmament” (Lee-Wright, 2012, p. 21) and a marginalized “third world of journalistic producers” (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006, p. 183, own translation). While atypically employed journalists have mostly been ignored in large-scale studies of the profession, there has been increasing scholarly interest in freelance and other atypical journalists in the past twenty years. As such, atypical journalistic work, and especially the precarious nature of it, has not necessarily been understudied, allowing us to identify key characteristics:

Atypical journalists are a highly heterogeneous and widespread group. There seems to be a division into well-educated, well-situated self-employed journalists and a mass of marginalized, underpaid flexible journalists, decreasing remuneration through high competition (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Massey & Elmore, 2011; Meyen & Springer, 2009).

Self-employment is increasingly a matter of constraint instead of choice. Aspirants and journalists in less prestigious media feel often forced to work atypically employed. The subfield of atypical journalism is an area where economic pressures are especially

¹ When I refer to “atypical journalists” throughout this thesis, I mean that in the sense of their employment and not whether their work is atypical in other capacities.

present; freelancers suffer in particular from potential flexploitation and a possible loss of autonomy (Cohen, 2012; Gollmitzer, 2014; Hermes et al., 2017).

Low remuneration and social isolation might contribute to different journalistic doxa. Research indicates that investigative reporting and watchdog role perceptions need stable working conditions and that freelancers perceive their role more as promoters, teachers, and artists. At the same time, journalists with little contact to newsrooms are anxious about not knowing the rules properly and feel at the mercy of the editor when it comes to changes to their work (S. Baines, 1999; Gollmitzer, 2014; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012; Summ, 2013).

Self-management is crucial. Freelance work blurs the boundaries of working- and leisure time. Freelancers often must pursue other non-journalistic media work to finance their living, calling for intra-role management to prohibit intra-role conflict. An entrepreneurial mind- and skill-set is perceived to be empowering for journalists, however, scholarship also criticizes entrepreneurialism as veiling the precarious nature of work (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; S. Baines, 1999; Cohen, 2015b; Hunter, 2016; Obermaier & Koch, 2015; Summ, 2013).

Paradox of journalistic precarity and passion. Even though freelance journalism is not well paid and atypical journalists often have to spend more time working in non-journalistic jobs, their job satisfaction seems high. This is sometimes explained with the prestige of journalism or passion, pursuing what one loves (Gollmitzer, 2014; Mathisen, 2019; Salamon, 2016).

However, most existing research consists of single-case studies, hardly generating comparative knowledge, even though it would be necessary to generalize, contextualize, and reflect on results without overestimating the specific cultural context they derive from (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012).

Aims and objectives

This thesis aims to map atypical journalistic producers and their freelance journalistic cultures under technological and economic transformations across six different media landscapes. By doing so, this dissertation will address the following five important research gaps:

(1) *Build a theoretical framework to analyze transformations in journalism.* The thesis aims to develop a theoretical framework to understand and empirically analyze

changes in the journalistic field, particularly concerning economic and technological forces, to analyze what journalism has become beyond the newsroom centrality. In doing so, I want to look at the possible transformations of the journalistic field and its doxa, like journalists' role perceptions and professional norms affected by economic and technical constraints.

(2) *Include journalists beyond full-time work.* Moreover, I want to redefine and open the term 'journalist' to include producers who are especially prone to economic and technical constraints as they work less than 20 hours in journalism and supplement their income through other sources. This will contribute further to the discussion distinguishing between journalists, atypical news workers, and amateurs. For the sake of a structured collection of data, it will investigate journalistic content producers who earn money with their journalistic work at least once a month.

(3) *Consider journalists' trajectories and access to resources.* While research on freelancers often focuses on financial precarity, only a few consider the accumulated resources that enable atypical journalists to pursue journalistic work as a passion despite financial precarity. This study will thus explicitly consider journalists' social background and the access to resources they have, providing more depth to the conditions shaping their work.

(4) *Examine the degree of heteronomy in the field of journalism with regards to atypical journalists.* In addition, this thesis wants to address how entrepreneurial skills are already implemented (self-marketing, use of social media, branding) and whether atypically employed journalists are either focused on audiences or editors (Who is the "customer"?).

(5) *Map the blurring boundaries of European journalistic fields.* Since research on atypical work suggests that freelancers and entrepreneurial journalists are represented to varying extent in different European countries, one final objective is to comparatively study where atypical journalism is located in various journalistic fields.

Accordingly, three larger research questions guide this doctoral project:

RQ1: How do technological transformations affect the work of atypical journalists and their freelance journalistic cultures?

RQ2: How do economic transformations impact the work of atypical journalists and their freelance journalistic cultures?

RQ3: How do these transformations play out across different media systems?

Previous work on freelancers has mostly been qualitative, providing great insights into the subfield of atypical journalistic work. However, these studies have often been single-case studies that do not allow us to draw more general findings on freelance journalistic culture. Thus, and to answer the above-stated research questions, this doctoral thesis project aimed for a comparative approach, surveying atypical journalists in different (European) media systems (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). A theoretically motivated selection resulted in Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the UK as countries for this comparison. Respondents were selected through a sampling approach through various online platforms, ensuring functional equivalence across countries. An online survey run in early 2020 yielded data of 430 respondents on their working routine and journalistic practices, working environment, use and purpose of social media, access to material resources, workload and additional incomes, socialization, entrepreneurial skills, motivation to work freelance, job satisfaction, perceived influences, role perceptions and sociodemographic background. Apart from basic statistical tests, multiple regression analysis and multiple correspondence analysis were employed to address my aims and objectives and answer the research questions.

As such, this thesis is the first to investigate atypical journalism cross-nationally. By focusing both on journalists' resources and working and their perception of their role for society, the study also contributes to our knowledge of atypical journalistic labour and whether this shapes their understanding of journalism's key function.

However, the project is also ambitious in its scope. While the questionnaire was carefully developed, professionally translated, and back-translated by academics from the respective countries, it can still be that differences between countries might also be grounded in the different wording and thus overestimated. Likewise, while I tried in the past four years to learn as much as possible about the journalistic cultures in the respective countries, my knowledge to interpret the results is primarily based on literature as I lack the experience of the Danish, French, Dutch, or British journalistic field. Moreover, atypical journalists are incredibly difficult to sample and ideally, we would sample them through the news media for which they work. As such an approach is not feasible, I collected possible respondents through publicly available data on different digital databases promoting journalists' portfolios and LinkedIn. While this provides functional equivalence across countries, this approach might overrepresent journalists with a more entrepreneurial mind-set. Lastly, the overall population of atypical journalists

is generally unknown, and my sample is small. Thus, while it still provides valuable insights and is helpful for cross-cultural comparison, it is not representative.

Chapter Overview

The thesis begins by discussing Bourdieusian thought in general and its application in journalism research to provide the basis for the theoretical framework. As such, **chapter one** lays the theoretical groundwork for this thesis by introducing field theory and Bourdieusian thought to study journalism as a social field instead of a profession. I first review Bourdieu's quest to study society and the power relations within by considering both individual and structural levels. This is followed with an in-depth discussion of the key concepts making up field theory: the field and the mechanisms building and maintaining its boundaries, forms of capitals as resources shaping the relative power of agents within the field, and habitus as the theoretical bridge between agency and the objective structure of the field. Chapter one ends with a discussion of how we can understand ICTs through a Bourdieusian lens as they form a crucial aspect of today's journalistic practice.

Chapter two zooms in on how the concepts of field, forms of capital, and habitus have been employed in journalism research. While Bourdieu has studied various social fields, his work on journalism remains elusive, leaving much potential for journalism-specific frameworks and combining field theory with other concepts. Here, I put emphasis on the boundary concept as theorized by Gieryn and others to understand what constitutes the journalistic field and concomitantly who can belong to it.

The boundaries of the journalistic field and external forces that can shape it are discussed in the first of two literature review chapters. **Chapter three** distinguishes between two specific forces shaping the journalistic field, technological and economic external influences. In particular, I review the enabling and constraining qualities of ICTs, which, on the one hand, allow anyone to work for any news organization from anywhere and, on the other hand, are perceived as accelerating the news cycle, contributing to time pressure, job enlargement, and metrification of journalists' performance. Yet, mastering technology has been viewed as a crucial resource and can be understood as a form of capital, habitus, and symbolic value in Bourdieusian terms. Moreover, the chapter reviews the tension between journalism as a good of merit and economic good. This is followed by a discussion of economically motivated transformations of the journalistic

labour market, how risk and uncertainty are increasingly shifted onto the individual worker and how journalists perceive economic influences to shape their work.

Zooming in on the individual, **chapter four** focuses on atypically employed journalists and the heterogeneity of atypical journalistic work. I start by outlining the history of atypical work, underscoring that it has always been part of the journalistic field. This is followed by a review of precarity as a concept to understand contemporary labour markets. Research locates atypical journalism at the intersection of freedom, flexibility, passion and precarity. To understand this complexity of precarious labour and perceived precarity in more detail, I introduce six dimensions of precarity along which I discuss findings on atypical journalism: financial security, access to resources, sense of community, legal and institutional protection, status, and recognition, and lastly boundaries of work.

To fully understand the heterogeneity of atypical journalism, **chapter five** outlines how we can think about it in Bourdieusian terms and situate it within the concept of journalistic culture. Thus, the chapter offers a framework based on the previous chapters, perceiving atypical journalistic culture through the concepts of forms of capital, doxa and illusio, and habitus. Here, I outline these concepts in more detail, discussing previous findings on atypical journalism in light of this framework. The chapter ends with identifying research gaps, stating the research questions, and arguing for a cross-cultural research study design.

This is picked up in **chapter six**, where I justify the methodological approach and present questionnaire development, sampling strategy, and data collection and how specific composite indexes and dummy variables were calculated for further analysis. Moreover, chapter five also discusses how data was analyzed and explains multiple correspondence analysis, which was employed to map the atypical journalistic fields.

The results start with **chapter seven**, in which I first start with a profile of the sample under study, their trajectory, and access to resources. I first discuss to what extent the sociodemographic parameters of the sample are like the sample of the *Worlds of Journalism Study* (WJS), which might also indicate to what extent findings can be generalized. I then discuss respondents' economic capital across age, gender, and countries and the conditions shaping their acquisition of economic capital. These conditions include the access to resources they have, their place of work, and other sources of income, among other things. This is followed by respondents' cultural, digital, journalistic, and social capital. The chapter reiterates findings from previous studies,

primarily the division between few that earn well and many that are precarious, and that many atypical journalists are well-educated and come from middle- to upper-class families.

Chapter eight presents the analysis to research questions one and two, how technological and economic forces shape atypical journalistic culture. More precisely, I analyze to what extent ICT-mediate work (technological transformation) and work in other communication areas and financial precarity (economic transformation) shape journalists' perception of autonomy (*illusio*), their core professional norms and roles (*doxa*), and whether they embrace a more entrepreneurial or marginalized *habitus*. Results indicate that while technological and economic transformations shape journalists' *doxa* and *habitus*, the most pronounced differences can be found on the country-level.

This difference across countries is thus picked up in **chapter nine**, which begins by situating respondents within the space of journalistic work as conceptualized by Örnebring and colleagues and finds that atypical journalists in all five countries primarily occupy marginalized positions. However, when mapping the fields of atypical journalistic work, a nuanced representation emerges: Across countries, we can distinguish between established atypical journalists who are unquestionably members of the journalistic field and marginalized respondents whose membership in the field might be disputed. Strikingly, established respondents tend to pursue the dominant role perceptions in their respective fields. Regarding freelancer-specific ethical norms, the results are less distinct across countries, indicating newer ethical challenges, like the strict separation between journalistic and communication work, are negotiated differently in different fields.

The concluding chapter, **chapter ten**, ties these findings together, discusses them in light of the theory and literature review and evaluates the study's contributions. Moreover, the chapter reviews the limitations and offers recommendations for further research.

Theoretical Framework

Chapter 1: Field Theory and Bourdieusian Thought

To investigate the heterogeneity of the journalistic profession, it makes sense to think of it through theories of societal stratification, social groups and boundary-drawing.

Bourdieuian field theory, while it has its limitations (R. Jenkins, 1992), provides a valuable framework, as it also allows us to investigate economically and technologically induced change on journalism culture, journalistic practice, and artefacts. Moreover, it offers concepts such as the social field “as an alternative to profession” (Hovden, 2008, p. 31) to overcome the debate over formal vocational and often-times normative criteria that agents must meet to be part of the profession. Additionally, Bourdieusian analysis allows for more than one vision of the journalistic field, that is, more than one perspective, to understand why people engage in journalism and what interests they pursue. This chapter will outline Bourdieusian thought, highlighting the concepts of field theory that are most useful for this research project. Lastly, I will reflect on some of the criticism on Bourdieusian concepts, the key of my adaption of Bourdieusian thought to journalism studies being to “think *with* Bourdieu”(Neveu, 2007, p. 335, emphasis mine) and not to follow strict theoretical rules.

A philosopher-turned-sociologists, Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) was primarily interested in how social reality is the outcome of ongoing struggles over scarce (symbolic) resources and meaning-making (Wacquant, 1992). The son of a postman from rural Southern France, he first studied philosophy in Paris and began to be interested in anthropology while serving his military service in Algeria (Atkinson, 2020). He turned to sociology, studying and publishing on Algerian society under French colonial rule. His theoretical and empirical work draws on Emile Durkheim and Max Weber but also Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gaston Bachelard (Atkinson, 2020; Wacquant, 1992). As such, his thinking aims to bridge structural functionalism and social phenomenology and offers a grand-scheme theory to examine social structures and power relations within a historical and geographic context. He does this through different interrelated concepts, which together form a tool to understand society at large. Compared to other grand-scheme theories (e.g. Habermas’ theory of communicative action, cf. Wacquant, 1993), most of his theorizing is also based upon and backed up by

an extensive empirical foundation (Neveu, 2007). Three key aspects form the foundation of Bourdieusian thought.

First, field theory offers an epistemological and methodological device to analyze society on both structural and individual levels through the interplay of three concepts – social fields, forms of capital, and the habitus of agents –, and remains open enough to consider change (Benson & Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 1977, 1993; P. Thomson, 2014). These three also build the base for Bourdieu’s theory of practice, which understands practice as the sum of a specific field plus the product of a specific habitus and overall volume of capital (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101):

$$practice = field + [(habitus) (capital)]$$

Following this, practice is the interplay of a specific social space such as the cosmos of journalism and embodied sense for this social space that participants have and the material and symbolic resources necessary to join in it. This simplified equation also includes the limitations to the agency and practice of certain agents as those equipped with relevant forms of capital and a habitus that corresponds well with the specific field will have more opportunity and more aspirations for their agency.

Second, field theory is an abstraction of the social world and therefore perceives people and groups as agents. Bourdieu (1990c, p. 50) rejected positivist and empiricist paradigms as well as an overreliance on subjectivist understanding as they, in his view, fail to account for the hidden mechanism shaping the constructions of the world. While he (1993, 1996) often includes and focuses on individuals such as Flaubert in his extensive writings on art, he also stresses that the interest of field-theoretical investigation is not an essentialized individual – or the “empirical individual” (Bourdieu, 1990a) – but the “epistemic individual”. The analytical construct of ‘epistemic individuals’ thus enables us to understand how agents make up specific parts of society, or, in his words, the “objective structures” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 56) through their interaction and relationships.

“they exist as agents – and not as biological individuals, actors, or subjects – who are socially constituted as active and acting in the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects, in this field.”(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107)

And somewhere else (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 24), he adds that field-theoretical inquiry should neither understand individuals as “particles subject to mechanical forces” nor as “conscious and knowing subjects acting with full knowledge of the facts”. Instead, he understands them as agents with a practical sense shaped by the concepts of field, forms

of capital, habitus, and other concepts such as doxa, the tacit understanding of the rules of the field, and *illusio*, an investment in the stakes of the field.

The final key aspect of Bourdieusian thought focuses on the relational: “To think in terms of field is to *think relationally*.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). In this way, positions, memberships in fields, and the distribution of power within society can only be understood fully when considered in relation to other members of the field and their position-taking in its hierarchy. It is thus a theory that benefits from a comparative element. This also includes the researcher and her position within the academic field. Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 2004; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) has continuously stressed that researchers need to consider their position vis-à-vis their object of study as well as within the academic field to critically reflect on academic practices and strategies which are mostly aimed at gaining recognition and not at understanding social reality. Bourdieu explored these strategies to gain peer recognition in his work on the French academic field (Bourdieu, 1990a) and essays on the scientific field and its genesis (Bourdieu, 2004). As a result, sociological reflexivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) is not limited to the mere internal reflection during the research process but an acceptance that academic research can only be a nearing of truth. The research objective, especially in social sciences, will always be viewed from a particular perspective and thus subject to biases or pre-conceptions, even when one has the “intention of abolishing one’s viewpoint” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 6).

This might be even more true when researchers investigate fields they have been part of, as in journalism studies. While Bourdieu rejects an empiricist epistemology, he also argues that purely inductive approaches do not work because of the researcher’s presuppositions (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 6). It would therefore be better to acknowledge these pre-conceptions and break with them by constructing the object of inquiry intentionally. This means thinking of elements of classification beforehand and considering a model built through relations that might be relevant. It also means acknowledging that it is just that, a theory model and not of reality. Bourdieu constantly warned against understanding fields, their struggles, and the other accompanying concepts as existing manifested in reality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 100–103; Hylmö, 2019). The three main concepts of field theory – namely the field itself, the habitus of agents and the forms of capitals agents can accumulate – build the bases for such a construction of the object. Even though they are “tangled together in a Gordian knot” (P. Thomson, 2014, p. 67), this chapter will try and explain these concepts

separately. Doing so will offer a systematization of field theory that forms the basis to explore further the usefulness and application of Bourdieusian thought in journalism studies in the next chapter.

The Concept of Field

The first concept, which also gives the theory its name, is the social field. From this epistemic perspective, we can understand society as comprising various dynamic social spaces or fields organized hierarchically in relation to their corresponding power. Social fields like the fields of economy, cultural production, or education are located within the meta-field of power which outlines the structure of society. While the field of power does not necessarily determine how other fields are organized, it certainly shapes the possibilities in other social fields and vice versa (P. Thomson, 2014). For instance, what happens in the economic field can shape the field of power and other social fields (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 44–53). In some cases, large fields can be divided into sub-fields which are then conceptually embedded in each other like Russian dolls; in a sense, they form a “microcosm set within the macrocosm” of society (Benson, 2006, p. 188). As such, the journalistic field, for example, has been situated within the field of cultural production, which itself is located in the larger field of power.

The organization of fields within the larger field of power, or societal space, is based on the symbolic power these fields have in relation to each other. Symbolic power is based on which resources in a given social space are perceived as valuable and which field can offer them. For instance, in a society in which knowledge is perceived as a valuable resource, fields producing knowledge might be located at the most powerful locations in the social space and influence the logic of other fields. In a social space in which economic growth is valued most, the economic field might be in this position, and so on. All fields compete over having their logic and vision of the social space acknowledged as universal. However, fields differ in their degree of internal struggle and autonomy.

Similar to the struggle between fields, fields themselves are places of classification, in which agents struggle over resources and opportunities (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 18). Even though the concept of field is often depicted as a limited, two-dimensional rectangular, fields should not be considered as such (Vos, 2016) but rather as a multidimensional social space with spatiotemporal settings, boundaries and inner

structures that are constantly negotiated. In Bourdieu's words (1998b, p. 40), a "field is a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and others who are dominated." With this definition, Bourdieu and many who employ field theory for their research compare the concept to a physical field of forces. As such, two opposing poles determine which agents (or particles, when sticking to the metaphor of a physical field) might occupy which position within the field. Indeed, fields are often depicted with forces working against each other. They can thus be conceptualized as horizontally structured by two poles, an economic pole and a cultural or field-specific pole (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 37pp), and vertically by the accumulation of symbolic capital, thereby organizing a space of possible positions for social agents (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30). However, reducing the social field to one of "social physics" oversimplifies and suggests deterministic laws in social behaviour, while a social field is characterized by more nuanced struggles (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). At the same time, Bourdieu also often evokes another metaphorical meaning of the concept, of a field of a game (most often football) with its internal rules, set positions for players and its space of possibilities (a score can only be reached by hitting the goal).

Establishing and maintaining Boundaries: The Nomos of fields

Before discussing the internal mechanisms of fields that structure the game or opposition, I want to first look at what is needed to speak of a field. While the field concept is often explained vis-à-vis the other main concepts, the forms of capital and habitus, it can also be perceived through less commonly used concepts that denominate the emergence of fields and the organization of struggle within them. Fields originate through differentiation from other social arenas by establishing their *nomos*, the fundamental reason for the field (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 96) or a "shared sense of how the field contributes to society and how the field shapes society's own vision of reality" (Eldridge, 2018, p. 112). *Nomos* distinguishes the field from others and legitimizes it as a singular entity; it could therefore also be perceived as the fundamental law of "vision and division" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 223) or belonging and non-belonging (Eldridge, 2018).

Linking this back to fields of knowledge production, or, how Bourdieu refers to them, fields of cultural production, each subfield follows its logic and has its myth (Neveu, 2007). Otherwise, it does not make sense to speak of a separate field. For example, the literary and the journalistic field, in most cases borne out of a field of

scholastic knowledge production, have distinctly different understandings of their purpose or function. In that way, *nomos* also acts as the constituting basis for the fields' boundaries. The *nomos* of a field defines the objective order, the own specific logic of practice, as well as the "mental structures of those who inhabit it" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 61). In fields of cultural production, cultural knowledge is valued. Thus, resources that add to such knowledge, like verbal abilities, academic, literary, or journalistic skills, shape the rules of the field and the aspirations and motivations of actors in it.

However, and because fields are per definition arbitrary (Bourdieu, 2000), *nomos* does not only refer to how the field is seen by its members but also how this specific vision can be discerned from other perceptions or ideas of the field, even from agents who believe to be part of it or who pose as belonging. Here, *nomos* divides the legitimate artists from the illegitimate, the worthy academics from the unworthy, the journalists who do 'good' journalism from those who do 'bad' journalism (Eldridge, 2018, p. 44). For example, in his work on the French field of art, Bourdieu describes how the dominant vision of the field during the nineteenth century was determined by 'pure' artists who only recognized "art for art's sake" and excluded anyone who would not share their understanding of art. Regardless, the *nomos* of a field is not set in stone. Quite the contrary, according to Bourdieu, it is contested and contributes to the internal struggle that comprises the field. Conflicts over *nomos* at the boundaries of the field arise when members with a very narrow perception of the field's constitution deny others membership to the field:

"Each is trying to impose the *boundaries* of the field most favourable to its interest or – which amounts to the same thing – the best definition of conditions of true membership of the field (or of titles conferring the right to the status of writer, artist or scholar) for justifying its existence as it stands" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 223)

Nomos is therefore successfully imposed by the dominating members of a field, yet always contested by the dominated. However, in his later writing Bourdieu (2000, p. 97) also describes *nomos* as confining because once an internal vision has been accepted, members of the field will not be able to take an external view on the field and understand its structure, rules, and stakes as given. Here, *nomos* and *doxa* presuppose each other, as a distinct vision of the field "allows a field to maintain its set of criteria (*doxa*) for belonging internally" (Eldridge, 2018, p. 44). Therefore, it can be argued that as struggle and tensions compose the shape of the field, the borders of fields "are the stake of struggles within the field itself" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 104). In some cases,

when the field is in a state of flux or only emerging, and the boundaries are not settled yet or dissolving, Bourdieu speaks of anomic boundaries – boundaries that cannot convey one dominant vision (Bourdieu, 1993, 1996, p. 132). Thus, the *nomos* of a field evokes the notion of a barrier and boundaries, which is translated into the struggles inside the field.

Internal Struggles

Inside the field, members struggle over meaning and recognition: For this, they compete over positions and resources to achieve these positions as both can shape which resources are perceived, or misrecognized, as most valuable and therefore yield the most power (see below on p. 31), as well as, who can determine which rules are taken-for-granted (see below on p. 21). This struggle, as noted, is characterized by the opposition between the two poles of horizontal stratification and the vertical hierarchy within fields. These two oppositions can also be described as two dichotomies of 1) new versus old, meaning new entrants to the field against established position-takers but also new forms of *nomos* against the old, and 2) by autonomy versus heteronomy, a struggle which “affects the whole structure of the field” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40). The latter refers to the horizontal opposition between the field-specific and the economic pole of a field and defines the degree to which a field is reliant on economic capital and thus the logic of forces from outside the field.

These forces do not need to be economic per se; they could also come from any other fields within the field of power, for example, the political field (Benson & Neveu, 2005). In contrast, for instance, an autonomous field is highly self-sufficient and relies mostly on a special skill, the field-specific capital, or, in other words, by the “extent to which it [the field] manages to impose its own norms and sanctions on the whole set of producers” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40). This ideal-type understanding of fields rarely occurs, as Bourdieu argues (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 144) that the economic field mostly dominates all fields of cultural production in contemporary democracies. Examples for such a horizontal differentiation are the opposition of elite avant-garde and popular forms of literature (Bourdieu, 1993) or between the ‘hard’ sciences and the more ‘soft’ arts in the scientific field (Bourdieu, 2004). The vertical differentiation is between new entrants and the old, established members of the field. For example, one case Bourdieu has described

is the struggle for dominance and position-taking of French writers Baudelaire and Flaubert (Bourdieu, 1996).

This opposition between horizontal and vertical poles creates either dominant or dominated positions depending on their relative weight in the field. For example, in a journalistic field that values critical commentary, those agents who have pursued such journalism and are known for it will occupy relevant – and because they determine what is perceived valuable – dominant positions in newsrooms, journalism schools, and boards of the journalistic profession. As agents occupy these positions, it renders some agents dominant and others dominated in their aim to determine the “legitimate discourse” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36) and the rules of the field. Therefore, the field is simultaneously a space of positions and a space of position-takings, which might or might not overlap and therefore exemplify the struggle. According to Thomson (2014, p. 73), “in a situation of equilibrium in a field, the space of positions tends to command the space of position-takings, that is the field mediates what agents do in specific social, economic and cultural contexts”. The space of possible positions defines which positions can be occupied in a specific social space and is also “generated in the relationship between a habitus and a field” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 100). As such, depending on the amount of specific capitals an individual, group of individuals, or organization can accumulate, and thus how their habitus fits the field (see chapter on habitus, p. 36), they can pursue specific possible positions which can either be dominating or dominated (see chapter on capital, p. 23). In this way, position-taking can also be conceptualized as the agency of groups or agents. They try to occupy and maintain a dominating position in the field as they participate in the constant struggle to either conserve or transform the relational structure of forces that constitute the field. Again, the relational aspect plays a crucial role in this position-taking as each position is

“subjectively defined by the system of distinct properties by which it can be situated relative to other positions; that every position, even the dominant one, depends for its very existence, and for the determinations it imposes on its occupants, on the other positions constituting the field” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 30).

In that sense, position-takings change whenever the space of possible positions changes due to new agents, tension, or shock, even when the objective position itself remains identical.

Within the social constitution of fields, cultural producers like authors, painters, and journalists occupy a position within the dominant sphere of the field of class relations

but a more dominated position within the field of power. Thus, according to Bourdieu (1993, pp. 37–40), producers of cultural products belong to the dominated of the dominating class. In fields of cultural production, the field-specific pole is characterized by high amounts of cultural capital and an objective of “art for art’s sake” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 36). That means that what they produce is perceived as valuable *within* the field, and therefore it is misrecognized as the purest form of art. In that sense, the most important audience for these producers² at the autonomous pole are other cultural producers *within* the field, while for those producers located at the more heteronomous pole, the audience is located *outside* of the field (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 39). Bourdieu thus argues that fields of cultural production, including the field of journalism, are subject to a double hierarchy, where the heteronomous principle favours those who dominate the field economically and politically. The autonomous principle favours those who can achieve the field-specific capital, manifested in awards and field-specific capital. This makes the producers at the heteronomous pole more susceptible to external demands, and according to Bourdieu (1993, p. 41), they need to create ‘weapons’ to defend their position within the field. These weapons, for example, audience ratings, are then used by the dominant agents of the field of power against the cultural producers at the autonomous pole. In the case of audience ratings, the autonomous producers would be pressured to create more for audiences outside of the field.

Therefore, following Bourdieu’s argument, the most autonomous producers’ goal is to exclude the less autonomous producers, as they perceive them as “enemy agents” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 41). As the autonomous producers will try to impose their definition of belonging to the field, Bourdieu emphasizes the social scientist must reflect on this when sampling their research objects. It could be problematic when one only follows the dominant definition, ignoring that there might be other cultural producers who are excluded by dominant agents: “what is at stake is the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer and therefore delimit the population of those entitled to take part in the struggle to define the writer.” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42)

² This does not mean that the work of more autonomous artists or writers can only be consumed and admired by members of the artistic or literary field, but that the validation they earn occurs within the field. In contrast, the validation for more heteronomous artists and writers occurs outside of it. This example might be more evident when thinking of the scientific field since the general public rarely consumes the ‘pure’ science of the autonomous pole but rather the more popularised and thus maybe superficial or abbreviated forms of popular science at the heteronomous pole.

Belief and Aspiration: Doxa and illusio

As a theory that focuses on social relations, field theory assumes that members of a given field share certain dispositions. This also means that members of the field know how to behave, have certain beliefs of what is “true”, and do not question specific circumstances structuring the field. Bourdieu (1977, p. 164) terms these beliefs about the “taken for granted” *doxa*. *Doxa* refers to the unquestioned rules about the social world; they exist and correspond as classifying beliefs in the collective, that is, the objective structure, and individuum, the subjective mental structure. A common example to explain doxa as collective and individual beliefs can be found in classifications of gender. Simply put, a doxic belief that has long been questioned but still exists both in the collective and individuals is that women are “naturally” better at care-work and thus should and want to stay home while men’s “natural” role is that of a breadwinner. The belief (once) dominant in the collective affects the individual who will act accordingly if they accept this divide as natural: “Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127).

It could be argued that doxa is thus the naturalization of the social world; it forms a specific set of implicit and commonly shared rules, contributes to the hierarchical division of the field, and eventually assures the internal homogeneity of the field. What is more, it contributes to the misrecognition of inequalities in the field and, therefore, accepts the unequal opportunities for some as naturally given (P. Thomson, 2014). In that sense, *doxa* reproduces power relations, and dispositions are reproduced by other members of the group and “institutions of collective thought” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167), for example, myths, laws, art.

The *doxa* of a field develops through historical struggle. When fields take shape, their specific point of view (nomos) and the arbitrary rules that protect them transform into naturalized truths. Over time, these rules render so “familiar that one is oblivious” to their random nature (Deer, 2014, p. 120). Moreover, through the process of field-formation and increasing autonomy from other fields, the conditions under which the fields doxa (and with it, its illusio) have formed are forgotten. The more stable the objective, collective structures are, the bigger is the field of doxa; this stability is guaranteed by a quasi-perfect fit of objective and internalized structures so that the “agents’ aspirations have the same limits as the objective conditions of which they are a product” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 165).

However, and this again shows that Bourdieusian conceptualizations are not as deterministic as they might appear on the first read, *doxa* is not invariable. While *doxa* refers to the “universe of the undisputed” collective beliefs, limiting what we can envision (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167), Bourdieu also thought of a universe of discourse or argument, or field of opinion, in which confronting arguments are continuously debated. This universe of discourse is organized by an orthodox and a heterodox pole and only emerges when heterodox or heretic beliefs are voiced, especially in times of political or economic crisis. Coming back to the example of doxic belief above, whether a gender is better at care-work than another, this has long left the universe of the undisputed. It is questioned and disputed and can now be considered an orthodox, if not heterodox, belief. While heterodoxy questions the rules of the game and voices experiences of the repressed, orthodox beliefs stay in line with the field’s *doxa*, defending, maintaining, restoring the “official way of speaking and thinking the world” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169):

“dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of *doxa* and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of *doxa* or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy” (ibid.)

Therefore, the concept *doxa* refers to belief and opinion at the same time. Thus, linking the concept again to the analogy of the field as a game, Bourdieu and others often refer to *doxa* as the rules of the game. According to Benson and Neveu (2005), *doxa* organizes the agency within fields, as agents believe in a particular game and accept its rules as natural and indisputable.

Coupled with *doxa* is the concept of *illusio*, which encapsulates the “belief that the game is worth playing” (Benson & Neveu, 2005, p. 3). By this, Bourdieu means that agents are caught up or invested in their quest to succeed in the struggle within the field without questioning the rules. *Illusio* describes “the fact of attributing importance to a social game, the fact that what happens matters to those who are engaged in it, who are in the game” (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 77). The concept, therefore, also captures the motivation and aspirations of agents and why some agents are more invested than others. Threadgold (2018) has used the concept to distinguish between agents’ motivations and aspirations, as well as different commitments to and awareness of these motivations. He argues that aspirations and motivations are shaped by the position of agents in the social space and the volume of capital they have been able to accumulate. Bourdieu similarly links *illusio* to habitus and field, how a certain investment in a field is shaped by embodied social

history and knowledge of the field (Bourdieu, 1998c) and how specific trajectories are not thought of or pursued because they are not “for the likes of us” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 56).

By using the example of college education, Threadgold (2018) further theorizes that even when students with lower socioeconomic and cultural capital consider a college education, their *illusio*, their belief that the game is worth playing, might differ vastly from students of economically and culturally rich families. Here, he distinguishes between the commitments towards the *illusio*, in short, “how much time, effort and emotion one is willing to spend” (Threadgold, 2018, p. 42), and differences in awareness how to achieve these aspirations through strategizing and networking. Moreover, as soon as agents believe in the game and have invested time and struggle in it, it becomes serious, pulling them “in the general doxic direction” (Threadgold, 2018, p. 40). Similarly, Bourdieu argues that if external pressures are perceived strongly by new entrants to the field, it can modify their *illusio* and make them, for instance, more susceptible to external logic (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 235–239). However, this does not mean that *illusio* equals self-delusion, as *illusio* can be realized and reflected through an ironic awareness. Without *illusio*, says Bourdieu (1990c, p. 82), agents cannot participate in the struggle of the specific field:

“Only for someone who withdraws from the game completely, who totally breaks the spell, the *illusio*, renouncing all the stakes, that is, all the gambles on the future, can the temporal succession be seen as a pure discontinuity and the word appear in the absurdity of a future-less, and therefore senseless, present, like the Surrealists’ staircases opening on to the void. The feel (*sens*) for the game is the sense of the imminent future of the game, the sense of the direction (*sens*) of the history of the game that gives the game its sense.” (Ibid.)

On the other hand, participation within the field is shaped by the accumulation of forms of capital, the second most commonly employed concept of Bourdieu’s toolbox.

Resources: The Forms of Capital

Position-taking is organized by accumulating capital, manifest and latent resources that agents possess by birth or acquire throughout their participation in various fields. In that way, field theory acknowledges the advantage of a privileged birth but also accounts for a possible change of power relations. The forms of capital can be thought of as “both the process in, and product of a field” (P. Thomson, 2014). As a product, the forms of capital are inscribed in the structures of the field; as a process, they shape the organization of society. Or, as Bourdieu (1986, p. 241) writes, “It is a *vis insita*, a force inscribed in

objective or subjective structures, but also a *lex insita*, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world”. More precisely, capital does “*not exist and function except in relation to a field*” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). The different forms of capital determine the power of a field within society and the power relations within the field. Moreover, they define the field’s objective structures and underlying rules through their specific distribution in the field. The respective value and hierarchy of the forms of capital vary in different social fields.

Bourdieu (1977) distinguishes four types of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital, whereas the latter is an accumulation and misrecognition of the other forms and can be translated into a form of power (see Bourdieu, 1977, p. 171pp). As the different forms of capital enable different positions, agents can possess a similar amount of overall capital and still occupy different positions in the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). Capital can exist in objectified, i.e. materialized, and embodied form, i.e. incorporated in the social agent or organizations, and is thus always “accumulated labor” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241).

Moreover, the different forms of capital can be converted into other forms. A common example is an investment of economic capital and time into further education and thus higher amounts of cultural capital, which can be converted back into economic capital in the cases where better education means higher-paying employment. The distribution of the different forms of capital among social agents and social groups characterize the structure of the social world, and it represents the inequality in the social world:

“The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favourable to capital and its reproduction.”
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 245)

Therefore, Bourdieu argues that the structure of the social world can only be thoroughly examined and understood when more than the materialized form of capital, that is, the financial resources agents or groups possess, is taken into account. In this way, he is critical of economic theories that consider classes merely according to their economic wealth or lack thereof and reduce social relations to “mercantile exchange” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 242).

Economic Capital

Regardless of his attempt to include other forms of resources, even in Bourdieusian field theory, economic capital is the dominant form of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). This might in part be due to contemporary society, which at large is capitalist, but Bourdieu (1990b, p. 93) also explains this dominance in part through the “essential instability of symbolic capital”, its opponent as a powerful force in the social space, and in part through the ‘rationality’, ‘predictability’, and ‘calculability’ of economic capital. In other words, the exchange is transparent as it is “always only a means to an end (profit, interest, a wage)” (R. Moore, 2014, p. 100). Economic capital is materialized, objectified capital and exists in either the “liquidity of commercial capital” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 253) or institutionalized in property or real estate.

In a sense, economic capital also represents security, especially when we think about agents of fields of cultural production, who inherited property or financial capital and are thus not reliant on the economic logic of the heteronomous pole but can allow themselves to produce cultural goods just for themselves: “It is once again money (inherited) that guarantees freedom with respect to money” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 84). This again fortifies the dominance of economic capital in fields of cultural production, in which often the most valued products and their producers are disinterested in economic success. Moreover, together with “time-labour” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241), economic capital can be seen as the foundation for further capital acquisition of all other forms. According to Bourdieu, it can be either transformed into cultural or social capital and thus eventually, in combination with these two other forms of capital, into symbolic capital.

In examining the Moroccan Kabyla tribe, Bourdieu (1977) distinguished between archaic, good-faith economies and capitalist, labour-oriented economies. In the archaic economy, labour is not seen as labour but as a natural, God-given duty to take care of one’s land, making passion or obligation the main drive for the pre-capitalist worker. In that sense, material and symbolic goods are exchanged as gifts, requiring every member of the social group to be loyal and caring for the other members (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 174pp). With an increasing awareness of the economy as a work-for-money exchange, labour is recognized as *labour*. This conceptual genesis is especially remarkable when we think about modern-day emotional labour or care labour, work that is not recognized as labour but as a passion or duty. Is that negating the economic character of work for the

individual? And what about symbolic payment, which is working for free in exchange for popularity, attention, awareness?

Fields of cultural production generally exhibit an uneasy relationship with economic capital that Bourdieu calls the “upside-down economic world” (1993, p. 40), which is closely linked to the dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy. The subfield of small-scale production, which is located at the more autonomous pole and produces for an audience with high symbolic and cultural capital, is opposed to commercial success and creates a logic of an “anti-economic economy” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 54), where only symbolic capital is valued as true profits. Symbolic capital can be measured in recognition by other members of the field and consecrating awards of prestige (see below, p. 31). However, as a prerequisite, the cultural producer needs to show complete disinterest in economic success (she only pursues literature because she is passionate about it). Still, these symbolic profits can eventually translate into economic capital, adding to the misrecognition of economic logic. This nevertheless comes with struggle or based on privilege, as only the ones who possess economic capital from somewhere else or deprive themselves might succeed in that upside-down economy (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 40). Therefore, Bourdieu also adds to how we can think of work and labour.

The experience of labour

For most people, economic capital is acquired through labour and therefore invested time. However, economic capital is not the only gain that working people pursue. Bourdieu thinks of labour and the experiences of labour along a spectrum with two extremes, forced and scholastic work (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 202pp). The more agents experience their work on the scholastic part of the spectrum, the more they are invested in their work for another gain than only economic capital. We could, therefore, also think of scholastic work as the work that agents pursue ‘out of passion’, a phrase often used by cultural producers (Duffy, 2017; M. Scott, 2012). Scholastic work then functions as “raison d’être” and contributes to the workers’ identity (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 245). While the term *scholastic* evokes an idea of purely academic work, it could also apply to craftsmanship and manual labour. Bourdieu (2000) argues that the margin of freedom or minimal privileges granted to employees can result in forgetting or ignoring existing constraints and investing themselves more in their work. He is therefore critical of the emancipatory potential of leaving workers the opportunity to organize their work. While it might

increase their well-being, it will also “displace their interest from the external profit of labour (the wage) to the intrinsic profit” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 205).

Regardless, scholastic work is often associated with higher satisfaction with the work and more symbolic profits. Here, the name of profession or occupation grants the worker symbolic capital when pursued as relevant for society. However, as the scholastic work is not simply any work, losing employment can have the effect of “symbolic mutilation” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 202). Job loss is therefore not only financially hard but also affects identity. Similarly, if agents are passionate about their work, they can endure long periods of economic uncertainty. Those who have the power to employ others in permanent positions can exploit this passion and hope. Bourdieu has explored this, for example, in the employment practices in the academic field where aspiring scientists endure long years of underpaid labour in the hope to be suggested for a permanent position (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 89).

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital is the most polysemic form of capital in Bourdieusian writing. In his works, Bourdieu refers to language capital, educational capital, academic capital, scientific capital – which can all be collapsed under the broader term of cultural capital³. What makes it more complicated is that cultural capital also exists in three different manifestations. Here, I will draw on the explicit chapter on the forms of capitals which describes cultural capital⁴ in three forms. a) It can be *embodied* into individuals as “long-lasting dispositions of the mind and the body” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243), i.e. as culture, cultivation, knowledge, practices, behaviour and beliefs. This would include, for instance, knowing how to read, speak a language, use an instrument, and the knowledge of table manners and religious traditions. In that way, the embodied version of cultural capital contributes to someone’s habitus but is also shaped by their habitus (see chapter on habitus, p. 36). Cultural capital can also exist in a manifested mode in b) *objectified* form as cultural goods – books, art, machines, technology – and c) in the *institutionalized* form of educational qualifications, which confirm and legitimize the cultural capital that individuals have acquired through schooling and academic or other further education.

³ And symbolic capital if they have been misrecognized as the field-specific most valued resources.

⁴ In the Chicago Workshop (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119), Bourdieu refers to cultural capital as “informational capital to give the notion its full generality”.

More importantly, this institutionalized form guarantees that others recognize the cultural capital obtained.

Embodied cultural capital is linked directly to the agent that worked to gain it either unconsciously through domestic transmission⁵ or through conscious “self-improvement” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 244), a time- and labour-costly investment. This intensive personal investment requires motivation, sacrifice, and risk-taking, especially since converting existing latent embodied cultural capital into economic capital cannot be guaranteed (cf. Bourdieu, 1986, p. 251). In this regard, time plays an important role, as it mediates the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital⁶, for example, this includes the time a person has to study and the resources her family can provide her this free time. This “external wealth converted into an integral part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 245). This leads to the paradox that people with a specific embodied cultural capital can be exploited if their expertise is needed by agents that hold large amounts of economic capital but only low amounts of cultural capital. Regardless of its complex diffusion, embodied cultural capital can be inherited like any other form of cultural capital. Hereditary embodied cultural capital is “disguised, or even invisible” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 244) because it is acquired through everyday exposure to specific forms of practice, knowledge and cultural capital in objectified form. According to Bourdieu, it can, in that regard, be perceived as symbolic capital. That means, because of its ‘natural’ existence, hereditary embodied cultural capital has a legitimizing authority, a form of power, and its function as cultural capital is being denied. Therefore, Bourdieu argues, this hidden transmission of capital is the “most powerful principle of symbolic efficacy of cultural capital” (1986, p. 245).

In objectified form, cultural capital is materialized as cultural goods, such as books, paintings, instruments, but also technology, machines, and scientific knowledge, and can be passed on to others similar to economic capital. However, in its materiality, it is always connected to embodied cultural capital, not only because it originates from it, but also because embodied cultural capital is needed to allocate, translate and use it: “Cultural goods can be appropriated both materially – which presupposes economic

⁵ This early unconscious acquisition leaves obvious or secret marks; for example, when thinking about language, a certain way of pronunciation or dialect can link an individual’s membership with a specific class or region (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 244).

⁶ To make it more complicated, economic capital is the prerequisite for time (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 251), which might explain the importance of economic capital for success in modern society.

capital – and symbolically – which presupposes cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246). To simplify, to own a car, book or instrument, one only needs to exchange it for money (economic capital), but to use it, one has to learn the skill of driving, reading or playing (cultural capital); the same holds for paintings, even though the skill of appropriation here is arguably more invisible. Objectified cultural capital may appear as an

“autonomous, coherent universe which, although the product of historical action, has its own laws transcending individual wills, and which, as the example of language well illustrates, therefore remains irreducible to that which each agent, or even the aggregate of the agents, can appropriate” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246)

However, this only applies as long as the cultural good is being allocated, executed and used as a “weapon and a stake in the struggle” in the fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246). According to Bourdieu, the creators and producers of cultural goods (including services) can be qualified as dominated if they use their embodied cultural capital to produce something that is then exchanged for economic capital. In contrast, the dominating groups own the means of production and “draw their profits from the use of a particular form of capital” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246).

“Everything suggests that as the cultural capital incorporated in the means of production increases (...), so the collective strength of the holders of cultural capital would tend to increase – if the holders of the dominant type of capital (economic capital) were not able to set the holders of cultural capital in competition with each other.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246)

Cultural capital increasingly needs validation through the educational system, which according to Bourdieu, is grounded in the continuous growth of cultural capital both embodied and objectified in families. Thus institutionalized cultural capital divides the profession from autodidacts, separates the legitimized knowledge from invisible, disputed forms of appropriation; the “recognized, guaranteed competence and simple cultural capital, which is constantly required to prove itself” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247). In that regard, it makes sense that cultural fields with permeable boundaries and many autodidacts increasingly try to establish professionalism, including academic certificates and other further education as criteria for membership.

Moreover, institutionalized cultural capital counters an expressed problem of embodied cultural capital: “the biological limits of its bearer” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246). Through the “collective magic” that is the educational system and its schemes of grading and evaluation of excellence, the embodied knowledge takes the form of qualifications or certificates and is liberated of its possessor: “social alchemy produces a form of cultural

capital which has a relative autonomy vis-à-vis its bearer and even vis-à-vis the cultural capital he effectively possesses at a given moment in time” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 246). This also makes it easier to make individuals comparable and exchangeable.

At the same time, institutionalized cultural capital establishes “conversion rates” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247) between cultural and economic capital – having completed a bachelor’s, master’s or doctoral program can, for instance, result in differences in starting salaries. However, the options to gain objectified cultural capital rely heavily on the cultural capital embodied in an individual’s family and their resources: “The direct transmission of economic capital remains one of the principal means of reproduction, and the effect of social capital (‘a helping hand’, ‘string-pulling’, the ‘old boy network’) tends to correct the effect of academic sanctions” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 255).

Social Capital

The third form of capital is manifested in the forms of group membership that an agent can build and the relations a group is able to establish and maintain: Social capital. It is defined by who you know and by whom you are known; it is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247). These relationships can either exist only in practical or pragmatic form, which means one relies on material or symbolic exchanges, or they are “guaranteed by the application of a common name” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247). This common name can relate to a family, a nation, tribe, school, guild and is constantly reinforced through institutionalized acts of membership and “durable obligations” and solidarity (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). In this way, proximity and homogeneity are acknowledged.

The amount of social capital an agent can gather depends on herself and on the agents in her networks: First, her social capital is formed by the size of her social network and the number of connections she can make with other agents and organizations. However, if those connections possess only little volumes of economic, symbolic, and cultural capital, her social capital will not be high. Only if she manages to connect with agents and groups with high volumes of other capital will her social capital be of a valuable size. Thus, social capital is never independent of the other forms of capital, as the exchanges of connecting with each other presume that agents acknowledge their homogeneity. Only then has social capital a multiplier effect on other forms of capital.

Social networks are, in this sense, products of individual or collective interest and pursue to establish or reproduce social relations. Social capital is therefore also crucial when it comes to boundary-making and (re)-establishing of boundaries: “Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of the group membership which it implies, re-produces the group” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248).

Social capital needs maintenance. It is consciously or unconsciously reproduced through symbolic exchanges at occasions, places and through practices that legitimize the specific position within the field and the value of social capital. For instance, not all social capital can be maintained at cruises or receptions; selecting specific schools or clubs determines specific values of social capital; cultural ceremonies will differ across the field of power. Essentially, maintaining social capital is hard work; it requires time and energy: “The reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). Naturally, the greater and better established social relations are, the easier it is to get new social capital, which means the more people know you, the easier it is that others also want to know you. Social capital might be especially relevant for new entrants to fields of cultural production, more so for those who do not possess high amounts of economic capital and thus cannot take time to accumulate symbolic capital and be recognized by others.

Symbolic Capital

Finally, symbolic capital is often used short-hand for renown and recognition. However, this form of capital is much more complicated as it captures the valorization of specific resources and properties and its contribution to power and domination in society. Symbolic capital makes up the resources perceived as important within the social space or a specific field. It legitimizes which other forms of capital are worthy to accumulate and as such exists on a different level than economic, cultural, and social capital as it translates directly into a form of power. Thus this concept is an attempt to capture the resources that shape symbolic power, and, according to Wacquant (in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119, fn 73), Bourdieu’s ultimate quest was to decipher the complexity of symbolic capital: “his whole work might be read as a hunt for its varied forms and effects”. While the accumulation of economic, cultural, and social capital all shape the

stratification of the field as a whole, symbolic capital is the recognition and validation of the possession and distribution of capital.

While education, financial security, and being part of a social group could all be perceived as valuable sources to participate in a field's struggle, none of the forms of capital is inherently good or bad. This is even more true for symbolic capital, as the properties and resources specifically valued in a specific field are arbitrary. The overall structure of positions within the field and the distribution of resources, knowledge, skills, or patterns of behaviour contribute to which forms of capital can be valorized and legitimized as symbolic. Members of the field internalize such categories of distinction through their socialization, or inculcation, in the field and therefore know and recognize it (Bourdieu, 1991). This embodiment of the field's structure describes the circularity of classification (Bourdieu, 1998c): social agents distinguish themselves through schemes to classify the world they live in or the objective structures in which they exist, while these structures also classify them. By doing so, agents reproduce and consecrate schemes or categories of perception and distinction (Bourdieu, 1984).

Therefore, to be more precise, Bourdieu argues we should talk of misrecognition rather than recognition when talking of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 111pp). Elsewhere, Bourdieu (1990c, p. 138) has also referred to symbolic capital as distinction, as the distribution of social recognition mirroring social stratification, whereby what is statistically more prevailing is perceived as "common" and therefore as less valuable. In essence, as with all other forms of capitals, the difference brings the advantage. But with regards to symbolic capital and therefore social recognition, it is not only reliant on the arbitrary categories of perception that grant value to one property and not the other, but also on the objective distribution of positions within the field which have historically grown out of these categories (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 238). This is to say, social actors observe and evaluate the behaviour of others, their personal properties and possessions, through these categories of perception, which they have internalized through their socialization within the field.

Moreover, the concept of symbolic capital is useful to examine social change – or rather the stability within fields and the social space even though individual actors and groups continuously participate in the struggle to alter society to their liking. The accumulation and possession of symbolic capital are also misrecognized in fields as natural, and those that possess high volumes of valorized properties are perceived as naturally important (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). This has led Bourdieu to

compare symbolic capital with Weber's conceptualization of charisma, however, as he remarks, without the trappings of realist typologies (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 141). As such, symbolic capital is essential for the formation of social groups, it distinguishes the dominant in a group from the dominated. Members of fields or groups "possess power in proportion to their symbolic capital, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they receive" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 106). In his early work on the rural Kabyle in Algeria (Bourdieu, 1977), Bourdieu dissects how symbolic capital is the foundation of all interactions as it converts the unavoidable, such as work and group membership, into chosen "relations of reciprocity" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 171). He later refined his early analysis to explore how symbolic capital in the social space is inherited, most visible through the inheritance of titles and family relations but also through demeanour (Bourdieu, 1990c, pp. 138–140) which reproduces a dominance of some, both in the struggle over resources as well as in the judgement of their value. Not all evaluations are equally important, and the preferences and judgements of the dominant group in a field have more weight, as groups and actors in general aspire and compare themselves to groups or actors in their immediate proximity.

As symbolic capital comprises resources that are perceived as important *within* the field, it is, therefore, field-specific, and it could also be understood as legitimization and pillar of the field's nomos:

"In the struggle for the imposition of the legitimates vision of the social word, (...) agents wield a power which is proportional to their symbolic capital, that is, to the recognition they receive from a group" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 238)

Therefore, bearers of the largest amount of symbolic capital would be the ones "best placed to change the vision by changing the categories of perception" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 239). However, as they occupy the dominant and powerful positions in the field, they are the "least inclined" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 239) to transform the field's nomos and objective structure of positions. As such, symbolic capital is directly linked to what Bourdieu calls symbolic power and symbolic violence. Bourdieu has referred to symbolic power as the "power to receive recognition of power" (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 131). And whereas symbolic power refers to the power to create belief, to define value within the field and shape and maintain its nomos, doxa, and illusio – that is the power to draw the boundaries, set the rules of the game and defines what is at stake –, symbolic violence refers to the process in which the dominated accept the field's symbolic capital, nomos, doxa, and illusio as natural even when they reproduce inequalities (Bourdieu, 1991,

chapter 7). Therefore, while all forms of capital represent valuable assets in the overall struggle within the field, it is the struggle over valorizing the resources one possesses and keeping them valuable that drives participation within the field. This has been an origin of criticism by other scholars (cf. R. Jenkins, 1992, pp. 113–115), as this conceptualization of symbolic capital and power reads reductive and deterministic, especially in his early work on the Kabyle (Bourdieu, 1977). It should therefore be added here that Bourdieu has (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 112) answered to such criticism and resumes that this recognition of symbolic capital and thus acceptance of symbolic power or symbolic violence is not an active, conscious acceptance but more of a subconscious awareness:

“It must be asserted at the same time that a capital (or power) becomes symbolic capital, that is, capital endowed with a specifically symbolic efficacy, only when it is misrecognized in its arbitrary truth as capital and recognized as legitimate and, on the other hand, that this act of (false) knowledge and recognition is an act of practical knowledge which in no way implies that the object known and recognized be posited as object.” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 112)

As symbolic capital is reliant on the misrecognition of specific possessions by others, the concept emphasizes the relational character of field theory. Only through the recognition of others are the resources that some possess valorized, as is the symbolic power of some legitimized (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170). However, not all social recognition is equally valuable as the dominant agents in a field also have more weight in imposing what should be perceived as worthy (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 139). In *Pascalian Meditations* (2000, pp. 240–242), Bourdieu contemplates how symbolic capital is linked to the human need to have a reason for being, as social recognition could be argued to be an essential aspect of being human. Accordingly, human beings would want to justify their existence and being recognized by others would validate this need (Bourdieu, 1991). In this context, he refers to symbolic capital as “social importance and reasons for living” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 241), and in its absence, it can also rid agents of being perceived as valuable to society.

“All the manifestations of social recognition which make up symbolic capital, all the forms of perceived being which make up a social being that is known, ‘visible’, famous, admired, invited, loved, etc. are so any manifestations of the grace (charisma) which saves those it touches from the distress of an existence without justification and which gives them not only a ‘theodicy of their own privilege’, as Max Weber said of religion – which is in itself not negligible – but also a theodicy of their existence” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 241).

As it is a precursor to power and domination, symbolic capital is the most unequally distributed and, as such, creates a “hierarchy of worth and unworthiness” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 241) within any field and in the social space. In his late critical, activist work on precarity and neoliberal transformation of society (Bourdieu, 1998a, 1999, 2000), Bourdieu describes how agents who possess only low or negative symbolic capital occupy the lowest and most dominated parts in the social space. They can be found in working-class suburbs and poor migrant communities; their cultural capital is either non-existent or not valued, they sustain their lives through precarious jobs or social welfare (Bourdieu, 1999, 2000). Those with negative symbolic capital are perceived the outcast within the field, they are not recognized as equals, and in some cases, humans – think, for example, about debates on migrants or homeless people, which talk about them instead of with them and frame them as object rather than subject. Moreover, low volumes of capital, symbolic capital specifically, makes them more susceptible to accept what is as given (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 139).

Change can especially be observed in the shift of what is perceived important within fields to receive recognition. For instance, as a resource or property increases inflationary, it loses its power to distinguish actors, and thus those most dominant will adapt their perception of importance. For example, in a society which favours academic education, an increase of diploma holders might contribute to such a shift: An ordinary degree will not add much to someone’s symbolic capital, but an excellent degree, a degree from a competitive and well-known institution, or a tertiary degree might. This begs the question, what are examples of symbolic capital? Bourdieu himself has clarified that instead of talking about symbolic capital, we should refer to the “symbolic effects” of other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 242). Therefore, any resource, property or behaviour that is aspired within a field and contributes to a group’s or actor’s renown and recognition can act as symbolic capital.

Most of these resources are based in forms of cultural capital, starting with embodied knowledge of dress, demeanour and proper language (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 85), but also institutionalized forms of cultural capital as titles achieved through education: “The professional or academic title is sort of legal rule of social perception, a being-perceived that is guaranteed as a right” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 241). In general, as symbolic capital is linked to a field’s nomos, each field favours different resources, which are then misrecognized, legitimized and made visible through awards and renown. Therefore, symbolic capital is often operationalized as awards, titles and positions of honour or fame

– without necessarily dissecting the underlying resources that comprise a group’s or agent’s reputation. In his early work on Kabyle society (1977), Bourdieu conceptualized economic capital as the opposite of symbolic capital. This has led scholars (R. Jenkins, 1982, 1992) to criticize his theoretical framework as economist because every struggle for symbolic capital would only be read as interested, rational practice. Moreover, such a reading would prevent economic capital from having symbolic effects, but in societies that perceive economic wealth as a value itself and rich agents as inherently important, large amounts of economic capital do indeed have symbolic effects (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 4).

Lastly, symbolic capital can be garnered through recognition in a specific field and the broader field of power or the social space – and in some cases, general fame or reputation might not be beneficial to someone’s field-specific renown. Bourdieu has talked at length (1993, 1998b, 2004) about reputation mediated through the mass media and how only those actors who are limited in their capabilities to reach symbolic capital within their specific field (art, science, literature) turn to renown mediated through mass media as amplification. I will return to this understanding of journalists as having the power over symbolic capital in the next chapter on the journalistic field. As the concept of symbolic capital refers to the ability to know and recognize what is perceived as valuable in a field, in essence, the embodied knowledge of categories of perception, it is also directly linked to the third larger concept in Bourdieusian thought, habitus and practical sense, the awareness of what is right and appropriate to do in a field (Bourdieu, 1977).

Objectified agency and embodied structure: the Concept of Habitus

The final concept is the habitus, the “theoretical bridge” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 120) between the agency and social structure. One driver of Bourdieu’s work was his quest to break epistemological binaries and overcome the divide between objectivist sociologists, especially structural functionalists and the subjectivism of symbolic interactionism (Bourdieu, 1990b, 1990c). For instance, when thinking about creative innovation, Bourdieu neither believed in the innate genius of a single agent nor in social

structures governing and determining all action (Bourdieu, 1990c, 1996)⁷. Therefore, with the concept of habitus, he wanted to explain peoples' behaviour, both in their practice and in their perception and evaluation of situations, by combining their dispositions and personal history with the structuring qualities of society. He draws on a large body of work of sociologists and philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whom all devised some form of habitus but refines it to marry structure and individuum together (Bourdieu, 1990b, pp. 15–16).

In short, habitus can be understood as a system of an individual's internalized beliefs and dispositions, their "embodied social knowledge" (Sterne, 2003, p. 375). It defines the behaviour, beliefs, and preferences but also the practice of an individual. The formation of habitus is identical to the accumulation of cultural capital (R. Moore, 2014). Both are acquired through socialization and the acquisitions of other capital; through social background, family, education and experience. As such, habitus encapsulates the assumption that individuals with similar backgrounds share similar dispositions.

Moreover, the concept captures the past and future at the same time. On the one hand, it includes the past of a person's position within a field. On the other, it can be thought of as a horizon of possibilities and thus structure her future trajectory. Therefore, habitus is tightly connected with the concept of the field – either as the social space or a specific field – as people will gain the schemes of perception, classification, appreciation or practice necessary to compete within the field through their participation in it. As such, the habitus-as-history encapsulates all the resources a person could earn and relies on volumes of capital and the objective structures of the field. At the same time, as habitus-as-future, it contributes to said objective structures as agents within the field anticipate specific positions within it and act accordingly (Bourdieu, 1977, 1996). Even though the concept of habitus is certainly not static and will adapt throughout an individual's life – as "accumulated history" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241) –, the early experiences and practices will be the most dominant in a person's habitus, as they shape experiences and practices that follow (Benson & Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 1990b).

Moreover, as early experiences and practices are influenced by an agent's volume of accumulated capital, essentially their social class, habitus can be perceived as a social structure, defining the reproduction of class relations and position-taking and perpetuating

⁷ Bourdieu even goes so far as to say that "a gift is nothing other than the feel for the game socially constituted by early immersion in the game, that class racism turns into a nature, a natural property unequally allocated by nature and thereby legitimated" (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 108).

the legitimacy and value of certain resources and relations between agents. Thomson (2014, p. 73) explains habitus as “a dialectic through which specific practices produce and reproduce the social world that at the same time is making them”. Simply put, habitus produces practices that tend to reproduce the objective structures that make up the habitus. In a sense, a person’s habitus is formed by the structure in which she is born, for instance, the societal field, or which she entered, for example, the journalistic field, and then she reproduces this same structure through the schemes of perception, including prejudices and biases, and patterns of behaviour that she has collected in her habitus, continuously adding to it. Because these shared dispositions inform practices, they come to be increasingly systematic, transcending the individual. This (re-)production of common-sense adds to the unity, regularity, and harmony of a social group or field, as it provides homogeneity: “The homogeneity of habitus is what (...) causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 80).

Here, the fit between habitus and field is once more decisive. The “system of dispositions” which make up habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 214) can also be perceived as a practical sense, a “social sensitivity” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 20) when participating in a field. Through ongoing experiences, habitus, or the set of dispositions are continuously shaped and thus build a sense of the “possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions, inscribed in the objective conditions” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 54). Here, habitus is again linked to *illusio* and aspirations which are followed or not even considered, as a habitus perfectly fit for a field will easily be immersed in the stakes of the field and participate in it while for a person with a habitus is less suitable this might take much more investment. Or, in Bourdieu’s words: “And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted.” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127).

Thus the practical sense is also a “sense of investment” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 68), which affects how agents sense the opportunities within the field and to what positions they aspire. In his work on the literary field, Bourdieu, for example, traces how those agents “richest in economic, cultural and social capital are the first to move into the new positions” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 68) while those agents with a less perfectly aligned practical sense aspire to the dominant positions, without realizing that these are slowly declining in symbolic value. In *Field of Cultural Production*, Bourdieu shows how

growing up in rural areas in highly centralized France can contribute to such a less aligned practical sense.

Bourdieu has often been criticized for the determinism in his concept of habitus, as it seemingly just sediments social power relations (R. Jenkins, 1992, chapter 4) and does not overcome the divide between individual and structure (King, 2000) and appears to put the agent within the limits of their social origin and neglects aspects of free will. And indeed, the concept of habitus does argue against an idea of complete and conscious free will. When reading Bourdieu's exploration of the transformation of the French field of literature in the late nineteenth century (Bourdieu, 1993, 1996), it does certainly feel deterministic that the rural, lower-class poets were doomed to turn away from the more recognized forms of literature and return to their origins, neither fitting here nor there. One could even argue that Bourdieu's use of "disposition" to explain the primary essence of habitus could enhance the determinism of the concept, as agents are disposed to, that is, inclined to a certain type of behaviour and from that perspective seem challenging to change.

However, these accounts that read so profoundly deterministic are also examples to exemplify the symbolic violence that those with high volumes of capital can wield, and social structures of inequality are reproduced. Initially, Bourdieu conceptualized it to overcome the pragmatic theory of rational choice and examine "practice in its humblest forms – rituals, matrimonial choices, the mundane economic conduct of everyday life" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 121). At the same time, Bourdieu also stresses that habitus or the practical sense is not static. It is constantly evolving and allows for spontaneous change:

"This infinite yet strictly limited generative capacity is difficult to understand only so. Long as one remains locked in the usual antinomies – which the concept of the habitus aims to transcend – of determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity, consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society. Because the habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning." (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 55)

Moreover, in *Pascalian Meditations* (2000, p. 234), Bourdieu adds that it "would be wrong to conclude that the circle of expectations and chances cannot be broken". He argues that a mismatch between positions can lead to "tensions and frustrations" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 234). This tension might result in agents being more susceptible to

the influences of other fields but could also contribute to social change. Similarly, Park (2009) explicitly sees the benefit of including habitus into any analysis of media production, as ruptures in social fields enable habitus to change tremendously and require it to adapt quickly to the new setting, as such, habitus could also be perceived as the starting point for resistance. However, in Park's eyes, the main problem of the concept is that it is not easily operationalized, and thus it is difficult to measure it directly. Park (2009, p. 12) goes so far as to attest it being a provocation from Bourdieu: "Even more frustratingly, the concept of habitus invites a kind of reflexivity that challenges the very idea of a neutral standpoint from which to understand the workings of any particular practical sense of the world." Bourdieu's work in critical ethnography on the Kabyle, for instance, shows the nuances needed to study habitus. However, he has also employed survey research, especially concerning social class, where he interpreted data relationally to "construct the field of possibilities in which social actors lived." (Park, 2009, p. 12).

Whereas Bourdieusian thought is therefore not without its flaws, the benefit of field theory is its openness and adaptability. Depending on "which" Bourdieu one reads, his concepts might appear more or less deterministic (Threadgold, 2018), which can also be perceived as a testimony for its adaptability. It is not a theory that offers universal and strict laws, but it helps to embed thinking about social phenomena and social relations into a more extensive theory of different concepts that can be adapted to the specific context. As such, we can employ his "toolbox" (Neveu, 2007, p. 340) for our purposes to consider "new" aspects, for instance, digital technology.

Understanding ICTs through a Bourdieusian lens

While Internet and Communication Technologies (ICTs) already emerged during Bourdieu's lifetime, he never really considered them in his works, leaving space to adapt his concepts to these forms of technology. Digital technology as a construct that permeates our everyday lives can be viewed through the three main concepts of field theory. It can be considered a field, a form of capital and a habitus, emphasizing other aspects of what we understand under the term digital technology or ICTs.

When considering digital technology as an external force that influences position-taking within the field, we must consider it a technological field within the broader field of cultural production. Here, the cultural product is the technology, the algorithm, the

social platform developed under a specific logic and nomos (Wu et al., 2019b). Like the journalistic field, the technological field offers something to other fields and might act as an intermediary – the technology to publish online, to reach audiences on their platforms. This also disrupts existing power relations. Google News as a news aggregator providing journalistic content while not producing it, yet profiting from advertising revenues, can be seen as such a disruption to the journalistic field, as can Facebook and other social media platforms. Perceiving technology as a technological field thus emphasizes the diverging nomos, doxa, and *illusio* compared to other social fields, such as the journalistic field. Such a perspective can be useful when exploring the intersection between fields and how power relations are negotiated and affect internal struggles differently.

However, as the products of the technological field transcend it and are implemented into the broader social space or specific social fields, they shape and influence practice. In that sense, technology has been conceptualized as a form of cultural capital (Romele, 2021) and, eventually, as embodied cultural capital and therefore accumulated history, as *habitus*. Romele (2021) conceptualizes technology as three states of technological capital, following Bourdieu's (1986) conceptualization of cultural capital. As such, he captures the artefact and its affordances, such as accessibility. As objectified technological capital, technologies are materialized as objects that can be owned and used and are designed for specific needs and purposes. Objectified technological capital would thus include the phone that we pick up in the morning or the program to write emails or enter the web.

According to Romele (2021), institutionalized technological capital describes the degree of institutionalized access some agents have to use technologies in a specific way compared to other agents. Embodied technological capital eventually describes how agents perceive, understand, and use technology (Romele, 2021). This knowledge and the schemes of perception are then accumulated into an agent's history with technology use, and as such, embodied technological capital contributes to their *habitus*. In an increasingly technologically mediated social world, technological capital affords agents to succeed more effortlessly in the social space. Romele argues, in contemporary society, technological capital is a valuable source with symbolic effects: "This means that technologies are embedded into symbolic dynamics of recognition, authority, discrimination, and exclusion and hence cannot be reduced to their empirical dimensions" (Romele, 2021 n.p.).

Similarly, Sterne (2003, p. 373) proposes a conceptualization of technology-as-habitus. He does not limit his conceptualization to digital technology but perceives any form of technology as a social artefact materialized through social practice, essentially being part of the habitus. He also emphasizes the element of spontaneity as an essential value of habitus as a methodological tool to examine change, especially technological change. As the role of technology is co-created by its makers and users, it is not a ‘thing’ but has a social role. The social environment transforms what common sense perceives as technology into different things, like, for example, a vinyl player that poorer (non-white) users have transformed into a new form of producing music (turn-tables). In that way, technology is made or produced through practice. An object transforms into technology through how users employ it. Following this, technologies perceived through the concept of habitus are then also symbols of power, such as radios that were only conceptualized as technology sending in one direction and only allowed to send broadly with the government’s approval. Moreover, technologies are always within the social struggle. Habitus helps us to understand first the social aspect of technology. Only then can we grasp the technological dimension, as habitus is always social and political, “grounded in specific context” (Sterne, 2003, p. 383). Technological habitus can then also be thought of as the “interface (the schema) between the visible and the invisible, the material, and the symbolic dimensions of the sociotechnical reality” (Romele, 2021 n.p.).

Based on this overview of Bourdieusian thought in general, the next chapter will discuss how the triad of field, forms of capital and habitus have been employed in journalism studies to understand journalistic practice, symbolic meaning-making, boundary work, and the changing nature of the journalistic field.

Chapter 2: Field Theory in Journalism Studies

While Bourdieu has examined various social fields, from the economic and political fields, and a composition of both, the field of power, to the educational, intellectual, and various cultural fields (literary, artistic, scientific and religious), his investigation of cultural production through mass media and above all journalism remains limited. He has considered the journalistic field through art critics as intermediaries in his analyses of other fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1993, 1996). Moreover, he has explored how agents in the academic field aim to garner symbolic capital through their involvement in journalism (Bourdieu, 1990a, 2004). Regardless, Bourdieu never examined journalism explicitly empirically.

While many of his French colleagues have especially explored the economic and political dimensions of the journalistic field (Bourdieu, 1994), Bourdieusian thought mainly entered journalism research through his book *On Television* (Bourdieu, 1998b). Since then, field theory and Bourdieusian thought have experienced substantial popularity in international journalism research (Vos et al., 2012). In a systematic analysis of Bourdieusian thought in journalism studies published in English peer-reviewed journals, we could show that field theory have been enthusiastically adapted and adopted to journalism research, especially in the past decade (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). Especially the concepts of field and forms of capital are used to think of journalism as a field, practice, and how we make sense of journalistic meaning-making (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). Journalism research primarily draws on his writings on journalism (Bourdieu, 1998b, 2005), and less consideration is given to his other work on fields of knowledge production, such as the academic field.

Nevertheless, international journalism research has developed a plethora of valuable adaptations, for instance, to understand the stratification of the journalistic field and journalists' role perceptions, journalistic routines, and norms, as well as what resources are necessary to participate successfully in the field. Moreover, field theory has been linked to the concept of boundaries (Gieryn, 1983; Lamont & Molnár, 2002) to study disruptions to the field mainly induced through technological change and economic pressure. Combining field theory with the boundary concept is thus ideal for investigating more marginalized and aspiring actors in the field. The following chapter will first give an overview of how Bourdieu himself conceptualized the journalistic field, followed by a

review of how Bourdieusian thought, especially the concepts explicated in the previous chapter, has been applied to journalism research to build a theoretical framework.

Bourdieu's view on journalism

Originally a televised public lecture, *On Television* is more a critical, if not polemic, essay on the state of French journalism and the dangerous influence of television on “the various areas of cultural production” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 10). Bourdieu (2005, p. 42) sees the crisis of journalism directly linked to the rise of television and the subsequent increase of audience research creating and reinforcing economic pressures and diminishing the autonomy of the journalistic field. This perception might be primarily rooted in the French media system, in which commercial media organizations are owned mainly by corporations or investors foreign to cultural production (Powers & Vera Zambrano, 2016; P. Thomson, 2014). Nevertheless, Bourdieu also perceived the journalistic field generally as the controlling gatekeeper of access to the public space: it has the “de facto monopoly on the large-scale information instruments of production and diffusion of production” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 46). He argues that both citizens and cultural producers are at the mercy of the journalistic field; they are dependent on journalists as mediators, connecting different societal fields with the public space. They are thus subject to the logic of mass media, which according to Bourdieu, underlie economic parameters and attention-seeking characteristics (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 50–55).⁸

However, this perception has long been challenged by technological change, where anyone with access to the internet has presumably an equal chance of being heard in public discourse. For example, politicians have long realized the potential of direct communication to their citizens (Engesser et al., 2017). How would Bourdieu have incorporated these technologies and social actors who emerge from blogs, social media, and other participatory forms in his analyses of cultural production? In his writing on literature and intellectual work, Bourdieu positions non-professionals outside of the field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 213). This perspective might make sense when considering that members of the fields discursively draw the boundaries of who belongs

⁸ One aspect in this regard, which seems to aggravate him, is that the journalistic field often favours the dominated agents of other cultural fields, who did not have the persistence or endurance to acquire recognition through work in their field but take the “easy route” by gaining recognition through mainstream media (1998).

and who does not (Carlson & Lewis, 2015; Gieryn, 1983). However, positioning them outside does not acknowledge the disruptive potential that Bourdieu (1996) grants new entrants to cultural fields.

Some scholars perceive his work on journalism as polemic (Couldry, 2007; Hesmondhalgh, 2006), and lacking in “empirical precision” (Hovden, 2012, p. 71). However, as discussed in chapter one, he offers some theoretical and methodological tools that can be useful to understand journalism practice. When aiming to understand journalistic products and the symbolic power of journalism, he emphasizes the importance to look at the relational position of a particular news medium in the field of journalism and subsequently the positions journalists occupy within “the space occupied by their respective newspaper or network” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 40). Moreover, he stresses factors that contribute to the autonomy of the journalistic field, aspects that might never have been as relevant as today, where the previously institutionalized separation of editorial and advertorial media work is increasingly blurring. The autonomy of the journalistic field is mostly challenged through economic pressure; even political influence is mediated through economic pressure, says Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 69), as the political field (in France) holds the monopoly over information and uses journalism for self-promotion (Marlière, 1998).

Bourdieu (1998b, p. 69) defines seven dimensions of examining autonomy of media organizations or journalistic agents: on the mezzo-level of specific news media, amount and quality of income (advertisers and state subsidies), as well as the degree of concentration of advertisers, influence the degree of heteronomy. Journalistic actors, according to Bourdieu, are first and foremost interested in elevating their position vis-à-vis intellectuals or politicians. On the micro-level, the concentration of press ownership, the position occupied by the news medium in relation to others, personal position within the news medium (status, reputation, beat), salary, and personal freedom for autonomous production influence the degree to which journalists are constrained by economic influence:

“There are small fry, newcomers, subversives, pains-in-the-neck who struggle desperately to add some small difference to this enormous, homogenous mishmash imposed by the (vicious) circle of information circulating in a circle between people who – and this you can’t forget – are all subject to audience ratings. Even network executives are ultimately slaves to the ratings.” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 26)

Bourdieu (1998b, p. 71) translates the two opposing poles of cultural and economic capital to peer recognition, where internal values determine whether someone is

recognized as a 'good' journalist (cultural capital), and public recognition, where audience numbers and ratings (economic capital) are crucial.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu never defined what exactly constitutes journalism, what makes up the *nomos* of the journalistic field, and his writing lacks in-depth analysis of the various types of journalism (Marlière, 1998). Even though his contribution to thinking of the journalistic field as overlapping with other societal fields is helpful, Bourdieu said little about mainstream journalism and did not implement these conceptualizations into empirical research to explore the specific modes of production. According to Hesmondalgh (2006), Bourdieu's case studies on literature and art have looked chiefly at small scale production, where symbolic capital is more easily observed, and the analytical dimensions of which cannot be easily transferred onto a field of mass-scale production. Hesmondalgh also argues that Bourdieu and his colleagues Champagne and Marchetti mainly focused on autonomous and prestigious journalism, neglecting the complexity of large-scale production: "Large-scale production might be more differentiated than Bourdieu's work suggests, and the relations of heteronomy and autonomy might sometimes be more fluid and complex than he implies" (Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p. 221).

Regardless, many early adaptors of field theory to journalism research see its apparent benefits. Benson (1999, p. 467), for example, argues that a field-theoretical perspective can explain how and what stories are selected and produced as a result of the "convergence of 'disposition' (habitus) and 'position' (structural location within the field)". Compared to other approaches to understand media production, such as political economy, cultural studies, and organizational theory, Benson (1999) concludes that field theory has many benefits. Accordingly, it offers the tools to consider media production and consumption on a macro-, meso-, and micro-level and the option to include economic, demographic or technological changes through the concept of forms of capital and the focus on competition and distinction. He later broadened field theory by marrying it with new institutionalism (Benson, 2006) to account for homogeneity in different media systems.

Neveu (2007) highlights the relational aspect of Bourdieusian thought and how field theory helps solve a conundrum of journalism research: Conceptualizing a profession that continuously shifts and adapts. Here, field theory enables us to think about journalism not as one unified profession but as "practices structured and split by complex cleavages" (Neveu, 2007, p. 337). Such a perspective allows viewing the various opportunities that individual agents and news outlets have, depending on their resources.

Here, Neveu emphasizes the value of field theory to consider field struggles not as mere economically driven class struggles.

Others value the applicability of Bourdieusian concepts to ethnographic work. Schultz (2007), for example, argues that a field-theoretical perspective can help understand the power relations within the larger hierarchical journalistic field and the newsroom as a microcosm of the social space. Understanding journalistic practice as the positioning of actors in relation to each other helps understand the legitimacy and relative weight of the single news story, single journalist, and single news medium.

The journalistic field

While journalists could be perceived as mediators within and between fields, Neveu (2007) says that journalism can indeed be considered a field in most contemporary societies as it produces “field effects” for those pursuing journalism. Since journalists need specific skills to be considered journalists by others, and because they share myths and values, or in Bourdieusian words, *illusio* and *doxa*, we can speak of journalism as a distinct field, says Neveu (2007, p. 338):

“A social space comes to work as a field when the institutions and characters who enter it are trapped in its stakes, values, debates, when one cannot succeed in it without a minimum of practical or reflexive knowledge of its internal rules and logics.”

In general, the concept of field is the most easily adapted to journalism research. As it locates organizations, agents, norms and routines in a confined space, most journalism studies employing field theory define it as a meso-level hierarchical social space of power relations and the struggle over resources, prominently characterized by an opposition between an economic, heteronomous, and symbolic, autonomous pole (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). This conceptualization speaks to general discourses around the tension between journalism as a symbolic (merit) or economic good. When Bourdieu explicitly wrote about the journalistic field, he conceptualized it as a subfield of cultural production, together with the arts and sciences (Bourdieu, 1993, 1998b). As such, the journalistic field is also located in the field of power since journalism contributes to the “production of categories for ‘vision’ of the social world, but at the same time, categories also of ‘division’” (Schultz, 2007, p. 192).

At the same time, most scholars follow Bourdieu’s assessment that the journalistic field is more heteronomous, as it is more oriented towards economic gain and audience

metrics (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 56–57). Alternatively, one could argue that the journalistic field is more heteronomous as its audience is located outside its boundaries (Siapera & Spyridou, 2012). Compared to other fields of cultural production, the journalistic field is thus endowed only with low amounts of symbolic and cultural capital. Whereas other fields of cultural production produce cultural goods that are inherent to their field, the field of journalism only “reproduces or publicizes knowledge produced elsewhere” (Siapera & Spyridou, 2012, p. 82). Moreover, in contrast to other fields of cultural production, the audience of cultural goods produced in journalism are not peers from within the field but primarily outside of it. On the one hand, this generates more economic capital for the field of journalism but also imposes the “heteronomous values on other subfields of cultural production” (Siapera & Spyridou, 2012, p. 82) and other fields. Lindell (2015) adds to this and proposes to consider this curious double-character of the journalistic field as the bullied bully more explicitly – it is heteronomous and therefore dominated by external influences, yet at the same time imposes constraints on others.

Journalism research, however, primarily focuses on internal field struggles. Here, fields are used as a concept to stratify news organizations and journalists along a hierarchization that follows the same principles of division that Bourdieu had conceptualized for fields in general: The horizontal axis between the autonomous and heteronomous pole, and the vertical axis along the division between old and new, which is where disruption to the field can most likely occur (Benson, 1999). In his extensive study of the Norwegian journalistic field, Hovden (2008, p. 183) describes the horizontal axis as the stratification between agents that have accumulated different degrees of journalistic capital – the field-specific capital. Accordingly, those with high amounts of journalistic capital – for example, through winning a prize or holding important positions in a newsroom or unions – are thus more located on the autonomous pole vis-à-vis their colleagues whose work is less valorized. The vertical axis comprises the overall volume of capital that agents have accumulated. As such, a combination of age, gender, and the journalistic genre and news medium are decisive factors of the vertical axis. While disruption is most likely to occur at the vertical axis, new agents do not necessarily unsettle the field’s structure since the overall demographic of the field is decisive for whether new agents can lead to change:

“For field theory, both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of demographic change in a field are crucial. A rapid influx of new agents into the field can serve both as a force

for transformation and for conservation. At the managerial or organizational level, new agents can only establish themselves by marking their differences with those already in the field, and thus they have the greatest incentive to found a new kind of press outlet or adopt a distinctive editorial voice. Quantity of new entrants relative to available positions, however, is also important, particularly at the entry levels. Increased competition for scarce jobs tends to make journalists more cautious and conformist, contributing to simple reproduction of the field.” (Benson, 1999, p. 468)

Therefore, while the journalistic field is dynamic and constantly changing, the struggles are primarily aimed at maintaining existing structures; transformative change is profoundly slow and rarely so disruptive that it would flip existing power relations (Vos, 2016). Vos and colleagues have investigated how technological influences and economic constraints have been discursively incorporated as acceptable repertoires of journalistic practice and norms instead of turning power relations upside down. For example, economic constraints have led to an optimistic assessment of entrepreneurial practices in meta-journalistic discourse (Vos & Singer, 2016). Similarly, shifts in the digital environment have prompted transparency as a new norm (Vos & Craft, 2017). Regardless, changes can affect the individual journalist; an increasingly heteronomous journalistic field “bleeds agents of their cultural capital and autonomy” (Vos et al., 2012, p. 852).

However, the concept has not only been used to reflect the relations between news organizations or individual journalists but also to understand the hierarchy between journalistic genres. While Bourdieu never explicitly acknowledged the heterogeneity of journalistic organizations, actors, and content, journalism research has shown the stratification of the journalistic field. For example, Hovden’s study (2008, 2012) shows that highly reputable journalistic news media and specific journalists – for example, investigative journalists misrecognized for their skill – are located at the more autonomous pole. Position-taking within the field is, therefore, always a question of power (Schultz, 2007). As such, the stratification of the journalistic field resembles the hierarchy between hard and more soft news, between current affairs news and magazines, between national political journalism and local journalism, often observed in journalism research: one is perceived more valuable and thus occupies the dominating part of the field, while the other is more dominated and often more dependent on the logic of the economic field (English, 2016; Schultz, 2007).

This hierarchy also reflects a gender division of power, as soft news are most frequently reported by women journalists, while more prestigious and well-paying hard

news is dominated by men journalists (Schultz, 2007). In general, younger and female journalists have less accumulated capital (Hovden, 2008, p. 129). This division of the journalistic field has led some scholars to conceptualize sub-fields within the broader journalistic field. For example, Siaper and Spyridou (2012) have separated digital journalism from the journalistic field at large and perceived it as a sub-field of online journalism. While it might have been appropriate, especially at the beginning of the decade, to consider digital journalists a separate breed of journalists, in the past years, much of the skill-set needed to practice online journalism has been incorporated into other forms of journalism as well. Regardless, it is more beneficial to conceptualize one journalistic field to trace the struggles over resources (capital) and boundary-making (nomos) as well as the shift in schemes of perception (doxa, habitus) over time.

Lastly, it is tempting to think that the journalistic field is globally affected by the same techno-economical influences, and we could thus think of it as one transnational field (Christin, 2016). However, scholars caution to think of journalism at large as a universal field (Benson, 2004; Powers & Vera Zambrano, 2016) since the social space that shapes it differs according to the specific national dominant political and economic influences and the specific symbolic capital. Benson (2004), for example, notes that field theory is situational and context-dependent, and journalistic fields have grown within specific national spaces and their specific makeup of power relations and the specific forms of capital that are perceived as valuable (see also Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012). This perspective can offer opportunities for researchers to understand journalism and its general transformation by comparing transnational differences and similarities. Such a comparison will most likely exhibit the endogenous factors shaping the field, such as the habitus, doxa and *illusio* (Lindell et al., 2020, p. 11). For example, by considering differences in population, history and culture of a national social space, as well as the specific differences exerting pressure on the journalistic field such as press commercialization, media policy or whether and how trade unions are embedded in the field, we can understand how journalistic doxa, habitus or *illusio* is differently articulated, expressed and perceived.

Willig (2012) exemplifies this with an ethnographic observation that ‘objectivity’ is an essential norm in Danish newsrooms. Field theory, she argues, connects this micro-level observation with the macro-level context, distinguishing what is perceived as objectivity in Denmark from what is objectivity, for instance, in the US, including the “political economy of journalism or the wider cultural implications of the daily practices

of journalists” (Willig, 2012, p. 376). Similarly, Benson (2004) concludes from comparative research that external shocks to the journalistic field can be better circumvented when it is less dependent on commercial success, that is, when it is more economically autonomous. Moreover, establishing and institutionalizing guidelines against heteronomous practices such as any practices that follow a logic from “political, economic, or even religious or activist fields” (Benson, 2004, p. 283) could aid in reproducing and maintaining professional practice. In short, Benson (2004, p. 284) summarizes that “journalism schools, awards for journalistic excellence, ombudsperson positions, and critical journalism reviews may have a significant semiautonomous power to shape the news”. Similarly, journalistic meta-discourse on the journalistic nomos, that is, the boundaries of the field and what distinguishes ‘good’ from ‘bad’ journalism, all contribute to reproducing and maintaining the field’s power relation, dominant habitus, doxa and illusio.

The principle of Vision and Division – Journalistic Nomos

Even though journalism research is increasingly interested in the boundaries of journalism, the concept of nomos is only fleetingly employed in field theoretical studies of journalism (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). It could be because nomos and doxa presuppose each other (see previous chapter, p. 21), and research focusing more on the internal struggle might thus not be concerned with the constituting boundaries of the field. However, as “traditional power to set the terms of belonging and non-belonging” (Eldridge, 2017, p. 53), nomos could well be combined with the concept of boundaries and boundary-work which encompasses the discursive, social and symbolic boundaries drawn by different social groups to establish and maintain a shared identity as well as limit access to resources for others (Gieryn, 1983; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Gieryn (1983) coined the term “boundary-work” in his work on the discursive distinction employed by scientists to distinguish themselves from non-scientist. Since these discourses are “claims to authority or resources” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 781), established members of a field try to limit access to it through the strategies of expulsion, expansion and protection (Gieryn, 1999).

In journalism studies, boundary-making and its different strategies have been applied to show how the journalistic field sanctions heretic practices within the field (Carlson, 2016) but also how it reacts to “claims to authority” from outside the profession

(Eldridge, 2014; Örnebring, 2013). As the boundaries of the journalistic field are much more permeable than those of scientific fields – institutionalized cultural capital is generally not a prerequisite to participate in journalistic practices (Lewis, 2015) – discursive boundary-making is even more crucial. According to Carlson (2015), journalistic boundary-work can include the incorporation or normalization of non-traditional journalists, practices or new media (expansion of the field); the dismissal of deviant actors, practices and forms or values (expulsion from the field); and lastly the protection of any attack on the field's autonomy. All three strategies enact parts of the field's nomos – by maintaining a distinct function and logic from other fields, thus ensuring autonomy, and by distinguishing between degrees of worth, thus adding to the internal stratification.

For the journalistic field, nomos describes the “shared understanding among journalists of their role and position in society as unique”, which they struggle to have accepted by society at large (Eldridge, 2018, p. 47). Moreover, the concept does not only describe the fundamentally unique function for the social space (vision) but also the logic within the field, defining who can belong to, who acts in accordance to this nomos and who does not (division). Nomos can therefore also be understood as narrative constructions of categorization, belonging and (self-)identification. The concept also defines the struggle within the field, as new entrants can challenge or reproduce the shared understanding or narratives of what journalism is. As a more heteronomous field that is influenced by and dependent on external logic, the nomos of the journalistic field might therefore be less strong and more challenging to grasp (Bourdieu, 2005). Arguably, a comprehensive understanding of the journalistic nomos would also include the perspective of non-members of the field, as any social field also strives to offer a unique function to the social space. In other words, to understand what makes up journalistic nomos, we should consider the vision shared by journalists, the vision shared by those making claims to membership to the field, and the vision of those not included in the field, for example, audiences. For the journalistic field, nomos has, therefore, an almost normative dimension, as its vision constitutes a “mission to society” (Hovden, 2008, p. 165):

“nomos referring to the normative order of the universe, a socially established and internalized worldview or cosmos, in which a community makes the world appear meaningful, coherent and stable to us, transposed over our experience of the world.”

Hanitzsch (2011) thus puts journalistic *nomos* on par with what others have termed journalistic ideology (Deuze, 2005), the distinct “traditional values that are deeply embedded in the professional cultures of journalism” (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 479). As such, *nomos* has also been linked to role conceptions as they grasp the variance of *nomos* (Eldridge, 2018; Hanitzsch, 2011; Ranji, 2022). Role perceptions as an analytical tool have a long tradition in journalism research (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017; Hanusch & Banjac, 2018) because they capture how journalists “conceive of their work and its contribution to society” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 144), in other words, how they conceive of the field’s *nomos*.

Moreover, role perceptions are considered a manifestation of journalists’ perception of the field’s norms – which speaks to the field’s *nomos* – and their professional motivations – which speaks to their *illusio*. Hanitzsch (2007) conceptualizes journalistic roles along the three dimensions of interventionism, power distance, and market orientation. Interventionism describes the degree of activism (or passivism) that journalists perceive as pivotal for journalism’s societal function, for example, whether journalists should report more in the style of an impartial observer or more participatory or advocating. Power distance relates to a *nomos* of journalism as a fourth estate, and market orientation relates to a *nomos* of journalism as independent and autonomous from commercial interests. All three dimensions have normative implications, as impartial reporting, strong distance to power and low market orientation all encompass role perceptions that contribute to the field’s autonomy. In contrast, more missionary or activist reporting, weak distance to power and high market orientation could be viewed as journalism being susceptible to external influences. As such, Hanitzsch (2011) also follows Bourdieu’s (2005) argument that *nomos* is strongest among those agents located at the intellectual or more autonomous pole, and therefore the normative journalistic role perceptions can thus also be equalled with the autonomous pole (Vos, 2016; Vos & Wolfgang, 2018).

While journalism-as-ideal is perceived as crucial for society and legitimated, journalism-as-practice is contested and constantly negotiated (Hovden, 2008, p. 164). It is here, in the negotiation and contestation, where the division of *nomos* is exerted. While it is not the obligation of the scientist to decide the *nomos* of a field and to “draw the dividing line between the agents involved in it by imposing a so-called operational definition” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42), she can observe discursive manifestations of *nomos* and the shifting boundaries. For example, Hovden (2008, p. 30) views the guidelines for membership in journalistic unions as a valuable indication of journalistic *nomos* as they

“separate the holy and profane, the accepted and the forbidden, clean and unclean”. Nomos can, therefore, best be viewed in the contestation induced by new entrants to the field, such as struggles over the legal definition and access to information or membership of associations (Eldridge, 2018; Siaperas & Spyridou, 2012).

Similarly, introducing new elements such as digital media for reporting is part of these struggles. For example, such use might be perceived as enriching or diminishing the field’s capital. A journalistic field that is more susceptible to external forces will have more difficulties mobilizing a strong, distinct vision, destabilizing the field’s boundaries (Hanitzsch, 2011). Here, normalization can be seen as one reaction “born out of this struggle to reassert the dominant vision of the field” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 71). Normalization is a strategy of expanding the boundaries by imprinting professional journalistic routines into emerging practices prompted by new technology and thus distinguishing them from non-journalists using the same technology. This normalization includes meta-journalistic discourse about such new practices (Carlson, 2007) and the acquisition by ascertaining their distinct vision. Here, the field draws on long-standing perceptions of their role. Early studies on journalists who embraced blogging as a format or micro-blogging through Twitter show how journalists, especially those occupying more established and thus symbolically recognized positions, tended to maintain their role as a gatekeeper and mostly linked to or retweeted official sources (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Singer, 2005).

At the same time, the struggle over nomos can also be aimed at a reinvigoration of journalism-as-ideal, and it is not uncommon that this is done by those located at the boundaries: “The younger and usually weaker outsiders – actors and titles – often use the same strategies as religious heretics. They claim to be the bearers of a return to the forgotten and true values of their field, buried under routine or deference” (Neveu, 2007, p. 337). Here, unorthodox practices that are heretic to the taken-for-granted shared assumptions of the field (see p. 21) can be framed as claims to returning to journalism’s ideal or function. For example, Tom Wolfe, Hunter S. Thomson, and members of the New Journalism perceived their rogue techniques of research and reporting as returning to journalism’s original purpose (Neveu, 2007). Similarly, the radical embrace of entrepreneurial skills of contemporary news start-ups, which is in stark contrast to the existing norm of separating journalism and business, is often justified by the claim to making journalism “good” or “real” again (Wagemans et al., 2016; Witschge & Harbers, 2018).

Journalism research has often explored these shifts through the concept of doxa instead of nomos. And indeed, many influences on the field could be thought of as challenging unquestioned rules of the field, such as the divide between journalistic work and business. The two concepts could therefore be seen as the “self-perceived sense of belonging (doxa) and self-preferred narratives of what journalism ‘is’ (nomos)” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 60).

Journalistic *illusio* and journalistic doxa

As discussed in the previous chapter (p. 21), doxa describes the taken-for-granted beliefs about the struggle within the field that have been shaped through experience. These unquestioned presuppositions and rules have been differently adapted to the study of journalism. Doxa has been used to explore long-standing journalistic norms and how they add to the stratification of the field. Doxa has also been employed to investigate the shifts in journalistic practices and the maintenance of symbolic boundaries, thereby stabilizing the journalistic nomos. Lastly, doxa has been employed to understand specific struggles manifested through the working conditions in the field. Here, the concept has been closely connected to journalistic doxa. In all instances, however, doxa describes the sense of belonging to the journalistic field.

Because doxa describes beliefs that have been internalized and accepted as ‘natural’, in the sense of ‘it has always been this way’, it can be challenging to be detected and can best be explored through ethnographic work and an exploration of journalistic habitus (Willig, 2012, p. 378):

“The analytical concept of doxa urges the ethnographer to look for the tacit presuppositions of a field and for the taken-for-granted knowledge of social space. It is not least at this level of questioning where the critical ambition and practical potential of field theory is evident: for reflexive sociology, an important *raison d’être* (sic!) is that it exposes the borders of doxa and displays the unwritten rules of the social, thus making agents more aware and reflect more about their practices.”

For example, in her ethnographic work, Schultz (2007, p. 194) conceptualizes journalistic news values as the products of journalistic doxa, as they are “a set of professional beliefs which tend to appear as evident, natural and self-explaining norms of journalistic practice”. Here, she distinguishes between a field of (undisputable) journalistic doxa, the journalists “gut feeling”, and a universe of journalistic discourse, in which journalistic judgement is discursively negotiated as either orthodox or heterodox, depending on the

situation and the degree of institutionalization of a news value. Depending on space limits and who proposed a story, news values might be evaluated differently.

Moreover, some news values such as timeliness are, for example, highly institutionalized in Danish journalism through the reproduction in journalism education. This institutionalization of orthodox values can be seen in informal conversations, and Schultz (Schultz, 2007, p. 198) writes that journalists refer to the same “stories that serve as shared memory” when they are asked for examples of these news values (man bites dog). Interestingly, they are not spoken about or discussed in everyday news work. Instead, they are only discussed when the researcher asks. Schultz, therefore, argues that they are embodied in the journalists’ habitus, which is exemplified through their description of them as “part of your spinal cord”, “back of your head”, or “more like a feeling” (Schultz, 2007, p. 198). Similarly, doxa includes journalistic norms and ideals such as objectivity (Örnebring et al., 2018).

As the rules of the game, doxa could also be considered in the normative assumptions of the field that journalists share. Here, Vos and Wolfgang (2018) conceptualize normative roles as journalistic doxa and journalistic capital because both concepts describe the naturalized underlying mechanisms of journalism and the legitimization of certain journalistic practices. According to Hanitzsch and Vos (2018, p. 125), individual journalists internalize such normative ideals of what journalists *should* do into cognitive orientations of what they *aspire* to do. Cognitive role orientations are thus the “institutional values, attitudes, and beliefs individual journalists embrace as a result of their socialization.” (ibid.). The acquisition of such roles through socialization differs according to various factors, such as the news organization they work in, the beat they report on, their newsroom’s audience orientation, and much more. As such, they also reflect the tendencies journalists have acquired throughout their socialization and their naturalized beliefs about the journalistic community.

Similarly, specific doxa can be strengthened when the agents sharing these beliefs garner peer recognition or symbolic capital (Lindell et al., 2020). However, journalistic doxa can also be unrelated to what is actually practised in the field, as Lindell, Jakobsson and Stiernstedt (2020, p. 10) show, when they discuss the discrepancy between the belief that Swedish public broadcast should reflect society as a whole and what is depicted in television productions: “The beliefs seem however, to part of the field’s doxa, which owes much to the persistent public service ethos”.

However, as entry to the field requires the basic acceptance of the field's rules (Benson, 1999), all agents who "engage in acts of journalism" share the journalistic doxa even if to a varying degree (Örnebring et al., 2018, p. 418). Therefore, as soon heretics challenge the doxa as arbitrary, it also enters the space of discourse. That is, as soon as doxa is somehow disrupted, for example, through external influences, it can be observed in meta-journalistic discourse. Similar to Schultz's (Schultz, 2007) observation of orthodox beliefs, Vos and colleagues show how certain heterodoxic beliefs are negotiated and normalized in the journalistic field through meta-discourse in trade publications and journalism conventions (Hellmueller et al., 2013; Vos & Craft, 2017; Vos & Singer, 2016; Vos & Wolfgang, 2018). Here, those who have legitimacy in the field deliberate whether new practices such as employing a more entrepreneurial ideal or disclosing journalistic practices more openly are more and more discursively embraced and, as such, misrecognized as legitimate. These discursive constructions of new journalistic norms vis-à-vis long-standing values could be understood as a paradigm shift underway (Vos & Craft, 2017). Therefore, while new entrants to the field can transform the doxa simply by not being aware of the shared presuppositions or by explicitly challenging them, doxa and *illusio* in general "conserve and maintain the field in a status quo" (Vos, 2016, p. 386).

For example, Stringer (2018) explores how BuzzFeed's and Vice's turn to employ more experienced and established journalists and attempt to invest in more consecrated forms of journalism such as investigative reporting. These attempts exemplify how difficult it is to overthrow the journalistic doxa completely. While slight shifts in journalistic doxa are observable (Vos & Singer, 2016), in the end, the journalistic field maintains its stability: "This reinforcement and avowal of journalism's traditional cultural capital ultimately has a conservative effect on the field, ensuring a certain level of continuity in journalism's established 'rules' or doxa" (Stringer, 2018, p. 1998). Eldridge (2018), however, argues against the tendency to understand journalistic belonging to the dominant, normative notions – as this exactly leads to the reproduction of the dominant understanding of the journalistic field. Journalism research and journalists alike have long considered journalism a united profession, ignoring journalistic outlets and practices that did not meet normative ideas (or the dominant doxa). Deviant and antagonistic agents, who act as heretics, might even contribute to a reinforcing of doxa: "Where the doxa may have traditionally reinforced orthodoxy, the subversion of interlopers has seen heterodoxical visions of journalism made salient, and the heretic no longer seems quite so blasphemous" (Eldridge, 2018, p. 108).

A third string of research considers doxa as a concept that captures journalists' beliefs about success in the field and how doxa is shaped through the socialization of new entrants. As such, doxa can also be considered a form of "discipline for the dominated members of the field" (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). For example, a strong doxa that "journalistic success is based on an individual's talents and not on acquired skills" (Prandner, 2013, p. 77) dismisses agents who accumulated their knowledge of journalism through education and not by being born into the field. Here, studies also often draw on the concept of *illusio* to explore the aspirations and motivations to belong to the field vis-à-vis the beliefs about how to belong to it. This research also more explicitly considers the social origin of journalists and the broader context within the field of power.

Örnebring and colleagues (2018, p. 408) argue the journalistic doxa becomes "increasingly uncoupled from the traditional organizational framework of journalism", thus challenging the *nomos* of the field – if material conditions affect the mobilization of doxa in the form of journalistic norms and values, it becomes more susceptible to external forces. Here, forms of capital and journalists' *illusio* play a key role. As Bourdieu (1993, p. 68) described in his work on the literary field, those richest in capital, especially material resources, will be best equipped to participate in the field's struggle. Next to these resources, *illusio* as a "necessary belief" (Willig, 2012, p. 374) or a "strong feeling" for the journalistic mission (Hovden, 2008, p. 198) captures journalists' motivations and aspirations. As such, *illusio* has also been linked to journalists' role perceptions and enactment, as journalists aspire to contribute to society (Ranji, 2022).

Similarly, the reasons for why journalists invest themselves in the field have been described as combining idealistic and personal motivations: "the investment to define what the field is about (public service autonomous from any influences) and the personal gratification (creative work autonomous of any constraints)" (Nölleke et al., 2022). As such, journalistic *illusio* is also closely linked to ideals of autonomy. Moreover, research has found that these idealistic beliefs shape how journalists react to external influences and experienced hardships (Nölleke et al., 2022; Ranji, 2022). Here, *illusio* is positioned vis-à-vis external taken-for-granted constraints, such as political constraints in authoritarian regimes (Ranji, 2021) or the internalized belief that one must endure years of insecure employment to make it in journalism. Such doxic beliefs "reinforce existing power relations, such as exploitative working conditions, instead of changing them" (Nölleke et al., 2022, p. 325). While journalists are aware of the unequal access to material security in journalism, they pursue it nonetheless.

Vera-Zambrano and Powers (2019) observe a similar notion. In their study, a journalist from a working-class background describes how she had to learn and accept the doxa to work more hours for less payment compared to jobs in the service industry: “everybody thinks that it’s totally fine to just work 12 hours and put down 8 on your time card, when you are making 27,000 dollars a year in the first place. That was really shocking to me.” (female local journalist, cited in Vera-Zambrano and Powers, 2019, 164). Here, the social origin of the journalist might have made this doxa visible for her – the concept of working merely for passion might have conflicted with her class background, argue Vera-Zambrano and Powers. These examples can be seen as internalizations of the larger neoliberal doxa at work in contemporary societies, permeating most fields (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 29–45, 94–105).

Journalistic capital and capitals needed in the journalistic field

The accumulation of different forms of capital makes up the structure of the field. In journalism research, scholars have also used the concept to explain differences in journalistic content (Benson, 2006; English, 2016) or the emerging relevance of audience engagement (Tandoc, 2015). Next to the concept of field, the forms of capitals are most often adopted to journalism research, even though what makes up such resources in the journalistic field is not that precisely conceptualized across scholarship (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). Most studies reviewed in a systematic analysis employ economic and cultural capital and focus on their opposition spanning the structure of the field between the cultural (autonomous) and economic (heteronomous) pole as conceptualized by Bourdieu (1998b, 2005) and Benson (1999, 2004, 2006) in his influential studies.

Economic capital

As the form of capital that exists primarily in manifest form, economic capital is often perceived through the terminology of the business of journalism – circulation, advertising revenues, or audience ratings (Benson, 2004; Bourdieu, 1998b), web traffic and clicks (Barnard, 2016; Tandoc, 2015). Therefore, the external influences on the journalistic field of contemporary democracies are also thought of as primarily economic. Regardless, economic capital is relevant for journalism’s “charismatic economy” (Hovden, 2012, p. 72). It is needed to fund resources such as time and well-trained employees to produce

journalism that is perceived as relevant and misrecognized by peers through awards. Because of this conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital, all journalistic practice is to some extent involved in the accumulation of economic capital, even though this is often misrecognized as disinterest.

Social capital

Journalistic social capital is also thought of more straightforwardly as the networks of informants, databases, and contacts among peers that journalists can draw on (Hummel et al., 2012; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012; Siapera & Spyridou, 2012; Vos, 2016). It is expressed in the forms of group membership one can build and the relations a group is able to establish and maintain. It is defined by who you know and by whom you are known. Journalism research often links social capital to the social networks of informants that journalists need to report exclusive news (Vos, 2016). However, social capital is also necessary to make one's name. For example, Hummel and colleagues (2012) mention that knowing other journalists might be a crucial advantage to enter the field in highly competitive environments. Such informal networks among journalists can provide (aspiring) professionals with information relevant to their careers, such as vacancies and other opportunities (Kapidzic, 2020). This is also reflected in Hovden's (2008, p. 207) finding that journalists often have parents working in the field as well – while this reproduction of positions might also be due to their learned habitus and acquisition of cultural capital at an early age, the social connection might have certainly helped to enter the field.

Siapera and Spyridou (Siapera & Spyridou, 2012) also consider social media as tools for journalists to gain social capital because they enlarge journalists' social networks and might connect them with sources, peers, and, most importantly, readers. This relationship to audiences could later be turned into social and eventually symbolic capital. More recently, journalism researchers have also studied social capital in the digital context, especially on Twitter, where the connections of journalists are visible for anyone to see in the form of follower numbers (Barnard, 2016; Jian & Liu, 2018; Maares, Lind, et al., 2021) but also in forms of visits and likes as well as comments (Pedroni, 2015). Here, social capital has often been linked to symbolic capital, as visible social connections might also be perceived as peer recognition and, thus, in the long run, symbolic capital (Jian & Liu, 2018; Maares, Lind, et al., 2021; Ranji, 2021). For example,

Ranji (2021) shows how Iranian journalists use their social and symbolic capital on social media to collectively yield symbolic power to make issues visible that have been suppressed in traditional media.

Journalistic capital – cultural or symbolic?

While economic and social capital are therefore more easily adapted to the study of resources relevant in the journalistic field, the conceptualization of cultural and symbolic capital is a bit more complex, if not ambiguous. Especially the distinction between specific cultural capital relevant to the journalistic field, general forms of cultural capital and symbolic effects of these are often not considered. In the following, I will discuss the different understandings of cultural, journalistic and symbolic capital, even though they are often intertwined.

Cultural capital is a form of power to distinguish individuals and groups (news organizations, specific journalistic beats, specific occupational roles) from others (Benson, 2006; Botma, 2012). Cultural capital has been linked to specific credentials and skills and the norms of the journalistic field, as, for example, objectivity, journalism's normative roles, and the legitimacy and credibility that journalism enjoys. Benson (2004, p. 189) lists “educational credentials, technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal abilities, and artistic sensibilities” as cultural capital because they (ideally) legitimize a journalist's position within the field. This follows the conceptualization of cultural capital as described by Bourdieu (1986). At the same time, cultural capital can also encapsulate journalists' experience in years and their experience in terms of prestige – where and what did they study, where have they worked, what topics have they worked on (Benson, 2006).

Similarly, Siapera and Spyridou (2012) distinguish between embodied, objectified and institutionalized forms of cultural capital in the journalistic field. Objectified cultural capital refers to the artefacts produced: the newspaper, the radio program, the website with its affordances such as layout and design. As such, the concept also captures the ephemeral materiality of journalistic work. Institutional cultural capital can include educational credentials, which are not a prerequisite to participate in the field as its boundaries are traditionally more permeable but which might nonetheless be of advantage

in the struggle⁹. Lastly, embodied cultural capital, argue Siaper and Spyridou (2012, p. 86), includes all the “know-how, tacit knowledge, skills” that individual journalists need to distinguish themselves from others. In online journalism, they say, technical skills would be especially crucial. These technical skills have further been named digital capital. Here, the concept of cultural capital is further broken down to refer specifically to computer skills, social media skills, audio-visual editing and mobile technology skills (De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019). De Vuyst and Raeymaeckers (2019, p. 562) assert that in contemporary journalism, having such digital capital can mean an advantage vis-à-vis other agents in the field and “can be exchanged for high amounts of symbolic capital in journalism”. Equating cultural capital with skills is, however, too narrow a definition.

Vandevoort (2017) distinguishes between an individual cultural capital, which encompasses the aforementioned skills and knowledge, and an institutional level where cultural capital organizes the arbitrary distinction between ‘good’ journalism and ‘bad’. Others have conceptualized cultural capital as “the legitimacy of the field; and it is legitimacy that ultimately earns journalism its autonomy and power” (Vos, 2016, p. 391). In both these assessments, cultural capital is again linked to the field’s nomos and doxa, and thus its normative implications – what function does the field serve and which forms of journalism are the accepted ones. In turn, cultural capital as legitimacy is also directly affecting economic capital:

“If audiences and sources lose their trust in the legitimacy of journalism, the power that journalists extract from the market and elsewhere will evaporate. Ironically, the social awareness of this legitimacy is the basis of the pressure brought to bear on journalism” (Vos, 2016, p. 391).

As such, cultural capital refers to the legitimate practices in journalism. Here, cultural capital manifests in commentary and meta-discourse (Barnard, 2016), in-depth reporting, intelligent commentary, valued aspects of journalistic content, and, maybe more recently, the creation of viral content (Tandoc, 2015), and the strategic rituals of objectivity and emotionality (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). What all of these categories have in common is that they try to capture journalistic excellence. Here, embodied cultural capital in form of the tacit knowledge about the rules of the game contributes to the distinction within the

⁹ Some forms of institutionalized cultural capital might, however, be disadvantageous. For example, in Austrian journalism, a degree in communication is often disregarded by established journalists and those most powerful in the field often emphasize how a specialized degree such as economics or politics, or a degree from the much more competitive programs of the applied universities would be more beneficial.

field. Being aware of the strategic ritual of objectivity, or the “gut feeling” of what events are newsworthy, can make a difference in the newsroom.

Vos and colleagues (Vos & Craft, 2017; Vos & Finneman, 2016; Vos & Wolfgang, 2018) have linked journalism’s cultural capital – and therefore journalistic capital – with Hanitzsch’s (2007) conceptualization of journalistic culture comprising journalism’s institutional roles, epistemologies, and ethical orientations. Here, cultural capital can be thought of as the embodiment of normative assumptions that are perceived as relevant and therefore legitimated within the journalistic culture and the broader social space (Vos & Wolfgang, 2018). This understanding already links to journalists’ habitus, as this embodied cultural capital provides a guide for action, or journalistic role enactment, and a means for reflection or criticism, or journalistic role perception. This understanding of cultural capital again emphasizes that what is needed to participate in a journalistic field is spatially and temporally dependent. For example, Vos and Finneman (2016) conceptualize journalists’ gatekeeping role as the critical aspect of journalistic cultural capital, while all the while acknowledging that it might be less relevant in certain national contexts or might even lose relevance in a world in which journalists are increasingly “gatewatchers” (Schwalbe et al., 2015) and less often gatekeepers. Here, influences from outside the field brought in through new digital technology lower the worth of this specific journalistic cultural capital, bringing about discourses within the field and new forms of cultural capital (Vos & Finneman, 2016). New entrants to the field from other fields might bring new types of cultural capital and, as such, add to the transformation of the field, shifting its doxa and eventually the principles of vision and division (Vos, 2016).

Such an understanding of cultural capital relates to the effects of specific knowledge (such as the tacit understanding of objectivity as a journalistic ritual or other normative assumptions), skill (such as in-depth reporting), or materialized object (such as viral content or intellectual commentary). All these forms are misrecognized as valuable and more relevant than other aspects of journalistic work and could therefore be considered the field-specific symbolic capital or journalistic capital. In journalism scholarship, the term journalistic capital has been used to refer to the field-specific cultural capital and the symbolic effects of all relevant sources in the field. For example, Schultz (2007) distinguishes between journalistic capital on the one hand and the effects of journalistic capital, the symbolic capital, on the other. She subsumes editorial capitals such as professional experience, formal organizational position, news beat, and prizes as

journalistic capital, which can then, in turn, be converted into recognition within the field and beyond, or, in other words, symbolic capital.

While researchers often operationalize journalistic capital through its material manifestations in the form of awards, it could also exist in forms of immaterial, and often-times very small gestures, such as “a pat on the back, or an appreciative remark in the newsroom”, or in the “small details of everyday newsroom practice”(Willig, 2012, p. 380). Here, being able to work on something that the journalist enjoys, maybe with a bit more time allocated, can be perceived as journalistic capital in the small microcosm of a newsroom: “Journalistic capital is a form of capital closely connected to the concept of peer recognition” (Willig, 2012, p. 380). Similarly, Bunce (2017) considers praise within the newsroom as cultural capital, which can later be turned into respect, and as such symbolic capital. Here, cultural capital is also dependent on what those with more managerial roles perceive as valuable and relevant. Vera-Zambrano and Powers (2019, p. 158) see symbolic capital most prominently in the “legitimacy accorded to some forms of reporting (e.g. investigative reporting, long-form storytelling) vis-à-vis less legitimate forms (e.g. clickbait news)”. Therefore, journalistic capital requires the social recognition through others and, in essence, social capital.

Another line of research understands journalistic capital as a combination of cultural, economic, social, and symbolic resources. For example, Barnard (2016) considers journalistic capital as the overall volume of cultural capital in the form of education and class-based knowledge, economic capital, social capital in the form of networks, and symbolic capital in the form of reputation and prestige. Others, on the other hand, subsume only cultural, social, and symbolic resources under the umbrella of journalistic capital and oppose it to economic capital (English, 2016; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012). Meyen and Riesmeyer (2012), for example, span the journalistic field between an economic and a journalistic pole, whereby the latter is a combination of skills (specific cultural capital), social networks (specific social capital) and symbolic capital. In that way, they oppose conceptualizations that equate journalistic capital with symbolic capital because “certain competencies (e.g., investigative and writing skills) and contacts (e.g., mobile phone numbers) lead to an advantage in the field” (Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012, p. 389). Following their argument, on the level of news organizations and media companies, journalistic capital is made up of reincorporated and institutionalized cultural capital in the form of journalists with awards or who are known for specific skills, social capital in the form of contacts, databases, and networks, and symbolic cap through the

recognition from competitors and agents outside of the field. In any case, journalistic capital can be considered the resource that “produces effects in the journalistic field” but also in other fields¹⁰ (Willig, 2012, p. 379).

Gender as negative capital

However, these effects are not distributed equally. As the journalistic field is traditionally a space shaped and dominated by men, researchers have argued that gender can negatively affect the conversion of journalistic skills, knowledge, and networks into symbolic capital and thus power and renown within the field. Drawing on Moi’s (1999) conceptualization of gender as a negative capital, especially women researchers have studied the struggle of women journalists within the journalistic field (De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019; Djerf-Pierre, 2007; Lucht & Batschelet, 2018). For example, Lucht and Batschelet (2018, p. 208) conceptualized gender as embodied cultural capital: “a set of gendered behaviors or dispositions that can be deployed strategically to gain leverage in a particular environment”. They explore how women journalists used this leverage to enter US-American broadcast journalism in the mid-20th century. While they often received less economic capital than men journalists, they persisted in the struggle and employed their social and cultural capital – in the form of personal privileges such as family background, social connections, education and normative beauty. They did not necessarily transform power relations in the field or empower other women journalists as a whole.

Likewise, Prandner (2013) shows that even though women journalists have much higher institutionalized capital in the form of university degrees, they could not occupy relevant positions in the Austrian journalistic field, and even fewer are in leadership roles. However, women journalists do not observe this discrepancy as such:

“Women, who are generally better educated and seem to depend more on higher education to progress in the field, tend not to recognize the structural importance of education for their success; they even fail to recognize the inequality of the sexes in relation to the chances of progression.” (Prandner, 2013, p. 77).

Similarly, gender affects the symbolic effects that social capital can have for women. Prandner (2013) describes how women journalists neither benefit from women-only

¹⁰ This perspective would relate to what Couldry (2005) has termed media capital, but as this refers to symbolic capital that external agents such as politicians, academics, or cultural producers accumulate, this form will not be further discussed here.

mentoring networks as they do not have the same weight in social capital nor do they benefit from traditional networks as it was difficult to find acceptance in these. Here, being included in such long-standing men networks might not only be difficult, but it also bears the danger of sexist stigma and other women journalists badmouthing them for fraternizing with male colleagues. Even newer forms of cultural capital are negatively affected by gender, as de Vuyst and Raeymaeckers (2019) show. According to their findings, digital capital is gendered in numerous ways, as women's digital capital is more often questioned based on gendered stereotypes. This leads to women more often questioning their abilities. Similarly, other social categories such as ethnicity or race will most likely negatively affect the struggle over power in the journalistic field. Therefore, scholarship should consider journalists' overall accumulated capital when studying how they engage in journalistic practice and how this volume of capital can support or constrain their efforts to act according to normative assumptions.

The space of journalistic work

In their conceptualization of the stakes within the journalistic field, Meyen and Riesmeyer (2012) link the journalistic capital accumulated by individuals directly to an organization. They assert that journalists can only employ their journalistic capital "as long as he or she belongs to an organization" (Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012, p. 390). In an era where the journalist and her journalistic capital is again increasingly uncoupled from a newsroom and where freelancers, contract workers, and other temporary employment could be perceived as an increasingly typical form of employment (Deuze & Witschge, 2018), such an understanding of journalistic capital collapses all non-employed journalists in one category and positions them in the less prestigious and powerless parts of the field.

While it might be true that it is more difficult for these journalists to garner symbolic positions (see also chapter four), these challenges are also shaped by the unequal resources that agents have in general and is not only determined through their employment status. For example, in his study of the Norwegian journalistic field, Hovden (2008) observes that journalists from families with higher amounts of cultural, economic, and social capital, such as academic households, are more likely to accumulate symbolic capital. Moreover, second-generation journalists are also more likely to accumulate symbolic capital. Hovden (2008, p. 138) concludes: "This specific journalistic hierarchy is thus also a *social hierarchy*, separating those raised in families with more capital (in

particular, educational capital and cultural capital) from those with less privileged backgrounds”.

Thus, not only field-specific resources shape journalists’ position-taking and how they practice journalism. Vandevoort (2017), therefore, distinguishes between a continuum of exogenous and endogenous forms of cultural capital to explain why and how journalists perceive similar situations differently. While endogenous cultural capital refers to the skills and resources that journalists have acquired through their socialization within the journalistic field – for example, internalizing its norms and values (doxa), procedures, conventions, and mastering the essential news genres –, exogenous cultural capital refers to their overall experiential structures, their schemes of perception schemes as well as general skills that they acquired outside the field but can employ in their journalistic work. His study on how Dutch and Flemish journalists covered the Syrian conflict shows that journalists with higher endogenous cultural capital work more often in generalist positions and have a “tendency towards procedural conservatism” (Vandevoort, 2017, p. 619). Journalists with more endogenous cultural capital embraced the normative assumptions of reporting objectively and keeping a critical distance and followed the professional routines of double-checking information with multiple sources and rarely including emotional accounts.

While these journalists tended to have a degree in communication, language studies, or journalism, journalists with exogenous cultural capital had studied subjects relating more to political conflicts or Arab language and culture. Moreover, their journalistic training was often done “on the spot” or autodidactic. This background inspired them to challenge journalistic forms of reporting or offered them a different approach to finding stories. They also embraced more subjective practices and had closer relationships with their sources. This specific knowledge gives freelancers an advantage as news organizations rely on employed journalists for factual hard news reporting. However, it also means that freelancers with weak social capital to a newsroom and weak social capital with sources were in much more difficult situations reporting from Syria, as they also received much lower support and security from buyers. While the risks of conflict reporting are not necessarily matched with the risks that other non-employed, or atypical, journalists experience, it is nonetheless imperative to include the material conditions of journalistic work into the Bourdieusian perspective and broaden our understanding of the economic and social resources that shape journalists position in the field.

Örnebring and colleagues (2018) offer such a theoretical concept of the space of journalistic work. They propose a stratification of the journalistic field along three dimensions that could be translated into different forms of capital: journalistic capital, material security, and access to resources. While the first one can be directly operationalized along the lines of peer recognition and status, material security and access to resources both speak to economic capital and social capital to some extent. Material security extends our understanding of economic capital as it includes a perspective of continuity predictability for the journalist. Material security, therefore, refers to “whether the practitioner is paid a regular salary for his or her work and whether the contractual relationship between the journalist and the employer is stable and long-term” (Örnebring et al., 2018, p. 408). Therefore, this dimension not only indicates whether and how much journalists earn money with their work but also to what extent they achieve reassurance through social security, paid leave, and retirement funds. Access to resources, on the other hand, speaks to the infrastructure of journalistic work as it refers to anything that would support journalists in their daily practice from an office, computers, recording and photography equipment to editing software, databases, and networks of sources and colleagues.

This concept of the space of journalistic work disentangles the overall capital volume of a journalistic organization from the working reality of the individual and accounts for varying levels of recognition (for instance, along the beat or seniority), employment status, and eventually benefits granted through the organization (funding for travel, access to prestigious informants and more). Atypical work and its association with precarious labour can thus be unravelled and the heterogeneous pool of independent stars, digital workers-for-clicks, and contingent broadcast journalists better understood. For instance, a senior freelancer covering politics might have much higher journalistic capital but less access to resources than a local contingent journalist covering lifestyle and societal issues. It also allows us to consider the various forms of free labour found in the space of journalistic work (Fast et al., 2016). Aspirational labour, that is, investment in work without economic remuneration in the hope of garnering social and journalistic capital, is common in fields of cultural production (Duffy, 2017; Henninger & Gottschall, 2007; M. Scott, 2012) and could also be located in the space of journalistic work in the areas characterized by low material security but high access to resources and medium to high journalistic capital (Örnebring et al., 2018).

Journalistic habitus and practical sense

The third concept in the triad to understand practice and power relations in the journalistic field is habitus. Vera-Zambrano and Powers (2019) criticize that Anglophone journalism research is overly reliant on the concepts of field and capital but does not use the benefit of Bourdieusian thinking to link class and professional ideology. This link between what journalists perceive to be journalistic excellence and “their social origins and professional trajectories” (Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019, p. 160) would be captured with journalists’ habitus. However, a systematic analysis of Bourdieusian thought in journalism studies showed that while scholarship did indeed focus on the concepts of field and forms of capital, half of all investigated articles also included the concept of habitus (Maares & Hanusch, 2020a). Still, the assessment that habitus and practical sense are neglected remains, as not even a third of all articles applied habitus in-depth.

This exclusion of habitus might be due to a more deterministic reading of Bourdieu, and that habitus is not easily operationalized and measured as directly as the forms of capital (Park, 2009). Income, houses owned, educational certificates, close friends, memberships can all be easily be inquired in contrast to what habitus encapsulates: The life story and how it manifests itself in guidelines for practice. The concept, therefore, directly relates and presupposes embodied cultural capital, as well as the concepts of *illusio* and *doxa*. Embodied cultural capital continuously shapes habitus, which equips the journalist with a horizon for what is possible. It, therefore, also affects and is shaped by what is taken-for-granted (*doxa*) and what can be aspired (*illusio*). Considering habitus and practical sense, therefore, offers the opportunity to include an intersectional understanding of journalists careers “in a relational perspective that specifies the context in which particular traits (e.g. gender, race, class) do or do not become salient” (Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019, p. 157). Moreover, such a Bourdieusian perception of class allows us to understand ascending and declining trajectories both in economic but also symbolic form. For example, someone with a working-class background could then be considered ascending in the hierarchical social space when they work in a position that is considered relevant even though they might not earn that much.

A specific habitus like the journalistic habitus is shaped in relation to a specific field. It is, however, continuously accumulated on top of the agent’s existing social

history. In journalism studies, habitus has been conceptualized as the “idea of journalistic identity, shaped by education and training within the journalistic field” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 44) and is performed through specific societally expected behaviour and thus position-taking. Habitus is, therefore, “the ‘situated self’ in that it captures the way social agents act within both the structures of their fields and how they grew into their position in society” (Eldridge, 2018, p. 43). Meyen and Riesmeyer (2012) distinguish between habitus as *opus operatum* and *modus operandi*, or, as I have described in chapter one (p. 37), as habitus-as-history and habitus-as-future. While the *opus operatum* *defines* how actors behave and is shaped by their dispositions, socialization, and current life situation, the *modus operandi* *observes* how they behave. Accordingly, they tried to capture the visible or measurable dimensions of habitus as *opus operatum* and *modus operandi* through journalists’ curriculum vitae, career, and journalists’ typical workday and role perception. Here, they understand the sociodemographic background, education, socialization in the journalistic field and current life situation as the accumulated history (*opus operatum*) and journalists’ daily tasks, aims, role perceptions, role enactment, expected audience expectations as well as their perception of media effects and ethical principles as *modus operandi*.

Similarly, Schultz (2007) connects the journalistic habitus with the normative assumptions, here a journalistic habitus is in line with an understanding of the taken-for-granted. For example, a journalistic habitus would be in line with the journalistic doxa, “understanding the journalistic game and being able to master the rules of the game” (Schultz, 2007, p. 193). Eldridge (2018, p. 144) also links journalistic habitus to journalists’ role perception, perceived role expectation and role performance. While these schemes of perception and expectations continuously evolve within the field, they also build on any relationship that journalists had with the field prior to entering. Eldridge, therefore, considers not only journalists’ formal education when thinking about habitus-formation but also informal encounters with journalists and the informal and formal acquisition of journalism’s *nomos*. As such, the upbringing of journalists, what forms of journalism were consumed and perceived as valuable, whether and how journalism’s societal function was discussed in school can all shape an aspiring journalist’s habitus. Similarly, aspiring journalists whose parents or close family and friends are also journalists will have acquired a practical sense that suits the journalistic field from early on (Hovden, 2008, p. 89). Eldridge (2018, p. 44) adds that habitus is then “further

replicated through the performance of certain roles as an expected pattern of behaviour anticipated by society.”

This is not to say that only children of journalists will succeed in the field and occupy powerful positions, but they will have an advantage compared to those who have to acquire the practical sense needed, especially since the formation of a specific habitus takes time. Hess and Waller (2016) exemplify this by investigating the habitus needed to succeed in local journalism. They argue that agents need a local habitus to engage in local journalism. Here, in contrast to more prestigious forms of journalism, institutionalized cultural capital might be disadvantageous. Instead, born and bred local journalists with no academic training but more embodied knowledge could be more successful compared to journalists with institutionalized cultural capital from prestigious schools. The (free) time-labour needed to acquire a professional habitus in contemporary journalistic fields can also prevent journalists from working-class backgrounds from ever reaching the most prestigious positions.

In their comparative study on different trajectories in local journalism in France and the US, Vera-Zambrano and Powers (2019, p. 161) show how journalists from working-class families describe tensions between the journalistic work that they enjoy and are proud of and the journalistic work “they would ultimately like to do, with the latter often corresponding to the more legitimate forms of journalism”. Here, they have acquired an understanding of which forms of journalistic work are perceived as more valuable than others, but they lack the material resources to engage in such journalism because it often necessitates free and aspirational labour to reach such positions. At the same time, the study shows the oblivion of journalists originating from professional working-class backgrounds to the “unequal opportunities” for all journalists to be working in the highly legitimate areas. Class background can also explain why journalists only ascend so much, even though they acquired cultural capital through prestigious education. Social origin also affects whether they continue to study even though everyone around them is getting paid for their work every day or whether they have the social and economic resources to forgo material security for years to come.

Not only a working-class background can affect habitus and position-taking in such a way, but gender and other personal traits can also have a similar effect. For example, in his study on Austrian journalism, Prandner (2013, p. 78) concludes that the “habitus in the field is a product of masculine domination and is thus strictly determined by males”. Women journalists can either embrace and imitate this habitus or accept that

they might have no chance of upward mobility. Here, we can consider gender or ethnicity as a layer of accumulated history that cannot easily be discharged but which also shapes the relations and schemes of perceptions between journalists (see also gender as capital, p. 65). This can have particularly disillusioning effects on aspiring journalists when they realize their habitus does not fit the aspired position perfectly. Journalists can thus either invest themselves in the field or adapt their aspirations:

“The subjects which change most in their relative attraction over time are also the most clearly gendered (with the largest differences between male and female journalists in term of attraction, and also the subjects conforming most closely to traditional gender roles and interests), which is probably reflecting the fact that the readjustment to the hierarchies of the journalistic field will be greatest for the students’ attitudes which were most closely linked to their personal interests, that is to say, their initial habitus (which will be in various sync with the demands of the social field). Also, because of the strong gendering of the hierarchy of the journalistic field (where the most prestigious forms of journalism – hard news, politics, economy etc. – are also the most male dominated (...), the mismatch between the initial taste of their habitus and the journalistic habitus, that is, the taste for the most prestigious forms of journalism, is much stronger for the female students, and demands greater degree of adjustment for the acquirement of journalistic capital and prestige” (Hovden, 2008, p. 101)

As habitus is unconscious and contains reflexive and self-critical aspects, such tensions also offer opportunities for change (Neveu, 2007, p. 340).

Journalistic habitus has often been subsumed as mastering the journalistic game (Schultz, 2007; Usher, 2017). However, it is not “one” game that can be mastered but many. Schultz (2007, p. 202) conceptualizes the journalistic news habitus as “a bodily knowledge and feel for the daily news game”. However, this game can be played from different positions, which means that there are different possible forms of professional habitus, such as editorial habitus, reporter habitus, intern habitus, investigative reporter habitus. Accordingly, a journalistic news habitus is marked by its immediacy and differs from an investigative reporter habitus. Different forms of journalistic habitus will make sense to specific positions. For instance, an online news journalist might need to be faster and do less investigative research – this habitus of working fast and having an overview of what other journalists do is necessary for this specific position (Willig, 2012).

Similarly, Meyen and Riesmeyer (2012) argue that the field position of the employer is also relevant in structuring journalists’ habitus. Likewise, Jian and Liu (2018, p. 1455) write: “To understand the habitus of journalists is to uncover the mutual shaping of macro institutional forces (e.g. state ownership of media institutions) and micro-level practices (e.g. news reporting) within historical and political contexts”. As such, journalists’ position and the topics they work on contribute to their habitus, which

informs their work routine. Linking this to their role perceptions, studies have shown that journalists working on lifestyle or culture topics emphasize other aspects of their function for society than those reporting on politics (Hanusch & Banjac, 2018; Hovden & Kristensen, 2018). Role perceptions also differ among journalists working for different media types and socialized in different national journalistic fields. Regardless, habitus should not be considered as a determining guideline for journalistic practice, argues Benson (2006, p. 194): “The cultural rules operating in fields are constraining and enabling, not determining”. Journalistic professionalism provides the freedom to choose what to report, whom to interview, how to formulate within a regulative set of rules. Benson (2006) points out that journalists might be aware, for example, of influences on their work through reflecting on their working routine and might try and compensate for these influences.

Moreover, habitus and practical sense is constantly progressing, as are fields (Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a). Shared practical sensibilities are formed by the daily interaction with peers, forming a shared experience. For example, the adaptation of digital technology into journalistic practices can be differently embedded into journalists’ habitus depending on their position, work environment and the community they belong to (Barnard, 2016). Here, technology-as-habitus can transform digital technology into many different things and thus guide everyday practice (Sterne, 2003). Social media can be perceived and employed as an immediate source of information that is almost subconsciously used, or as a platform to reach audiences and connect, or as a platform to seek peer recognition – or all together. This can be employed effortlessly, depending on the existing habitus of journalists. Habitus and practical sense could explain why some aspects of social media are not as frequently used, argue Powers and Vera-Zambrano (2018a). Journalists often ignore the directive from management to post several times a day because it is impractical for them and disrupts their daily routine. New digital technology can, therefore, also disrupt the alignment of field and habitus. Wu and colleagues (2019a) explored the different reactions to automation in journalistic practice through journalists’ different habitus. They showed that for some journalists, their habitus has “created attitudes of resistance towards changing the status quo, particularly since the old ways have enabled them to gain privileged positions within the field”. In a field that increasingly favours digital capital, such a resisting habitus either needs to align itself to the evolving field, or the journalist will experience a disadvantage. As habitus, doxa, and *illusio* presuppose each other, this will also affect journalists’ motivations and sense of

belonging to the field. The next chapter will continue with a review of two external influences shaping journalistic work, technology and economic forces.

Literature Review

Chapter 3: Technological and Economic External Influences

As described in the previous chapter, the field concept allows for contestation and fuzzy boundaries. However, this also creates a methodological problem of where to draw them (P. Thomson, 2014). Journalism research has turned to this problem in the past decade by explicitly investigating these boundaries, the shifts in journalistic ideologies and how journalists discursively draw these boundaries. Much of this work draws on Gieryn's (1983, 1999) concept of boundaries (see chapter 2), which understand boundaries as sites of struggle over the legitimacy of claims of belonging. From a field-theoretical perspective, this also relates to the influences from external fields and their logic. Most in focus are extra-media level influences from the economic field, influences from digitization, and influences from the political realm (Hanitzsch et al., 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

All of these are, of course, highly interconnected. For instance, more accessible technology makes working from home more manageable, which might lead to companies decreasing their costs in the workspace (Bunce et al., 2018). Similarly, issues such as monopolization and media concentration can be affected by political influence. Therefore, transformations through technology could also be understood as the mediation of social, political and economic forces, which have always shaped journalistic practice. Örnebring and Ferrer-Conill (2016) argue against a 'natural' trajectory of technology and caution that it needs to be understood through the specific economic, social, and cultural context in which new technology occurs and is used (see also De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019; Örnebring, 2010, p. 17). Therefore, the adaptation of new technologies in journalistic practice is as much shaped by economic influences on the field and the journalistic culture or political regulation of the media system. However, as technology has been discussed as one key contributor to change in journalistic practice, I will address technological and economic influences separately in the following chapter.

Technological influences

What is technology in journalistic work, and how does it influence it? When we speak of technology in journalism these days, it is often associated with big data journalism, social media reporting, analyses of journalists' performance through metrics, and automated

journalism. Technology, however, has continuously affected how journalists do their work. From the introduction and development of typewriters, from analogue to digital photography, from typesetting to content management systems and layout programs – technology has always been adapted and adopted, making journalistic work more efficient and some occupational roles redundant. Depending on how old and new agents resist or accept such disruptions, new technologies can change journalistic practice and the journalistic field (Eldridge & Broersma, 2018). Technology is, therefore, more “a conduit for primarily economic and organizational influences” (Örnebring, 2016, p. 90).

In his 2007 book on media work, Deuze (2007, p. 141) proclaimed, “Journalism as it is, is coming to an end”. He referred to the dissolving boundaries between the various forms of public communication as well as the technological blurring of distinct news work sectors such as print, television, or radio journalism¹¹. With the possibility of everyone contributing to the news, journalism’s “seminal role in providing the collective memory and social cement of societies” (Deuze, 2007, 142) has been challenged and contested at various sights of boundary struggle. Moreover, technology and the concomitantly evolving convergence of newsrooms also brought about a multi-skilling of journalists. Such change is, however, always dependent on the specific national context. For example, broadband quality can foster or avert virtual newsrooms, and journalists can embrace social media differently according to labour laws (Örnebring, 2016; Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a).

In the following, I will focus on the aspects enabling or broadening journalistic work introduced through technology. This includes the facilitation of remote work and the accessibility of technology like audio and photo equipment to anyone, allowing the “people formerly known as the audience” (Rosen in Deuze, 2009, p. 315) to participate in journalistic work. I will also consider the constraining influence of technology on journalistic work, the shifting focus on metrification of news work and the often-proclaimed acceleration of work (Cohen, 2019). Lastly, I will specifically return to the idea of digital capital and habitus and discuss literature that shows how journalists, especially those atypically employed, have incorporated digital technology in their everyday work to have an advantage in the field’s competition.

¹¹ For example, all these forms of journalism were still taught separately in the programs that I studied until 2015 as if the basic premises of radio or newspaper journalism were distinctly different.

Technology as enabling work – technology as broadening the field

Digital technology uncouples journalistic work more and more from the newsroom. While traditionally, journalistic practice also included periods spent outside of newsrooms (Usher, 2019, p. 99pp), doing the so-called “legwork” (Reich & Godler, 2017), ICTs allow anyone to work from anywhere for a newspaper, magazine or online blog (Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Perreault & Ferrucci, 2020). Even reporting for television or radio stations can, to some extent, be done with only minimal personal contact to the newsroom. Both hardware and software equipment has become more affordable and versatile, enabling one person to shoot, record, and edit her news stories independently, sometimes solely on her phone (Blankenship, 2016; Mills et al., 2012; Tara Marie Mortensen, 2014; T. J. Thomson, 2018; Wallace, 2009). Freelancers, for example, think it is essential to have the technological skills to remain self-reliant, especially in more technologically advanced production processes such as television or radio reporting (Örnebring, 2016, p. 103).

Digital technology can also greatly influence journalists’ researching and reporting practices. Social media have become an integral part of journalists’ everyday routine. They use them, for example, to observe specific topics while they are unfolding as well as just the general topics that seemed to be of interest at the moment. Newsrooms also employ social media to circumvent time and resource constraints as journalists can report on issues in different geographic localities without having to be at the site of occurrence (Bossio & Bebawi, 2016; Hernández-Fuentes & Monnier, 2020). Similarly, digital technology connects news organizations with reporters from remote areas. Put differently, atypical journalists these days can more easily connect with news outlets across the globe and thus broaden their network of customers regardless of where they live (Hellmueller et al., 2017; Hoag & Grzeslo, 2019; Maares & Putz, 2016).

Digital technologies have brought opportunities for atypical journalists, says Deuze (2007, p. 155): “For many of them, networked technologies, standardized software systems and the integration of newsflows across different media has potentially increased their chances of finding work, securing albeit temporary assignments, and working ‘on the go’”. For some atypical journalists, this also means greater editorial control because it enables them to decide which piece of work they want to sell ultimately. In a study on freelance photojournalists and their relationship with photo editors, Thomson (2018, p. 813), for example, concludes, “The remote working conditions of freelancers (...) meant

that they have much more control over which images they sent for review and were subsequently published”. In photojournalism, connecting with newsrooms through ICTs provides freelance photojournalists a safer and less intimidating environment. Moreover, ICTs have led to a democratization of photojournalism, offering anyone the opportunity to engage in such work (Aubert & Nicey, 2015; T. J. Thomson, 2018). While ICTs, in general, connect atypical journalists or people engaging in journalistic work with newsrooms, start-ups like *Upwork* or *Freelancer* have made these informal transaction labour markets more official (Hellmueller et al., 2017; Hoag & Grzeslo, 2019). They take on the role of a mediator and offer journalists an opportunity to pitch and sell work when their usual customers are slow or unreliable (Hoag & Grzeslo, 2019). Hellmueller and colleagues (2017) find that especially specialist topics such as human rights, environment, geopolitics, and religion are covered by journalists on these platforms, i.e., less time-sensitive and more in-depth investigated content.

At the same time, the broad accessibility of ICTs and publishing software has contributed to an increase in non-traditional journalistic formats in various forms of blogging, vlogging, podcasting, or micro-blogging on social media like Instagram or Twitter (Bruns & Highfield, 2012; Hermida, 2010). This shift offers new entrants the opportunity to engage in journalistic work, build a portfolio, and eventually contribute to journalism in a more traditional setting. For example, hyperlocal news blogs might be relatively inexpensive compared to printed hyperlocal newspapers (Harte et al., 2016). Simultaneously, this broadening of the field blurs the boundaries between different forms of communication and cultural production, prompting the question of which practices and actors can be considered journalistic (Deuze, 2007, pp. 154–161), especially regarding lifestyle-related blogs, vlogs and micro-blogs (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2011; Maares & Hanusch, 2020b). Thus, social media works as a “propellant” for this emerging form of journalistic work (Kus et al., 2017, p. 364). Here, new agents contribute both to more ‘hard’ journalistic beats or lifestyle topics in the form of blogging, be it on traditional weblogging sites like WordPress, specific platforms for audio or visual content like YouTube, Soundcloud or Flickr, or social media networks that enable micro-blogging forms like Twitter or Instagram. In addition, legacy media provide similar platforms to engage citizen participation. In these cases, new entrants can also contribute to legacy journalism.

Journalism research has often subsumed many of these new agents and their products as citizen journalists and user-generated content. Still, such a typology neither

considers the degree of professionalization some of them have nor their motivation to engage in journalistic work. For example, Aubert and Nicey (2015, p. 566) highlight that many of the young citizen photojournalists they interviewed are extremely professionalized with regard to their equipment and working routine, adapting to the “codes of the world of journalism”. Nicey (2016) refers to them as “semi-professional amateurs” (see also Tara M Mortensen et al., 2015). According to him, what they lack to be considered professional is their “low or inexistent income gained from their production” (Nicey, 2016, p. 231). It might therefore make sense to understand this work through a labour perspective (Fast et al., 2016): if and how much participants are paid and what motivates their participation can distinguish between those who pursue journalism as a hobby and those who aspire either to acquire experience or to land a job.

Similarly, Ahva (2017) finds that many contributors to such platforms cannot be considered amateurs. Her study on participatory journalistic practice at emerging journalism outlets concludes that contributors to such platforms include “young professionals, part-time journalists, freelance writers and photographers” (Ahva, 2017, p. 147). Others have also attempted to categorize the many different forms of audience participation and citizen journalism and conclude that “the relationship between professionalism and non-professionalism in the field of citizen journalism is not a matter of either/or” (Kus et al., 2017, p. 362). They find that both experienced and aspiring journalists participate in non-traditional, citizen journalism projects for various reasons. For example, more experienced journalists cannot let go of their journalistic identity after retiring or moving to a different occupation (see chapter four, p. 123). Aspiring journalists, on the other hand, are aware of the competitiveness of job entry and want to expand their experience and repertoire through such unpaid work. Kus and colleagues (2017, p. 368), therefore, conclude that whereas some citizen journalists “were striving towards the center of traditional journalism (...) others were keen to remain on the periphery”.

This, however, is met with less enthusiasm by journalists. In recent years, journalism research has investigated how journalists discursively draw the boundaries of the journalistic field and thus decide who could be considered a journalist. While some emerging organizations like news start-ups have slowly been accepted to the field (Stringer, 2018; Tandoc & Jenkins, 2017), individuals like bloggers are often discursively dismissed as unprofessional or perceived as a threat (Pirolli, 2017; Ryfe, 2019). Ferrucci and Vos (2017) show how digital journalists draw on organizational backing, journalistic

role perceptions and their daily routine to distinguish their work from that of bloggers and citizen journalists. Notably, these digital journalists are themselves rather ‘new’ entrants to the field and, to some extent, delegitimized (Siapera & Spyridou, 2012). Similarly, Örnebring (2013) reports that journalists draw on the long-standing credibility of journalistic organizations when comparing themselves with citizen journalists. Interestingly, here, their claims of legitimacy are “based on a comparison of the best from the journalists’ own side (...) with the worst from the other” (Örnebring, 2013, p. 47). Even when journalists themselves (micro-)blog, they dismiss those who have no or marginal organizational backing, especially in lifestyle journalism (Ferrucci & Vos, 2017; Pirolli, 2017). Here, journalistic identity is associated with full-time work and everyday journalistic routine¹².

Access to the field is also guarded through access to the newsroom as a space of journalistic legitimacy. For example, in her work on participatory journalism, Ahva (2017, p. 151) finds that the communication and organization between citizen journalists and the newsrooms were primarily ICT-mediated, and citizen journalism could therefore be considered an “online business” with minimal access to the physical newsroom:

“In fact, the newsrooms of *Voima* and *Cafebabel* were also physically rather hidden, which did not seem to invite visits. Most of the content-related participation in these newsrooms was thus enacted with the help of digital and mobile technology.”

Spatial belongingness can therefore also be considered a privilege. Lastly, this prompts the question of the newsroom as a physical place and space of belonging. While Usher (2019, p. 114) views the newsroom as a critical “material location” in journalistic work because it is a “central place for physical meetings with editors and colleagues and the principal site for communicating organizational culture”, it is also true that more and more journalists work outside of this material location (Deuze & Witschge, 2018). For example, Bunce, Wright and Scott (2018, p. 3383) explore how virtual newsrooms organize journalistic work. In their conceptualization, the journalistic newsroom can exist as a physical location, but it can also be perceived as “relative space” through the relative properties and access to resources that people in that space have. Moreover, the newsroom can be perceived as a “relational space”, that is, as the relationships and power relations that develop in such a space. While a physical workspace such as an office building provides access to diverse material resources, the virtual newsroom only exists

¹² Which bloggers could arguably also have and part-time journalists might not.

via one device and ‘only’ requires a stable internet connection. Moreover, relative space describes the diverse meanings a workspace can mean for different workers. In a virtual setting, this could relate to whether a journalist has “a slow internet connection, is logging in from a busy family holiday, has a precarious employment contract” (Bunce et al., 2018, p. 3383). The dimension of the relational space lastly describes the relationships and power relations that form in either a physical or virtual workplace and how relationships that formed in one place easily migrate to the other, excluding, for instance, those who have no presence in the newsroom or participate less in the virtual room through chatting and connecting. The virtual newsroom does indeed offer what a place-based newsroom does to some extent – a space to coordinate and organize everyday journalistic practice (see also Perreault & Ferrucci, 2020). Moreover, it offers a sense of belonging and the opportunity to connect. At the same time, it can blur the boundaries of personal and professional time and contribute to work stress, as the next section shows.

Technology as constrainer – technological influence from the technological field

Digital technology has, however, also been perceived as a constraining force on journalistic work. The ever-present stream of information provided through news-tickers, news channels, and finally also social media (Hermida, 2010) has been described as contributing to time pressure (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2009) as well as copy-paste and churnalism (Jackson & Moloney, 2016; Saridou et al., 2017), algorithms and web analytics impact the selection and filtering of news and has been linked to clickbait content (Bakker, 2012). Similarly, the virtual accessibility of content management systems (CMS) shape where and how journalists work, contributing to a feeling of being ‘always on’. Cohen (Cohen, 2019) finds that eliminating space constraints has led digital newsrooms to demand more and more content. Here, journalists talk of multi-tasking, being ever-present and needing to produce numerous small pieces in one day instead of focusing on one or two stories per day:

“For most digital journalists, work time and non-work time blur, as they are tethered to smartphones from the moment they wake up until the moment they go to sleep. They are expected to work from any location, be enmeshed in current conversations on social media, and be available to work is and when news breaks.” (Cohen, 2019, p. 582)

Therefore, it is not surprising that journalists attribute great influence over their workday to technology: “In journalists’ own account of changes in their work, technology occupies a central place – even *the* central place. Journalists in general view technology as an

inevitable, impersonal force that directly causes many of the changes taking place within journalism.” (Örnebring, 2016, p. 25). Örnebring (2016) argues this could be explained by the pervasiveness of technology in journalists’ everyday work. This, again, speaks to the understanding that technology alone is less influential but could be considered more of a mediator of other influences, often economic ones.

Digital technology influences journalistic practice in numerous ways. For example, mobile devices and social media contribute to “job enlargement” (Beam & Meeks, 2011, p. 232) of journalists everyday practice. They are required to take on a larger variety of tasks such as tailoring news stories to social media platforms, life-blogging and -tweeting of evolving events (Matheson & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020; Perreault & Ferrucci, 2020; Thurman & Schapals, 2016), as well as editing news from the website to have it published in next day’s print version. Here, even though “technology has become an ever-present part of processing/editing activities in journalism” (Lewis & Westlund, 2015, p. 31), the job enlargement is not necessarily only a result of said technology. Instead of hiring journalists just for specific new tasks, media organizations collapse job profiles and journalists are required to provide a much larger skill-set (Cohen, 2019; Deuze, 2007), especially regarding multimedia content. Here, they might also need to produce visual, audio, or video content. This switching between formats and platforms adds to journalists’ workload as they need to do it all in one. Beam and Meek (2011) report findings from US American surveys showing that journalists creating additional digital forms of content express an increased workload and argue this might contribute to an increasing threat to journalism’s professional autonomy and public service mission. Accordingly, journalists who perceive their workload to have increased also report significantly lower autonomy in their ability to get a subject covered and freedom to select stories to work on. However, it did not affect the freedom to decide which aspects to emphasize. Moreover, especially more experienced journalists exhibit frustration with the additional tasks to everyday journalistic practice introduced through digital technology (Perreault & Stanfield, 2019; Robinson, 2011). In a study on how travel journalists position themselves vis-à-vis bloggers, Pirolli (2017) finds that travel journalists reject audience engagement, social media usage, search engine optimization (SEO) and other additional tasks as unnecessary.

Following my argument from the first chapter (p. 40), digital technology could be perceived as cultural products from a technological field. Such products include social media and algorithms shaping the visibility of journalistic content on social media, search

engines, the news website, and programs computing how an article, video, or podcast clicks. As products of the technological field, these products follow the specific nomos of the technological field, which might be in contrast to the journalistic nomos of a specific societal mission. For example, as for-profit enterprises, social media follow a commercial logic. Here, connectivity, attention and popularity are key values that decide how content is filtered and visible to users (van Dijck, 2013). As such, they favour those posts and users who are well-connected, popular and draw attention which might conflict with normative ideals of journalism.

As a result, and depending on other, often economic influences, technological tools like web analytics and internal means of metrification can shape journalistic work (Örnebring, 2016, pp. 83–85; Tandoc, 2014). Here, audiences and whether they are perceived as “passive recipients”, “aggregated commodities for media advertisers”, or “active participants” (Lewis & Westlund, 2015, pp. 25–26) determine how journalists work with and think about such technology. Unsurprisingly, journalists working in digital newsrooms have more access to these metrics and use them more in everyday practice (Cohen, 2019; Hanusch, 2017). Similarly, journalists in more competitive and more consumer-oriented markets integrate such tools into their working routine (Hanusch, 2017; Tandoc, 2014).

Cohen (2019) concludes from such observations that web analytics contribute to an obsession with metrics and, at the same time, an increasing commodification of journalistic work. Research shows that measurability changes the way journalists think of their story, for instance, by thinking of the headline first, selecting similar topics and choosing specific visuals to attract attention (Cohen, 2019; Lamot & Paulussen, 2020; Tandoc, 2014). Similarly, Hanusch (2017) reports that journalists’ use of web analytics leads to day-parting, describing how editors and journalists try to have specific stories publishable at a particular time to reach the largest audience possible. This is perpetuated through “platform-parting” (Hanusch, 2017, p. 1581) or playing by the affordances of a specific platform on which journalistic content is published. Platform-parting also entails understanding or imagining different platforms’ algorithms (Bucher, 2017; Mansell, 2012). All of this contributes to a “functional differentiation” of journalistic work, fragmenting journalistic cultures into more and more fine-grained sub-cultures. At the same time, web analytics affect how journalists assess their work, as good numbers are perceived well in the newsroom and connect self-worth with well-received stories (Christin, 2017; Cohen, 2019).

While web analytics provide journalists with information on which stories are well-received by their audience, social media offer a continuous stream of publicly available information or as means to connect with audiences and disseminate content through an additional outlet (Barnard, 2016; Hermida, 2010; Lasorsa et al., 2012; Molyneux & Mourão, 2019). Most journalism research has predominantly focused on journalists' use of Twitter (Goggin, 2020; Lewis & Molyneux, 2018), but some survey research has explored how journalists think of social media in general and its role in their routine. Findings show that journalists frequently use social media such as Twitter, Facebook and collective knowledge platforms like Wikipedia and that this use has increased over the years (Bossio & Bebawi, 2016; Djerf-Pierre et al., 2016; Willnat & Weaver, 2018). However, when journalists are asked to assess how valuable social media are for their daily tasks, journalists do not think of social media as useful (Djerf-Pierre et al., 2016). Furthermore, they claim to be sceptical about the quality of information they find through social media research (Bossio & Bebawi, 2016).

Moreover, the perceived value of social media has decreased over the years, as Djerff-Pierre, Ghersetti and Hedman (2016) find in their longitudinal study. What has increased is the “strong organizational pressures to be active in social media experienced by many journalists” (Djerf-Pierre et al., 2016, p. 858). At the same time, Australian journalists surveyed by Bossio and Bebawi (2016) report that they use social media primarily to save time and quickly find information. This finding is in line with a study by Willnat and Weaver (2018), who also find that 62 per cent of journalists say social media allows them to be faster in reporting news stories. At the same time, they also acknowledge that social media does not necessarily improve their productivity. Social media is also used to monitor other journalists and news companies. While journalists, in general, take advantage of the possibilities these digital tools offer them, they are also aware of the downsides: “many of the journalists we interviewed through that the growing use of social media in journalism has sacrificed accuracy and speed and that user-generated content might threaten the integrity of journalism.” (Willnat & Weaver, 2018, p. 903).

Digital Capital, digital habitus, and symbolic capital

The literature review so far shows that journalists react to and use digital technology differently. Considering this through a Bourdieusian perspective, we can argue that it

might be of value to learn and embrace new tools in their practice for different journalists in different positions. Such a perspective would consider the embodied knowledge about specific technologies as a form of capital, and eventually as a form of habitus (see chapter 1, p. 42), and the effects this might generate in the field as the symbolic capital of specific digital knowledge. For example, essential digital capital like understanding and being able to use digital technology like basic word processing software is as essential as general and specific knowledge to enter the journalistic field. On the other hand, knowing how to edit audio, photos and video could be an advantage in the struggle over positions. In the current age of big data, it might even be more valuable to know how to code, use statistical software, or newly emerging technology such as automation to scrape, analyze and write (De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019; Wu et al., 2019b). Similarly, being aware of and knowing how to use social media and garner large numbers of followers might be an advantage in the competition over audience engagement (Holton, 2016; Molyneux et al., 2019; Molyneux & Holton, 2015) as well as story sourcing (Perreault & Ferrucci, 2020; Siapera & Spyridou, 2012) and peer recognition (Olausson, 2018; Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a).

As discussed in the previous chapter (p. 62), de Vuyst and Raeymaeckers (2019) conceptualize computer skills, social media skills, audio-visual editing and mobile technology skills as digital capital that offers journalists an advantage. This includes being aware of the different possible technologies and what can be done with them as well as actually being able to use them. It also includes having access to technology. Knowing how to use technology is usually not dichotomous but could be considered a spectrum. For example, thinking of the most commonly used word editing programs, users could a) not be aware of them, b) know how to open, type, and save their writing, c) be aware that they can change font type, font-size and the general layout, or, d) even know of more advanced shortcuts for editing and moving text around and so on. De Vuyst and Raeymaeckers (2019) further distinguish between more exceptional, and thus more valued, and more common forms of digital capital. Programming, coding, and development design are perceived as more advanced and thus more valuable among journalists. In their study, respondents referred to these skills as ‘hard skills’ and attributed them high symbolic capital because of their scarcity. Commonplace forms of digital capital, on the other hand, were using spreadsheets, producing and editing videos or photographs. For freelancers and atypical journalists, having more advanced digital skills can be advantageous in the job market.

However, in interviews, journalists often claim that digital capital is more an “essential add-on to the toolbox of journalists (De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019, p. 560), and traditional journalistic skills are still as relevant. Depending on the newsroom culture and hierarchies, “new” forms of reporting and too much focus on digital skills could be a disadvantage for marginalized journalists. For example, research on mobile journalism continuously reports that journalists writ large believe having a more limited number of tasks results in better and more professional journalism (Blankenship, 2016; Kumar & Mohamed Haneef, 2018; Salzmann et al., 2021). Journalists who report, edit and produce (audio)visual journalism all at once have to focus on their journalistic skills like observing, listening and asking follow-up questions as well as on sound, audio, lighting, composition and more. Blankenship (2016, p. 1067) describes this as distinguishing between different brains, a “photographer brain and a reporter brain”. Similarly, journalists believe computational skills are relevant but so are knowing and following journalistic norms. Here, journalists draw and maintain the boundaries and, as such, uphold their journalistic authority (Carlson, 2016). Wu, Tandoc and Salmon (2019b) explored how journalists think about automation and computational skills and found that both sceptics and enthusiasts believe journalistic skills should be the primary concern of journalists.

While knowledge about digital technology and digital skills have been conceptualized as capital, others have referred to digital habitus or tried to capture journalists’ use of digital technology through the idea of practical sense (see chapter one, p. 38). In more mobile and multimodal media, having a diverse skill set and a “feel for the game”, a practical sense, that is, a habitus attuned to the digital environment and the slight differences of different distribution channels can be an advantage as well. For example, journalists in newly converged newsrooms have to acquire the tacit knowledge of whether a story would work better in print or audio format and how this shapes the production, which can be quite challenging to foster (Ferrucci et al., 2017). Powers and Vera-Zambrano (2018a) argue that such effortless shifting between different platforms takes time to be acquired into journalists’ practical sense. Therefore, adapting existing routines to new technology happens more quickly compared to new or uncommon purposes. Similarly, young, digital-native journalists tend to be more attuned to mobile journalism, as using mobile devices is part of their embodied history (Ibrahim, 2015; Perreault & Stanfield, 2019).

In their study on French and US American journalists' use of social media, Powers and Vera-Zambrano (2018a) show that journalists in both countries use social media as a place for inspiration, to access information, follow trending topics, monitor officials and observe other journalists and media. Interestingly, most respondents said they use social media because their peers do. This also shapes how they learned to use this technology: in an informal, autodidact way. While they are aware that they could employ social media for other purposes, only a few use them to connect with audiences or brand themselves. These routines thus extend what journalists have integrated into their habitus throughout their professional life. Their "practical sensibilities are shaped by both long-term social learning (e.g., how to report a story, which influences how they understand social media's potential) and regular interactions with colleagues, which incentivizes and shapes technology use" (Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a, p. 2735). Similarly, Barnard (2016) argues that social media use, especially Twitter, slowly transforms journalists' habitus and how they perceive the world. However, this transformation and how journalists use social media are also shaped by their position in the field, as especially more well-established journalists are less inclined to use the reciprocal affordances of social media (Groshek & Tandoc, 2017; Olausson, 2018).

Social media use is often linked to different forms of capital to advance one's position in the field. Knowing how to use different social media has been conceptualized as digital capital (Barnard, 2016; De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019). As a technology connecting different users, social media use has been conceptualized as social capital (Maares, Lind, et al., 2021; Siapera & Spyridou, 2012). Lastly, as platforms contributing to peer recognition and public renown, they have been thought of as creating symbolic effects (Barnard, 2016; Maares, Lind, et al., 2021).

Social media has been studied as a means for journalists to brand themselves and their work to audiences and subsequently within the newsroom. Much of this work has focused on self-branding practices on Twitter and predominantly on media systems with a profound commercially competitive environment like the US (Holton, 2016; Molyneux et al., 2019); Australia (Hanusch & Bruns, 2017), the UK (Simon, 2019), and the Netherlands (Brems et al., 2017). In times of uncertainty, journalists realized that directly reaching their audiences might be beneficial; they "become household names with whom it is easy to communicate" (Brems et al. 2016, 2). In their study on health journalists and how they use social media to brand themselves, Molyneux and Holton (2015) find that journalists imitate behaviour that has also been described by scholars of influencers and

other bloggers (Leaver et al., 2019; Maares, Banjac, et al., 2021; Olausson, 2018). They build intimate relationships with their audience directly, which creates tension with their news organizations and shifts their loyalty towards the audience. Journalists can thus increase their market value because they attract audiences to their work and organization. Moreover, social media can create ‘buzz’ and make others aware of one’s work (M. Scott, 2012). Thus, for freelancers, self-branding offers an opportunity to stay in contact with (potential) employers and advertise their work both to media companies and audiences.

Again, comparative research suggests different adaptations of social media to foster social and symbolic capital, even across countries that are culturally and economically similar. For example, comparing journalists’ self-branding on Twitter in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK, Hanusch (2018) finds that UK journalists employ Twitter distinctly different to curate their identity. UK journalists emphasize their corporate identity, possibly because the pronounced competitiveness of the UK market might “lead journalists to focus more strongly on a corporate identity as they feed off, as well as contribute to their employer’s brand” (Hanusch, 2018, p. 1501). Similarly, Powers and Vera-Zambrano (2018a) observe that while social media are used in France and the USA to garner peer recognition, how it is done differs. US American journalists are expected to use social media, and it is viewed as a tool to differentiate oneself as tech and media-savvy; thus, social media are often used by entrants and aspiring journalists and less by established journalists to make ‘a name’. Here, social media are used as a tool to reach audiences, hit specific numbers and make larger accounts aware of one’s work. On the other hand, French journalists employ social media to stay up-to-date among peers to ensure their stories are exclusive and thus eventually well-received. Here, audience engagement is not relevant to garner peer recognition and is thus also not expected. In the USA, declining audience numbers are perceived as individual problems that each journalist can solve by engaging directly with audiences. In France, it is viewed as an organizational problem that news organizations have to solve.

However, research also indicates that not all journalists have equal opportunity to reach peer recognition on social media. Social media like Twitter reproduce and perpetuate existing relationships and hierarchies within the journalistic field (Hanusch & Nölleke, 2019; Usher et al., 2018). A study investigating how journalists interact on Twitter based on their professional reputation shows that less-known journalists failed in their quest for social validation. However, these aspiring and less well-recognized journalists “sought to engage with journalists of a higher professional reputation to

broaden their network and to be recognized by the important players of the field” (Maares, Lind, et al., 2021, p. 512). This, in part, contradicts journalistic discourse that aspiring journalist should create their own brand to reach success in a highly competitive field (Langeder, 2012; Lorenz, 2018; C. Scott, 2016). Similarly, Simon (2019) cautions media organizations to rely too heavily on such metrics to evaluate their employees as this might enhance existing structural inequalities. His study shows that journalists and their posts achieve popularity if they have been on Twitter for some time (early adapters), work for an outlet with national reach, and do not follow many others. Moreover, focusing too much on social media metrics as an indicator of success also posits journalists more closely in competition, especially as it becomes harder and harder to gain visibility and a following through self-branding on social media (Duffy, 2017).

Economic influences

As was already insinuated in the first part of this chapter, the ways in which technology is adapted and adopted to journalistic practice is also shaped by economic influences. As discussed in chapter two (p. 47), the journalistic field is predominantly oriented towards audiences outside of the field. It is, therefore, a more heteronomous field and more susceptible to external forces. In contemporary capitalist societies, these external forces are often of economic nature. But again, economic forces do not shape journalistic work alone; they are interrelated with technological transformations and political powers (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). For example, political forces can protect journalistic organizations from commercial influences through regulation or prevent critical reporting by owning or funding media organizations. Similarly, technology can contribute to economically induced transformations of the field, for example, by “increas[ing] standardization and organizational control over work” (Örnebring, 2016, p. 88). As such, digital technology can contribute to the downsizing of newsrooms through routinization and central organization. Örnebring (2016) argues that this interrelation of economic forces and digital technology lands on fertile soil in the journalistic field and its discourses around speed. Speed is framed in the journalistic community as a key value of journalistic and professional success; news, periodicity, and speed have historically been connected through the “interplay between technology and liberal capitalism” (Örnebring, 2016, p. 28).

Nevertheless, economic influences are hardly applicable only to the journalistic field; other fields of cultural production are similarly affected, such as other media work and academia and higher education (Allmer, 2018; Deuze, 2007). However, the normative ideal of the journalistic field, its *nomos*, is often articulated around the ideal of providing a function to society and thus closely linked to discourses of autonomy despite the heteronomy of the field (Örnebring et al., 2016). Here, journalism has traditionally been perceived as inconceivable with economic ideals and profit-making, even though profit has always been at the heart of journalistic production (Ryfe, 2021). This chapter will trace this tension between journalism as good of merit and economic good and how such an understanding might be problematic in an age of information affluence. This is followed by a discussion of transformations of the field induced by an economic rationale, including how an economic logic first established professional structures and then later demolished these through outsourcing and downsizing. Finally, the chapter will end focusing on (perceived) economic influences on the micro-level and how these affect journalists' view of the audience, their role perception (*habitus*), and perception of journalistic autonomy (*doxa*).

Journalistic products as economic goods

The journalistic field is a field of cultural production, and most of the products created through journalistic practice have traditionally been considered economic goods as they were sold and bought for consumption. Accordingly, Nielsen (2016, p. 51) argues, “journalism as we know it has developed with a particular business, the business of news”. Therefore, from an economic perspective, news and journalistic products are a commodity “shaped by forces of supply and demand” (Hamilton, 2004, p. 7). However, these goods have specific characteristics that make it necessary to fund them through various resources.

First, creating journalistic content requires an infrastructure of material resources and employees researching, reporting, editing and distributing. Thus, journalistic cultural goods entail comparatively high fixed costs. The first copy of every newspaper, radio show, or single article is relatively expensive compared to every next copy (Hamilton, 2004; Nielsen, 2016). Second, the journalistic field commodifies (researched and contextualized) information, which differs from other economic goods in its consumption. Economic theory describes journalistic goods as non-rivalrous (and in some

cases non-exclusive) public goods, as well as experience and credence goods (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1995). As public goods, one news story can be accessed and consumed by numerous people without lessening the product and in some cases, consumers can even obtain information without having to pay for it. As experience goods, audiences can assess the quality or value of a news story only after consumption. Journalism or news as such is thus not of one particular quality. In fact, news stories are “highly differentiated products that can vary along many dimensions” (Hamilton, 2004, p. 9)(Hamilton 2003, 9). Lastly, as credence goods, consumers have no means to evaluate the accuracy of an article thoroughly and thus have to trust that the information presented in a news story has been truthfully investigated and reported (McManus, 1995). As a result, consumers turn to other means to assess the quality of information, for example, the credibility of specific genres or the reputation of specific brand names (McManus, 1995). Here, the profession also draws on autonomy as a key marker of distinction – both from other distributors of information outside the journalistic field, for example, politicians and companies, and within the field (Carlson, 2017, pp. 37–40). These specific characteristics of journalistic goods shape how the production of such goods is funded and the role played by journalistic work.

Therefore, the journalistic field encompasses media organizations that produce and sell information goods, as well as individuals who partake in such production with their time-labour and who (most of the time) get remunerated. Employing a business logic to the production and distribution of journalistic products has “simultaneously sustained and constrained journalism” (Nielsen, 2016, p. 51), as it provides news organizations, newsrooms and journalists autonomy from the political field and the field of power in general. Yet, at the same time, it has made it more susceptible to economic influences, especially in information-rich environments and competitive markets. Media organizations cater their products to audiences, who, as consumers and users, spend money and time by reading, listening to, or watching a news story. Here, in a “wider ‘attention economy’” (Nielsen, 2016, p. 52), news organizations compete over audiences’ attention with other, in some cases much more entertaining, media. As such, audience attention is one of the critical markers of economic success in the journalistic business. However, while audiences as consumers are often perceived as the primary market for news production, journalistic work is shaped by four markets of value creation (McManus, 1995, p. 305): audiences, advertisers, owners and investors, and lastly, sources. Audiences trade their attention and, in some cases, a subscription or payment for

journalistic content. Advertisers pay for the visibility of their product and access to the audience, in the digital age also access to trace data (Nielsen, 2016). Owners and investors provide specific infrastructure and organization of everyday work in exchange for revenues. And lastly, sources trade their information in exchange for visibility but also access to the audiences, and in some rare cases, for financial remuneration.

In addition, journalistic goods have continuously been funded through resources other than just selling the product to consumers (Nielsen, 2016; Picard, 2004). According to Picard (2016, p. 148), “[j]ournalism has never been a commercially viable product”. Traditionally, journalism has been financed through public or state-supported funding, as in the case of public service broadcast or cross-funded through advertising and payment or subscription (McManus, 1992; P. C. Murschetz, 2020; L. Scott, 1963). Regardless, the historical development of approaching journalistic production as a business has embedded an economic logic within the routines of journalistic practice. Ryfe (2021) argues that periodicity, facticity, efficiency and exclusivity, all key drivers of journalistic practice, have evolved exactly *because* the journalistic practice has been conceived as a business. As such, he objects to the arguments from market theorists like McManus (1995, p. 308), who describes the principle norms of journalism – “to inform” – and business – “to maximize profits” – as opposing each other.

While it is true that these dual objectives have long shaped the journalistic discourse and how news organizations and journalists alike have positioned themselves vis-à-vis business practices and commercialism, this separation is slowly dissolving even in news organizations with high symbolic capital such as the *New York Times* or *Guardian* (Coddington, 2015; Cornia et al., 2020; Ferrer-Conill, 2016). However, the boundary between economic and journalistic interests had protected journalists from commercial interests, argues Coddington (2015, p. 79): “As the wall slowly declines in professional importance, it is imperative that journalists develop and defend a less fraught and more robust set of norms that safeguard the profession’s integrity and autonomy amid powerful commercial forces and an increasingly skeptical public.”

Similarly, Picard (2014) argues that in contemporary societies, news organizations cannot flee the dominant economic logic, or in Bourdieusian terms, the economic doxa. Moreover, news organizations exist in a market that has always been marked by competitiveness – competition over audience attention, competition over exclusive news and scoops, competition over advertising shares (Beam, 1998; Picard, 2005; Ryfe, 2021; L. Scott, 1963). Such a competitive marketplace has been considered a strategy to ensure

media companies serve the public and “increase the possibilities for variety and diversity in content” (Picard, 2005, p. 339). As such, media companies are first and foremost economic businesses, and all of them are market-oriented to some degree, even public service broadcasters.

Instead of conceptualizing market-orientation as a binary category, Beam (1998) opted to think of a spectrum of market-orientation with different degrees. On one side, the extreme poles would be news organizations who primarily focus on providing a service to their community and on the other side organizations who primarily concentrate on maximizing their profit (Beam, 1998, 2001). However, news organizations also tend to be more market-oriented when they perceive their environments as more competitive to decrease uncertainty (Beam, 2001). Furthermore, market orientation perceives audiences as customers instead of citizens, which would speak more to the societal mission of journalism (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018). Market orientation is then based on knowing the specific range of customers, their needs and preferences, letting employers know about them, and acting accordingly (Beam, 2001). Thus, according to the degree to which a news organization collects and assesses audience preferences, disseminates them among managers, editors-in-chief or the entire newsroom, and adapts its content to these preferences, we can speak of more weak or strong market-oriented news media.

Therefore, while autonomy is central to journalists’ collective identity and thus also boundary work, in practice, nearly all news organizations are subject to market pressure, “they are not immune from the economy” (Carlson, 2017, p. 38). Any project needs funding to establish its foundations, remunerate its producers and journalists, and eventually re-invest capital to be sustainable. Studies on the sustainability of journalism start-ups show that projects with less focus on the entrepreneurial part are more likely to fail, even though having a business plan does not mean immediate success (Achtenhagen, 2017; Bruno & Nielsen, 2012; Buschow, 2020). For example, Porlezza and Splendore (2016) show how crowdfunding does not remove journalistic work and journalistic products from the competitive marketplace.

Digitization, in general, has generated more competition over audience attention and advertising budgets as more and more agents entered the journalistic field and the broader field of cultural production in the form of entertainment. Here, the lack of regulation has led to a disruption of steady advertising revenues compared to the introduction of commercial broadcast (Nielsen, 2016). At the same time, corporations from the technological field add to this competition, as they provide users with new forms

of infrastructure like social media and search engines. With audiences staying on these platforms longer, advertisers are more inclined to buy space there than on news websites (Mansell, 2012; Nielsen, 2016). In journalistic discourse, the current crisis of journalism, job loss and newspaper closure is often associated with declining advertising revenue online and the impossibility of getting audiences to pay for news online. It is therefore associated with technological influences. However, commercialization, decreasing staff and changes in content have started much earlier.

The transformation of the journalistic labour market

Even though transformations in journalistic fields “are not identical or even necessarily running parallel from country to country, as inherited market structures, varying preferences and regulatory frameworks have shaped the news business in different ways” (Nielsen, 2016, p. 52), commercialization and media concentration can be observed globally. Economic influences within the journalistic field are thus also a reflection of the dominance of economic logic and capital in the social space at large (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 29–45, 94–105). Moreover, competitiveness is embedded into the logic of journalism as a business. As such, news organizations that did not succeed in drawing more audiences to their products than their direct competitors have always succumbed unless publicly funded. Scott (1963) described how newspapers competing in the same audience and advertising markets would eventually lead to monopolies of those succeeding in the struggle. These monopolies enabled large media companies to merge content creation, packaging, distribution, and place of consumption in one organization (Picard, 2005; Salamon, 2016).

Moreover, in the second half of the 20th century, news organizations in the US, but also France and other European countries, have become a place of investment, attracting external investors due to high revenues made through advertising (Chalaby, 2005; McManus, 1995; Picard, 2005). This eventually emphasized the business aspect of the news business, accelerating market-driven and commercialized news production (Cohen, 2016; McManus, 1994). Growth and expansion have historically led to the routinization of journalistic work and stable employment conditions (Cohen, 2016; Örnebring, 2010). At the same time, the focus on advertising revenues has always represented a risk for the sustainability of the business. With the emergence of each new news provider, first cable television, and the worldwide web, information is now widely accessible, but the

audiences' attention span remains the same. This leads to a fragmentation of the audience, declining advertising revenues and eventually fewer resources to invest into news production (Nielsen, 2016).

From an entrepreneurial perspective, news organizations thus have to decrease production costs to maintain profit margins. As described before, journalistic news production is characterized by high fixed and low variable costs. This is even more true in the digital age, where copying and distribution costs have plummeted (Picard 2016). As such, labour is most costly, especially as media owners cannot reduce it quickly. Any newsroom, regardless of the size of its audience, depends on some amount of gathering and processing news. Media organizations have long begun to manage these fixed labour costs by merging newsrooms, converging news production, and reducing staff. The first large group that became redundant due to technological change were printers whose labour could be automated in the 1908s (Lee-Wright, 2012). This was followed by reducing expensive in-house productions and merging newsrooms of different outlets of the same monopoly (Ferrucci et al., 2017; Picard, 2005). Newsroom and media convergence are also used to reduce costs, that is, the institutionalized practice to exchange, repurpose, and promote journalistic products across outlets of the same monopoly or within a network of media companies (Deuze, 2007). Here, technology is employed as a tool of efficiency, streamlining old structures and making human-power redundant (Picard, 2005). Digitally produced journalistic content can be stored more sufficiently in databases and shared across different outlets of the same media conglomerate. Lastly, legal loopholes allow media monopolies to acquire the rights to news articles bought from freelancers. This means that they can re-use them across their media syndicate and sell these pieces to other news outlets (Salamon, 2016).

Such processes also affect journalists' working conditions. In scholarship, the 2008 financial crisis and recession are often named causes of massive journalistic labour market transformations (c.f. Nikunen, 2014). However, casualization of work and increasing numbers of freelancers have started earlier than the financial crisis (Salamon, 2019). Even before the 2008 recession, Deuze (2007, p. 147) argues that media organizations weaken union work and lead to the corrosion of working conditions "by shifting towards a model of individualized and contingent contracts". Perceiving news work as a lucrative form of investment has slowly led to an environment of "flexibilized production" (Cohen, 2016, p. 77). As a result, more and more labour has been outsourced over the years. Whereas outsourcing has been a reaction to high labour costs, it also offers

employers the opportunity to circumvent labour regulation, collective labour agreements and unionization attempts (Örnebring & Ferrer-Conill, 2016). For example, reporting can be outsourced overseas, as can (sub-)editing, transcribing, layout and design work and the cheap production of content optimized to keyword searchers (Bakker, 2012; Cohen, 2015a). Moreover, on a global market, content is then remunerated for a fraction of the cost, even less than what it would have costed before when outsourced to local professional freelancers, transcribers or translators. Similarly, citizen journalism and UGC contribute to the casualization of work, especially in photojournalism (Aubert & Nicey, 2015; Compton & Benedetti, 2010; Tara Marie Mortensen, 2014).

These transformations occur even in countries with relatively strong labour and employment laws. In her study focusing on Finnish journalism, Nikunen (2014) shows that the labour market transformations are similar to other countries. Newsrooms are merged, leading to a decreasing specialization and multi-skilling of journalistic staff so that fewer employees can produce more content on varying topics for different outlets (see also Deuze, 2007; Picard, 2005). Moreover, staff is laid-off and casualized, transferring the risks of the journalistic business onto the individual (Cohen et al., 2019; Henninger & Gottschall, 2007). Cohen and colleagues (2019) thus argue that the journalistic labour market is increasingly flexible, however, only benefitting employers' flexibility. For example, in her work on freelancers in conflict reporting, Palmer (2015) shows that news organizations favour freelancers and stringers as the cheaper solution. Moreover, they tend to work independently, and risks and protection can equally be outsourced. Here, global journalism start-ups like Upwork contribute to the redundancy of employed correspondents (Hellmueller et al., 2017; Hoag & Grzeslo, 2019). The risks are transferred to the individual, increasing the competition among different individual content producers. This encompasses declining wages making these casualized workers especially prone to commercial influences (Cohen, 2015a).

Thus, commercial influences shape the size of the newsrooms and concomitantly journalistic content (Ferrucci, 2015; Ferrucci et al., 2017). With the number of employed staff decreasing, newsroom journalists still have to cover the same spectrum of topics (Deuze, 2007, pp. 147–149). For example, newspapers in the Netherlands have long turned to freelancers to produce in-depth features and specials (Bakker, 2012). Lee-Wright (2012) thus describes how casualization affects both employed and freelance journalists as well as mentoring processes in the socialization of young journalists. Accordingly, employed journalists are desk-bound and increasingly adopt the role of

managing and editing outsourced content (see also Cohen, 2012). On the other hand, contingent and precariously employed journalists have no desk of their own and have to work on flexible workstations or ‘hot-desks’. Such ‘hot-desking’ leads to difficulties understanding the specific rules of the journalistic game (Lee-Wright, 2012; Steensen, 2018).

Moreover, to attract larger audiences, news production includes more and more entertaining content and soft news (Beam, 2003; McManus, 1995), as well as more sensational news (Picard, 2005). More recently, a longitudinal study of German news describes a shift towards more entertaining and soft news across broadsheet, tabloid newspapers and public service news (Karidi, 2017). More market-oriented news organizations also tend to report less controversial information to attract a broader audience, which may lead to relevant criticism not being included if the opinion or taste of the audience is expected to be different. For example, by comparing newsrooms with different degrees of market-orientation, Ferrucci (2015) finds that issues of race were perceived as too controversial for a more strongly market-oriented outlet as they might drive audiences away. Similarly, monopolies’ syndicating and sharing practices lead to more of the same content and a homogenization across different media outlets (McManus, 1995). A strong market-orientation has traditionally been associated with adverse influences on journalistic work and the journalistic product. However, Ferrucci (2018) also found that a weak market-orientation can hinder innovation and risk-taking, as the journalistic outlet is mainly financed through funding and (maybe) subscription and therefore often does not have much room for manoeuvre.

All this has led new actors to accept that journalism is a business and to embrace the entrepreneurial part while at the same time producing journalism that speaks to its societal role (Beam & Meeks, 2011; Ryfe, 2021). Such entrepreneurial start-ups are not rejecting the market-orientation of news per se. Nevertheless, they view the increasing degree of market-orientation towards short-term profits without re-investment into the journalistic product as critical. Wagemans and colleagues (2016) explore the French start-up *Mediapart*, which achieved financial sustainability through exclusive and investigative reporting. Start-ups have been a reaction to downsizing and commercialization at legacy media and few job opportunities for new entrants (Powers & Vera Zambrano, 2016). Therefore, many entrepreneurial journalism projects frame themselves as opposing legacy media to bring back ‘good old journalism’ even though, in many cases, they resemble traditional media (Wagemans et al., 2016).

Similarly, Usher (2017) shows venture-backed journalism start-ups believe they offer better journalistic products. Overall, these new attempts aimed to reinvigorate the traditional journalistic doxa to some extent – such as “the importance of the traditional function of journalism to inform, to orient, and to engage” (Usher, 2017, p. 1124). As such, it is no surprise that more recently, entrepreneurial journalism also focuses on offering fact-checking to counteract mis- and disinformation and correcting traditional legacy journalism (Singer, 2018). However, not all start-ups necessarily care about content and providing ‘good’ journalism – as research shows (Baack, 2018; Cheruiyot et al., 2019; Usher, 2017), some of them also aim to develop and offer specific technology to make journalistic practice better. There is often hope voiced that the “new intermediaries” (Bilton, 2019, p. 99) or parajournalists (Cohen, 2019) such as news aggregators and social media might offer a chance to reinvigorate and reinvent journalism. Bilton (2019), for instance, sees an opportunity in crowdfunding news organizations, such as the UK organization *Byline*, which directly connect journalists with their audiences and helps to fund investigative reporting. For this, journalists, just like any media producer, have to adapt and understand “that media production is no longer simply a matter of producing great content. Media producers must take in the whole value chain and reclaim their relationship with media consumers.” (Bilton, 2019, pp. 107–108). However, such an understanding assumes that audiences a) are interested in the content and b) have the time and economic resources to fund and follow ongoing investigations, for instance. The 2021 termination of the international arm of the Dutch *De Correspondent* shows that it is not that easy to foster such dedication from audiences. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic shows that in times of crisis, audiences tend to turn to established and often-times regional news media (Newman et al., 2020) and might have to cancel their almost philanthropist media subscriptions due to “increased insecurity in their personal financial situation.” (Pfauth & Wijnberg, 2020).

Economic influences on individual journalists

Commercialization and strong market-orientation also influence journalists’ and their practice on an individual level. Research has long described how the deterioration of stable working environments transfers risk onto the individual journalists, which is also expressed in the self-motivated multi-skilling to remain employable (Compton & Benedetti, 2010; Deuze, 2007; Sennett, 1998). Moreover, Cohen (2016, 2019) describes a

shift towards perceiving the single journalistic article as a product. In the digital age, each news piece will be evaluated on its performance and is expected to draw audiences. This results in the individual journalist feeling “responsible for the profitability of their company” (Cohen, 2019, p. 583). On the individual level, research has focused chiefly on how perceived economic influences affect journalists’ perception of autonomy, their role in society and their satisfaction with their work. For example, studies show that casualization shapes the extent to which journalists can afford critical and in-depth reporting, their relationship with public relations professionals, and their dependence on so-called freebies (Hanusch et al., 2020; Rosenkranz, 2016). Moreover, commercial interests and advertising considerations are mediated through organizational management and influence perceptions of autonomy and job satisfaction (Hanitzsch et al., 2010; Örnebring et al., 2016).

In the *Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS)*, Hanitzsch and colleagues (2010; Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a) had the opportunity to compare perceived economic influences vis-à-vis other influences across countries with very diverse media landscapes. They found four dimensions of perceived economic influences which generally seemed to be more important in shaping journalistic practice than political influences: advertising considerations, profit expectations, anticipating the needs of advertisers, and market and audience research (Hanitzsch et al., 2010). As such, these perceptions reflect news organizations’ market-orientation and acknowledge that even for public broadcast and non-profit media, “the high costs of modern news production and distribution introduce economic criteria at every stage.” (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019, p. 108). European journalists, in general, report lower perceived economic imperatives influencing their work than other journalists (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019). Here, Scandinavia, France, and Austria were among the countries reporting the smallest numbers. This might be related to their strong public service broadcasting institutions and thus the easing of commercialization. However, such self-reports always have to be taken with a grain of salt. For example, US American journalists also report low levels of economic influence in the *WJS*, which appears to be in stark contrast to the literature on how market-driven and commercialized the field is. This might, in part, be due to journalists’ inability or unwillingness to acknowledge such influences on their work, especially in environments where autonomy from economic influences is firmly embedded into professional journalistic ideology (Carlson, 2017, p. 38; Coddington, 2015).

Moreover, in some instances, these influences might “appear to be less important in journalists’ perceptions because these influences are further removed from their daily practice than, for example, the influence of norms and routines” (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019, p. 113). Thus, not all journalists experience economic pressure similarly. Unsurprisingly, survey research shows that journalists in commercial and market-driven newsrooms tend to experience more economic pressure than those working in publicly funded media (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011; Lauerer et al., 2017). Moreover, political journalists appear to be less affected by economic pressures (Skovsgaard & van Dalen, 2013), and cultural journalists express less economic pressure than their generalist colleagues (Hovden & Kristensen, 2018). On the other hand, research continuously shows that advertising and commercial influences are especially present in lifestyle journalism (Hanusch, 2012b; Hanusch et al., 2017, 2020). Lifestyle journalism is mainly dependent on advertising and public relations material and free access to services and products to review for their audience (Duffy, 2013; Hanusch et al., 2017). Moreover, they are increasingly competing with non-traditional actors such as bloggers, YouTubers and Instagrammers over the audiences’ attention and advertising budgets, adding to economic pressures (Maares & Hanusch, 2020b). This is especially relevant in travel journalism, where news media have long stopped funding entire independent trips and rely on agencies to cover the travel costs (Hanusch, 2012b; Rosenkranz, 2016). Similarly, fashion, beauty and personal technology are areas that appear to be more dependent on such freebies and public relations material. Hanusch and colleagues (2017) compare commercial influences on Australian and German lifestyle journalists. Even though they could not detect meaningful differences between the countries, the topic journalists worked on, and the viability of their employer seems to affect how strongly journalists experience these influences.

Koch and colleagues (2020) conceptualize public relations and advertising influences through the six bases of power (French & Raven, 1959). Public relations shape journalistic production mostly through informational power in the form of exclusive information, expert power in the form of expertise and knowledge, referent power by gaining journalists’ trust and providing texts in journalistic format, as well as reward power in the form of freebies (Koch et al., 2020). Legitimate and coercive power, on the other hand, is mediated through the organizational level. For instance, the editor-in-chief or management might exert their power by pressuring journalists not to write about topics

concerning powerful advertisers (McManus, 1995; Picard, 2005). This is done covertly through the organizational culture.

As such, commercial influences can be nuanced. In another study, Hanusch and colleagues on lifestyle journalism (2020) distinguished between direct and coercive pressures from advertising and public relations (hard power) as well as more soft and subtle pressures, often mediated to newsroom hierarchy and considerations (soft power). They find that travel, fashion, and beauty journalists are most affected by hard and soft power. Moreover, journalists working for magazines perceive pressures from hard power more strongly. Such pressures are even more pronounced for freelance and casualized journalists (Rosenkranz, 2016). Moreover, younger journalists and journalists with less training are more wary of being potentially influenced in their reporting (Hanusch, 2012a; Hanusch et al., 2020). In part, this might be because they have not fully internalized journalistic doxa, or professional ideology, and are aware of the conflict between their working conditions and journalistic norms and values ideology. In contrast, more experienced journalists “feel a stronger ideological obligation to deny their influence, despite their impact on their work” (Hanusch et al., 2020, p. 1042).

Commercial influences and perceived competitiveness thus also affect how journalists conceive of their role in society. For example, adversarial investigative reporting necessitates financial security (Cohen et al., 2019; Örnebring et al., 2018). The *WJS*, for example, shows that journalists perceiving strong economic influence tend to express more often collaborative roles. At the same time, monitorial and accommodative roles are more often embraced when perceived commercial influences are low (Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019, pp. 294–303). Similarly, lifestyle journalists in more competitive environments tend to support more entertaining, inspirational roles and offer a service to audiences (Hanusch, 2012a, 2019; Hanusch et al., 2017). In another study, Hanusch and Tandoc (2019, p. 708) conclude that perceived competition is negatively related to citizen orientation. That means journalists working for more market-oriented and more competitive news organizations do not perceive their societal role as monitoring and scrutinizing political leaders and businesses or providing audiences with information they need to participate in society.

Lastly, commercial pressures can affect journalists’ perception of autonomy (Örnebring, 2016, chapter six; Örnebring et al., 2016). Autonomy is a crucial marker of journalistic professionalism and part and parcel of journalists’ claims to legitimacy and authority (Carlson, 2017, pp. 37–40; Deuze, 2005). Autonomy is deeply embedded in

journalism's professional mythology and often named by aspiring journalists as motivation to invest themselves in the journalistic game (Hanusch et al., 2014). Autonomy could thus be considered a vital aspect of journalists' *illusio*, "both in terms of individual contributions to society and in terms of individual development" in the newsroom (Nölleke et al., 2022, p. 331). Nölleke and colleagues argue that this *illusio* and the doxic belief that economic constraints are part of the game shield young journalists from being disillusioned with journalism. At the same time, the longer they participate in the field and thus take its *doxa* for granted, journalists "often perceive that they have more autonomy when in fact they are subscribing to the organizational or corporate viewpoint" (Hamada et al., 2019, p. 138).

While autonomy is thus a norm shaping journalists' collective identity, it can also be employed to understand the specific influences affecting journalistic work. For example, Örnebring and colleagues (2016) show that journalists in more commercialized media systems like the UK assess their autonomy in everyday work as lower than journalists working in media systems with stronger public service media like Sweden. The study approaches these influences through the concept of workplace autonomy. Here, journalists' autonomy is shaped on an individual level by hierarchical structures in the workplace, the constraints of journalistic production and to what extent journalists are flexible in their knowledge-based decision-making, but also how much these decisions are formed by the shared rules of the game, *doxa*. Moreover, workplace autonomy also considers how much journalists are affected by external pressures from audiences, advertising, and sources. Their study, focusing on five European countries, shows that journalists believe PR practitioners aim to influence their work. Especially in more liberal or commercialized media systems, respondents agreed to such statements. Moreover, their results indicate, again, that commercial influences like audience metrics, the competitive environment, revenues and advertising considerations are mediated through the workplace hierarchy in which journalists are located: "journalists do not necessarily 'see' external autonomy factors (notably commercialization) as directly affecting their internal (workplace) autonomy" (Örnebring et al., 2016, p. 320).

Concluding, this chapter has tried to untangle the techno-economic forces that shape journalistic work. By understanding digital technology and primarily ICTs as both enabling and constraining force, the chapter outlined how more journalistic actors can engage in journalism beyond the newsroom and how remote work can lead to stress and

social isolation. Likewise, the chapter briefly discussed how digital technology shapes journalistic practice through social media but also software and algorithms measuring their performance. Besides, viewing ICTs through a Bourdieusian lens, they can be seen as a resource strengthening journalists' position in the field and as a habitus, informing journalists' everyday work. To understand the force of economic capital on the journalistic field, the chapter summarized the literature on long-standing debates surrounding journalism as an economic good. Moreover, the chapter outlined the transformations of media organizations and newsrooms and how economic influences affect individual journalists and their work.

Chapter 4: The Heterogeneity of Atypical Journalism

During the second half of the 20th century, stable full-time employment and work in a newsroom were the standard in journalism. This form of employment has been associated with the professionalization of an occupation that traditionally had lower entry barriers than other professions such as medicine, law, or education (Lewis, 2015). As such, full-time employed journalists and reporters have been considered professionals vis-à-vis other agents engaging in journalistic or semi-journalistic work. Therefore, much of journalism research generally focused on these standard employed journalists located within newsrooms (Hanitzsch & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2009). In recent years, however, more and more focus has been given to those working “beyond the newsroom” (Deuze & Witschge, 2018, 2020). As explored in the previous chapter, different transformations of the journalistic field have moved more and more journalistic work outside of the newsroom context.

Atypically employed journalists include anyone who has no permanent or full-time employment. Atypical work, in general, refers to 1) employment limited in time, such as fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work; 2) work that is less than part-time labour or marginal employment; and 3) new forms of self-employment or pseudo-self-employment such as (flat-rate) freelance, casual and subcontracted work (Schweiger, 2009). Contemporary competitive and flexible work environments delineate the journalistic career. Deuze and Witschge (2018, p. 171) argue that as a result, journalists either embrace an entrepreneurial identity or will follow a patchwork of various jobs and projects. Whereas traditional linear careers are still possible in journalism, journalists with an entrepreneurial mind- and skill set might be able to innovatively create a career even though they started from the boundaries of journalism. In Boudieusian terms, they eventually take symbolically valued positions within the field. A “patchwork career” (Deuze & Witschge, 2018, p. 171), on the other hand, leaves the journalist perpetually marginalized. They find their “permanence in impermanence, forever flexibilized on the outside *as well as* on the inside of news institutions.” (ibid., italics in org.). In the journalistic field, atypical employment includes freelancers, entrepreneurial journalists, workers on temporary or short-rolling, flat-rate or otherwise contingent contracts (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Deuze, 2007; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Hummel et al., 2012). From a legal perspective, freelancers are self-employed contractors who work for multiple media outlets “without a long-term commitment to any of them”, independently

producing finished pieces (Walters et al., 2006, p. 6). However, colloquially, freelancing is also sometimes used for those working on short-time contingent contracts or a flat-charge (Cohen, 2012; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012).¹³ They can either work from home with rare contact to the news organization or as hot-deskers within the organization.

While research has long traditionally focused on mainstream journalists, especially elite and print journalists (Hanitzsch & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2009), quite a few studies examining freelancers, entrepreneurial journalists, and journopreneurs have been published in the past decade. However, most of them consist of single-case studies, hardly generating comparative knowledge. Studies with larger samples on journalistic practice are often conducted in cooperation with associations (e.g. Buckow, 2011; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Qualitative analyses focus on a specific field (e.g. television journalism, Summ, 2013; e.g. photojournalism, T. J. Thomson, 2018), a specific research question (e.g., precarity, Gollmitzer, 2014; relationship to PR, Koch & Obermaier, 2014; autonomy, Mathisen, 2017; collective identity Naït-Bouda, 2008; precarity, freelancing and gender, Prandner & Lettner, 2012) or the entire creative and media scene (Ekinsmyth, 1999; Henninger & Gottschall, 2007). The general thesis is that freelancing is often an “alternative to unemployment” (Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 19, own translation) or an “alternative pathway” into the profession (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016, p. 253), and freelance journalists work under precarious circumstances. This chapter will trace research on these ‘underrepresented’ journalists and discuss the specific tension of freelance work between freedom, passion, and precarity in contemporary society. I will begin by giving a short overview of the history of such atypical work to exemplify that even though freelance and contingent work is not necessarily new for the journalistic profession, it has new qualities compared to the early days of journalistic practice.

A short history of freelance and atypical journalistic work

Cohen (2016, p. 55) contemplates that compared to the general history of journalism, the “evolution of freelance writing as an occupation and the conditions under which they have worked (...) remains untold”. Early on, news work was a one-person business, for

¹³ For example, in German to distinguish between the two, the self-employed freelancer is referred to as “Echt Freie”, real freelancers, while the one working without a stable contract for only one media company is referred to as “Fest-Freie”, fixed freelancers (Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009).

example, as “walking newsmen” (Høyer, 2003, p. 452) and later the first printer-editors in the early days of printed pamphlets. That is, the “labour of collecting, presenting and distributing information was all done by one person, the newsman himself” (Örnebring, 2010, p. 61). In the sixteenth century, walking ‘newsmen’ sold the news they had gathered at post offices and other public places as oral news stories. Early newspapers in the seventeenth century were run by publishers who often also edited and printed contributors’ letters or essays. They also copy-pasted and, in some cases, translated news from other papers (Høyer, 2003; Jarlbrink, 2015). The first full-time freelance workers aided these publishers, often for a relatively low remuneration for their work: “a small sum and a promise of printed copies” (Cohen, 2016, p. 58).

In general, freelancers produced the editorial part of newspapers to a large extent until the early 1800s and the increasing industrialization (Blöbaum, 1994, p. 127). Here, “freelance” authors often functioned as news gatherers, collecting news and offering written articles to the printer, who then edited and published them (Cohen, 2016; Jarlbrink, 2015). Moreover, lawyers, clergypersons, medical doctors, or other members of the bourgeoisie would also contribute essays in the form of letters. In some cases, such contributions received no financial compensation. For example, Cohen (2016)’s work illustrates that the Canadian magazine market in the early 19th century perceived writing for magazines as free training for aspiring authors, and payment was uncommon for magazines published in US America until 1819. As such, the argument of free training as payment has long prevailed in the journalistic doxa naturalizing free labour as a requirement to enter the field. Moreover, the social origin of freelance contributors thus also influenced their status within the hierarchy of authors. Whereas some were dependent on the extra income, others thrived on the symbolic capital of being visible. Høyer (2003, p. 454) also describes a distinction between essayists from the bourgeoisie professions and “hack writers, newsmongers and reporters acting as leg men” on the other.

At that time, journalism as a distinct field had not yet evolved and for many aspiring authors and poets in the emerging literary fields writing for newspapers proved to be an excellent way to support themselves. In contrast to prestigious literary work, working for newspapers was perceived by these authors as “muddying [their] hands” (Lonsdale, 2015, p. 269). With the emergent mass press, news became the core business of newspapers, which contributed to the advent of a distinct journalistic field and a change of the requirements of journalistic work. Standardization of content and style thus

determined what freelance authors could write and sell (Cohen, 2016, pp. 59–60).

Distinctive roles of publisher, editor and journalist evolved, and in the mid-19th century, a newspaper presumably employed two to three full-time editors (Blöbaum, 1994, p. 153). Nevertheless, freelancers still provided most content.

This was about to change at the turn of the century, as news organizations had to rely on specific content regularly (Høyer, 2003; Örnebring, 2010; Salamon, 2019). Moreover, with increasing circulation and revenue, news organizations could employ more journalists (Jarlbrink, 2015). By the end of the 19th century, working for newspapers as an editor or journalist had slowly transformed into an accepted, well-paid, and well-received occupation (Blöbaum, 1994). Lonsdale (2015) traces how author-journalists perceived their journalistic work in their fictitious writing and describes a shift from the deskbound writer to the active reporter in the early 20th century. She also observes a discursive construction of the journalistic field through a narration of journalistic norms and routines such as the inverted pyramid or less embellished writing. Investigative and muckraking reporting inspired young journalists and reporters to work for newspapers because they aimed at a career in journalism, not to sustain their literary work (Jarlbrink, 2015; Lonsdale, 2015).

Newspapers and periodicals continued to rely on freelancers. Some see this dual system of employed and freelance contributors as means to mitigate the tension between journalism as an economic and a public service good. Gottschall (1999), for example, argued that employed journalists were needed to maintain continuous everyday news production; freelance journalists had been necessary to produce more time-intensive and specialized investigations. Cohen (2016, p. 57) similarly argues that the rationalization of journalistic labour in industrialized news production led journalists to yearn for their “autonomy over their craft and control over their labour processes” and thus follow freelancing. As such, freelancing could also be perceived as challenging the status quo of routine journalistic work. During the 20th century, freelancers were thus part of the journalistic field, especially for magazine publishing, where freelancers predominantly wrote the articles (Cohen, 2016, p. 77; Ekinsmyth, 1999). Gottschall (1999) assumed that about 15-20 per cent of journalists working for German media during the 1960s-1980s were either freelancers in the genuine sense or worked freelance for one news enterprise. These arrangements were enjoyed both by media companies and freelancers because they were not perceived as “a second choice but were valued as a form of professional practice that guaranteed an autonomy appropriate to the activity” (Gottschall, 1999, p. 642, own

translation). Working self-employed has been and still is associated with autonomy and freedom and is thus linked to positive connotations (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012). However, it is a “very complicated version of freedom” (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2010) as remuneration rates in journalism often only cover the final piece and not the time and resources invested.

Lastly, freelance journalism has also often been described as gendered, as freelance work offers more flexibility and is thus assumed to be more compatible with motherhood and care work. However, even as early as the 18th century, working for periodicals offered some women an opportunity to pursue a career. Contributing to magazines was perceived as an acceptable activity as “writing jobs could be completed in the privacy of one’s home” (Duffy, 2013, p. 25). In the late 19th century, with the differentiation between deskwork and reporting, young women eventually entered the field to do the less prestigious work of news gathering (Jarlbrink, 2015). Regardless, women journalists were underpaid compared to men, especially women freelancers (Salamon, 2019). In the late 20th century, freelance journalism began to be associated with motherhood. Working freelance, especially for magazines, ostensibly allowed women to take care of their children while still following a career. In her study on women journalists leaving full-time employment, Elmore (2009), for example, observed that many women left the newsroom when they became mothers, often only returning to freelance work afterwards (Antunovic et al., 2019; Örnebring & Möller, 2018). At the same time, recent research suggests that the increasing uncertainty of freelance work makes childrearing and -caring unlikely (Gollmitzer, 2014; Maares & Putz, 2016).

Atypical journalism: Between freedom, flexibility, passion and precarity

While freelance journalism has always comprised some degree of insecurity and low remuneration, transformations of the labour market discussed in chapter three (p. 94) have been described to accelerate such working conditions (Cohen, 2016; Deuze & Witschge, 2018; Salamon, 2019). The working conditions of atypically employed journalists are increasingly associated with discourses around precarity. Early studies on flexibilised forms of employment in media work have long criticized that the individualization of career management makes workers, on the contrary, more dependent and puts them more at risk (S. Baines, 1999; Ekinsmyth, 1999; Henninger & Gottschall, 2007).

Today, atypical work is often perceived through a dichotomy of choice, education, or remuneration. For example, Ladendorf and Edstrom (2012) distinguish between two models of self-employment, where journalists are either pulled or pushed into this form of labour. Whereas the former comprises “highly skilled, younger professionals” (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012, p. 714), the latter refers to less well-educated and marginalized journalists who are pushed into atypical work for lack of better employment opportunities (see also De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Mathisen (2017), on the other hand, distinguishes between two types of freelancers, idealists, who enjoy in-depth investigation and reporting, and entrepreneurs, who perceive their work as a business, sell stories and recycle research material into numerous stories for various media outlets. However, both groups experience precarity and constraints, underlining that there seems to be no “right” way for autonomous success.

Growing precarity and the blurring boundaries of the newsroom have meant that increasingly all journalists are affected (see, for example, a preliminary report by Hanitzsch & Rick, 2021). Accordingly, journalists are expected to be always-on, flexible, and multi-skilled (Deuze, 2007), regardless of their employment status. At the same time, journalistic work, like other work in the larger field of cultural production, is highly associated with discourses around passion and a calling. Journalists, musicians, academics – they all perceive their work “profoundly satisfying and intensely pleasurable” (Gill & Pratt, 2008, p. 15)(see also Allmer, 2018; Duffy, 2017; Umney & Kretsos, 2015). Such identification with one’s work has been described as job-focused work-life arrangements, which might have unhealthy implications. When the job is prioritized, resulting in low “leisure time and postponing other wishes and interests” (Henninger & Gottschall, 2007, p. 58), self-worth and identity are deeply intertwined with it. Thus, while journalism research widely employs the concept of precarity as synonymous with employment insecurity and project work, over-identification and the subjective perception of choice are equally important to consider when studying journalists’ circumstances in the space of journalistic work.

Precarity as a concept to understand contemporary labour markets

In political economy and critical sociology, the term precarity is closely associated with the uncertainty brought about by capitalist deregulation of labour laws and societal change (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Hardt & Negri, 2009). These changes include

the globalization of competition of labour through economic and technological transformations and policy changes allowing for more flexible employment, the weakening of union work, and an erosion of the standard employment career (Kalleberg, 2009; Rodgers, 1989; Sennett, 1998). A decrease of staying with one employer, as well as an increase in long-term unemployment, contingent work and increasing transferral of risk from employer to employees, are signs of precarious conditions (Kalleberg, 2009). Accordingly, downsizing, outsourcing, and creating competition even within one organization are classic strategies of this risk-transferal. Bourdieu (1998a, p. 85, original emphasis) described these mechanisms as profiting the dominant while decreasing values of solidarity and humanity among the dominated within the field of power:

“Casualization of employment is part of a mode of domination of a new kind, based on the creation of a generalized and permanent state of insecurity aimed at forcing workers into submission, into the acceptance of exploitation. To characterize this mode of domination, which, although in its effects it closely resembles the wild capitalism of the early days, is entirely unprecedented, a speaker here proposed the very appropriate and expressive concept of *flexploitation*.”

These changes of the 20th century engendered the ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011), a “neologism that brings together the meaning of precariousness and proletariat to signify both an experience of exploitation and a (potential) new political subjectivity.” (Gill & Pratt, 2008, p. 3). Employment insecurity exists since workers are remunerated financially for their labour. However, it has affected chiefly the low-wage sector and unskilled workers. Today, with the increase of atypical employment, precarious work can be found in all professions, according to Kalleberg (2009, p. 6). Moreover, increasing labour precarity also impacts life course patterns, prolonging the period between adolescence and what is considered stable adulthood with “landmarks such as home ownership and parenthood” (Umney & Kretsos, 2015, p. 314). In times of heightened labour market uncertainty, the young and less experienced are laid-off first or have difficulty finding new employment (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007), delaying the transition between labour market entry and labour market integration. While some form of precarious labour has always characterized this transition, it increasingly also affects highly skilled young workers, especially in the sectors of cultural work (Allmer, 2018; Gill & Pratt, 2008; Umney & Kretsos, 2015).

In a sense, cultural production is prone to precarious labour as it does not generate values according to the economic logic of capitalism (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 29–45, 94–105). This has implications for the diversity of these sectors, as workers must rely on other sources to support their living while enduring the years of precarious and highly

flexible labour (Deuze & Witschge, 2018). For instance, Umney & Kretsos (2015) studied the perception of precarity among aspiring jazz musicians and found that most came from affluent, middle-class backgrounds and could afford to work for free or low wages as their basic living needs were met. Similarly, research in journalism studies (Gollmitzer, 2014; Maares & Putz, 2016) shows that “precarity becomes a rite of initiation” (Örnebring, 2018b, p. 123) that aspirants need to be able to afford and which is normalized as it “shapes your character” (Hernández-Julián & Vera-Zambrano, 2020, p. 67, own translation). This again highlights the relevance to consider economic and social dimensions when studying precarious labour. In that sense, many young professionals working in project-based work who pause their entry into adulthood with stable employment and family might not fit into what we consider as precarious labourers, as they can always rely on familial sources of income or turn to other non-creative sources of work (Umney & Kretsos, 2015).

Dimensions of precarity: Self-organized self-employment and marginalized self-exploitation

Therefore, while atypical work is often described as precarious, not every unstable job necessarily fits this description. Instead, uncertainty over the continuity of work, lack of control over working conditions, wages, the pace of work, lack of legal protection or belonging to a community, and low financial income characterize precarious labour (Rodgers, 1989). It is thus insecure, flexible, contingent, and comprises “illegalized, casualized and temporary employment, to homeworking, piecework and freelancing” (Gill & Pratt, 2008, p. 2). As such, precarious labour entails limited social benefits and statutory entitlements, such as social security, health care, and pension funds (Cohen, 2015b; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012) – depending on where one is located – and renders workers vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Rodgers, 1989). Moreover, precarious working conditions in (freelance) journalism can implicate health risks such as mental burnout and stress-related illnesses (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Gollmitzer, 2014). Further, Hernández-Julián and Vera-Zambrano (2020)’s work indicates that social isolation might enhance precarity compared to those working collectively or for a company with high symbolic capital.

From a Marxist perspective, precarity is also perceived as a “strategy of capitalist control” (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 146) as it enforces market flexibility, both in career

choices as well as daily work routines, and dissolves workers' control over time. Accordingly, it blurs the boundaries of work and non-work time and requires labourers to be always prepared to work. Thus, precarity can decrease the individuals' ability to "project themselves into the future" (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 83). Labour is a "core activity in society" (Kalleberg, 2009, p. 1), and stable employment is considered "an important personal landmark" (Umney & Kretsos, 2015, p. 314), as well as a strong marker of identity and group membership. Lack of work has thus implications for individuals' physical and psychological well-being and morale (Sennett, 1998). Crucially, the concept of precarity does not only refer to the objective structures of society imposing uncertainty but also whether those working and living under these conditions perceive it as threatening (Masquelier, 2019).

Similarly, Anderson & Pontusson (2007) distinguish between 'cognitive' and 'affective' job insecurity – the former refers to the perception of upcoming job loss while the latter encompasses the anxiety experienced in anticipating a possible job loss. This might also explain why workers in countries with better social protections are not necessarily exempt from experiencing job insecurity. Similarly, Bourdieu (1998a, p. 84) postulates that the increase in insecure, underpaid work is eventually felt as a threat to the middle class, leading to a feeling of permanent insecurity. Therefore, the increasing *perception* of job insecurity has been interpreted as evidence of growing precarity (Kalleberg, 2009). Perception of precarity can thus have a paralyzing effect (Ekdale et al., 2015). On the other hand, it might also explain why some professionals, especially in the sector of cultural production, choose to endure precarious working conditions to follow their 'passion' and do not feel affected by it as much (Standing, 2011; Umney & Kretsos, 2015).

Based on Castel's (2000) zones of the social space and Rodgers (1989)'s criteria for precarious labour, Brinkmann and colleagues (2006) defined five dimensions to evaluate whether atypical labourers can be classified as precarious (Table 4.1). The reproductive-material dimension evaluates whether workers are able to earn enough with their work; the social-communicative whether they are integrated within an organizational workspace; on legal-institutional level, whether they are legally protected and able to voice their dissatisfaction; regarding status and recognition whether their work and they as workers are acknowledged within their workspace; and lastly, on the level of content of work, the degree to which they can identify with their work and can maintain boundaries between work and leisure time.

Table 4.1: *Five dimensions of precarious labour*

Dimension	Characteristics of precarious labour
reproductive-material	primary source of income does not secure decent living
social-communicative	no integration within an organization; lack of or straining social relationships within the work community
legal-institutional	lack of opportunities to participate, no control over collective agreements, lack of security
status and recognition	lack of recognition among peers as well as society
content of work	either permanent loss of meaning or overidentification (along with blurring boundaries of personal and private life)

Note. Dimensions adapted from Brinkmann et al. (2006, p. 18)

Much of the macro-level critique from sociology (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Hardt & Negri, 2009; Sennett, 1998), however, presents predictions without an empirical foundation of the “emotional and cognitive effects on the micro-level” (Örnebring, 2018b, p. 112). Precarity is thus both objective in the form of structural transformation and subjective in the form of socio-psychological impact of these transformations, which can manifest in a feeling of permanent uncertainty, even when actual job loss is not experienced (Masquelier, 2019). Moreover, precarity plays a distinct role in power relations (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 81–87). In a sense, the subjective experience is not only organized by objective forces such as the shifts in labour markets but also by “symbolic constraints such as those embodied in the *doxa*” (Masquelier, 2019, p. 147). Thus, precarity is seen as the “inevitable condition of existence” (Masquelier, 2019, p. 145), leading to “generalized subjective insecurity” (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 83), which again reproduces insecurity. In a sense, it describes an internalization of the mechanisms of precarity (Gollmitzer, 2014) and might compete with the *doxa* of subfields, such as the journalistic field. Örnebring and colleagues (2018, p. 408) argue that it is increasingly “difficult to formulate and mobilize *doxa* for the purposes of field independence, or actually create journalism as a field autonomous (or at least semiautonomous) from other fields” when precarious contracts are the norm. At the same time, these constraints “come to be symbolically cultivated as empowering, and adjustment to the established order as a form of liberation” (Masquelier, 2019, p. 145). This might explain the self-exploitative notion of following one’s passion.

Moreover, the overall volume of relevant forms of capital helps agents to occupy dominating positions and thus to wield symbolic power (Masquelier, 2019). Here, the accumulation of forms of capital or access to resources enables us to distinguish between different levels of precarious labour. Linking this back to the space of journalistic work

conceptualized by Örnebring and colleagues (2018), the experience of precarious and insecure working conditions might differ (see also p. 66). As such, having access to resources and being recognized and valued by colleagues might soften financial insecurity, whereas lacking social capital might enhance feeling isolated and thus add to the uncertainty.

Finally, habitus aids to explore the varying experiences and understanding of precarity (Masquelier, 2019). As embodied history, habitus does not only refer to the actual practice of individuals but also how it reflects their socialization and what they assume as possible (see also chapter one, p. 37). In that sense, habitus assumes individuals' dispositions and perceptions based on their social position and their expectations as well – the precarity experienced can already vary based simply on gender or school socialization. As such, it holds the “potential for recognizing the arbitrariness of the established order and, consequently, questioning its legitimacy” (Masquelier, 2019, p. 145).

While much work on atypical journalism describes a dichotomy of well-paid, well-educated, and well-connected freelancers on the one hand, and a mass of marginalized, underpaid, insecurely employed on the other hand (Gynnild, 2005; Massey & Elmore, 2011; Mathisen, 2019), precarious labour should be considered more as a continuum and ambivalence of passion and insecurity, camaraderie and competition (Gill & Pratt, 2008; Kennedy, 2010). Corsani (2012), for instance, points to the subjectivity of perceived precarity and argues that age and family situation are important aspects to consider. Thus, to describe precarious labour more cohesively, and based on the previous literature review, we can distinguish six dimensions of journalistic precarity: *material security, access to resources, embeddedness within social networks, legal and institutional protection, status, and recognition, and blurring boundaries of work.*

Material security

Research on atypical journalism has primarily focused on economic capital and the material security it entails when discussing potential precariousness. While freelancers and temporary and contingent workers lose much of their social security benefits, transformations of the journalistic field also contribute to decreasing income levels. With the casualization and outsourcing of work, only the product is remunerated (Örnebring & Ferrer-Conill, 2016), but not the time invested, lowering the actual income per hour to the

extent that can be considered precarious (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; Cohen, 2015b). For example, studies find that the acquisition of assignments – that is, pitching stories to media companies as well as crowdfunders – take up a considerable amount of time which is not remunerated (Hunter, 2015; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 60). In general, atypical journalistic work is not well-paid, and the remuneration rates have been reported to decrease in the past decades (Cohen, 2016; Hayes & Silke, 2018; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Rosenkranz, 2019). This might also have implications for journalistic content. For example, Mathisen (2019) argues that since freelancers are mostly paid per final piece and not working hours, they chose topics and content that is a) not that time-consuming and therefore b) also not that complex regarding ethical dimensions.

Schnedler (2017, pp. 119–130) investigated the differences in income of German contingent workers, flat-rate, and ‘real’ freelancers and to what extent these salaries could be considered precarious. While his study draws only on a small number of cases for each group, he observed that most atypical journalists earned much less than their employed colleagues and most contingent and flat-rate contracts bypassed existing labour agreements. However, contingent workers and flat-rate freelancers could count on the continuity of their income while ‘real’ freelancers lamented the space rate system of remuneration. Especially in local and online journalism, respondents reported remuneration rates of 25 cents per line and lower – rates that are much less than what is promised by law. Other works by Cohen (2016), Rosenkranz (2019), and Hayes & Silke (2018, 2019) observe similar developments. In contrast to other non-journalistic media work where contractors are paid per hour of production, news organizations generally pay freelancers per word, finished text or minute (Cohen, 2012, p. 148). What is not remunerated in this context are hours of pitching stories, researching, conducting interviews, and editing. In some cases, online pieces are not remunerated at all (publication for visibility) or authors only receive payment for a certain amount of clicks (Cohen, 2019; Hayes & Silke, 2018).

Moreover, much atypical journalistic work is aspirational, i.e., freelancers research and produce on speculation whether it will be paid (Rosenkranz, 2019). Here, the payment behaviour of publishing houses and newsrooms adds to the insecurity that freelancers face as they cannot depend on continuous income despite continuously working (Meyen & Springer, 2009; Schnedler, 2017). Rosenkranz (2019) examined the shift of payment practices in freelance travel journalism, an area in which producing on speculation can be extremely costly. Newsrooms used to pay “kill fees”, a percentage of

the price set initially if an article was not published. However, in recent years, newsrooms only pay for published articles. Production on speculation is extremely risky for freelancers as newsroom editors mostly tend to voice interest in a piece either only orally or in “vague e-mail responses” (Rosenkranz, 2019, p. 620). Moreover, articles are usually only remunerated after publication and not when they are accepted by the newsroom, prolonging the time of uncertainty for producers. Interestingly, Rosenkranz (2019, p. 620) also observed that even though production on speculation was kept intentionally vague and informal, news editors and freelancers alike “understood their informal agreements as exclusive assignments”, making it impossible for the freelancers to pitch the same idea to another outlet. This shifts the power relation between editors and freelancers into an asymmetry, as the “risks of production, including the costs for travelling were almost completely put onto the freelancers, publications gained organizational flexibility” (Rosenkranz, 2019, p. 620).

Moreover, news organizations are free to choose from the immense ideas competing freelancers are continuously pitching (Cohen, 2012; Compton & Benedetti, 2010). This adds to the competitive environment, preventing freelance journalists from having close collegial relations with other freelancers (Accardo, 2007, p. 280). Likewise, freelancers report pitching ideas that are rejected only to be reported by someone else for the newsroom (Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 82). Schnedler (2017, p. 123) thus concludes that while contingent and flat-rate journalists’ income is relatively low, it is still continuous and cannot be considered precarious. ‘Real’ freelancers, on the other hand, cannot sustain their living only through their journalistic work and cannot count on continuous income and are thus considered as precarious on the dimension of material security.

What is more, the entry to the journalistic field has increasingly become a matter of having access to existing economic capital. Research indicates that young journalists are much better educated and invest considerable time-labour in improving new digital and multi-media skills (Deuze & Witschge, 2018; Gollmitzer, 2014; Pereira, 2020). While the entry into journalism has always been competitive, the “scale and scope of precarity in journalism today is of a different and higher order of magnitude than it was for previous generations of journalists” (Örnebring, 2018b, p. 119). What is more, this labour market precarity is widely accepted, especially among the young (Gollmitzer, 2014). In general, young entrants to the field have internalized the uncertainty of the journalistic labour market in which aspiring journalists have to endure years of unstable

working conditions, including underpaid or unpaid internships and project work, to make it in journalism finally (Gollmitzer, 2014; Matos, 2020; Nölleke et al., 2022; Pereira, 2020; Salamon, 2015).

Thus, not only cultural capital in the form of education is relevant, but also economic capital in resources to sustain the first two to three difficult years of trying to enter journalism (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Gollmitzer, 2014). Similarly, Pereira (2020, p. 16) concludes that the relatively high entry barriers lead to homogeneity in the socio-demographic composition of the French journalistic field, which is predominantly “made up of white males”. This reiterates an argument by Deuze and Witschge (2018, p. 172), who consternate an exclusivity of the journalistic occupation:

“In fact, if we put it provocatively, it increasingly seems to be the playing field of only those who can afford to work for years or even for the majority of their careers below or around the minimum wage in the largest and therefore most expensive cities, as that is where the main news outfits (as well as most hyperlocal companies and news startups) are generally located.”

However, not only young journalists are dependent on cross-funding their journalistic work. Studies on freelancers illustrate that many work in other areas, primarily other communication work, such as PR, consulting, or corporate publishing (Buckow, 2011, p. 57; Koch & Obermaier, 2014; Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 145).

Moreover, both survey and interview studies repeatedly show that some freelancers are financially dependent on a spouse or state benefits (Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Schnedler, 2017). Deuze and Witschge (2018), for example, quote a Dutch study describing that almost two-thirds of all freelance journalists in the Netherlands earn below the minimum wage and many freelancers depend on income from their partner to sustain their work in journalism. This is supported by many other studies focusing on freelance and atypical journalistic work. As such, low payment and precarious working conditions are recurring themes in this area of research.

Access to resources

Another dimension that touches both on reproductive material and social-communicative inclusion can be found in what Örnebring and colleagues (2018) conceptualize as access to resources. This dimension is less often considered in research on atypical journalism, even though lacking access to material resources such as equipment and relations with informants complicate atypical journalistic work immensely (Deuze & Witschge, 2020; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Cohen (2015b) criticizes that research has long ignored the

material conditions under which freelance journalists work. In most countries, self-employed workers are by law in charge of the material resources they need for their work. However, current remuneration rates in journalism do not allow journalists to cover maintenance of these resources through their invoices to customers.

While best-practice, entrepreneurial handbooks, and journalism education advise aspiring journalists to re-use investigations and interviews for multiple platforms, journalism research does not consider the materiality of journalistic work as much. Journalists are taught to think in terms of converging journalism: Record an interview in high quality, produce a piece for a magazine and a radio feature (Hofert, 2006; Leverton, 2011). Ironically, such advice literature oft begins by saying that “fancy equipment isn’t needed” (Pulford, 2009, p. 25) without acknowledging that even a laptop computer and a place void of distraction are also material resources that are not for free¹⁴.

Thus, this presupposes that aspiring freelancers have access to material resources such as recording equipment and editing software. Even though this hard- and software is becoming increasingly affordable in the digital age, they still mean a considerable investment for the individual journalist. Only a few studies consider this investment that freelance journalists must cover when starting out. Hunter (2015), in her research on crowdfunded journalism, explicitly names that freelancers turn to crowdfunding to purchase equipment and cover their costs for travelling. Crowdfunding platforms thus make visible the material resources needed to sustain journalistic work. Similarly, Rosenkranz (2016, 2019) investigates how freelance travel journalists react to declining travel funds. In many cases, journalists depend on free plane tickets or accommodation covered by tourism agencies. What is more, compared to journalists in standard employment, atypical journalists have only limited access to further education and training (Cohen, 2015b), another aspect that would fall into their lack of access to material resources. And while contingent workers might have access to equipment, in many cases, they do not have access to training precisely because their employment status has been outsourced from the media company (Schnedler, 2017, p. 123).

Some freelancers have reacted to the high costs of material resources by pitching together to set up a shared freelance office (Archetti, 2014; De Peuter et al., 2017; Lang & Gölde, 2000; Norbäck & Styhre, 2019). This means splitting the costs for equipment

¹⁴ The same author suggests that many writers have found a place to establish work periods “in the garden shed” (Pulford, 2009, p. 27), a cynical remark considering that most atypical journalists have most likely not even access to a garden.

and the phone and electricity bills. Moreover, in some cases, such a freelance collective meant that members could cover for each other when one falls ill (Lang & Gödde, 2000). In recent years, such shared offices have evolved into co-working projects, which capitalize on the isolation of freelance and self-employed cultural workers. De Peuter and colleagues (2017) argue in their critical assessment of co-working spaces that such (international) enterprises have appropriated an innovative way to split entrepreneurial uncertainty and shifted it into traditional corporate logic, often backed up by venture capital and speculation.

Lastly, lack of access to informants or news agencies can even affect the quality of journalism, as story ideas are recycled from other media. One of the earlier accounts that link freelance and atypical journalism with precarity was offered by Accardo in the 1990s, who interviewed freelance journalists or “*pigiste*” in France.¹⁵ Among other aspects, he found that precarious freelancers had no access to resources such as archives or news agencies, which meant that they turned to other media or turned to their personal environment for inspiration (Accardo, 2007, p. 279). Similarly, Meyen and Springer (2009, p. 84, own translation) quote a freelancer who is constantly searching for story ideas: “When I read the news or watch television, it’s always in the back of my mind: Is that suitable? Is this a topic for me?”. This also leads to a focus on timeless, social topics that always work, such as homelessness or healthy lifestyles.

Embeddedness within social networks

Similarly, social capital can shape journalists’ experience of precarity, especially regarding the degree to which atypical journalists are embedded within an organization or connected with peers. Here, research has found that those working in entrepreneurial start-ups have a sense of belonging (Deuze & Witschge, 2020), those that are socially isolated lack mentorship and an understanding of specific organizational norms (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Summ, 2013; T. J. Thomson, 2018). This affects both contingent and ‘real’ freelancers; they all rely on “informal structures and relationships” (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 833) to be able to do their work.

In her oft-cited study on precarious working conditions of German freelancers and interns, Gollmitzer (2014) explores how freelancers move in ever-fluctuating networks and relationships, maintaining good ones and improving new ones. However, they also

¹⁵ His first larger study on freelance journalists was published originally in 1998; I draw on the second edition published in 2007.

condemn the lack of feedback and clarity regarding the standards that news organizations want to have met. As these journalists have no opportunity to work shifts within a newsroom, they cannot “get a feel for how editors think and work” (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 833, see also Mathisen, 2019). Similarly, a study on atypical television journalists (Summ, 2013, p. 174) shows that newsrooms do not invest in the socialization of their flat-charge freelancers and contingent workers. Hence, the work is not predictable, and so are the standards that newsrooms require of their atypical workers, which impedes socialization into the specific rules of the game of a newsroom even more. Thus, aspiring journalists often turn to other atypical journalists to understand the system.

Almost two in five freelancers agree that freelancers experience high social isolation (Buckow, 2011, p. 68). If atypical workers are only connected to the editor-in-chief and have no personal relations with other colleagues, they are left without an “in-person contact” (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 833), which can lead to disquiet. In his study on aspiring photojournalists, Thomson (2018) shows that despite flattening hierarchies and burdens to access the field, technology also prevents crucial aspects of socialization and makes journalists more vulnerable. Photojournalists who had almost no or only ICT-mediated contact with editors lacked in understanding the specific rules of the game and also the commitment to the work as they required feedback and mentorship. Mentoring, feedback and appreciation from colleagues and peers is “an especially important precondition for (ongoing) motivation” (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016, p. 263). Similarly, Accardo (2007, pp. 280–285) linked social isolation and not being connected to a professional community to perceived precarity (see also Frisque, 2014). As these studies point out, informal meetings with colleagues are necessary to get a feel for the work and have a sense of belonging (Usher, 2019).

Feeling embedded in a community and understanding the shared dispositions contributes to confidence, renders work meaningful, and is necessary to feel in control over one’s work (De Peuter et al., 2017). Mathisen (2019), for example, traces how journalistic ethics are shaped by the experienced or perceived loneliness of working as a freelancer. She finds that especially young entrants feel vulnerable in their contact with sources as they do not have institutional backing, sometimes forcing them to “accept terms set by the sources of a kind that a large newsroom would never accept” (Mathisen, 2019, p. 646). At the same time, journalists working alone miss the many little opportunities to discuss minor uncertainties of everyday journalistic practice, for example, in their news judgement and on their finished pieces. While her respondents can

frequently discuss substantial ethical dilemmas with their editors, they miss the tacit everyday peer mentoring. Mathisen (2019, p. 647) thus concludes: “This gives reason to discuss whether freelancers risk losing ties to the professional community, as they find themselves outside the daily discussions cementing professional values, discretion and ethical standards”.

Legal and institutional protection and status and recognition

While labour regulations and laws vary in different national contexts, research indicates news enterprises violate such regulations most often when it comes to remunerating freelancers timely or adequately and adhering to copyright laws (Cohen, 2016; Salamon, 2016). Similarly, in some countries, some atypical workers are remunerated as freelancers even though their dependencies on only one media company would legally indicate false self-employment (Maares & Putz, 2016; Matos, 2020; Schnedler, 2017). Moreover, atypical journalists, especially ‘real’ freelancers, are at risk of no institutional backing in defamation lawsuits, an issue that is discussed in the field but less examined in scholarship (Hayes & Silke, 2019; Spinney, 2021). Research also indicates that freelance journalists feel left alone by regulators (Gollmitzer, 2014). Thus, atypical journalists’ legal and institutional protection is relatively low, especially when journalistic unions do not represent them.

While unions provide journalists with legal advice, especially regarding copyright and contract issues, research on the precarious conditions of journalists emphasizes the relative lack of unionizing. Especially young professionals and freelancers describe not belonging to a professional community (Gollmitzer, 2014; Örnebring, 2018b). The reasons for them to shy away from union membership are ambivalent. On the one hand, trade unions have experienced a “substantial weakening” concomitantly with the deregulation and commercialization of the labour market (Örnebring, 2009, p. 7). Ironically, as the market became overcrowded, competition sank the wages, and the bargaining of personal contracts made collective agreements less attractive, the role of unions declined. Thus, membership might be seen as another financial investment without any benefit. Moreover, journalists’ disinterestedness in unionizing might be rooted in entrepreneurial discourses of self-sufficiency (Ladendorf, 2012, p. 89), and in a peculiarity of the journalistic profession, namely its “long-established professional norms

that are fundamentally individualistic in nature” (Örnebring, 2018b, p. 122), i.e. that journalism is meritocratic, highly competitive, and only a few excel at it.

On the other hand, not all atypical journalists are equally recognized as members of the field and eligible to join its professional institutions, such as journalism unions (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016). In some national contexts, unions exclude information workers. For example, Mathisen (2019, p. 641) reports that the Norwegian Journalist Union “expelled all member working with PR or information work” in the late 1990s. Similarly, the Swedish Union of Journalists emphasizes that freelancers should not engage in public relations (Ladendorf, 2012).¹⁶ In other countries, eligibility is moderated through journalists’ income: In Denmark, freelance union members must earn a minimum of DKK 17.918 – which would be around €2.000 – per month to be admitted (Dansk Journalistforbund, n.d.). Austrian freelancers have to earn at least €1347,33 per month to join the section Print, Journalism, Paper of the general union for workers in the private sector (GPA-djp, 2018). On the other hand, in the Netherlands and UK, journalists must only prove that at least half the monthly income derives from journalistic activities (NUJ, n.d.).

Thus, not all atypical journalists find full recognition within the journalistic community if we consider unions as part of it. Only a few studies investigate journalistic union work, primarily focusing on examples of successful union work but not so much on the disinterestedness of journalists to participate in it (Cohen, 2016; Salamon, 2016). In recent years, freelancers and atypical journalists across the globe have rallied for more recognition and solidarity by forming specific unions. Salamon (2016, p. 993) traces the developments of such an “e-lancer resistance” in Canada in which precariously remunerated journalists organized through digital technology and formed “virtual unions” to resist unfair and exploitative practices by a media monopoly. In some countries, unions developed freelance branches, or specific freelance unions formed to offer their members legal advice and other services. Here, members have to fulfil different criteria of eligibility. For example, Freischreiber, a union in Germany and Austria for freelance journalists, acknowledges that freelancers can depend on other communication work. However, they require members to be transparent about their public relations and

¹⁶ On their English web page on eligibility for membership, the Swedish union also names relatively strict rules. For example, freelancers have to work primarily journalistic and “on behalf of a Swedish mass medium” (Journalist Förbundet, 2019), which would exclude any emerging journalistic enterprises. This, however, seems to be less strict formulated in their Swedish information on eligibility; here, it only says freelancers need to provide Swedish commissioning enterprises (Journalist Förbundet, n.d.).

strategic communication work. Further, their journalistic expertise and communication work must not overlap (Buckow, 2011, p. 35).

However, status and recognition seem to be crucial factors to enjoy journalistic work (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Massey & Elmore, 2011; Mathisen, 2017) and sometimes this recognition can be as simple as some form of contractual stability (Örnebring, 2018b). Moreover, research on legal protection shows that country-level variables such as the deregulation of work are also crucial in this context. For instance, Örnebring (2018b) shows that Eastern European and UK journalists already perceived themselves as part of the precariat, whereas journalists from other countries perceived precarity more as a potential threat than an experience.

Content of work: Journalists' illutio

One aspect which has captivated much of the existing research on freelance journalism is how the occupation makes up such a large part of journalists' identity that they are willing to endure precarity. Brinkmann and colleagues (2006) describe this dimension as relating to the content of work. Here, both alienation and over-identification can contribute to precarity. As such, labour is precarious when workers do not perceive their work as meaningful or when it blurs boundaries between professional and personal life, if not replaces their personal life. While alienation of work can occur when journalists must complete tasks they do not perceive as worthy of journalism (Matos, 2020), the profession tends to contribute strongly to journalists' identity, according to studies on job loss (Sherwood & O'Donnell, 2018).

Accordingly, being a journalist is more than a mere job. In Bourdieusian words, we can thus think of this dedication as part of journalists' illutio, their motivation to stay in the game despite it being precarious. When discussing job loss and transformations in the field, journalists "ascribe social value" to their journalistic work (Cohen et al., 2019, p. 819). As such, ex-journalists mourn the identity they had as a vital part of society. In her study on women journalists leaving the profession, Elmore (2009) finds that these women still appropriate the journalistic identity despite not working in it anymore. Similarly, Örnebring and Möller (2018) describe the inner negotiations journalists faced when they left the profession, either voluntarily or because they were made redundant. On the one hand, ex-journalists describe working in newsrooms as stressful and possessive. On the other, journalistic work and the journalistic profession have a certain appeal and

contribute to the respondents' identity: "Being a journalist is described as a 'lifestyle' or as a natural and embodied part of your personality. Some of the respondents report still behaving as journalists, and that they miss the adrenalin of doing journalistic work." (Örnebring & Möller, 2018, p. 1057).

It is thus not surprising that research studying transformations of the labour market, job loss and freelance journalists' motivations finds that many journalists turn to freelance not necessarily by choice but for lack of other, more stable, opportunities within the journalistic field. Whereas freelancers historically opted for self-employment by their preference, they increasingly have no choice at all than to go freelance (Massey & Elmore, 2011, p. 674). Antunovic and colleagues (2019) report that many of their respondents referred to the instability of the journalism labour market. Their survey asked journalists to describe their motivation to work freelance in an open answer. While many older women journalists named freelancing as an opportunity to combine childrearing and professional work, other respondents indicated a lack of choice, referred to lay-offs or the lack of full-time employment in general. Especially those journalists who had been working in full-time employment for some time saw freelancing as necessary after being made redundant. Similarly, a study on Austrian freelancers showed that about two-thirds of respondents had not chosen freelance work voluntarily (Maares & Putz, 2016).

Other studies indicate that aspiring journalists turn to atypical work for lack of full-time employment (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Frisque, 2014). Freelance work as well as underpaid and, to a lesser extent, unpaid internships are perceived as an opportunity to enter the field and to garner social capital (sociability) and symbolic capital (visibility) on the job market (Pereira, 2020). However, entering journalism through freelancing is relatively complicated as entrants must invest much more time and labour to make themselves seen and known. Neidorf (2008), for example, shows how fresh graduates without enough social capital in the form of broad social networks in the industry have a harder time cold pitching story ideas. In many cases, aspiring freelancers do not receive a response, which demotivates them and eventually leads to disappointment and quitting the industry altogether.

However, the content of work can also minimize journalists' vulnerability to other dimensions of precarity (Brinkmann et al., 2006). Journalists who had agency when turning to freelance work and perceived to have control over the content of their work reported being gratified with their working situation. For example, Massey and Elmore (2011) studied job satisfaction of US American freelance journalists and found that

especially women highly enjoyed their freelance work, had strong job satisfaction, and would choose to freelance again. Job satisfaction was significantly influenced by having enough work, reasonable remuneration and taking care of children at home. De Cock and de Smaele (2016) also link free choice to job satisfaction and a healthy relation to their work. They distinguish between forced and voluntary freelancers, which differ in their evaluation of irregular working hours and working from home. While voluntary freelancers enjoy the unpredictability of working hours and their freedom to work when they please, forced freelancers are more critical of continuous working hours and a feeling that “you are never done” (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016, p. 261).

Here, work boundaries are blurring between different forms of labour and personal and professional time. Regarding the former, studies on freelancers working in other fields of communication work (Obermaier & Koch, 2015; Wright, 2015) explore the effects of this work on their professional role. The blurring of personal and professional life occurs on two levels, the temporal layer of work and the affective labour involved (Siapera, 2019). This requires journalists to manage their time and emotions to prevent precariousness through overidentification (and eventually burnout). Studies indicate that freelancers believe they need to be constantly available and always working (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Mathisen, 2019) and build and maintain relationships with prospective commissioning newsrooms (Hayes & Silke, 2018; Rosenkranz, 2019). Moreover, meaningful engagement with audiences on social media has been described as a necessary tool for journalists of all employment statuses to increase their market value (Molyneux et al., 2019). This affective dimension of journalistic labour can be highly pleasurable (Siapera, 2019) but requires a considerable investment of personal time and care (Saipera & Iliadi, 2015) – which is again not remunerated. Research on social media work (Duffy, 2017) shows that this can, in fact, also heighten precarity.

Concluding, journalistic work outside the newsroom has always been part of the journalistic field. However, recent developments have led to an increase in precarious working conditions for atypical journalists. Still, research shows that many endure this precarity out of a passion for the profession. Thus, while precarious working conditions for journalists are by far not as existential as for those working in false self-employment in the service industry or those most dominated in society (see chapter one, p. 35), thinking about atypical journalists as precarious or partly precarious positions them more

clearly within the journalistic field. They occupy the more dominated parts of the field, as they lack overall volumes of capital. Their cultural capital is either non-existent or not valuable within the field; they lack social connections and social recognition in the journalistic community as well as financial security. Lastly, this low volume of capital, especially symbolic capital, makes them more susceptible to accept their position as given, to resign, and, most crucially, to accept the dominant doxa of the social space rather than the specific doxa of the journalistic field (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 139). The next chapter will combine Bourdieusian thought and existing scholarship and outline the framework and research questions.

Framework and Methodology

Chapter 5: Thinking with Bourdieu about atypical journalism culture

The previous chapter has discussed atypical journalistic work within an ambivalent spectrum of passion and precarity. To fully understand the resulting heterogeneity of (atypical) journalistic work, this chapter will outline how we can think about it in Bourdieusian terms and situate it within the concept of journalistic culture. According to Hanitzsch (2007), we can think of different journalistic cultures globally and across different beats and reporting styles. Journalistic culture thus entails the various formulas, beliefs, epistemologies, and practices that make up the unique contribution of journalism to society. As such, the concept is closely reminiscent of Bourdieusian concepts of field and the contestation about its *nomos* (chapter one, p. 18). Moreover, as journalistic cultures include journalists' values, beliefs, and epistemologies that shape their practice, the concept reminds of *habitus* as history or *habitus* as *opus operatum* (chapter one, p. 37; chapter two, p. 70).

In his effort to offer a universal theory of journalistic cultures, Hanitzsch (2007) focused on variance in journalists' institutional roles, epistemologies, and ethical ideologies. This was further expanded by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic factors which form journalistic culture (Hanitzsch, Ahva, et al., 2019). While journalists' roles, ethics, and trust in institutions make up the intrinsic factors, their perceptions of autonomy comprise extrinsic factors. Thus, intrinsic factors are primarily acquired through socialization, and extrinsic factors can be viewed as the objective structure enabling or limiting journalists' beliefs.

Figure 5.1 illustrates how I integrate both the concepts of journalistic culture with Bourdieusian thought and how both economic and technological forces shape atypical journalists' culture as a result. As discussed in chapter three, different technological and economic forces shape the journalistic field, with specific transformations like spatiotemporal availability of (journalistic) workers, low-cost accessibility of flexibilised workers, and low-cost production at the intersection of these. These influences shape the objective structures of the journalistic field, and concomitantly, journalists' intrinsic and extrinsic factors of journalistic culture. Applying the model of journalistic culture as outlined by Hanitzsch and colleagues (2019) to Bourdieusian thought, I conceptualize

journalists' accumulated journalism-specific knowledge and resources (forms of capital) and doxa (role perceptions and professional norms) as intrinsic factors. Likewise, extrinsic factors relate to journalists' perceived influences and editorial autonomy, both of which are closely linked to journalists' *illusio*. As such, capital, doxa and *illusio* form the journalistic culture or habitus as *opus operatum*.




Figure 5.1: Framework of Journalistic Culture shaped by technological and economic forces

As forms of capital, doxa and *illusio* and journalists' habitus shape the heterogeneity of the field and the position-taking of different actors in that field, I will outline these key Bourdieusian concepts in relation to findings from the literature on atypical journalism.

Forms of Capital: The heterogeneity of atypical journalistic culture

The concept of field lets us understand atypical journalists' location in the journalistic hierarchy. Moreover, it is helpful to consider the heterogeneity of atypical journalists in their position-taking, choice to work self-employed, and satisfaction with their work. As outlined in chapter two (p. 47), the journalistic field is often considered as stratified along a horizontal axis, indicating the degree of journalistic capital accumulated vis-à-vis economic capital, and a vertical axis of overall volumes of capital. According to Hovden (2008, p. 137)'s study on the stratification of the Norwegian journalistic field, freelancers

occupy the lower parts of the field. Similarly, following Örnebring and colleagues (2018)'s conceptualization of the space of journalistic work, atypical journalists can most likely be found in its less recognized and ill-equipped areas. However, depending on atypical workers' education, experience, and professional recognition, they could occupy symbolically valued positions.

Apart from economic capital, individual journalists thus require cultural capital in the form of education, knowledge, and skills; social capital in the form of relationships with newsrooms, other journalists, and sources; as well as journalistic capital, i.e. the field-specific symbolic capital, in the form of professional reputation but also their place in the symbolic hierarchy of beats and media format (see also chapter two, p. 63). Summarising the literature on atypical journalism, they generally tend to lack economic and social capital but have high volumes of cultural capital and, in some cases, symbolic capital.

Cultural capital: For individual journalists, cultural capital occurs in materialized form in the artefacts they produce, in institutionalized form in their education and training, and in embodied form in the (tacit) knowledge they acquired throughout their life and by participating in the specific field (see also chapter one, p. 27). As such, embodied capital also informs and is informed by the field-specific doxa and habitus, i.e., journalists acquire the fields' norms, epistemologies, ethical considerations and roles (Vos & Craft, 2017; Vos & Finneman, 2016; Vos & Wolfgang, 2018).

While atypical journalists' embodied cultural capital has been less investigated, they are generally well-educated, and the majority have a university degree and specialized training in journalism. Survey-based studies compared the level of education to numbers from studies on all journalists and found that in most cases, freelancers are even better educated than their employed colleagues (Buckow, 2011; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009). In addition, among atypical journalism, women journalists tend to have better education (Antunovic et al., 2019; Meyen & Springer, 2009). This professionalization, and in some cases over-qualification, might also be a reaction to the prolonged entry into the job market (Pereira, 2020). Freelancers primarily invest in their digital capital, i.e., their digital knowledge and skill set (Cohen et al., 2019; Pereira, 2020). Hayes and Silkes (2018) observe that while adapting to technological developments and broadening their digital skills might be habitual for younger freelancers, older freelancers have to invest more time. This is on par with other studies showing that digital skill sets are often broadened intuitively from

an early age (T. J. Thomson, 2018) and on their own expenses (Naït-Bouda, 2008). Digital skills are perceived as necessary capital to set oneself apart from the masses of journalists. However, when asked about their relationship towards technology, the freelancers interviewed by Hayes and Silke (2018) mostly talked about ICT affordances such as social media platforms. Only one talked about the new opportunities to create multi-media content easily. Moreover, only a few reported using social media for networking and branding. Still, compared to employed journalists, freelancers are more likely to engage with their audiences on social media, share personal information to brand themselves and promote their work explicitly (Brems et al., 2017).

Journalistic capital: The field-specific symbolic capital refers to practices, knowledge, and skills that are misrecognized as more valuable than others (see chapter two, p. 63). As such, symbolic capital captures professional reputation and renown among peers, if not society at large. In the journalistic field, we can find such misrecognition

- a) in the professional reputation of some media formats over others (national news outlets as more legitimate than regional ones, newspaper journalism as more legitimate than digital journalism),
- b) of some beats over others (political news as more legitimate than lifestyle news),
- c) and of some forms of reporting over others (investigative reporting more legitimate than clickbait reporting).

Media types. Traditionally, freelancers have worked predominantly for print media, as this only requires tools to write and not to shoot, record or edit material. Survey-based studies show that atypical journalists still work for magazines, newspapers, and online media (Buckow, 2011; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009).¹⁷ However, commercial and public broadcasts similarly rely on stringers (Salamon, 2019) and flat-charge workers for project-based work (Summ, 2013). A longitudinal study comparing numbers of freelancers in Belgium in 2013 and 2018 (Van Leuven et al., 2021) finds that atypical work increased significantly in both the print and television sectors. However, the rise was less pronounced in television. There also seems to be a division between the different forms of atypical work: self-employed freelancers with multiple clients work predominantly for newspapers and magazines (Buckow, 2011;

¹⁷ Deuze and Fortunati (2011, p. 111) state that atypical work is “significantly higher among newcomers in the industry and among those working in television and online”, but unfortunately do not provide a reference that confirms this statement.

Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012). Contingent workers or freelancers on a flat-charge who work mainly for just one media company tend to work for broadcast media (Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Summ, 2013). A study exclusively focusing on freelance journalists working for television (Summ, 2013) thus also describes them as semi-dependent. This allows media companies flexibility while at the same time having access to a pool of highly qualified workers. However, especially among those working for public broadcast, freelancers report that newsrooms hire many atypical journalists for smaller projects than to work with fewer journalists regularly (Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 91). This deliberate minimizing of working hours per month prevents newsrooms from being accused of supporting false self-employment.¹⁸ However, in broadcast, atypical journalists often do not have many customers. Therefore, more and more freelancers work across different media types.

Beats and reporting. Considering the history of atypical and freelance journalism, these journalists tend to be specialists in at least one area, often culture, politics, business, or science (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Other often-mentioned beats are social and criminal justice reporting, lifestyle beats and regional or local journalism (J. Jenkins, 2017; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Van Leuven et al., 2021). As such, atypical journalists work both in symbolically consecrated areas and areas that are not perceived as ‘valuable’.

Similarly, freelancers appear to do more long-form reporting like reportages, features and documentaries, as they are better remunerated (Mathisen, 2017). Ideally, this speaks to the division of labour described by Gottschall (1999), which outsources more complex and in-depth investigation and reporting outside the newsroom. Moreover, these specializations also speak to the fact that freelancers often work for magazines. However, such outsourcing also puts some beats under more pressure as atypical work also means precarious working conditions, less legal protection when reporting, and eventually less protection from external influences (Van Leuven et al., 2021). This is especially evident in lifestyle reporting (Rosenkranz, 2016) and in the local beat, where atypical journalists are more vulnerable to political and commercial influences (J. Jenkins, 2017; Mathisen, 2019). In contrast, van Leuven and colleagues (2021, p. 1214) neither report many

¹⁸ Regardless, atypical journalists working for television earn relatively well compared to those working for online media or newspapers. Some even refer to them as “luxury freelancers” (Summ, 2013, p. 179, own translation), even though remuneration rates are declining here as well (see also Matos, 2020 fn 4; Ryan, 2009).

atypical journalists working for the political beat nor has the number of political freelance journalists been increasing, supporting the “privilege and prestigious position” of the political.

Lastly, even though they are not considered forms of capital as Bourdieu has conceptualized them, I still want to reflect on gender and age as key dimensions influencing journalists’ accumulation of overall capital, primarily symbolic capital. Scholarship has conceptualized gender as negative capital (Djerf-Pierre, 2007; Moi, 1999). Similarly, age is tightly linked to capital accumulation, as acquiring forms of capital requires time-labour (Bourdieu, 1986). Both, in turn, also shape journalists’ schemes of perception (doxa, habitus).

Gender. Atypical work and freelancing in journalism have long been associated with women journalists, as it is assumed that freelancing is more compatible with childbearing and -rearing or a “flight from gender biases in the news room” (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 838, see also Elmore, 2009; Antunovic et al., 2017). While qualitative studies often interview slightly more respondents identifying as women (J. Jenkins, 2017; Mathisen, 2019; Matos, 2020; Norbäck, 2021; Schnedler, 2017), the decision to sample more women is rarely discussed in light of the overall composition of the field. This might also be since actual numbers of atypical journalists are hard to come by, and representative findings are also not the aim of qualitative studies.¹⁹ Of the few survey studies that report frequencies on gender, age and education (not all do), we can not conclude that freelancers are primarily women.²⁰

Qualitative studies show that for some women, freelancing offers them indeed the opportunity to continue their journalistic work while taking care of their children (Elmore, 2009). Many women also found that they could not get back into their old job after motherhood and therefore turned to freelance (Antunovic et al., 2019; Örnebring & Möller, 2018). Elmore (2009, p. 252) thus argues that “the women’s quest for freelance journalism work articulates resistance to the long hours and lack of control that predominate in daily newswork”. In another study, Elmore and Massey (2011) found a

¹⁹ Hayes and Silke (2018) selected a sample that reflects the general demographics of all Irish journalists, which was accordingly more male-dominated. However, while appearing more systematic, such a sampling approach also conflates atypical journalists and those in full-time labour, which could differ in sociodemographic background.

²⁰ For example, numbers range from 68% of women journalists in the USA (Massey & Elmore, 2011) to 70% in the USA and Canada (Antunovic et al., 2019), over 53% in Germany (Buckow, 2011) and Austria (Maares & Putz, 2016), to 42% in Canada (Cohen et al., 2019) and 35% yet again in Germany (Meyen & Springer, 2009).

significant positive relationship between women freelancers' job satisfaction and having children at home. However, results also indicate that some journalists quit journalism altogether as it proved to be challenging to combine freelance work and taking care of a family (Antunovic et al., 2019; Örnebring & Möller, 2018).

Lastly, scholarship indicates that women freelancers might be more affected by financial precarity (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, p. 124; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 60). Salamon (2019, p. 3) argues that "relatively low-paid freelance journalism is pronounced among women journalists". A structural analysis of Austrian journalists' monthly income shows that while freelancers as a whole earn much less compared to their employed colleagues, 44% of women freelancers earned up to € 2.000 compared to 30% of men freelancers (Prandner, 2013).

Age. Moreover, recent research indicates that aspiring journalists must endure uncertainty and atypical employment when entering the field (Gollmitzer, 2014; Hayes & Silke, 2018; Hummel et al., 2012; Nölleke et al., 2022; Pereira, 2020). Accordingly, atypical and freelance journalists should be comparatively young compared to journalists in full-time stable employment. Here, reported findings from surveys are less conclusive compared to findings on journalists' gender.²¹ For example, findings from Germany reported that 46% of freelancers were under the age of 45 in 2008 (Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 61), while another survey conducted one year later found that 75% of respondents were under the age of 45 (Buckow, 2011, p. 52). The studies sampled freelancers through two different professional unions, which might explain this discrepancy, as might the broader socio-political circumstances of the 2007 financial crisis and the unfolding recession. Meyen and Springer (2009, p. 19) thus argue that freelance journalists as a cohort might get older since self-employment might offer an "alternative to unemployment" for older journalists made redundant. Qualitative studies from the past decade also indicate that not only beginners lost their job or could not find stable employment during the recession and its aftermath, but also middle-aged and older journalists were made redundant (Antunovic et al., 2019; Nikunen, 2014). However, a longitudinal study comparing Belgian journalists across all forms of employment in 2013 and 2018 shows that freelance journalists were indeed significantly younger than employed journalists (Van Leuven et al., 2021).

²¹ To some extent, this is because studies only report percentages for arbitrarily formed age groups but do not mention the median or mean age and standard deviation; others report age split for different groups, for example, gender, without stating the total age median or mean.

Nevertheless, age seems to play a crucial role for so-called “forced freelancers”(De Cock & De Smaele, 2016, p. 261). Respondents in various studies report they were either considered too old or too young, had either too little experience or not the necessary (digital) skills (Antunovic et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019; De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Hayes & Silke, 2018). Survey-based research, however, finds that especially older journalists are voluntarily self-employed, while younger atypical journalists would not mind finding stable full-time employment (Buckow, 2011, p. 62; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 47). Moreover, experienced and voluntary freelancers believe that self-employment can only be successful after employment in the industry as one would otherwise lack social capital. In a survey, roughly two-thirds of respondents advised somewhat or strongly against pursuing a freelancing career directly after graduation (Elmore & Massey, 2012).

This contrasts with the job market, which often requires entrants to the field to work in atypical employment. Unsurprisingly, qualitative studies show that younger freelancers are more inclined to invest low paid or unpaid aspirational labour to build a portfolio and reputation, eventually landing them employment. This includes building good relationships with senior journalists (Norbäck & Styhre, 2019), networking and self-branding on social media (Hayes & Silke, 2018), and investing time-labour in acquiring new skills (Accardo, 2007, pp. 273–274; De Vuyst & Raeymaeckers, 2019). For example, younger and less experienced freelancers concentrate on building their reputation and are willing to work long hours and weekends for low wages (Gollmitzer, 2014). Similarly, Antunovic and colleagues (2019) report that younger respondents perceived freelancing more positively as they thought it was a temporary period of their lives.

Older freelancers, on the other hand, “actively develop strategies to take time off work” and try to decline offers once in a while (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 834). This also creates generational tensions, as more experienced freelancers believe that younger entrants to the field spoil remuneration rates (Gollmitzer, 2014; Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 61). Antunovic and colleagues (2019) report similar conflicts. In their sample, experienced freelancers report that newsrooms increasingly perceive them as overcharging because younger freelancers are willing to work for low pay or simply visibility.

Illusio and doxa: Atypical journalists' aspirations and beliefs

The concepts of *illusio* and *doxa* form the basis for boundary-making and contestation over the journalistic field's *nomos*. They also describe journalists' investment into the field and the naturalized truths that inform their participation in it. Hence, the concepts relate to autonomy as a motivation to partake in the field's struggle (*illusio*) and journalists' normative assumptions and beliefs about the field, like professional norms and normative roles (*doxa*).

Illusio as autonomy and freedom

The concept of *illusio* captures why agents are motivated to participate in the field. As discussed in chapter two (p. 58), in the journalistic field, *illusio* refers to journalists' "strong feeling" for the journalistic mission (Hovden, 2008, p. 198) and has been linked to journalism's claims of autonomy as a key boundary marker of the field. Autonomy here combines idealistic and personal motivations to invest themselves in the field. On the one hand, journalists are caught up in a quest to offer "public service autonomous from any influences" (Nölleke et al., 2022, p. 331). On the other, *illusio* also describes their motivations to pursue "creative work autonomous of any constraints" (ibid). Self-employment is mainly linked to such personal beliefs and aspirations as working freelance is ostensibly linked to freedom and more autonomy over one's work hours, workplace, and choosing topics and angles when reporting. An essential aspect of the word *freelancer* is the notion of precisely this freedom (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012). However, as Mathisen (2017, p. 1006) points out, it refers more to an "illusion of freedom". Autonomy and freedom have often been positioned as a counterbalance to precarious and insecure working conditions (Mathisen, 2019). However, it is more likely a myth, and in Bourdieusian terms, an *illusio* to legitimate staying in the field under such conditions.

In studies investigating atypical journalists' motivations, autonomy is thus often named by respondents as a reason to enter freelance work or to stay despite difficulties (Antunovic et al., 2019; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Ryan, 2009). For example, Edstrom and Ladendorf (2012, p. 716) show that freelancers' discourses around their journalistic practice focus on freedom as a key aspect. For them, this means having agency over their own time and the topics they work on as well as being freed from difficult work relationships with managers and colleagues. These notions are reminiscent of Örnebring

and colleagues (2016, pp. 318–319)‘s conceptualization of workplace autonomy (see chapter three, p. 101): Working outside a hierarchical context and making discretionary decisions. As such, perceptions of freedom and autonomy are linked to high levels of job satisfaction (Corsani, 2012; Mathisen, 2017). While most atypical workers are dissatisfied by low remuneration rates and lack of social benefits, they nonetheless report high job satisfaction regarding their overall work and the agency they have over it. Ryan (2009) compared staff and contingent television journalists and found that those freelancing were significantly happier with the freedom they had to choose over assignments. Moreover, the perception of autonomy appears to be more assertive when atypical workers are ‘real’ freelancers. Compared to freelancers on a flat-charge, ‘real’ freelancers appear to be more satisfied with the control over their work time as well as the time they have for research (Maares & Putz, 2016).

Qualitative studies further exemplify this discursive connection between job satisfaction and autonomy as control over working hours and content (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Mathisen, 2017). This also speaks to the organizational constraints many respondents encountered when they worked in full-time employment. Antunovic and colleagues (Antunovic et al., 2019) quote both voluntary and forced freelancers who were dissatisfied with discriminating workplace environments and having to complete tasks they did not enjoy, such as managing and editing. Thus, freelancing is perceived as more creative (Corsani, 2012) and can break with routines and menial tasks as journalism. The freedom that self-employment affords appears to be a romantic or nostalgic notion for ‘good’ journalism (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012, p. 717). Similarly, Mathisen (2017, p. 915) concludes:

“The freelance life can mean engagement in satisfying professional tasks based on the freelancer’s own ideas rather than tasks to be performed in a prescribed manner. The freedom to decide which kinds of stories to work on is important, in addition to the possibility of avoiding the kind of work they find undesirable.”

However, journalists’ perceptions of autonomy and freedom are also immensely shaped by economic constraints. Furthermore, while self-employment offers more opportunities for creativity and meaningful work, at the same time, it is characterized by longer periods in which freelancers have no work. In a study by Antunovic and colleagues (2019), these fluctuations are referred to as a “feast or famine life”. These periods of famine can be anxiety-inducing which diminishes the perception of autonomy and freedom (Corsani, 2012). Research also indicates that atypical journalists appear to be aware of the myth of

freedom and autonomy. For example, a respondent in Ladendorf and Edstrom (2012, p. 717)'s study distinguishes between "the feeling of freedom" and "actual freedom", and in another study, Norwegian freelancers acknowledge that the freedom afforded is more of an illusion Mathisen (Mathisen, 2017). As income can be discontinued at any time, freelance journalists must always be available unless they have the economic capital and thus privilege to endure such periods of no work (Corsani, 2012; Mathisen, 2019).

Here, *illusio* is positioned vis-à-vis external taken-for-granted constraints, or from a Bourdieusian (1998a, pp. 29–45, 94–105) perspective, the internalization of contemporary societies' neoliberal doxa. Both Cohen (2012) and Gollmitzer (2014) thus criticize the illusion of autonomy and freedom as exploitative because it makes freelancers believe they have freedom in a system that only remunerates the finished piece and not the labour invested. Accordingly, compared to employed journalists, atypical workers are ostensibly more autonomous "to develop their ideas at the creation stage" (Gollmitzer, 2014, p. 829); however, they are not paid for this work. In general, journalists are paid per line or minute of the finished product (Gollmitzer, 2014; Hayes & Silke, 2018; Mathisen, 2017) and, in some rare cases, even per click received (Antunovic et al., 2019; Cohen, 2019). Moreover, copyright contracts often prevent atypical journalists from getting remunerated for further uses, but media companies can re-use and sell the product (Salamon, 2016). Thus, the benefits of autonomous creative work "are often undermined by precarity" (Cohen, 2012, p. 148).

However, contrary to the dominant notion of freedom, very few freelancers, often those with high journalistic capital and economic resources, "have the autonomy to pick and choose assignments and employers" (Örnebring, 2016, p. 142). Almost all respondents of a recent interview study with Irish freelancers claimed that freelancing meant they could not invest as much time in reporting as they would like to (Hayes & Silke, 2019). Moreover, they reported only choosing topics that they knew would sell well. Before taking assignments or pitching stories, freelancers also consider whether a story would be too time-consuming and whether it would bring about ethical and legal difficulties (Mathisen, 2019). Moreover, while having full agency over which topics to cover is difficult to reach (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016)), freelancers also report encountering difficulties in determining the angle of a story (J. Jenkins, 2017).

Thus, autonomy includes workplace autonomy and journalists' freedom to choose the topics to report on and manage their working time freely. It is also a normative ideal and key marker of the journalistic profession (see chapter three, p. 99). While this

autonomy from political and economic influences is generally mediated through the newsroom (Hamada et al., 2019, p. 138; Örnebring et al., 2016, p. 320), atypical journalists appear to be confronted with external influences more directly and must negotiate their perception of autonomy as a normative ideal. Deuze and Witschge (2020, p. 83) argue that journalists' autonomy "today is rather reduced because of the need to self-commodify, to cross-subsidize, and to promote and publish, next to just producing news and information". This is especially true for atypical journalists and even more for those working in lifestyle areas (J. Jenkins, 2017; Rosenkranz, 2016) or those working on social issues (Conrad, 2015).

Doxa as professional norms

As the taken-for-granted truths, the concept of doxa is often employed to capture "a set of professional beliefs which tend to appear as evident, natural and self-explaining norms of journalistic practice" (Schultz, 2007, p. 194). Doxa pertains to the unspoken rules of the game that journalists have acquired over the years of their socialization in the field. Thus, it refers to the professional norms and ideals discursively (re)produced through education, training and metajournalistic discourses, such as journalism as public service, striving for objectivity, independence, immediacy and ethical decision-making (Deuze, 2005). I will focus on three aspects capturing doxa as professional norms: how atypical journalists pertain to the norm of objectivity and impartiality, how strict they are in maintaining a boundary between journalistic and other communication work, and to what extent they pursue ethical decisions during the editing process.

Qualitative research on atypical journalists indicates that they might have nuanced epistemic views regarding objectivity as a professional norm. In her study on crowdfunded freelance journalism, Hunter (2015, p. 284) finds that atypical journalists perceive objectivity as impossible and sometimes even unnecessary to reach: "they very clearly identify reporting as a human process that will never be neutral, as it involves people who cannot ever be fully divorced from their values, perspectives and cultural milieus". Still, some of her respondents turn to rigorous impartiality, fairness, and balance, and others believe factual reporting with a subjective perspective is possible (see also J. Jenkins, 2017). Likewise, atypical journalists who brand themselves to build and maintain direct relationships with their audience are less objective and turn to transparency instead to

At the same time, impartiality and fairness are especially relevant for those working both in journalism and other communication work – as more and more atypical journalists do (see also chapter four, p. 117). A German survey finds that the majority working in public relations does so out of financial necessity (Buckow, 2011, p. 57). Here, scholarship indicates that freelancers, just like news organizations, negotiate to what extent it is acceptable to circumvent the “wall” between journalistic and other communication work (Buckow, 2011; Coddington, 2015; Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009). As they tread unknown territory, atypical journalists must draw on their personal ethics. For example, Ladendorf (2012) illustrates how investigative reporters decline information work as they believe it would damage their reputation. However, “sometimes survival is deemed more important than ethics” (Ladendorf, 2012, p. 92). This might have uneasy implications for journalism when freelancers pitch stories to newsrooms that they have already developed commercially, as observed in the activist and non-governmental sector (Conrad, 2015; Wright, 2015).

While some PR-journalists “endure the state of cognitive tension” (Fröhlich et al., 2013, p. 822), research also finds that some atypical journalists enjoy their work in public relations, even if they engage with it out of financial necessity (Fröhlich et al., 2013; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 145). They claim to “perform PR activities completely according to the principles of journalism” and by emphasizing “the similarity between PR activities and classical journalism” (Fröhlich et al., 2013, p. 822). Regardless, those who must engage with PR work out of financial necessity evaluate secondary employment in PR much more negatively than those who primarily enjoy their work in PR (Koch & Obermaier, 2014). Thus, journalists employ different strategies to negotiate inter-role conflicts, namely topic separation, passive shielding, and mindful selection of clients and assignments in PR. Whereas the majority claimed to follow mindful selection, only a third works in separate areas and one-in-four tends to conceal their PR work from journalistic clients (Koch & Obermaier, 2014). To help freelance journalists overcome such ethical dilemmas when facing PR and journalistic work, freelance-specific discourse has outlined and established ethical principles in some countries (Buckow, 2011).

However, negotiating an acceptable separation between journalism and communication work is not the only ethical dilemma that atypical journalists as individuals must face. Atypical journalists might have different perceptions of ethics than the newsrooms they work for when it comes to the editing process. For example, freelancers working for US American lifestyle magazines are aware of different reporting

preferences of their commissioning newsrooms and negotiate their personal preferences against these (J. Jenkins, 2017). Here, some find this process difficult, especially when newsrooms change the angle in a way that mocks or harms their sources. Ultimately, most accept the changes made by editors: “Although these journalists felt conflicted about the ways their stories were presented, they recognized their role in the editorial relationship – as a writer for a paying client” (J. Jenkins, 2017, p. 195). Similarly, in a study on ethical boundaries in Norwegian freelance journalism, respondents claim that editors sometimes threaten or undermine their professional integrity by editing or framing the final product in a way that is contrary to their intention (Mathisen, 2019, p. 648). Atypical journalists have limited options to react to such edits: protest and be branded as difficult, withdraw and not get remunerated, or accept changes as they are dependent on the income and fear they will not be commissioned in the future.

This means that atypical journalists are confronted with ethical dilemmas that they often must solve independently without organizational support (J. Jenkins, 2017; Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019; Rosenkranz, 2016). Some freelancers thus also distinguish between “high-stakes” and “low-stakes” ethical dilemmas (J. Jenkins, 2017, p. 194). Here, journalists reporting on lifestyle topics and other areas that are traditionally considered soft news believed that their ethical “decision-making carried less consequentialist weight” (ibid.). Some also apply practices in their reporting that are considered not particularly ethical in the profession. Such practices included interviewing friends on a topic, letting sources read the article before publishing, focusing on sources’ success instead of including problematic aspects, and not identifying as journalists when investigating a story.

While atypical journalists might negotiate these ‘low-stakes’ ethical decisions independently, research also indicates that some uncomfortable decisions are purposefully outsourced to freelancers, for example, in travel journalism, where resources to fund trips for research have been decreasing (Rosenkranz, 2016). Editors-in-chief and newsrooms are aware of the ethical dilemma of relying on commercial funding and reject this practice for their in-house reporting. Likewise, Mathisen (2019, p. 647) concludes that “editors sometimes do not entrust the editorial staff with assignments and tasks and give them to freelancers; in this way the editor avoids problematizing any issues, for example, about content marketing and sponsored travels”. Nevertheless, freelancing travel journalists report that news companies gladly buy pieces by freelancers even though tourism agencies have funded them (Rosenkranz, 2016). This posits travel

journalists in a difficult position. They are aware they might ‘sell themselves’, yet at the same time perceive themselves as ‘honest’ (Rosenkranz, 2019, p. 624) and try to negotiate the fine line between journalistic ideals while at the same time earning a living.

Such difficult ethical decisions are exacerbated as atypical journalists often depend on the income from other communication work. Following this review of the literature, it becomes apparent that atypical journalistic work is informed by oscillating adherence to traditional professional rules of the game, depending on their level of precarity.

Doxa as cognitive role orientations

Moreover, as outlined before, I conceptualize another dimension of doxa as the internalization of cognitive role orientations into normative role orientations (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018; Vos & Wolfgang, 2018). Whereas role perceptions have also been conceptualized as habitus (Eldridge, 2018; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012), Hanitzsch and Vos (2017, p. 125) argue that cognitive role orientations “tend to appear as evident, natural, and self-explaining”. They make up the doxic schemes of perceptions that can inform journalists’ habitus (Schultz, 2007, p. 193). Cognitive role conceptions thus capture beliefs about the field that journalists acquire throughout their socialization to the journalistic community as a whole and specific communities of practice (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017). This socialization, however, differs depending on the news organization they work in, the beat they report on, their newsroom’s audience orientation and much more. As such, journalists who completed a degree in journalism might adhere more to cognitive roles relating to monitoring or critique and control than journalists trained in local newsrooms or lifestyle media. Similarly, journalists working under highly competitive conditions in digital news media might embrace a more audience-oriented role orientation (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). Thus, atypical journalists who do not experience continuous socialization *within* newsrooms might thus have different cognitive orientations than journalists in stable full-time employment.

For example, it has been stipulated that precarious working conditions and work in other communication areas can affect how journalists think of their role in society. Gollmitzer (2014) questions whether precariously employed journalists can embrace and

perform the watchdog role of journalism²². Likewise, research on Swedish atypical journalists shows that freelancers have adapted to market forces by developing an identity as “producers” (Ladendorf, 2012, p. 87). As they produce both journalistic and public relations and advertising content, they frame their professional identity within their “own conscience rather than conventions of the journalist profession” (Ladendorf, 2012, pp. 87–88, see also Buckow, 2011, pp. 73-81). A team of German researchers has investigated how work in journalism and public relations might affect journalists’ role perceptions (Fröhlich et al., 2013; Koch & Obermaier, 2014; Obermaier & Koch, 2015). Pragmatic PR-journalists perceive their journalistic role to serve the public, whereas they see it as persuading the audience in public relations. Only disillusioned freelancers saw the inter-role conflict as a burden; these journalists tend to see their role to be investigative, which contrasts their public relations work (Fröhlich et al., 2013). A following survey study finds a relationship between the motivation to work in PR and journalism and the anticipation of dual-role conflicts (Koch & Obermaier, 2014). Lastly, they could illustrate that inter-role conflict can lead to tension and insecurity in their professional identity (Obermaier & Koch, 2015). Both tension and insecurity in their professional identity also affect their perception of stress and, ultimately, their job satisfaction. Obermaier and Koch (2015, p. 625) thus conclude that journalists who believe in normative journalistic functions experience more significant inter-role conflicts than those who share no such disposition. This might also explain why many atypical journalists embrace a less normative journalistic identity.

Apart from this focus on inter-role conflict, role perceptions of atypical journalists are seldom at the core of interest. Interview studies link atypical journalists’ professional identity, their occupational status, and the choice they had in it. For example, research examining the role perceptions of German journalists finds that freelancers tend to either perceive themselves as service providers or artists (Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012, p. 394). Meyen and Riesmeyer draw on a large number of about 500 interviews conducted over three years to understand how habitus and field position shape journalists’ schemes of perception and behaviour, arguing that the struggle within the field is an influencing factor for developing specific role perceptions. Precariously employed freelancers thus cannot be detectives or sentinels as “they are missing resources and possibilities to decide

²² Even though, strictly speaking, her study does not address journalists’ perceived function or what kind of journalism they aim to do.

about their published topics” (Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012, p. 399). Similarly, they only find young, aspiring freelancers striving for the service provider role because these respondents presumably perceive their atypical employment as an initiation rite. The other freelancers in their sample tended to perceive themselves more as artists, i.e., they saw their journalistic work more as a springboard to fulfil another career in the arts. This is reiterated in a later study on Austrian freelancers. Here, in-depth interviews reveal that freelancers perceive their function for society more in gathering and communicating information than investigative reporting (Maares & Putz, 2016, p. 52). This also seems to be linked to the lack of time that atypical journalists can invest as the remuneration is too low.

Likewise, Mathisen (2017) investigates how the tension between autonomy and economic constraints shape freelancers’ professional role perception. She distinguishes between two professional identities, which she calls idealists and entrepreneurs. Accordingly, idealists pursue in-depth investigation and reporting and are motivated by autonomy, even if this identity results in lower income. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, perceive themselves more as running a business and perceive their work as a commodity that they sell to newsrooms. Thus, they are oriented towards the media company and not necessarily the audience. They also emphasize that their identity as entrepreneurs will protect them from exploitative practices and eventually protect their professional autonomy (Mathisen, 2017, p. 920). Another study, also focusing on more entrepreneurial freelancers, indicates that they perceive their role as engaging audiences through innovative practices while at the same time “reinforcing and repairing journalistic norms, including transparency” (Holton, 2016, p. 925).

Survey-based studies often draw on item batteries which are also commonly used to investigate journalists’ role perceptions in general, making freelance journalists’ perceptions at least a bit comparable to those of journalists in standard employment. Research shows that atypical journalists are less likely to perceive themselves as watchdogs or critical investigative reporters. Meyen and Springer (2009, pp. 99–101) show that most respondents embrace service or interpretive roles, especially younger atypical journalists. On the other hand, the watchdog role was only embraced by 15% of their respondents, and the majority were over 45 years. These findings are reiterated in a study conducted a few years later by Buckow (2011, p. 76), even though her respondents perceived it a bit more important to control those in power and less important to give guidance in audiences’ lives and satisfy their needs. Similarly, Austrian freelancers

tended to be more oriented towards the role of the detached observer and less towards the audiences, which might be rooted in the fact that atypical journalists perceive the commissioning newsroom as their customers and not the audience (Maares & Putz, 2016, p. 58). Also, in direct comparison to employed journalists, freelancers tend to view an audience orientation as much less important. Drawing on the German dataset of the *Worlds of Journalism Study*, Steindl, Lauerer and Hanitzsch (2018, p. 54) find that only a third of freelancers think it is vital to attract the largest audience possible and offer service and advice as well as entertainment and relaxation. In comparison, at least half of the employed journalists view these aspects as important. This study also finds that freelancers tend to be oriented mainly towards the role of a neutral observer.

Habitus of atypical journalists

Journalists' habitus is shaped by their accumulated volume of capital and the internalization of the field's *illusio* and *doxa*. As discussed before (chapter one, p. 36; chapter two, p. 70), habitus comprises the schemes of perception, classification, and beliefs that form journalists' evaluation of situations and their practice. Journalistic habitus thus depends on and reflects the journalists' position in the field. For example, the habitus of local journalists, their schemes of perception and everyday practices will be different from a journalist working for a national magazine. Journalists' habitus also reflects their overall socialization and thus their social class (Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019). However, habitus constantly adapts to changing power relations within the field, which external influences can shape. Even in times of relative stability, journalists' habitus is changing as it is "accumulated history" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). Moreover, as a practical sense, habitus can provide agents with a sense for opportunities (see also chapter one, p. 38 and chapter two, p. 70).

For example, journalists with higher embodied digital capital can adapt their everyday practice to new demands, allowing them to gain a better position in the field by embracing a *digital habitus*. As discussed in chapter three (p. 87), in more mobile and multimodal media, having a diverse skill set and a "feel for the game", a practical sense, that is, a habitus attuned to the digital environment, can be an advantage as well (Barnard, 2016; Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a). Tech-savvy journalists can thus carve out a specific niche for newsrooms and make themselves indispensable (Perreault & Stanfield, 2019). However, research on mobile journalism practices does not address whether

mobile journalists are primarily employed, contract workers, or freelancers. As mobile and digital journalism is often produced by younger journalists since their embodied history is more attuned to the new technology (Hayes & Silke, 2018), we can, however, assume that a digital habitus might also be dominant among aspiring freelancers (Cohen, 2016, chapter five). A digital habitus is also often shaped by an awareness that their work is paid based on its performance, and journalists work accordingly.

Similarly, adopting the increasing neoliberal doxa and embracing a more entrepreneurial mind and skill set could be conceptualized as an *entrepreneurial habitus*. Considering the transformation of the labour market and an increasing shift towards individualized and self-organized work, the industry and journalism scholarship frequently refer to the concept of entrepreneurial journalism and entrepreneurial skills in journalism as an opportunity to react to these changes and reinvigorate journalism (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; Singer, 2016; Vos & Singer, 2016). Moreover, studies on atypical journalists also show that an entrepreneurial mind-set might limit the perception of insecurity and offer a feeling of empowerment (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2017; Norbäck, 2021; Rosenkranz, 2016).²³ In (freelance) journalistic discourse, embracing an entrepreneurial mind-set is generally viewed as positive (Elmore & Massey, 2012; Ladendorf, 2012), and unions and schools offer courses in entrepreneurial journalism to individual journalists (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010; Singer & Broersma, 2020).

Entrepreneurial journalists embrace an economic mind- and skillset (Baines and Kennedy 2010, 103). For individual journalists, this means considering which news outlets would be interested in their reporting, evaluating their marketplace and whether they must supplement their journalistic work with other sources of income. As such, entrepreneurial freelancers stratify their income sources by relying on more than one commissioning newsroom, ideally repurposing research trips and interviews for stories across media types and finding other forms of financing like crowdfunding (Hunter, 2015; Rosenkranz, 2016). Moreover, they need to build a network of relationships. As discussed in chapter four, aspiring journalists who lack social capital within the journalistic community have difficulty placing their pitches and understanding the specific rules of the newsroom (see p. 119). Thus, entrepreneurial success is often linked

²³ Even though scholarly analysis is more critical as the euphemistic use of entrepreneurial journalism might cover up self-exploitations and add to the internalization of precarity instead of resolving it (Cohen, 2015b; Örnebring, 2018b; Salamon, 2016)

to seniority and a broad social network to find and pitch topics (Elmore & Massey, 2012). Lastly, entrepreneurial journalists perceive both the news organization and the audience as clients (Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 32). Thus, it becomes more relevant for these freelancers to consider the final audience of their work and try to build and maintain relationships with them (Holton, 2016; Rosenkranz, 2016). This speaks to broader developments of (self-)branding in journalism in general (see chapter three, p. 87). By considering themselves as a brand, entrepreneurial journalists carve out a specific (niche) topic to offer a clear value proposition to audiences (Singer, 2016). Entrepreneurial journalists broaden and draw on their digital capital (Holton, 2016; Rosenkranz, 2016).

However, lacking the resources to empower themselves, atypical journalists could also accept a *marginalized habitus*. Such a habitus would accept the precarity of atypical journalism as outlined in chapter four, including being always on and prepared to produce for anyone willing to buy their work (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Ladendorf, 2012). This also includes the blurring of work and non-work time, as atypical journalists accept to work anytime, for long stretches and being prepared to react to commissioning editors' requests (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016, p. 261; Mathisen, 2017; Meyen & Springer, 2009, p. 83).

Research Questions

As the previous chapters have illustrated, much of the research on atypical journalism has focused primarily on one aspect, either freelancers' precarity, entrepreneurial mind-set, motivations, or personal ethics. Less research has investigated atypical journalistic work comprehensively, considering their access to resources and personal trajectories.

Moreover, scholarship on atypical journalism has primarily focused on single case studies. While they provide valuable and often in-depth insight into atypical journalists' motivations, role perceptions, professional norms, and socio-material contexts, they do not offer a general insight into how atypical journalistic work is affected and shaped by technological and economic forces. Based on the theoretical framework and literature outlined in the previous sections, I aim to map atypical journalistic work and their atypical journalistic cultures under technological and economic transformations across Europe. Three larger research questions guide this project, each one of them including more specific sub-questions:

RQ 1: How do technological transformations affect the work of atypical journalists and their freelance journalistic cultures?

RQ 1a: How does ICT-mediated work affect the socialization of atypical journalists through newsrooms, and how does it inform their understanding of a journalistic habitus and journalistic doxa (their institutional role and ethical ideology)?

RQ 1b: How are the practices of atypical journalists affected by ICTs, and how do they perceive this to influence their *illusio*?

RQ 1c: To what extent does ICT-mediated work and the degree of embeddedness within a newsroom determine whether atypical journalists experience autonomy and control over their product?

RQ 2: How do economic transformations impact the work of atypical journalists and their freelance journalistic cultures?

RQ 2a: Where can atypical journalists be located in the space of journalistic work?

RQ 2b: How does the additional work in non-journalistic areas affect the habitus of atypical journalists and their journalistic doxa (their institutional role and ethical ideology)?

RQ 2c: How do atypical journalists perceive economic constraints to affect their *illusio*?

RQ 2d: To what extent are entrepreneurial skills implemented and accepted into ideas and practices of atypical journalists?

RQ 3: How do these transformations play out across different media systems?

RQ 3a: How can competitiveness and monopolization in different media systems explain differences and similarities in economic precarity, adaptation to entrepreneurialism, and work in other areas?

RQ 3a: How can the degree to which digital technologies are implemented in media systems explain differences and similarities in ICT-mediated work and the adoption of digital habitus and digital capital?

By investigating atypical journalistic cultures in Europe, this study employs a comparative approach. Comparative research offers multiple benefits to achieve a more general understanding of social phenomena and how change shapes and affects these differently across different (national) contexts (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012; Hanusch &

Hanitzsch, 2017). Comparing multiple social spaces also allows us to generalize more universally applicable theories while at the same time preventing overestimating phenomena in the social systems that we are most familiar with (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). A case in point is the dominance of Anglo-American professional values and newsroom culture, which have long been perceived as universal or at least applicable to “Western” media systems (Örnebring, 2012). For example, the *WJS* illustrates that US American journalism – which is often implicitly understood as the journalistic ‘norm’ in dominant research culture – is, in fact, an outlier in Western journalism (Hanitzsch et al., 2010, p. 291).

When comparative research combines macro-level data like institutional settings, historic structures, cultures, and contexts with micro-level data such as perceptions or behaviour of individuals, it can also function as a quasi-experimental design (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012; Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). As comparative research has grown in communication studies in the past years, it has become increasingly apparent that case selection should not be arbitrary, especially for smaller studies like this dissertation project (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017; Örnebring, 2012). Ideally, the comparison looks at cases where phenomena are most similar or most different (Sartori, 1991). While comparative communication research often focuses on comparing two or more countries, it is necessary to reflect what is actually compared and whether less “obvious and more conceptual” (So, 2017, p. 22) aspects should be at the centre of the investigation. For instance, media system models, different journalistic cultures, or media markets are often associated with nations but might also have historic similarities or disparities with neighbouring countries (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). The next chapter will thus outline case selection, data collection, and data analysis.

Chapter 6: Measures, data collection and analysis

This thesis employs a comparative survey study to answer the research questions outlined in chapter five and map atypical journalistic culture in Europe. An online survey provides the most feasible approach to address atypical journalists across the continent to collect data for such an ambitious project. Surveys are not only a cost-effective way to collect a lot of numeric data in a short period of time. In this particular case, their online availability is extremely valuable since respondents can be reached regardless of their location (Rasmussen, 2008).

Previous studies have worked with narrow definitions of journalists as a research object. This excludes a vast group of journalistic workers who do not fit the tight criteria of maximum pay or workload (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020; Thurman et al., 2016; Weischenberg et al., 2006), creates a “methodological artefact” (Pöttker, 2008, own translation), and possibly construes a picture of “an assumed homogeneity of the profession” (Deuze & Witschge, 2018, p. 168). Therefore, this study aims to redefine and open the term ‘journalist’ to include the producers that are not in full-time and stable employment. However, for the sake of a structured collection of data, respondents had to earn money with their journalistic work at least once a month. This was assured through sampling as well as questions about remuneration.

Case selection

As stated in the previous chapter, justification for the sample is crucial, especially for smaller studies with less than ten cases (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017; Örnebring, 2012). Compared across the globe, Western European journalists appear to share a similar journalistic culture, with a strong focus on and tradition in public service, professional codes of ethics and accommodative and monitorial roles at the centre of journalists’ perception of their role in society (Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019). However, according to the *Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS)*, they have different numbers of atypical journalists. Thus, different levels of atypical employment in Western European journalism have been a key variable of selection. As such, the following countries were selected: Austria with a small number of freelancers (8.3%), France (14.1%), UK (16.6%), and Denmark (20.5%) with moderate levels of freelancers and the Netherlands (36.9%) with the highest level across Western Europe (Josephi et al., 2019).

Table 6.1: Countries for Comparison

	Austria	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Media concentration ^A and Commercialization	High	Medium	Medium	High	High
Degree of atypical work ^B					
Estd. no. of journalists	4.100	7.196	35.000	15.000	63.618
% of freelancers	8.3%	20.5%	14.1%	36.9%	16.6%
% of part-time	14.4%	5.4%	4.8%	16.9%	6.9%
Implementation of technology / convergence ^C	Medium	High	High	High	High
Popularity of online-only media	4/16	0/16	4/16	3/16	5/10
Internet penetration	83%	96%	84%	86%	92%
Professionalization	Medium	Stronger	Weaker	Stronger	Medium
Academic degree ^B	63.3%	93.2%	95.5%	87.5%	86.3%
Self-regulation ^D	institutionalized (not legally binding)	institutionalized	non-institutionalized	institutionalized (not legally binding)	non-institutionalized
Role of state in Media System ^D	Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, strong public-service broadcasting	Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; particularly strong press subsidies, strong public-service broadcasting	Strong state intervention; press subsidies; periods of censorship	Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, strong public-service broadcasting	Market dominated, strong public broadcasting
Media system ^D	Democratic Corporatist	Democratic Corporatist	Polarized Pluralist	Democratic Corporatist / Liberal	Liberal
Journalistic Culture ^B	Monitorial	Monitorial	Monitorial	Monitorial	Monitorial

Note. References:

^A Grünangerl et al. (2021), Allern & Pollack (2019), Kammer (2017), Lardeau (2017), Vandenberghe & D'Haenens (2021), Moore & Ramsay (2021)

^B Hanitzsch et al. (2019a)

^C Reuter Digital News Report (*Reuters Institute Digital News Report*, 2017)

^D Hallin and Mancini (2004)

Moreover, comparative researchers should know the history that shaped the specific social spaces under investigation (Esser, 2019; Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018b). While in larger projects, many researchers with in-depth knowledge of the different cases work together (Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019), this project is limited by the scope of a doctoral thesis. Thus, four variables were drawn from studies on freelancers, the media system models proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), and comparative research on news work in Europe by Örnebring (2016) to understand the national journalistic fields under investigation. Moreover, an empirical application of Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s historical analysis and theoretical model, which resulted in four Western European media systems, was considered (Brüggemann et al., 2014). This resulted in the following variables for further comparison: Media concentration and commercialization, degree of atypical work indicated through numbers of freelancers and part-time employees, implementation of technology and convergence as well as popularity of digital native journalistic sites, professionalization, and role of the state (Table 6.1). Following Hallin & Mancini (2004), journalistic professionalism is conceptualized here as journalists' autonomy, the development of distinct norms and rules, and a public service orientation. These contexts will be outlined for each case below.

Austria

Among European countries, Austria has a comparatively low inclusive press market, high political parallelism, low journalistic professionalism, and moderate direct press subsidies (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Büchel et al., 2016). Moreover, the public broadcast in Austria is strong, the relatively late entrance of private radio (in 1995) and television (in 2003) could not diminish the strong position of the public broadcast provider *Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF)*, which dominates with three national TV and radio channels as well as nine regional radio and television programs (Steinmaurer, 2009).

Proportional representation has a long tradition in Austrian life and Austrian media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 168). Despite the Austrian Cartell Act, mergers of media companies are generally not rejected by authorities (Grünangerl et al., 2021). Thus, the Austrian media landscape is highly concentrated in terms of market share, ownership and localization (Steinmaurer, 2009; Trappel, 2007). Moreover, the television and radio market is dominated by Public Broadcast ORF, and four large media companies controlling the Austrian press market, Styria Media Group, Mediaprint, Verlagsgruppe

News and the AHVV Verlags-GmbH (Grünangerl et al., 2021).²⁴ These publishers own outlets in at least two different media sectors, such as digital outlets and broadcast media. Moreover, the tabloid press and the public broadcast control most of the market share. According to Trappel (2007, p. 63), this concentration provides the dominant agents in the field with power and influence in the media and the political field. Almost half of the market share is controlled by two media organizations, namely the public broadcast *ORF* and the tabloid *Kronenzeitung* (Grünangerl et al., 2021). Both media organizations lead the ranking of the most used digital media. Lastly, most news organizations are located and produced in the capital, Vienna, with 56% of journalists working there (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 75).

For a country of relatively small size both in terms of land and population, Austria still has a broad variety of news media competing over audience and advertising shares. What is more, sharing German as publication language, both the broadcast and print market traditionally compete with media from Germany²⁵. Austrian legacy media, including ORF, rely on a mix of sales or licence fees and advertising to fund their newsrooms. Moreover, the press is funded through state subsidies in relation to their circulation, benefitting mostly large tabloid media (Grünangerl et al., 2021). In addition to this overt funding of news media through the state, some Austrian media benefit through advertising from state institutions – such as ministries – and companies – such as public transportation companies. As such, these state advertisements can be understood as a form of covert media subsidy, as some media organizations – again among them *Kronenzeitung* and *ORF* – benefit from them the most (Grünangerl et al., 2021).

Digital news media are primarily spin-offs of existing traditional media, and the Austrian media landscape is only “slowly digitalizing” (Grünangerl et al., 2021, p. 95). Even though the online market is growing, digital-native outlets are still far behind the online offerings from legacy media (Grünangerl et al., 2021; Sparviero et al., 2017), and some innovative digital projects, such as *Addendum*, had to be closed in the past (Horizont, 2020). Many newspapers started offering their content online for free as early

²⁴ While these media companies dominate the market, non-media institutions are also present, even though they are less common than, for example, France. Among them are the Catholic church, the Raiffeisen Holding, and since 2009 Red Bull Media, a project by soft drink producer Dietrich Mateschitz (Grünangerl et al., 2021).

²⁵ Historically, Austrian newspapers have been closely intertwined with German media organizations; many exist because of German investment capital, even if it later was pulled out again (Trappel, 2008, 65).

as 1995 (Der Standard); however, in the past years, they have tried to find more sustainable models of paywalls and subscriptions (Derstandard.at, n.d.).

Journalistic professionalization is relatively low in Austria compared to other European media systems when measured along formal journalism education, unionization, and self-regulation. However, when measured along the five dimensions of professional journalistic ideology (Deuze, 2005), Austrian journalists exhibit a strong orientation towards being a detached observer and less towards monitorial roles (Hanitzsch & Lauerer, 2019), strong orientation to ethical norms, and high professional autonomy (Wyss & Dingerkus, 2019). According to the journalism union, journalists' ethos is not always matched with the resources available, especially for investigative journalism (Grünangerl et al., 2021). Moreover, the union's spokesperson claims that journalists report increasing workload and decreasing time available for further training and education.

As journalism is a free profession in Austria, no formal skills are required to work as a journalist. While communication science has been established at Austrian Universities since the early 1940s, specialized journalism bachelor and master programs have only been introduced recently at universities of applied science (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 73). Moreover, further professional training is available but not mandatory, and lack of time and financial resources often prevents journalists from attending such training (Grünangerl et al., 2021, p. 135).

Similarly, union membership is not mandatory. There are a couple of vocational unions, and the largest of them, djp, is part of the largest union of employees in the private sector (GPA). Moreover, self-regulation is relatively informal (Trappel, 2007, p. 69). The Press council has been reinstated in 2010 after an eight-year period during which it did not exist (Warzilek, 2013). Moreover, the two largest tabloid newspapers are not part of the Press council and do not accept its rulings. While most news media – except for ORF, who follow a very detailed statute – have no formalized ethical guidelines, many journalists claim their newsrooms respect the Press council's code of conduct (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 198).

In the past, journalism in Austria has been called an “overcrowded profession” (Hummel et al., 2012, p. 730), with estimates of 7,100 full-time journalists (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, p. 17). However, a recent study assumes fewer journalists,

which could indicate a decline of standard full-time work in Austrian journalism²⁶. The WJS estimated 4.100 journalists in 2014 (Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019), and the most recent Journalism Report by Kaltenbrunner and colleagues (2020, p. 75) estimated 5,350 full-time journalists.

Following the most recent representative study, the typical Austrian journalist is male (53%), in his mid-forties, has no tertiary education, works full time, works in the print sector, and earns approximately €4,100 per month pre-tax (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, pp. 71–74).²⁷ Women and younger journalists are better educated but in less powerful positions or work part-time. Research has indicated that social capital and connections are key for position-taking in the Austrian field. According to a longitudinal study by Hummel and colleagues (2012), soft skills are more crucial than institutional education for occupational success. As Prandner (2013) argues, the explanation might lie in a covert gender division. Many of the well-educated journalists are women, yet they often earn less. Moreover, they struggle to progress their career because they lack social capital in the form of “long-standing male-dominated networks” (Prandner, 2013, p. 77).

Atypical employment is difficult to assess within the journalistic field, as are the numbers of freelance journalists. Recent studies show between 4% (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 75) and 8.3% freelancers (Josephi et al., 2019). Accordingly, Grünangerl and colleagues (2021, p. 133) argue that “freelance journalism in the news field is not a widely common practice”. Moreover, they cite the spokesperson of the Austrian union who reports that older journalists are increasingly invited to retire as they are considerably more costly than beginners. On the other hand, qualitative studies have indicated that young journalists often need to work as freelancers or in (unpaid) internships to enter the field (Hummel et al., 2012; Nölleke et al., 2022). Nevertheless, the union has no detailed information on atypical employment in Austrian journalism. Kaltenbrunner and colleagues estimate another 600 to 900 atypical journalists working for Austrian news media who do not meet their sample criteria.²⁸

²⁶ It could, however, also be an indicator of the increasing difficulty to sample a free profession such as journalism that does not require official registries.

²⁷ WJS received similar results in 2014/15, except for journalists’ academic education. Here, 63.3% held a university degree (Lohmann & Seethaler, 2016) compared to only 48% in Kaltenbrunner and colleagues’ study (2020, p. 73). Again, this could either mean that highly educated (young) journalists have left the field in the past five years or that sampling diverged between both studies.

²⁸ This is discussed in more detail below on page 20.

According to Kaltenbrunner et al. (2008, p. 90), the high concentration of Austrian media ownership affects the fluctuation and career opportunities within the field. Changing employers or finding work after being laid-off might be more complicated if the same owner controls the alternatives (Grünangerl et al., 2021). In their surveys in 2006 and 2019, Kaltenbrunner and colleagues (2008, p. 90, 2020, p. 251) show that increasingly, a large part of employed Austrian journalists tends to stay 15 years or longer at one media company. While Grünangerl and colleagues (2021, p. 133) interpret this as an indicator for “high and growing job security”, the results might also point in another direction. It appears that these results mainly reflect the security of older journalists. The 2020 journalism report shows that standard employment journalism in Austria is an ageing profession; 34% of respondents are older than 50 years, and 29% are over 40 (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 72). Only ten per cent of journalists are under the age of 30, and most of them work in online media, commercial broadcast, or weekly and bi-weekly magazines. This is also reflected in a 2015 study of Austrian freelance journalists. Respondents of the survey were generally younger than the average Austrian journalist (Maares & Putz, 2016).

Historically, Austrian media companies had problems with bogus employment, especially in the broadcast sector. After regular monitoring and cases in which workers sued for regular employment, false self-employment has been reduced in the past decade (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020, p. 76). Moreover, atypical journalists lament the low remuneration and opaque regulations for social security and health insurance fees primarily (Maares & Putz, 2016).

Denmark

In Hallin and Mancini's Mancini's (2004, p. 70) typology of media systems, Denmark came relatively close to the ideal form of the corporatist democratic model. Denmark has a long tradition of institutionalized journalistic professionalism (Willig, 2016) and strict public service statutes for both the public and commercial broadcast (Allern & Pollack, 2019; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021). Traditionally, political parallelism used to be high, with every larger town having four newspapers aligned with the four major parties (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 154). According to Brüggemann and colleagues (2014), Denmark's media ownership is not particularly regulated by the state. However, this appears to have no effect on the pluralism of Danish media. Blach-Ørsten and colleagues (2021) see this

rooted in the strong requirements for the press to provide public service and the fact that much of the press is owned by foundations instead of corporations. However, the Danish system expresses some degree of concentration of market share and ownership (Kammer, 2017). The public service broadcasts are comparatively large and have a strong position in the market; both *Danmarks Radio (DR)* and *TV 2* rank first and second before the two national tabloids, *BT* and *Ekstra Bladet* (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021; Jauert & Søndergaard, 2007). Moreover, while the national press market is highly competitive, the regional press is not, as it is divided among five “regional monopolies” (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021, p. 161).

Danish press is funded primarily through sales, media subsidies and advertising to offer some protection from external influences (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021). While *DR* is funded through a household fee and, to some degree, sponsorship, the national channels of *TV 2* are primarily financed through advertising and its regional channels by the household fee. Historically, media subsidies used to be much more covert than in other Scandinavian countries. For example, tax reductions were a form of subsidizing both the press and public broadcast services (Allern & Pollack, 2019; Schultz, 2007). In 2014 a law was introduced to enable direct state subsidies for print and online media (Allern & Pollack, 2019). However, the basis for these subsidies is not the circulation of outlets but the *journalistic* workforce, their audience’s social diversity, and the degree of valuable political and cultural content (Schrøder & Ørsten, 2019). As a result, the three largest media companies receive half of the subsidy (Allern & Pollack 2017). According to Flensburg (2015, as cited in Allern & Pollack, 2017, p. 1433), this new law acts as a “brake pad” to limit the concentration and commercialization of Danish media and to foster public service. In 2018, the government proclaimed less public funding to the public broadcasters and more print and online press subsidies, which will most likely reduce the staff at *DR* by presumably 375 positions until 2023 (Schrøder & Ørsten, 2019).

Despite Denmark having excellent digital infrastructure and press subsidies are eligible to digital native media, the most used online news sources are still the spin-offs of legacy news media. For example, the online news media *Alttinget* was founded in 2000 but has only achieved a small but stable readership (Schrøder et al., 2021; Schrøder & Ørsten, 2019). Other innovative projects focused on reinvigorating journalism have not been too successful (Schrøder & Ørsten, 2016). The digital entrepreneurial and member-

based news project *Zetland* was only able to achieve its first operating profits in 2020 despite having been founded in 2012 (Schrøder et al., 2021).²⁹

Denmark is considered to score high on measures of journalistic professionalism. Compared to the other cases in this study, the Danish field has a long and strong history of institutionalized journalism education, a high degree of journalistic autonomy, a strong journalism union³⁰, an institutionalized tradition of self-regulation and a high public service orientation both through state regulation as well as in the journalists' cognitive role perception (Allern & Pollack, 2019; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021; Skovsgaard et al., 2012; Willig, 2016). Even for aspiring journalists, role orientations relating to investigating those in power remain popular (Møller Hartley & Askanius, 2021), and few think it is vital to be primarily oriented towards the audience. Moreover, journalists' autonomy and ethical decision-making are protected through the newsroom code of conduct and self-regulation through the Press council. However, editorial and advertorial departments are increasingly collaborating, mainly in lifestyle sectors (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021).

In general, Danish journalists across various media organizations express similar professional norms (Skovsgaard et al., 2012). This is rooted in their education which can be considered homogenized. Denmark already started institutionalized journalism education in 1961 with the foundation of the Danish School of Journalism (DJH), which had a monopoly on journalism education until 1998 (Willig, 2016, p. 42). Even when Roskilde University and the University of Southern Denmark started offering academic journalism programs, the strong focus on practical training remained with mandatory internships, which ingrain aspiring journalists with the fields doxa, conserving professional values.

Without this formal education, it is difficult to enter journalism in Denmark. As such, the boundary of the Danish journalistic field is less permeable than in other countries, making it a profession similar to law and medicine (Skovsgaard et al., 2012). In fact, the journalism programs control the number of journalists on the market, and fewer students have been admitted in an effort to align the education of aspiring journalists to the demands of the labour market (Skovsgaard et al., 2012; Willig, 2016). The WJS

²⁹ However, *Zetland* has been creative in acquiring economic capital through other means, such as filling theatres with live performances where journalistic stories are told within two minutes on stage (Deuze & Witschge, 2020, p. 86).

³⁰ Almost all journalists are members of this union (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021; Josephi et al., 2019).

estimated 7,196 journalists in 2015, a comparatively high number in relation to Denmark's population (Josephi et al., 2019). The average Danish journalist is male (57%), in his mid-forties, has completed a bachelor's degree, works full time and in the print sector (Skovsgaard & van Dalen, 2016). Lastly, Danish journalists are also homogeneous in their social background, with many coming from the upper-middle class (Skovsgaard et al., 2012; Willig, 2016).

According to Willig (2016, p. 42), the early establishment of institutionalized journalism education was to "prevent a journalist proletariat arising". It appears that this formal education provides aspiring journalists with enough social capital to legacy newsrooms that they will find permanent employment there. For example, Skovsgaard and colleagues (2012) found that freelancers and non-permanent staff were less likely to have a formal journalistic education. Moreover, the same study found that Danish freelancers were significantly more often women.

Despite regulating the supply of journalists to the market's demand, the number of freelance journalists increased in Denmark between the mid-90s to early 2000s, similar to other European countries (Nies & Pedersini, 2003). While the strong union offers employees high job security, Blach-Ørsten and colleagues (2021) suppose that especially economic transformations have challenged the viability of Danish news media. Thus job security and income are decreasing, particularly for the younger generations of journalists. However, no recent numbers and findings on freelance and atypical journalists are available. The WJS finds that 20.5% of respondents worked as freelancers (Josephi et al., 2019) but does not detail age, gender, education and how these journalists answered to more complex constructs such as influences and role perceptions. A similar survey conducted in 2009 finds that Danish freelancers tend to position themselves a bit more left than employed journalists and agree more to a strong critical-active role (Skovsgaard et al., 2012). Moreover, freelancers report significantly lower autonomy in choosing the story's angle and choosing the sources for a story. However, compared to employed journalists, freelancers appear to be less influenced by time pressure and deadlines.

France

In media system typologies, France is subsumed with other Mediterranean countries despite sharing many similarities with the Democratic Corporatist Model (Brüggemann et

al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 89). The media system is characterized by relatively high political parallelism, low inclusiveness of the press market, relatively low journalistic professionalism, moderate investment in public broadcast services, high press subsidies and high ownership regulation (Hallin & Mancini, Brüggemann et al., Nielsen & Linnebank, 2011). In contrast to other cases in this study, the press market is relatively weak (Kuhn, 2013), and the largest television network is private (Lardeau, 2017)³¹. In the past decade, the press market has shown an increase in concentration in ownership, both nationally and regionally, despite continuous attempts to regulate such monopolies (Lardeau, 2017). Moreover, the five largest media companies in terms of turnover (including the French state) own multiple organizations across different media types. Non-media organizations, for example, defence and construction companies, hold large shares of the French news media (Chalaby, 2005; Lamizet & Tétu, 2007; Lardeau, 2017).

French news media have a long history of opinion press with national newspapers and magazines aligned with different political perspectives (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 90–93; McMane, 2012). While readership and advertising revenues have steadily declined since the 1990s (Lamizet & Tétu, 2007), many newspapers remain up and running thanks to a system of state press subsidies (Lardeau, 2017). These state interventions emerged after the second world war in attempts at nation-building, offering freedom from political, financial and commercial pressures (Lardeau & Le Floch, 2013). According to Chalaby (2005), the state dependency has grown out of regulations that maintain monopolies, which minimizes incentives to innovate the press. The introduction of commercial television and radio broke the monopoly of the public broadcast in the 1980s (Chalaby, 2004). Since then, the state-owned broadcast comprises five channels, including the transnational channel *Arte*. These channels are financed through public taxes, while the seven commercial broadcast channels are financed through advertising or subscription (Lardeau, 2017).

Another distinct feature of the French media landscape is the early introduction of news through the *Minitel*, a news service similar to online news accessible through telephone lines (McMane, 2012). As the news appeared on a small screen, journalists learned to write shorter news for the *Minitel* as early as the mid-80s. News media offered web-based news as early as 1995. The most popular online media are spin-offs of

³¹ Even though this channel, TF1, used to belong to the public broadcast and was privatized in 1986 (Chalaby, 2005, p. 287).

traditional press and television media (Antheaume, 2021; Lechenet, 2016). Moreover, digital native and citizen journalist platforms were founded in the early 2000s (McMane, 2012) and legislation passed a bill in 2009 which offers online-born news media the “same status as those in the print media” (Lardeau & Le Floch, 2013, p. 208). Among the top brands used online in 2020, five were digital native, among them *Brut* and *Mediapart* (Antheaume, 2021). Like Dutch *De Correspondent*, *Mediapart* is a success story of subscription-based, investigative reporting (Wagemans et al., 2016).

Journalism in France is considered comparatively less professionalized than in other European countries. While French journalists have traditionally belonged to the intellectual elite and held university degrees, formal journalism education is less institutionalized. In 1956 the first two journalism schools were officially recognized by a national commission on the employment of French journalists, which educate a controlled number of journalists each year (Guénée, 2019). Entry to these schools is thus highly competitive and, in some cases, costly (McMane, 2012). However, attending such an institution is not required to pursue journalism. As research by Vera-Zambrano and Powers (2019) indicates, it could be that journalists from working-class backgrounds will probably forgo further education and work instead.

Moreover, there is not one strong union but multiple unions affiliated with political parties, which only represent limited numbers of journalists (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 111; McMane, 2012). While codes of ethics have been established as early as 1918 (McMane, 2012), they are not necessarily institutionalized in journalistic culture, and self-regulation exists within organizations but not in an institutionalized form like a press council (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 113). However, a recent survey found that French journalists are strongly committed to a professional standard of ethical decision-making (Mercier et al., 2017).

Journalism is an open profession in France; however, numbers of journalists can be estimated relatively well based on press cardholders (McMane, 2012; Pereira, 2020). Anyone who earns a monthly salary or minimum wage with their journalistic work is eligible for such a press card. Even though the press card is not mandatory per se, journalists without one cannot be employed for longer than three months (McMane, 2012). The WJS estimated 35,000 working journalists in 2017. In their recent survey of French journalists, the typical journalist is male (55%), in his mid-thirties, completed a degree in journalism or communication, and works full time and in the print sector

(Mercier et al., 2017).³² In general, French journalists were highly educated, with eight of ten holding a master's degree. French journalists have traditionally come from middle- and upper-class upbringing (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 110; Pereira, 2020; Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019). While the percentage of women journalists has been increasing steadily until 2008, it remained the same in the past decade (McMane, 2012), which might be connected to the “decades of sexism and out-of-date habits in French newsrooms” (Antheaume, 2019, p. 84).

French journalists are less exposed to market influences, and the labour protection is stronger than in more liberal media systems (Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a). According to the WJS, 14.1% of respondents worked as freelancers (Joseph et al., 2019). In 2012, 6,550 press cardholders were freelancers, and 1,248 held temporary contracts (Frisque, 2013). Officially, French labour law distinguishes between permanent contracts, temporary contracts and freelance contracts called “pige” for journalism (Naït-Bouda, 2008; Pereira, 2020). However, as Frisque (2014) argues, the boundaries are much fuzzier, and the group of “instable” or atypical journalists comprises other forms of self-employment like auto-preneurs and authors. This circumvents many of the journalists' rights offered through pige contracts (Frisque, 2013, p. 80).

French scholarship has long pointed to the increasing precarity among aspiring and atypical journalists as early as the 1990s and 2000s (Accardo, 2007; Devillard, 2002). Especially women and younger journalists are affected (McMane, 2012). Moreover, research indicates that the public broadcast channels France 3 and Radio France are among the biggest employers of precarious workers (Okas, 2007). In her interview study on pigiste journalists, Naït-Bouda (2008) argues that the general ideal of professional independence is not more than a myth. The journalists interviewed believed they are not seen for what they do but only what they symbolize – the precarious worker. Freelancers report lower degrees of total freedom, but most are nevertheless satisfied with being a journalist (McMane, 2012). However, more than one in five is very unsatisfied, more than employed journalists.

³² However, the sample is nonrepresentative as the margin of error of this sample is at 6,5% (Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019, p. 55). In comparison, a survey from 2009 found French journalists to be in their early forties and, in general, an ageing profession (McMane, 2012, p. 193).

Netherlands

Historically speaking, the Dutch media system has shared many traits of the democratic corporatist model, such as early press emergence of a press market, the establishment of freedom of the press and partisan press (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 143; Pleijter et al., 2012). However, in their empirical assessment of the media systems, Brüggemann and colleagues (2014) cluster the Netherlands in a Western model together with the USA, which represents the ideal liberal model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 70). As such, the Dutch media system is characterized by low inclusiveness of the press market, moderate political parallelism, high press subsidies, low ownership regulation, a deregulated media market and high journalistic professionalism (Brüggemann et al., 2014).

This different clustering could well be evidence that the Dutch media system has shifted more towards a liberalized and commercialized media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 160). For example, in 2007, a law was passed to relax cross-ownership regulation (Bakker & Vasterman, 2007). Moreover, commercial broadcast has entered the Dutch media landscape relatively late in the early 1990s (Bakker & Vasterman, 2007). Like Austria, the Netherlands share a language with a neighbouring country, and while Belgian media company DPG Media has entered the Dutch market, the Netherlands can be considered a global media player (Vandenberghe & D'Haenens, 2021).

The newspaper and magazine market has been highly concentrated for years. In 2008, three publishers controlled 90% of the circulation (Bakker & Vasterman, 2007). This has increased even more in the past decade, with Mediahuis and DPG Media dominating the national and regional press market (Vandenberghe & D'Haenens, 2021). Moreover, DPG Media owns a radio channel and, as of 2019, the largest and most popular digital-born news website, nu.nl. The television and radio market are otherwise dominated by the public broadcaster *Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO)*, *Talpa Network* and *RTL Nederland* (Vandenberghe & D'Haenens, 2021). However, the regional radio and television market is characterized by much more independent projects.

The benefit of such a strong concentration in ownership is that some news media are financed through the revenues made by another (Vandenberghe & D'Haenens, 2021). While most traditional press media are financed through sales and advertising and commercial broadcast through advertising, the public broadcast is maintained through taxes and some advertising. Part of these advertising revenues is allocated to subsidies for

news in general, innovative press media and journalism infrastructure (Dutch Journalism Fund).

Thus, these subsidies have been used to fund digital native news media and projects like *Blendle* (Slot, 2021). The largest digital native news site *nu.nl* was launched in 1998, and in 2021, all news media are available online (Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021). Moreover, digital subscriptions have been steadily increasing in the past decade. Many existing online-only entrepreneurial projects like *De Correspondent* and *VersBeton* have turned primarily to subscription and donation business models to be less dependent on advertising revenue.

Dutch journalism scores high on the measures of journalistic professionalism. Journalists are increasingly well-educated, and systems of self-regulation and ethical standards are well established (Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021). Most journalism education occurs at the bachelor’s level at universities of applied sciences in Utrecht, Tilburg, Zwolle and Ede (Drok, 2019).³³ The first of these programs was introduced in 1966 Hogeschool Utrecht.³⁴ As these programs are regularly evaluated and accredited by an official body, they have developed a streamlined profile of skills and knowledge that journalism students should be equipped with.

Dutch journalists have a long history of unionizing, with the first union established in 1894 (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 171). The largest union today is NVJ which represents all journalists regardless of employment. The NVJ also established the journalism council (Raad Voor de Journalistiek) in 1960, which deals with complains about ethical misconduct and offers a code of ethics. While not all media support this council (Bakker & Vasterman, 2007), most newsrooms follow its code (Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021). Moreover, the profession is protected by another institution of self-regulation, the Dutch News Monitor, which was established in 2005 and reports regularly on the state of the media. Lastly, the Dutch media system has a Media Ombudsman Foundation, which strives to maintain journalistic ethics (Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021). The WJS thus shows that most journalists believe everyone should follow

³³ Moreover, since the 1990s, universities have offered further journalism programs at the master’s level (Drok, 2019).

³⁴ However, according to Drok (2019, p. 114), “the conviction that you are born as a journalist and you can only develop your genetic potential by doing journalism in daily practice never disappeared and still is rather widely spread among practitioners”.

professional codes of ethics; however, many believe that controversial reporting techniques can be justifiable in some cases (Hermans, 2016).

In 2016, the estimated number of journalists working in the Netherlands was 15,000 people (Josephi et al., 2019). Similar to the other countries in this study, the typical Dutch journalist is male, in his mid-forties, has completed a degree either from university or a journalism school and works for newspapers, weeklies or magazines.³⁵ However, four in ten held a full-time position. Compared to other European countries, the number of freelancers and other atypical workers increased drastically in the past 40 years. Following the results of the WJS, 36,9% of respondents said they were freelancers (Josephi et al., 2019). Translated, that would mean about 5.400 freelancers. According to Pleijter and colleagues (2012), the number of freelance journalists has continually increased from 293 in 1980 to 1.885 in 2000 to 2.128 in the early 2010s. While the initial increase was partially due to the growing media market with the introduction of commercial broadcast, many journalists were also laid off in the past decade, especially those working for regional newspapers (Pleijter et al., 2012).

Media companies prefer to buy content from “poorly paid, self-employed journalists, or freelancers” (Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021), a direct consequence of media concentration as it gets more challenging for journalists to move between companies. Younger journalists work in ‘uberised’; that is, flexible, insecure yet dependent working conditions. Unsurprisingly, Dutch journalism students anticipate that they will most likely work primarily as freelancers (Singer & Broersma, 2020). While the NVJ supports all journalists with advice on legal, copyright, and insurance issues, Slot (2021, p. 426) argues the field can be characterized “in survival mode”. Accordingly, many try to carve out a niche or “feel a pressure to innovate, and do it because they *have to*” (ibid.). Similarly, atypical journalists in the Netherlands invest much more time to brand themselves on social media than their employed colleagues (Brems et al., 2017).

UK

The UK has the longest tradition of commercial (popular) press among European countries. While partisan and opinion press were standard in 19th century Europe, British news media understood journalism as an industrial enterprise and aimed to reach large

³⁵ Many worked for online media, strengthening a result from a similar survey in 2006, which showed that Dutch journalists have long been working across media (Pleijter et al., 2012).

audiences regardless of social class and political affiliation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 202). This meant more autonomy from political power and less dependence on press subsidies early on. The UK is thus often considered an example of the liberal media system, despite having a strong and well-funded public broadcast (Brüggemann et al., 2014). Moreover, ownership is much more regulated than in other countries considered liberal media systems. Thus, Brüggemann and colleagues (2014) clustered the UK together with Austria, Germany, and Switzerland in a Central model.

Similarly, the British media system has a long tradition of deregulation. The monopoly of public broadcast *BBC* was limited already in 1955 when commercial television *Independent TV (ITV)* entered (Curran & Seaton, 2018, p. 90; Örnebring, 2016, p. 42). When most other European countries started to deregulate their public broadcast in the 1980s, the British government introduced cable television (Curran & Seaton, 2018, pp. 90, 349). However, the *BBC* remains the most prominent domestic content provider with the largest audiences across television, radio, and online news (M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021).

UK legislation forbids cross-ownership and limits mergers; however, ownership concentration has notably increased in the national press. Moreover, News Corp UK and Ireland, Reach PLC and DMG Media Ltd dominate the publishing market in revenues and ownership (M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021). The press primarily depends on sales and advertising revenues, and it is particularly hit by the readership and advertising moving online. In the regional sector in particular, outlets had to close or merge (M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021; Newman, 2019; Örnebring, 2016, p. 42). As a consequence, more and more news production has been concentrated in London.

While all news media were affected by the technological disruption of the internet, the large publishers remained relatively strong as they had already started to publish online by the end of the 1990s. According to Curran and Seaton (2018, p. 133), their decision to offer news for free online protected them against online-born competition. Only two digital native outlets are among the most often used online news sources, the *HuffPost* and the *Lad Bible* (Newman, 2019).

British journalism developed professional standards early on with the emergence of the mass press. However, it appears journalistic professionalism is not as strong in the UK compared to Northern or other liberal media systems (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 222). Particularly journalists' autonomy from internal and

external influences is affected. Influences from owners increased when Murdoch entered the media market in 1969 (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 221). Similarly, while the public broadcast is supposed to be protected from political influence, Moore and Ramsay (2021, p. 465) assert that “consistent government pressure has been exerted on the BBC over the past decade”. Commercial pressure on newsrooms is further increasing through native advertising and lobbying (Cornia et al., 2020; M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021).

Moreover, entry to journalism in the UK does not require formal education (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 11). For a long time, journalism education occurred only through years-long on-the-job training and master’s programmes were only established in the 1990s (David, 2019; Sanders & Hanna, 2012).³⁶ Regardless, most journalists have at least a bachelor’s degree (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 11). While the training of journalists is thus not as homogenized as in Denmark, the British media system has several institutions providing ethics guidelines and monitoring both press and broadcast (M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021). Moreover, members of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) must follow the code of ethical journalistic practice. However, while the NUJ used to represent almost all journalists, under the Thatcher government, it lost its power (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 223–224). Today, only 35% of UK journalists are members of the NUJ (M. Moore & Ramsay, 2021).

According to estimates from 2015, the UK has 63,618 working journalists (Joseph et al., 2019). The average British journalist is male (55%), in his early forties, holds a university degree, works full-time and for print media (Thurman et al., 2016). Moreover, previous research has shown that journalists have increasingly a middle- to upper-class background, and the majority were white, a figure which does not represent the overall British population (Sanders & Hanna, 2012). This might partially be due to the relatively high costs of gaining a journalistic education (Sanders & Hanna, 2012; Thurman et al., 2016).

Media closures and mergers have led to enormous job losses across sectors (Sanders & Hanna, 2012), and 16.6% of journalists worked as freelancers in 2015 (Joseph et al., 2019). However, according to Thurman and colleagues (2016, p. 16), the number of freelancers has remained steady between 2001 to 2015, which indicates that

³⁶ The only other academic journalism education were postgraduate qualifications, for example, at Cardiff University (since 1970).

most journalists made redundant will eventually leave the profession altogether.³⁷

Moreover, findings indicate that most British freelancers are more often older journalists who left permanent employment either voluntarily or were let go (Spilsbury, 2016, pp. 16–19).

More women appear to work more often as freelancers (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 10), and ethnic minorities are overrepresented in atypical work (Spilsbury, 2016, p. 16). Compared to all journalists, freelancers tend to work to a similar degree in London and the South East of the UK. The only difference regarding the location of work is that almost one in five freelancers worked from outside the UK (Spilsbury, 2016, p. 17). Moreover, respondents reported working primarily full-time, with 16% working more than 48 hours per week and 65% doing additional work, primarily in other communication jobs and education and research (Spilsbury, 2016, pp. 24–25). While freelancers tend to earn less than employed journalists, a few earn comparatively more (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 19). Remuneration rates and getting paid are thus the two prominent aspects that freelancers highlight (Spilsbury, 2016, pp. 27–39). They complain especially about citizen journalists and other laypeople ruining the prices. However, they also agree to benefit greatly from digital technology as they can sell their work to other English-language publications (Spilsbury, 2016, p. 15). Only a third works for only one newsroom, most British freelancers have multiple clients (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 16). Lastly, most freelancers rarely or never participate in editorial meetings. While their perception of freedom in selecting stories is like that of employed journalists, they feel they have less freedom in choosing the angle of a story (Thurman et al., 2016, pp. 27–28).

Data collection

Cross-cultural comparative research needs to “ensure equivalence, that is, the ability to validly collect data that are indeed comparable between different contexts and to avoid biases in measurement, instruments, and sampling” (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017, p. 1). Thus, survey questions should be phrased unambiguously and straightforwardly to prevent measurement errors through misinterpretation (Rasmussen, 2008). Likewise, a

³⁷ It could also indicate, again similar to the numbers reported from Austria, that many journalists made redundant supplement their journalistic work so that they do not fit the requirements to participate in surveys anymore. For example, the Labour Force Survey by the Office for National Statistics shows that 42% of journalists identified as self-employed (House of Lords, 2020, p. 38).

functionally equivalent sampling approach was employed to ensure that similar populations were addressed in all countries.

Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire focused on the freelancers' working routine and journalistic practices, working environment, use and purpose of social media, access to material resources, workload and additional incomes, socialization, entrepreneurial skills, motivation to work freelance, job satisfaction, perceived influences, role perceptions and sociodemographic background (see p. 315). Questions revised and adapted previous survey batteries to simplify answering and include a mix of open-ended and closed questions to prevent opting for skewed answers (Pasek & Krosnick, 2010).

To ensure cross-national equivalence, the master questionnaire was put together in English with simple wording and consistent concepts (Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019). Apart from misunderstanding, measurement errors can also occur when questions are sensitive, or respondents feel they need to answer according to social norms and expectations (Fricker Jr, 2008). Therefore, particular consideration was given to the operationalization of remuneration, ethical decision-making, and other communication work questions. Moreover, the English and German versions of the questionnaire were sent to freelance and ex-journalists to test its feasibility (pre-Test I), ensure that survey questions were easily understood and that the survey design was intuitive (Best & Krueger, 2008). Here it was challenging yet crucial to create a questionnaire covering the above-mentioned variables and social demographics in a short, precise form to prevent both fatigue and distraction, especially with open-ended questions, as well as social desirability (Krosnick, 2018). As a result, some aspects were excluded, for example, items covering political influence was excluded from the question of perceived influences, and questions covering journalists' general ethics were left out in favour to address specific ethical dilemmas that atypical journalists encounter in their work.

Due to the comparative purpose, different approaches to describe labour and practices and legal definitions of work needed to be considered while developing the questionnaire. Except for the German translation, the Danish, Dutch, and French versions of the questionnaire were professionally translated. Afterwards, native speaker communication and journalism scholars back-translated it and confirmed that the questions made sense in their respective languages and that the design appeared

reasonable (Hofstede, 1998; Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019). The aim of this process of professional translation and back-translation was to make all questionnaires less unambiguous and more applicable. At the same time, this process functioned as another pre-Test to evaluate whether survey questions and design were realistic in the context of the other four journalism cultures. Still, there always remains the possibility that translated versions of the survey measure differences in how questions and item batteries are understood and not necessarily differences in the constructs themselves.

Pre-testing showed that filling out the survey took about 20 to 30 minutes, despite cutting down questions to the most necessary. This proved to be a problem, as another disadvantage of online surveys is the so-called “roll-off” effect (Best & Krueger, 2008, p. 223): respondents who exit the survey due to its length, leaving researchers with varying sample sizes for different survey items. Therefore, only the two first questions were mandatory for respondents as they served as a screening and immediately excluded anyone who did not meet sampling criteria: 1) a question regarding their employment status and 2) a question asking whether they have earned money with their journalistic work at least once a month in the past half-year. Moreover, sociodemographic questions were moved to the end, which is problematic as they are needed to test relationships between groups.

Sampling

As discussed above, previous survey studies have worked with narrow definitions of journalists as a research object, thus emphasizing newsroom centrality and leaving out a vast group of journalistic workers. Therefore, this study aimed to redefine and open the term ‘journalist’ to include producers who have no full-time and stable employment. However, for the sake of a structured collection of data, respondents had to earn money with their journalistic work at least once a month. This was guaranteed through sampling as well as questions about remuneration.

Still, this approach poses a significant limitation of the study as well. As the journalistic profession is relatively open and there is no fixed definition of what makes a journalist, even less so a freelance journalist, there is no census data on how many journalists work freelance in the selected European countries. This is even more true for atypical journalists in short-term contracts. Atypical workers are generally difficult to sample as the overall population is unknown (Antunovic et al., 2019), which is why

previous studies, like the Austrian journalism report, have excluded ‘real’ freelancers from their sample (Kaltenbrunner 2020, 2008). Scholars from the Netherlands, Denmark and France confirmed that atypical journalists and freelancers are an exceptionally hidden and widespread population (email correspondences). On the one hand, this highlights the need for a more thorough investigation of these journalistic producers. On the other hand, this makes data collection challenging. Numbers derived from previous studies and the WJS (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a) can only work as indicators since sampling has not been consistent across countries either (Lauerer & Hanitzsch, 2019).

To ensure consistent sampling across the six countries, the sampling approach must be systematic and functionally equivalent (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017; Hofstede, 1998). While initially, the idea was to build a list of respondents through clustered sampling, where the clustering units are different forms of journalistic media (Fricker Jr, 2008), this approach lacked feasibility. The idea was to select the same number of various journalistic outlets with differing political orientations, specialization, and funding models (public broadcast vs private) to collect numbers and contact details of atypical journalists. This collection was supposed to be compiled by observing producers’ appearance (by-lines and authorship) in journalistic media and comparing these to lists of employees, and where need be, inquiry to newsrooms. Soon it was evident that this approach would require considerable resources, and, moreover, media companies would often not provide their journalists’ contact details under the pretext of the EU’s general data protection regulation (GDPR). Sampling respondents through commercial providers like Cision was not an option as a consultation soon revealed they did not have nearly enough freelancers and other atypical journalists in their database.

Another approach, sampling through journalism unions, is problematic, especially as not all atypical journalists are organized in unions and some national unions have strict(er) criteria to qualify for membership. Moreover, except for Austria and the UK, the other three countries in this sample have no particular larger freelance union, freelance-specific branches of unions, or vocational unions for freelancers. While I have been in contact with journalism unions in all countries, again, they could not provide me with contact details due to GDPR and instead offered to send out the survey through their newsletters. This, however, would have given me less control over response rates as not all unions could provide exact numbers of freelancers in their networks. Moreover, as non-response errors can be easily reduced by personal contact with respondents, including a cover letter highlighting the importance of the study, and follow-up reminders

(Rasmussen, 2008), it was important to me to reach journalists personally. Moreover, this can reduce self-selection bias, meaning that only those who are (un)happy with their freelance work are inclined to react to a mass email (Rasmussen, 2008).

In the end, I chose a more pragmatic approach, which at the same time offers functional equivalence across countries: Collecting all contact details of freelance and entrepreneurial journalists that were listed on different digital databases and LinkedIn. LinkedIn was one common source of contacts in all countries; in Austria, France and the Netherlands, they were collected through platforms on which journalists advertise their portfolio (Torial, Malt, and Villamedia); in Denmark, Netherlands, and the UK through publicly available databases provided by unions which advertised journalists' skills (Journalist Forbundet, NVJ, and NUJ); and in Austria and France through vocational unions offering freelancers to advertise their areas of expertise to potential employers (Freischreiber, Profession: Pigiste, and Youpress). While this approach entails a bias towards respondents who aim to showcase their portfolio to potential customers and thus might embrace a more entrepreneurial habitus, I could contact the entire sample personally. Moreover, it might be that journalists who chose to freelance voluntarily might be overrepresented as well (Mathisen, 2017). However, generally speaking, Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et al., 2019, p. 821) argue that through self-selection bias, surveys might usually over-represent "those most invested in the topic". In this case, it could also mean that dissatisfied respondents were more willing to complete the survey.

Data management and analysis

Data was collected through the SoSciSurvey online tool (Leiner, 2019) between January and April 2020, and respondents received reminders to participate three times. Data management and statistical analysis were performed using SPSS software (IBM, 2020). In total, 1.881 journalists were contacted, of which 38.65% responded to the invite (see Table 6.2). After cleaning the data, removing cases that did either stop halfway, missed to answer crucial questions, or exhibit simplified response patterns (Blasius & Thiessen, 2015), 22.86% of all contacted respondents were represented in the final dataset. Still, some non-responses remained in the dataset, especially among sociodemographic questions needed to understand their accumulated capital.

During the period of data collection, the COVID-19 pandemic shifted much of social and work life across the globe and could potentially have affected the results of this

study. Almost seven out of ten completed the survey before March 13, 2020, and thus before the pandemic led to lockdowns and remote work in most countries. However, testing for group differences across variables like job satisfaction, perceived influences, role perceptions and contact with the professional community did not yield significant differences.

Table 6.2: *Sample, Response and Completion Rate*

	Contacted	Responded	Completed	Response Rate	Completion Rate
Austria	380	176	101	46.32%	26.58%
Denmark	427	151	78	35.36%	18.27%
France	304	134	80	44.08%	26.32%
Netherlands	389	135	92	34.70%	23.65%
UK	381	131	79	34.38%	20.73%
Total	1.881	727	430	38.65%	22.86%

Open questions were back-translated using the free software *DeepL*. One open question was also excluded, as answers did not yield any consistencies. The question asked respondents to describe their current job title and was answered with a plethora of occupational roles to specific tasks to specific everyday practices to lamentations over the job market. This might indicate that concepts like job titles or occupational roles do not fit the circumstance of atypical work (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 17). Other open questions were transformed into nominal data: subject areas were re-coded into hard, soft, and mixed news beats following the procedure of the WJS. Current region of residence and region of residence during childhood were re-coded into capital, city, town and semi-dense area, regional area, and abroad. Parent's occupations were re-coded according to the international standard classification of occupations (ILO, 2012).

Apart from descriptive analysis, ordinal logistic regression and multiple regression analysis were performed to determine whether relationships between variables remain across the different countries (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017, p. 15). To map the stratification of atypical journalism in each field, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was performed, using R and packages FactoMineR (Lê et al., 2008) and factoextra (Kassambara & Mundt, 2020).

Measures: Component Indices and compound variables

Some survey questions and items had to be computed into indices or compound variables to answer the research questions. All indices, except respondents' role perceptions, were

built following a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the most independent factors of an item batterie for further analysis. For all PCAs, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures of sampling adequacy were $>.6$, indicating a good factor analysis (Field, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Moreover, for all PCAs, Bartlett's test of sphericity was also significant ($< .001$), which means correlations between items are sufficiently large to perform PCA. When extracting factors, only factors with eigenvalues ≥ 1 were considered.

Perceived Influences

Possible influences on respondents' work were measured through 15 items used in previous research (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019; Hanusch et al., 2020; Weaver et al., 2006). They were partly adapted in wording to be more applicable to the situation of freelancers. As this thesis focuses on economic and technological influences, items relating to political influence were excluded to make the questionnaire shorter.

Table 6.3: *Rotated Component Matrix of Perceived Influences*

	Component		
	1	2	3
Advertising considerations	.821	-.003	-.04
Public relations	.777	.014	-.017
Free products and services	.718	.133	-.04
Audience research and data, e.g. web analytics/metrics	.502	.167	.228
My friends, acquaintances and family	-.058	.779	-.074
My personal interests	.039	.71	-.232
Other journalists	.133	.607	.175
Relationships with sources	.103	.437	.194
Feedback from the audience	.349	.419	.166
Conventions and ethics of the profession	-.187	.113	.804
Media laws and regulation	.116	.127	.789
Deadlines	.093	-.075	.574
Explained variance	21.827	15.031	13.086
Cronbach's α [#]	.697	.585	.612

Note. Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. KMO = .667, Bartlett's test of sphericity $p < .001$. Only factors with eigenvalue ≥ 1 were considered. [#]Adjusted Cronbach's α on standardized items.

These items were then analyzed with a PCA. After initial screening, three items³⁸ did not load to any of the factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1 and were excluded, leaving the PCA with 12 items. Further examination of Kaiser's criteria and the scree-plot suggested retaining three factors accounting for 49.94% of the total variance. Among the factor solutions, a varimax-rotated three-factor solution yielded the most interpretable solution (see Table 6.3). This leaves us with three scales: *commercial influences* including items pertaining to advertising, public relations and web analytics (Cronbach's $\alpha = .697$), *relationship influences* comprising the influence of journalists' friends and family, as well as other journalists, sources, and the audience (Cronbach's $\alpha = .585$) and *procedural influences* including deadlines, conventions of the profession as well as media laws (Cronbach's $\alpha = .612$). While these reliability scores are generally lower than the recommended score of .7, they reflect a broad coverage of the constructs being measured (Boyle, 1991).

Purpose of social media use

To assess journalists' digital capital, four indices were computed. The first two are compound indices of social media employed for research and distribution purposes (see chapter seven, p. 200). The second two measure the purpose of this digital capital, namely the extent to which social media are used to make work more efficient and for branding purposes.

Table 6.4: *Rotated Component Matrix of Journalists Social Media Use*

	Component	
	1	2
I use social media to develop relationships with audiences.	.836	.179
Using social media allows me to promote myself and my work much better.	.833	.281
I use social media to professionally gain respect and renown.	.818	.161
Because of social media, I communicate better with people relevant to my work.	.711	.476
Social media has decreased my daily workload.	.004	.789
Social media allows me to cover more news stories.	.314	.752
Social media allows me to be faster in reporting news stories.	.384	.693
Social media has improved my productivity.	.397	0.672

³⁸ These were: *Social Media*, *My editorial supervisors*, *higher editors and commissioning editors*, and *My own financial resources*.

Explained variance	54.661	13.536
Cronbach's α [#]	.872	.785

Note. Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. KMO = .874, Bartlett's test of sphericity $p < .001$. Only factors with eigenvalue ≥ 1 were considered. [#]Adjusted Cronbach's α on standardized items.

Here, an existing five items from Willnat and Weaver (2018) and two items from Molyneux and colleagues (2019) were adapted and analyzed via PCA. Two components have an eigenvalue ≥ 1 , and both account for 68.19% of the variance. Thus, a two-factor solution appears most plausible (see Table 6.4). This leaves us with two scales: social media use for *productivity* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .837$) and *branding purposes* (Cronbach's $\alpha = .785$).

Job satisfaction

Job satisfaction was measured by two approaches to get a more nuanced understanding of the facets that shape journalists' satisfaction (Massey & Elmore, 2011). One approach was to ask them directly to rate their overall job satisfaction on a scale from low (1) to high (10).

Table 6.5: Rotated Component Matrix of Journalists' Job Satisfaction

	Component		
	1	2	3
The financial security.	.844	.108	-.005
The vocational security.	.761	.149	.003
My income from journalistic work.	.722	.021	.125
The career opportunities in journalism.	.672	.161	.211
The separation between professional and private life.	.493	.132	.153
My depth of contact with commissioning newsrooms.	.483	.241	.207
My daily workload.	.43	.028	.357
The relationships I have with other journalists.	.43	.877	.09
The amount of contact with other journalists.	.083	.843	.128
The opportunity to discuss work in progress with other journalists.	.142	.831	.102
The appreciation for my work by the journalistic community.	.127	.688	.127
The topics I work on.	.246	.128	.857
The variety of journalistic work.	.011	.093	.788
The time for research and investigation.	.105	.146	.646
The freedom to plan my own work schedule.	.191	.062	.597
Explained variance	31.311	12.862	11.672
Cronbach's α [#]	.786	.847	.741

Note. Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. KMO = .810, Bartlett's test of sphericity $p < .001$. Only factors with eigenvalue ≥ 1 were considered. [#]Adjusted Cronbach's α on standardized items.

Another approach employed 16 items drawn from previous studies examining job satisfaction among journalists and freelancers (Gollmitzer, 2014; Weischenberg et al., 2006). As one item (“The quality of feedback I receive from my audience.”) did not load with particular weight on any of the factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1 , it was excluded from further analysis, leaving the PCA of 15 items. Further examination of Kaiser’s criteria and the scree-plot suggested retaining three factors accounting for 55.84% of the total variance. Among the factor solutions, a varimax-rotated three-factor solution yielded the most interpretable solution (see Table 6.5). This leaves us with three scales: satisfaction with *job security and workload* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .786$), satisfaction with the *embeddedness within a professional community* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .847$) and the satisfaction with the *content of work* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .741$).

Doxa: Ethical decision-making, objectivity, and separation from other communication work

One aspect of journalists’ doxa concerns the learned rules of the game and professional norms, like objective reporting, ethical decision-making, and the strict separation between journalism and other communication work. As freelancers and atypical journalists encounter very specific ethical problems (see chapter five, p. 140), five items covering the issues of autonomy that journalists have to negotiate with commissioning editors, and two items relating to PR and other communication work were combined with an existing seven items surveying to what extent journalists perceive objectivity and transparency necessary in their daily work (Hellmueller et al., 2013). After an initial screening of PCA, it is evident that two items relating to journalists’ use of transparency and objectivity³⁹ did not load to any of the factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1 and were thus excluded. Further examination of Kaiser’s criteria of the remaining 12 items and the scree-plot suggested retaining three factors accounting for 52.07% of the total variance. Among the factor solutions, a varimax-rotated three-factor solution yielded the most interpretable solution (see Table 6.6). This leaves us with three scales: *ethical editorial decision-making* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .725$), *professional norms of objectivity and transparency* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .609$) and *separation from PR and communication work* (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .768$).

³⁹ These were: “I include user-generated information in my work” and “As long as I don’t willfully suppress relevant information I will write truthful stories.”.

Table 6.6: *Component Matrix of Journalists' normative values*

	Component		
	1	2	3
I prefer to withdraw stories rather than publish them if the commissioning editor changes them too much.	.731	.165	.211
My credibility is vital, therefore I do not accept changes made (...) that go beyond the scope of the story.	.688	.136	.17
I select my clients carefully and never accept assignments from organizations with questionable objectives.	.641	.068	.059
Ethical breaches will happen anyway, opposing critical changes (...) will not make a difference.*	.638	-.097	-.033
I don't oppose changes (..) because I fear I will lose a client.*	.638	-.047	-.128
It is not acceptable to cause readers to feel one way or another.	-.117	.765	.218
The way I write stories should not nudge readers to take a particular side.	-.097	.752	.215
I show anyone that I include all concerned parties in my news stories.	.093	.671	-.105
Telling everyone where my facts originated is important to me.	.322	.464	-.373
I write stories around verifiable facts.	.237	.367	-.167
When I engage in other communication work (...) it does not compromise the quality of my journalistic work *	.03	-.01	.838
I would never engage in other communication work, such as corporate publishing or PR.	.222	.107	.826
Explained variance	22.619	15.600	13.852
Cronbach's α #	.725	.609	.768

Note. Principle Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. KMO = .651, Bartlett's test of sphericity $p < .001$. Only factors with eigenvalue ≥ 1 were considered. #Adjusted Cronbach's α on standardized items. *Items were reverse recorded before the PCA.

Doxa: Role Perceptions

Another level of journalists' doxa concerns the normative perceptions of their role in society (see chapter 2, p. 56). Here, an item batterie used in the WJS (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a) was employed to measure 1) the degree to which respondents aspire to be detached and objective, and 2) the degree to which they embrace accommodative, monitorial, collaborative and interventionist role perceptions (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018; Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019). Here, instead of building indices through PCA, I followed the argument of Lauerer and Hanitzsch (2019, p. 63) and employed a formative approach to compare role perceptions with those of journalists in general in Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the UK. A formative approach to compound indices does not assume that a construct like the "watchdog role" exists independently of its conceptualization and causes its indicators. Instead, in formative index construction, indicators reflect the defining characteristics of the construct

(Coltman et al., 2008). While indicators for a formative approach do not need to correlate or be interchangeable, a formative index is still valid. According to Lauerer and Hanitzsch (2019, p. 64), a formative approach is especially suitable in cross-national research, as “the underlying combinatory logic, assuming compositional substitutability among indicators, may contribute to a better representation of differential realities in distinct cultures”.

Habitus

A formative approach was also employed to compute three scales of journalists’ habitus. Based on the literature review, which suggests that atypical journalists either embrace an entrepreneurial habitus or are pushed into a working situation in which they work a lot and do not get paid a lot, it was assumed to find three types of journalists’ habitus: An entrepreneurial, and idealistic, and a marginalized digital habitus. These were measured through 17 items deduced from the qualitative studies (see chapter five, pages 144-146). However, a PCA suggested retaining two factors accounting for 27.4% of the variance. As these two factors did not make sense theoretically, three indexes were formed excluding four more ambiguous items (e.g., *My focus is on in-depth reporting*, an item that could arguably be true for any form of habitus).

Accordingly, an entrepreneurial habitus contains the items *Part of my job is maintaining contacts with newsroom editors in order not to be forgotten*; *Part of my daily work is pitching new ideas to news organizations*; *I purposely select news organizations I want to produce journalistic content for*; *When I produce my stories I think of the news organization as the customer*; and *I reuse interviews and research for multiple articles and news stories*.

A digital habitus comprises the items *I frequently live-tweet or live-blog for news organizations*; *I regularly report directly from my phone (mobile journalism)*; *For some of my work, I am paid on a basis of clicks received, rather than words written*; and *For most of my stories, I research information solely online*.

Lastly, a marginalized habitus pertains primarily to a delineation of work and personal time and contains the items *I am prepared to produce stories for any news organization who will buy my work*; *If my commissioning editor contacts me, I react immediately regardless of the time of day*; *I work every weekend in the month*; and *If need be, I work for long stretches without a break until my deadline is met*.

Low and high choice

To assess whether respondents work freelance out of choice or because they had to, a dummy variable measuring high choice or low choice was computed from a question asking why they started to work freelance with four multiple-choice answers. One answer option indicated intrinsic motivation (“It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy”), the three options all implied external motivations or pressures, like lack of positions or incompatibility of job and family life (see survey question 21, appendix p. 320). Respondents who only selected the intrinsic motivation were coded as having high choice; respondents who selected extrinsic reasons or the intrinsic motivation along with an extrinsic were coded as having low choice. As questions about the past are highly dependent on the salience of memory and time that has passed (Krosnick, 2018), this variable does not necessarily address respondents’ original motivation but captures their perception of it at the time of data collection.

ICT-mediated work

A binary variable was computed based on specific indicators of four variables to assess whether journalists’ work is primarily ICT-mediated. As such, ICT-mediated work was met when respondents never worked in a newsroom, communicated with daily, often, or sometimes with newsroom editors via email or phone, and communicated sometimes, rarely, or never with newsroom editors and other journalists in person.

Regular contact and regular feedback

Two dummy variables were computed to include journalists’ regular contact and regular feedback in MLR analysis. Accordingly, regular contact was met when respondents daily to often communicated with newsroom editors via ICTs or in person and when they talked daily to often to other employed journalists. Regular feedback was met when journalists received feedback from employed journalists and editors-in-chief daily to often.

Multiple correspondence analysis

To examine respondents’ position in relation to each other, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is employed. MCA is a geometric method (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010),

often employed by Bourdieu and others using field-theoretical concepts to understand and visualize how some practices, preferences, behaviours, beliefs, or perceptions are stratified relationally between different groups of people (Bourdieu, 1990a; Hovden, 2008; Lindell et al., 2020; Pedroso Neto & Undurraga, 2017). MCA is often referred to as a method in which the model follows the data and not vice versa, as is often the case in other statistical modelling (Benzécri, as quoted in Hjellbrekke, 2019, p. 6).

MCA is closely related to PCA and is a form of dimension reduction, primarily for categorical data (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). In contrast to the normal Correspondence Analysis, in which some variables are used as describing variables and others as variables to be described, in MCA, each variable has the same status (Blasius & Greenacre, 2006). It is based on an indicator matrix, or a “respondents-by-category table with as many rows as respondents (...) and as many columns as response categories” (Greenacre & Blasius, 27). Accordingly, each individual is indexed for each modality of each question. This results in two “clouds of points” (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010, p. 1) – one of categories and one of individuals, which reveal the coordinates of either categories or individuals. Accordingly, we will have a visual representation of individuals in the statistical space, in which they are located in relative proximity according to their response patterns. This means that individuals “with similar response profiles are located close to each other” (Lindell et al., 2020, p. 5). In contrast, individuals with opposite response patterns are in opposition to each other in the space. Likewise, response categories (or modalities) that are located in relative proximity tend to “‘catch’ the same individuals, or individuals with similar response profiles” (Hjellbrekke, 2019, p. 35). Points that are leaning towards the centre of the coordinate system, that is, that have no strong positive or negative associations with other categories tend to be meaningless in the distinction of different groups in the space (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 70). These clouds of individuals and categories are constructed based on active variables; however, supplementary variables can be added later on in the process. This will not affect the coordinates of the space anymore but can be useful to illustrate the social space in more detail (Blasius & Schmitz, 2014).

For each case (i.e., each national journalistic field) in this study, MCA is employed to map freelance journalists according to their accumulated forms of capital. This means that for the statistical model, a set of 12 variables with 29-30 modalities (see Table 6.7) are treated as active variables. The field-specific capital, the resources that

Table 6.7: Active variables used to construct the fields of atypical journalism

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK
Field-specific capital					
Number of years in journalism	<15 years 15-30 years >30 years	<15 years 15-30 years >30 years	< 9 years 10-24 years > 24 years	<15 years 15-30 years >30 years	<15 years 15-30 years >30 years
Experience in national newsroom (employment)			-----Yes----- -----No-----		
Experience in national newsroom (internship)			-----Yes----- -----No-----		
Beat			-----Hard----- -----Soft----- -----Mixed-----		
Cultural capital					
	High school or lower	Bachelor's or lower	Bachelor's or lower	Undertook some studies	Undertook some studies
Level of education	Undertook some studies Bachelor's Master's and higher	Master's or higher	Master's or higher	Bachelor's Master's and higher	Bachelor's Master's and higher
Journalistic education			-----Yes----- -----No-----		
Parent's education		-----No parent tertiary education----- -----One parent tertiary education----- -----Both parents tertiary education-----			
Economic capital					
Yearly income	< 8,000 EUR 8,000-16,000 EUR > 16,000 EUR	<140,000 DKK 140,000-280,000 DKK > 280,000 DKK	<13,000 EUR 13,000-26,000 EUR >26,000 EUR	<16,000 EUR 16,000-32,000 EUR >32,000 EUR	<18,000 GBP 18,000-36,000 GBP >36,000 GBP
Dependency on other source of income			-----Yes----- -----No-----		
Social capital					
Attend editorial meetings	Never Rarely At least sometimes	Never Rarely At least sometimes	Never Rarely At least sometimes	Rarely or never At least sometimes	Never Rarely At least sometimes
Work in newsroom			-----Yes----- -----No-----		

Note. Category modalities across countries differ to account for the specific dataset. As rarer modalities contribute much more to the geometric space, it is recommended to have variance in active variables, but group sizes should not differ too much (Hjellbrekke, 2019, 37).

create symbolic effects in the field, was measured through the number of years respondents have spent in journalism, whether they have experience in national newsrooms either through employment or internships, and the beat they work in.

Regarding cultural capital, the focus lies on institutionalized, embodied, and inherited cultural capital. These were measured through journalists' formal education, whether they have studied a specific journalism degree, and the formal education of their parents. Economic capital was measured through two variables: respondents' yearly income after taxes and whether this income was sufficient or they depended on other sources of income. Lastly, social capital relates here only to the social capital they might have in the journalistic field and is measured again through two variables, to what extent respondents attend editorial meetings and whether they work in newsrooms. To construct a geometric space, active variables need to provide some variance, and it is recommended to exclude particularly low frequencies of modalities as they would highly contribute to the variance: the rarer something is, the higher is its contribution to the geometric space (Hjellbrekke, 2019, p. 37). Therefore, some modalities had to be adapted to the specific national settings, for example, journalists' experience in years, their education, and income.

These active variables will result in a visual representation of the social field, onto which other supplementary variables can be projected at a later stage of the analysis (Blasius, 2010). Here, journalists' doxa (ethics and roles), habitus, age and gender, whether they chose to freelance voluntarily, perceived influences and their parents' occupations were included as supplementary variables (see Table **10.1**). The collaborative role and digital habitus were excluded as they did not provide enough variance to plot in a meaningful way. This will allow us to understand where the forms of habitus or doxa are most represented in the social space. Or, to put it as Lindell and colleagues (2020, p. 5), "how values, attitudes, practices – in short, position-takings – correspond with various positions and hierarchies in the field".

Results

Chapter 7: Profiles of European Atypical Journalists

Before diving into how economic and technological forces impact journalists' doxa and habitus, I first want to offer a profile of the sample under study. This includes their accumulated forms of capital and the specific conditions in which they work. The sample represented in this study does not diverge broadly from previous survey results in sociodemographic parameters. Compared to data from the *Worlds of Journalism Study* (WJS) (Hanitzsch, Hanusch, et al., 2019a), respondents were more often women in most countries and slightly older (see Table 7.1). The UK is an exception here, as much more respondents were men, and they were almost seven years older than the sample of journalists surveyed in 2015.

Table 7.1: *Sociodemographic background compared to all journalists from WJS*

	Gender (women)	Age		University degree	Degree in journalism*	Experience in years	
		Median	M (SD)			Mean	(SD)
Austria							
Freelancers (N=101)	43.6%	46	45.64 (16.03)	71.2%	31.7%	17.59	(13.37)
All journalists (N=818)	40.8%	43	43.00 (9.87)	63.2%	41.9%	17.94	(9.79)
Denmark							
Freelancers (N=78)	46.2%	53	52.47 (11.89)	93.6%	65.4%	22.24	(12.42)
All journalists (N=1.362)	43.1%	45.5	45.90 (11.78)	93.2%	82.2%	18.41	(11.89)
France							
Freelancers (N=80)	57.5%	36	39.49 (12.16)	96.4%	72.5%	13.05	(10.17)
All journalists (N=228)	45.4%	34	36.64 (10.81)	95.6%	79.2%	11.84	(9.81)
Netherlands							
Freelancers (N=92)	48.9%	46	44.79 (12.98)	87.9%	51%	19.15	(12.48)
All journalists (N=522)	39.3%	47.5	46.76 (11.06)	81.8%	57.8%	18.73	(10.46)
UK							
Freelancers (N=79)	27.8%	43	50.88 (12.11)	89.7%	26.6%	23.11	(11.34)
All journalists (N=700)	45.2%	43	43.17 (12.30)	86.3%	41.2%	22.74	(12.03)

Note. Data for atypical journalists of this study, data for *All journalists* were collected for WJS from 2014-2015 (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). *Degree in journalism and communication sciences.

When looking at their education, a similar percentage of respondents had a university degree, except in Austria, where freelancers were slightly better educated than the sample of all journalists from 2015. This difference, however, is also in line with studies indicating that Austrian freelancers are generally well-educated yet precarious (Maares & Putz, 2016; Prandner, 2013). Remarkably, though, fewer respondents tended to have a specific degree in journalism or communication sciences than all journalists surveyed by Hanitzsch and colleagues (2019a) across the countries. When comparing the means of journalists' experience in years, respondents did not differ much in their professional experience. If anything, they tended to have worked a little longer in journalism.

Generally, we can conclude that based on previous studies, the sample of respondents is more or less in line with the general demographic of journalists in the respective countries, except for the UK. Here, respondents were much more often men journalists. This difference indicates that the UK sample achieved in this study most likely does not represent UK atypical journalists very well, especially as research on British freelancers indicates that while they are often older than the average journalist, women should make up about half of the freelance population (Thurman et al., 2016, p. 10). While this study also included respondents working less than 20 hours per week, this is unlikely a good explanation for an overrepresentation of men, especially as the majority (68.1%) of British respondents worked more than 20 hours per week in journalism. Still, and this is again in line with previous research (Maares & Putz, 2016; Meyen & Springer, 2009; Prandner, 2013), women journalists across countries were significantly younger than men. They were on average 43.29 years old ($SD = 11.9$) while men were 49.26 ($SD = 14.95$), $t(408.12) = -4.508$, $p < .000$.

Accumulated capitals

As outlined in chapter five (p. 128), knowing about journalists' accumulated capital helps us understand the stratification of the journalistic field; thus, knowing about the economic, cultural, social, and symbolic resources that atypical journalists have accumulated allows us to map the position of atypical journalists within a social hierarchy. As gender and age can affect capital accumulation, this chapter will also discuss differences between women and men journalists and younger and older journalists. Moreover, as one objective of this study is its comparative component,

differences and similarities of capital accumulation across the five countries will also be discussed.

Economic capital

The most apparent form of respondents' economic capital is their income from journalistic work and other sources. However, we should also consider the conditions under which they amass this income. Therefore, this section will discuss not only income and remuneration but also journalists' form of employment, their working hours, the location of work and access to other resources, other work and whether they have children living at home.

In general, it appears that the journalists in this survey were indeed precarious from a financial perspective. The survey asked respondents to select their income from journalistic work after taxes and working expenses from ten income brackets. Following the procedure employed in the *WJS*, these income brackets were based on the average disposable income in the respective countries.⁴⁰ Following this, 40.8% earned less than 16,000 Euros, 140,000 DKK, or 12,000 GBP with their journalistic work, and 72.2% had a disposable income lower than the mean of the working population in their respective countries. Respondents' income was further stratified according to four factors: their working hours, gender and age, and the national setting.

Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, income correlates significantly with respondents' weekly work hours, Spearman's $\rho = .457$, $p < .001$. However, Table 7.2 illustrates that while the mean of weekly working hours continuously increases with each higher income bracket, the standard deviations also indicate much variance in the lowest and highest income brackets. When distinguishing between those working 20 hours and less and those working more than 20 hours, it becomes apparent that even respondents with a higher workload, 65.3% still earned less than the median disposable income (see also Table 10.3). Moreover, almost ten per cent of those working more than 20 hours earned the minimum amount on the scale.

⁴⁰ Accordingly, the mean disposable income of the working-age population (18-65) in the five countries (OECD, 2016) was divided by four to create comparable intervals, which allowed a scale with the mean disposable income as the halfway point. In Austria and the Netherlands, the intervals were based on EUR 8.000, in France on EUR 6.500, in Denmark on DKK 70.000, and in the UK on GBP 6.000.

Table 7.2: *Yearly disposable income by weekly working hours*

	N	Mean	SD
0-8,000 EUR #	84	16.93	14.139
8,001-16,000 EUR	70	27.56	15.738
16,001-24,000 EUR	52	32.6	13.673
24,001-32,000 EUR	74	35.36	11.571
32,001-40,000 EUR	36	35.14	12.82
40,001-48,000 EUR	25	36.76	9.216
48,001-64,000 EUR	28	34.46	15.969
More than 64,001 EUR	20	38.75	10.497
Total	389	29.79	15.329

Note. # Yearly disposable income is shown for Austria and the Netherlands. For the other countries the brackets were composed as follows: Denmark: 0-70,000 DKK; 70,001-140,000 DKK; 140,001-210,000 DKK; 210,001-280,000 DKK; 280,001-350,000 DKK; 350,001-420,000 DKK; 420,001-560,000 DKK; more than 560,001 DKK. France: 0 – 6,500 EUR; 6,501-13,000 EUR; 13,001-19,500 EUR; 19,501-26,000 EUR; 26,001-32,500 EUR; 32,501-39,000 EUR; 39,001-52,000 EUR; more than 52,001 EUR. UK: 0 – 6,000 GBP; 6,001-12,000 GBP; 12,001-18,000 GBP; 18,001-24,000 GBP; 24,001-30,000 GBP; 30,001-36,000 GBP; 36,001-48,000 GBP; more than 48,001 GBP. Yearly disposable income was measured in 10 income brackets, due to low frequencies, the three highest income brackets were collapsed to one.

Regarding gender and age, being a woman and younger was associated with less economic capital from journalistic work. Accordingly, women earned less than men, $\chi^2(7, N = 402) = 15.92, p = .026$ (see also Table 10.4). Likewise, those earning the lowest income were on average 10 years younger ($M = 42.95, SD = 17.57$) than those earning the most ($M = 52.2, SD = 9.36$), Welch's $F(7, 123.997) = 2.656, p = .014$ (see also Table 10.5). Both differences between the groups cannot be explained by weekly working hours. While men worked on average 31.13 ($SD = 14.54$) hours per week and women 28.43 ($SD = 16.27$), the difference is not significant, $t(364.83) = -1.737, p = .083$. Similarly, age and working hours did not correlate, ($r = -.003, p = .945$).

However, the most apparent difference appears to be between countries. Especially Austrian respondents earned significantly less, here almost half of the respondents located themselves in the lowest income bracket (see also Table 10.6). Moreover, a Kruskal-Wallis H -test shows that these differences between countries are significant, $\chi^2(4) = 62.737, p < .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that Austrian respondents earned significantly less than the rest in this survey (see Table 7.3). This difference, again, can only partially be explained by respondents' weekly working hours. Comparing their working time across countries, French ($M=34.67, SD=12.95$), British ($M=31.97, SD=13.22$), and Dutch respondents ($M=31.85, SD=14.47$) worked most hours. Austrian ($M=26.77, SD=18.36$) and Danish ($M=23.78; SD=14.29$)

respondents worked significantly less in journalism per week, Welch's $F(4, 199.39) = 7,315, p < .001$.

Table 7.3: *Pairwise comparison of journalists' income across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-4.884***	-4.940***	-5.529***	-7.453***
Denmark		-.004	-.445	-2.509
France			-.445	-2.529
Netherlands				-2.151

Note. Standardized z -values. *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Conditions shaping economic capital accumulation

While the beat and platform that respondents primarily report for did not significantly correlate with journalists' income⁴¹, other conditions shaped their economic capital accumulation. As such, what made a difference was how much time respondents spent on one story. On average, respondents spent 29.78 (SD = 15.38) hours per week on journalistic work and 23.67 (SD = 26.32) hours per story.⁴² Fifty-two per cent only produced up to five articles or news stories per month. However, spending more time on one story did not necessarily translate into higher income, $F(2, 363) = 54.794, p < .001$. As Table 7.4 illustrates, respondents working more hours in journalism were more likely to earn more as well ($B = .483, p < .001$). Nevertheless, at the same time, the more time they spent working on one story, the more likely they were to earn less ($B = -.218, p < .001$).

Table 7.4: *MLR of disposable income by weekly working hours and hours per story.*

	Disposable income
Weekly working hours	.483***
Hours per story	-.218***
Variance explained (R^2)	.228***

Note. Coefficients are standardized Beta coefficients. Adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

⁴¹ Statistical test for Beat: $\chi^2(14, N = 403) = 21.213, p = .096$; for Platform: $\chi^2(21, N = 400) = 23.501, p = .318$.

⁴² It must be noted, though, that five per cent of the respondents did not answer the question of weekly work hours as they said it was difficult to assess their weekly workload. Accordingly, it varies depending on feast or famine times (Antunovic et al., 2019).

Comments from respondents also indicate that the survey did not entirely manage to measure the unfair remuneration practices from newsrooms and thus the economic difficulties journalists faced. As, for example, one British journalist wrote:

“Payment of freelancers is often delayed (and even NOT paid). We are asked to do speculative work, or work for free. Work for magazines is often unpaid (on the basis that you will receive ‘coverage’). The payment per word does not allow time for research and editing can reduce payment. The treatment of journalists by some organizations is degrading and there is no way of identifying the good from the bad. We are often contacted by potential clients who are looking for the cheapest option, or just free advice.”

It is thus not surprising that more than half (57.1 %) pursued other work next to their journalistic work. Twenty-nine per cent practised work in other communication-related fields like advertising, public relations, social media management and more. Another 12.6% worked in research and education, and 9.5% earned an additional income from translation, editing and proofing. Other areas such as art, design, book writing, and book publishing were also mentioned (see Table **10.2**). Thus, while many pursued work in related fields of cultural production, some also worked in the service industry (6.5%), the classic job to supplement creative work (M. Scott, 2012).

Moreover, there was a significant connection between weekly hours spent in journalism and other work. Those who only worked in journalism spent on average ten more hours on their journalistic work ($M = 35.65$, $SD = 14.90$) than those working in non-journalistic areas ($M = 25.39$, $SD = 14.25$), $t(363.64) = -6.995$, $p < .000$. However, not all appeared to pursue other work only out of financial necessity. Almost 60% said they enjoy working outside of journalism, which is reminiscent of findings from Koch and colleagues (Fröhlich et al., 2013; Koch & Obermaier, 2014) who show that PR-journalists primarily practise communication because they enjoy the variety. Still, 45.1% said they worked in other areas because their income from journalism was not sufficient. Moreover, 27% also said that this other work helped them overcome times without commissions from journalism. This finding is reminiscent of the ‘famine times’ that Antunovic and colleagues (2019) describe in their study. While age and gender do not correlate with whether respondents work in another area⁴³, it does depend on which

⁴³ Statistical test for gender and other work: $\chi^2(1, N = 418) = .126$, $p = .722$; for age: $t(379.43) = 1.060$, $p = .290$.

country respondents live in. Austrian respondents worked significantly more often in other areas, followed by Danish and British journalists. French respondents, on the other hand, worked least often in other areas, $\chi^2(4, N = 427) = 10.77, p = .029$ (see also Table **10.7**).

Of those without work in other areas, two-thirds (66.5%) did not depend on other sources of economic capital. Still, 14% of the entire sample received financial support from other sources, most often their spouses, partners, or parents (see also Table **10.8**). A few also received financial support from governmental institutions like pensions and unemployment compensation. Others had just enough economic capital saved to work in journalism without subsidizing it through other work. For example, respondents from France and the UK wrote they lived off their savings at the moment. Another respondent from the Netherlands wrote that they were not dependent on other sources of income, but they earned just enough to make a living. While women reported slightly more often to depend on financial support through others than men (see also Table **10.9**), there appears to be no significant connection between the two variables, $\chi^2(4, N = 178) = 7.450, p = .114$.

Dependency on other sources of income, be it from other work or from financial support, was related to age and work experience but not to gender⁴⁴. We found that those who could not sustain their living only from journalistic work were significantly younger ($M = 43.75, SD = 13.4$) than those who could ($M = 48.91, SD = 13.95$), $t(411) = 3.816, p < .001$. Moreover, and unsurprisingly, those dependent on other forms of income had worked less years in journalism ($M = 16.09, SD = 11.9$) than those who were not dependent ($M = 21.39, SD = 12.61$), $t(425) = 4.438, p < .001$. And lastly, they had worked much shorter time in atypical journalism ($M = 9.56, SD = 9.17$) than those respondents who did not depend on other income ($M = 12.35, SD = 9.97$), $t(422.24) = 3.014, p = .003$.

Another factor shaping economic capital concerned the access to material resources that journalists have (see chapter four, p. 117). Here, respondents primarily relied on their own hardware (85.7%), their own software (82.5%) and their own network of experts and sources (69.2%) for their journalistic work. A compound index based on these three items was computed, measuring overall access to resources from little access (=1) to high access (=5). Having access to resources from news companies was chiefly related to the platforms that journalists worked for and the form of atypical labour they

⁴⁴ Statistical test for gender and dependency on other sources of income: $\chi^2(1, N = 427) = .267, p = .605$.

did. Respondents who identified themselves as freelancers tended to have fewer access to newsroom resources ($M = 1.6$, $SD = .80$) than those who worked freelance and in contract and part-time work ($M = 2.11$, $SD = 1.09$), Mann-Whitney-U test $z = -2.880$, $p = .004$. Moreover, journalists working for newspapers and magazines reported to rely on their own resources ($M = 1.59$, $SD = .74$), so did those working for online-only news media ($M = 1.56$, $SD = .75$), and those working across different media platforms ($M = 1.69$, $SD = .89$). Only broadcast journalists reported more access to newsroom resources ($M = 3.13$, $SD = 1.34$), H -test $\chi^2(3) = 15.119$, $p = .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests indicated that journalists working for broadcast media indeed differed significantly from the other groups in their access to resources (see Table 7.5).

Table 7.5: *Pairwise comparison of access to resources between platform types*

	Print digital	Broadcast	Converged
Print	-.440	3.683**	.267
Print digital		3.874**	.737
Broadcast			-3.609**

Note. z -values. ** $p < .01$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Print refers to journalists working for newspapers and magazines, print digital refers to journalists working for online-only news websites and blogs, broadcast refers to journalists working for public and commercial radio and television, converged refers to journalists working across different platforms.

This difference was especially apparent regarding access to hard- and software (Table 7.6). More than half of broadcast journalists said they used the newsroom's hardware and software to do their work. In comparison, only very few journalists working for text-focused publications, be it printed or digital, had access to company hardware like computers, and about seven to nine per cent had access to software like editing programs. Interestingly, when it comes to immaterial resources like the social capital of newsrooms, their network of experts and sources, more respondents across the platforms had access to these. While the majority still heavily relied on their own networks, about one in ten counted more on the newsrooms' networks, and about four in ten relied on both their own and the newsrooms' networks. Compared across countries, Dutch respondents had significantly less access to resources than those in other countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 57.465$, $p < .001$ (see also Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests, Table 10.10).

Table 7.6: Access to resources from newsrooms across platforms

	Print	Print digital	Broadcast	Converged
I have access to hardware (computers, cameras, audio equipment) from a news organization.	3.2%	0.7%	54.6%	3.9%
I have access to software (audio/visual editing software etc.) from a news organization	6.7%	7%	54.6%	8.8%
I have access to the network of experts and sources of my commissioning newsroom.	9.0%	8.8%	27.3%	10%

Note. Access to resources was measured with the question: “When you think about the access you have to resources, which of the following applies to your current working situation?”. Answers were measured on a semantic differential with a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 = I have access to..., 1 = I use my own... and 3 = both equally. Displayed are percentages of answers 4 and 5.

Access to resources was also linked to regular contact with newsrooms (see findings on social capital, p. 211) and journalists’ work location. Journalists with regular contact to the newsroom earned significantly more than those with no regular contact, Mann-Whitney-U test $z = 4.336$, $p < .001$. When asked to assess how much time of their journalistic work they spent at various locations (Figure 7.1), most respondents answered they primarily worked most of their time from home.


**Figure 7.1:** Working time spent at different locations of work.

Figure illustrates the frequencies in per cent to the Question “When you think about your average daily work routine, how much time do you spend working in the following contexts” with five items measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = never and 5 = 100-76%. 51-100% combines the answers from 4 and 5.

Other options, like co-working spaces, coffee-houses or rented offices, were usually only used for up to 25% of their working time. Twenty-two per cent of all respondents had access to a rented office, but less than five per cent of them used it up to 100% of their working time. Remarkably, almost half (47.2%) worked in newsrooms, albeit mostly only up to 25% of their workday.

While there were no differences in work location across gender, there were differences when it came to age and working hours. Those working primarily from home were on average older ($M = 48.7$, $SD = 13.58$) than those who worked only up to 25% of their work time from home ($M = 43.5$, $SD = 12.77$), $F(4, 407) = 3.297$, $p < .001$. However, Bonferroni post hoc tests could not show significant differences between the degrees of time spent working from home. Similarly, respondents working from newsrooms were younger than those never working in newsrooms, $F(4, 400) = 4.378$, $p = .002$. Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that those who spent 26 to 50% of their working time in newsrooms were significantly younger ($M = 38.94$, $SD = 13.31$) than those who never worked from newsrooms ($M = 48.05$, $SD = 14.17$), $p = .005$. On the other hand, working in a rented office is not significantly correlated with age ($F(4,403) = .166$, $p = .956$, as is working from a flexible co-working space ($F(4,401) = 1.257$, $p = .286$). Similarly, respondents working from coffeehouses tended to be younger ($M = 41.37$, $SD = 11.59$), than those who never worked from coffeehouses ($M = 48.95$, $SD = 14.40$), $t(339.42) = -5.746$, $p < .001$. Full-time freelancers worked more often in newsrooms and spent more of their working time in newsrooms compared to respondents working 20 hours and less, Mann-Whitney-U test: $z = -2.875$, $p = .004$.

Across countries, we can find significant differences in journalists' work location. Apart from the degree to which journalists worked from coffee houses, all other options were distributed differently among the countries (Table 7.7). While most journalists in all countries worked primarily from home, there are significant differences, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 34.267$, $p < .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that respondents from the UK and France worked significantly more from home than those from Denmark and the Netherlands (see also Table 10.11). Danish journalists, on the other hand, worked much more often in rented offices and also spent more of their working time there compared to Austrian, French, Dutch and British respondents, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 33.532$, $p < .001$ (see also Table 10.12). Similarly, when working from flexible co-working spaces, these are used significantly different across the countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 19.775$, $p = .001$. Dunn-

Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that Austrian respondents were significantly less likely to work in a co-working space than Danish and Dutch respondents (see also Table 10.13). Lastly, the time spent working in newsrooms also varies significantly across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 40.705, p < .001$. Here, Dutch respondents work significantly more often in newsrooms than Austrian, Danish, French, and British respondents. Moreover, Austrian respondents also work more often from newsrooms than Danish journalists (see also Table 10.14).

Table 7.7: *Location of work across countries*

	N	51-100%	M	SD
Work from home				
Austria	101	75.2%	4.13	1.13
Denmark	76	51.3%	3.62	1.41
France	80	83.8%	4.42	0.97
Netherlands	91	61.5%	3.7	1.26
UK	79	87.3%	4.49	0.91
ALL	427	71.9%	4.07	1.20
Work in a rented office				
Austria	100	3%	1.21	0.74
Denmark	77	20.8%	1.94	1.43
France	79	2.5%	1.24	0.72
Netherlands	91	5.5%	1.25	0.79
UK	76	1.3%	1.12	0.54
ALL	423	6.4%	1.34	0.93
Work in a flexible co-working-space				
Austria	100	0%	1.08	0.33
Denmark	77	7.8%	1.48	0.96
France	79	0%	1.24	0.56
Netherlands	89	4.5%	1.43	0.83
UK	76	2.6%	1.21	0.68
ALL	421	2.9%	1.28	0.71
Work in a coffee-house				
Austria	100	1%	1.52	0.67
Denmark	76	0%	1.3	0.54
France	79	1.3%	1.37	0.60
Netherlands	89	1.1%	1.44	0.69
UK	76	1.3%	1.45	0.64
ALL	420	1%	1.42	0.63
Work in a newsroom				
Austria	100	10%	1.61	1.09
Denmark	76	3.9%	1.2	0.67
France	79	2.5%	1.44	0.72
Netherlands	89	10.1%	1.96	1.11
UK	76	1.3%	1.36	0.72
ALL	420	6%	1.53	0.94

Note. Frequency, mean, and standard deviation to the Question “When you think about your average daily work routine, how much time do you spend working in the following contexts” with five items measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = never and 5 = 100-76%. 51-100% combines the answers from 4 and 5.

Moreover, journalists' working location was not shaped by the fact whether they have children living at home⁴⁵. Generally speaking, the findings question the often-made claims that freelancing makes journalistic work and family life more compatible. While 48.3% of the respondents said they had children, only a third had at least one child living at home with them. Moreover, women freelancers were not more likely to be a parent. Quite the contrary, men journalists were more often parents. Still, gender and having children were not significantly correlated, $\chi^2(1, N = 404) = .80, p = .777$. Moreover, while journalists without children at home worked slightly more ($M = 30.36, SD = 15.98$) than those who had children at home ($M = 28.34, SD = 13.57$), the difference was not significant, $t(319.42) = 1.314, p = .190$. Journalists in Denmark were most often parents (62.3%), followed by the UK (51.4%) and the Netherlands (45.6%). Austrian (42.4%) and French (36.3%) respondents were significantly less likely to be parents, $\chi^2(4, N = 416) = 19.85, p = .001$.

Cultural capital

As outlined in the theory section and framework, cultural capital mostly captures educational credentials. However, I also include embodied cultural capital from journalists' backgrounds growing up and journalists' use of digital platforms in their work to measure a specific form of digital capital.

Women journalists were better educated than men, they more often had completed tertiary education $\chi^2(5, N = 421) = 19.811, p = .001$. Out of ten, almost six women held a master's degree compared to four men (see Table 7.8).

Table 7.8: *Education by gender*

	Women journalists (N = 193)	Men journalists (N = 228),
Mandatory school	1%	2.6%
Secondary school	1.6%	7.5%
Bachelor's degree	31.6%	33.3%
Master's degree	57.5%	43%
Doctorate	5.2%	4.4%
Undertook some studies, but no degree	3.1%	9.2%

⁴⁵ Mann-Whitney-U tests: Work from home: $z = -1.216, p = .225$; rented office: $z = -1.677, p = .093$; co-working space: $z = -1.529, p = .126$; coffeehouse: $z = -1.272, p = .204$; newsroom: $z = -1.258, p = .209$.

Moreover, men more often had only completed secondary school or lower (10%) or started tertiary education but never finished it (9.2%) compared to women. In line with this, better-educated journalists tended to be significantly younger, H -test $\chi^2(5) = 25.078$, $p < .001$. Those with a master's degree were, on average, the youngest (see Table 7.9). Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that those with a master's degree differed significantly in age from those with mandatory school education ($z = 3.404$, $p = .010$). Similarly, they differed significantly in age from those with a doctoral degree ($z = -3.389$, $p = .011$). Moreover, as the better educated had been working significantly fewer years in journalism, it appears that having a master's education (or equivalent) has only become relevant in recent years.

Table 7.9: *Education by age*

	N	Age	
		M	SD
Mandatory school	7	63.43	15.19
Secondary school	20	48.95	20.67
Bachelor's degree	137	47.57	13.88
Master's degree	207	43.82	12.23
Doctorate	19	55.58	13.68
Undertook some studies, but no degree	25	48.8	14.74

When only considering those with bachelor's or master's degrees, respondents holding a master's degree have worked significantly fewer years (16.45, $SD = 10.97$) in journalism than those who held a bachelor's (20.91, $SD = 12.73$), $t(370) = 3.564$, $p < .001$. However, there is no significant difference between bachelor's and master's holders when it comes to years in *atypical* employment, suggesting that those with higher education entered atypical journalism much faster after they finished their degree. Journalists with a bachelor's degree have spent about the same time in atypical work (11.49, $SD = 9.75$) as those with a master's degree (10.25, $SD = 9.01$), $t(370) = 1.244$, $p = .214$. What is more, having a tertiary degree was not related to a better income from journalistic work, $\chi^2(6, N = 407) = 4.879$, $p = .559$.

Moreover, almost half (48.2%) of those who undertook or completed studies had specialized in journalism or other communication fields, and 35.5% had specialized in their topic of expertise. French respondents most often had a journalistic education (65%), followed by Danish (52.6%), Dutch (46.7%), Austrian (23.8%) and British (16.5%) journalists, $\chi^2(4, N = 430) = 56.928$, $p < .001$. This is insofar remarkable as it

indicates that atypical journalists in all countries except France tended to have a different specialized education compared to all journalists. Other fields of study were social sciences (41.8%), arts and humanities (29.5%) and the sciences (11.5%; see also Table 10.15).

When looking at their socio-economic upbringing, respondents came from middle to upper-middle-class backgrounds. While almost a third of all fathers (30.8%) and mothers (33%) had only completed mandatory school, 44.9% of fathers and 40.3% of mothers held a university degree (see also Table 10.16). Moreover, as illustrated in Table 7.10, fathers primarily worked in more high-paying professions, as did mothers – if they had not been homemakers (27%). Based on the classification of occupations by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2012), the respondents’ fathers worked primarily in legal, social, and cultural professions, which includes attorneys and judges, authors and journalists, librarians and archivists as well as religious professionals (12.11%), as teachers (9.79%), scientists or engineers (9.02%) and chief executives, senior officials and legislators (7.21%). Similarly, respondents’ mothers worked primarily as teachers (15.3%), in legal, social, and cultural professions (9.76%), as health professionals (8.97%), as well as general and keyboard clerks (6.86%).

Table 7.10: *Occupation of respondents’ parents*

	Father’s profession (N = 387)	Mother’s profession (N = 378)
Managers, politicians, and legislators	18.1%	2.9%
Professionals	39%	36.2%
Technicians and associate professionals	10.9%	7.9%
Clerical support workers	2.1%	9.5%
service and sales workers	6.5%	7.7%
skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	3.1%	1.3%
Craft and related trades workers	11.9%	2.9%
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	2.6%	0.8%
Elementary occupations	3.6%	3.7%
Military	2.1%	--
Homemakers	0.3%	27%

Note. Recoded answers to the question “Growing up, what was your father’s / mother’s profession?” Answers were recoded according to the ILO standard classification of occupations ISCO-08 (ILO, 2012, pp. 87–357). As the ILO classification does not include a category for domestic care work, this category was added as ‘homemaker’. However, only 378 respondents named their mothers’ occupation compared to 387 for their fathers. This could also be as many respondents did not categorize “homemakers” as an occupation, as some wrote: “She had no work, she stayed home”. In the cases of such utterances, mothers’ occupation was coded as “homemaker”. However, when respondents did not answer the question at all, such a coding could not be made.

Only a few had parents who had worked as journalists (3.5%). This finding could also indicate that they lack the specific social capital to find stable employment in the field.

Parents of women journalists, young journalists, and respondents from Denmark and France were significantly better educated. Fifty-three percent of women's fathers held a university degree compared to 38.3% of men's fathers, $\chi^2(5, N = 404) = 16.375, p = .006$. Likewise, 48.6% of women's mothers completed a university degree compared to 34% of men's mothers, $\chi^2(5, N = 404) = 12.476, p = .029$. Younger journalists had better educated mothers (H -test $\chi^2(5) = 70.330, p < .001$) and fathers (H -test $\chi^2(5) = 13.956, p = .016$). Bonferroni-Dunn post hoc-tests show that journalists with a mother holding a PhD ($M = 35.83, SD = 11$), master's ($M = 40.38, SD = 12.58$), bachelor's ($M = 41.6, SD = 12.58$) or high school diploma ($M = 45.87, SD = 13.48$) were significantly younger than those with mothers who only completed mandatory school ($M = 54.29, SD = 12.4$, see also Table **10.17**). For fathers, post hoc tests only show significant difference of age between respondents with fathers with a bachelor's degree ($M = 44.01, SD = 13.08$) and mandatory school ($M = 50.11, SD = 14.74$; see also Table **10.18**).

Compared across countries, parents' education also differed significantly. Danish and French fathers were much better educated than Dutch, British, and Austrian fathers, $\chi^2(20, N = 409) = 82.011, p < .001$. More than half of Danish (56.6%) and French (53.2%) fathers held a university degree compared to 47.2% of Dutch, 40.1% of British and 30.6% of Austrian fathers. While Austrian journalists had the highest number of fathers who only completed mandatory school (42.1%), they also had the highest number of fathers with doctorates (15.8%). This finding might also be specific to Austria's history of education as doctorates were the only degree in the Austrian system until the 1960s, and even until the 1990s, doctorates comprised a two-year programme not specifically designed for an academic career (Pechar et al., 2008, p. 11). Dutch fathers, in comparison, had much lower levels of mandatory school (13.5%), but the majority appeared to have completed an a-level education (34.8%). Similar observations can be made regarding the education of mothers, $\chi^2(16, N = 409) = 111.195, p < .001$. Again, French and Danish mothers were particularly well educated, with 62.6% of French mothers holding a university degree and 53.3% of Danish mothers. Mothers in the UK and Austria held lower institutionalized education certificates (55.2% of British and 45.8% of Austrian mothers only completed mandatory school).

Similarly, mothers of women journalists, younger respondents and French journalists were more likely to have worked in management positions and other professions. For fathers, on the other hand, no significant relationships could be detected, even though French and Dutch fathers were more often managers, politicians, or legislators (see also Table **10.19**)⁴⁶. While almost half of the mothers of women journalists had worked either as managers or in other professions (44.9%), only a rough third of men journalists' mothers did (34.3%), $\chi^2(5, N = 374) = 15.975, p = .007$. Moreover, more men journalists reported that their mothers had been homemakers (33.3%) than women journalists (19.8%). Likewise, mothers of younger respondents tended to have worked in professions, while mothers of older respondents have worked as homemakers, H -test $\chi^2(9) = 52.781, p < .001$. Respondents whose mothers were homemakers were much significantly older ($M = 54.24, SD = 13.58$) than those with mothers working as managers or legislators ($M = 40.73, SD = 10.33$), technicians ($M = 38.57, SD = 10.88$) or professionals ($M = 42.65, SD = 12.72$). However, there were no significant difference observed between fathers' occupation and respondents age, H -test $\chi^2(10) = 10.904, p = .265$. Lastly, significantly fewer French mothers had worked as homemakers (7.6%) compared to Austrian and Dutch mothers (36.4% and 35% respectively), $\chi^2(20, N = 378) = 43.149, p = .002$. Moreover, more than half of French respondents had mothers who worked in the professions, most often in the teaching (24.2%) and health professions (13.6%, see also Table **10.20**).

Specific cultural capital: Digital capital

As a specific cultural skill set, digital capital has been argued to be beneficial for atypical journalists in competitive environments. As such, digital platforms can function as tools for atypical journalists to find news and stories to report on, as freelancers have long done through other media (Accardo, 2007; Meyen & Springer, 2009). However, when asked which platforms they use for sourcing purposes, most of the respondents said to rarely or never use digital platforms, except for blogs authored by journalists or other experts like scientists or lawyers, and crowd-sourcing sites like Wikipedia (see Table **7.11**). Some platforms were exclusively never used by respondents, especially audio-sharing sites

⁴⁶ Statistical test for fathers' occupation and gender: $\chi^2(5, N = 382) = 8.283, p = .141$; for fathers' occupation and age: H test $\chi^2(10) = 10.904, p = .265$; for fathers' occupation and country: $\chi^2(20, N = 386) = 30.194, p = .067$.

(62%), personal messenger tools (40.7%), and blogs authored by regular citizens (32.8%, see also Table 10.21).

Table 7.11: *Frequencies of digital platform use for sourcing purposes*

	Daily to often	Sometimes	Rarely to never
Blogs authored by journalists or other experts (e.g., scientists, lawyers)	28.1%	35.2%	36.6%
Blogs authored by regular citizens	6.0%	21.1%	73.0%
Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter	26.3%	26.1%	47.5%
Social networking sites, such as Facebook	23.0%	27.5%	49.5%
Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn	14.8%	32.2%	53.0%
Audio-visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr	11.3%	27.1%	61.5%
Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud	5.5%	8.3%	86.2%
Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or Snapchat	20.7%	15.3%	64.0%
Content communities and crowd-sourcing sites, such as Wikipedia	29.0%	35.6%	35.3%

Note. Frequencies to the question “How often do you use the following for sourcing stories?”, measured from 1 = daily to 5 = never. For this table, categories 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 were collapsed to one each. $N = 418-427$

Similarly, few used such digital platforms to distribute their journalistic work (see Table 7.12), despite it being perceived as increasingly crucial for atypical journalists in competitive settings (Brems et al., 2017; De Cock & De Smaele, 2016). Most respondents used Twitter and Facebook to distribute their journalistic work.

Table 7.12: *Frequencies of digital platform use for distribution purposes*

	Daily to often	Sometimes	Rarely to never
Your personal blog	14.5%	13%	72.5%
Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter	32.8%	17.5%	49.8%
Visual micro-blogging sites, such as Instagram, or Tumblr	14.1%	13.3%	72.6%
Social networking sites, such as Facebook	32.7%	23.3%	43.8%
Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn	21.8%	24.4%	53.8%
Audio-visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr	3.6%	7.8%	88.6%
Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud	3.1%	4.3%	92.7%
Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or Snapchat	10.5%	13.6%	75.8%

Note. Frequencies to the question “How often do you use the following to disseminate your journalistic work?”, measured from 1 = daily to 5 = never. For this table, categories 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 were collapsed to one each., $N = 418-427$.

Moreover, while it makes sense that few journalists shared their work on audio or audio-visual sharing sites, it is remarkable how few make use of other platforms to distribute their work. More than half (56.1%) did not have a personal blog on which they shared or linked to their work (see also Table 10.22).

Looking at differences in digital platform use, we found that younger respondents employed these much more often for sourcing and distribution purposes. Moreover, there were apparent differences across gender and countries. Therefore, to test for differences across age, gender and countries, the items for digital platform use for sourcing and distribution were compiled to form two compound indices.⁴⁷ Accordingly, younger respondents appeared to use digital platforms more frequently for sourcing purposes, even though the correlation with age is weak, Spearman's $\rho = -.219$, $p < .001$. On the other hand, women ($M = 2.25$, $SD = .66$) and men journalists ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .7$) employed digital platforms similarly for sourcing stories, Welch's $t(357.44) = -.063$, $p = .950$. Comparing across countries, Danish journalists used digital platforms least often for sourcing purposes ($M = 1.93$, $SD = .6$) and Dutch journalists most often ($M = 2.59$, $SD = .69$, see also Table 7.13).

Table 7.13: *Distribution of digital platform use across countries*

	Sourcing purposes			Distribution purposes		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Austria	86	2.17	0.64	89	1.95	0.68
Denmark	68	1.93	0.60	66	1.77	0.49
France	70	2.27	0.63	73	1.79	0.62
Netherlands	79	2.59	0.69	85	2.1	0.62
UK	73	2.27	0.70	71	2.29	0.73
Total	376	2.25	0.69	384	1.98	0.66

Note. Means of indices for digital platform use for sourcing and distribution purposes, where 1 = no use at all and 5 = very frequent use.

The distribution across countries differed significantly, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 35.001$, $p < .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests show that Danish journalists differed significantly in their use of digital platforms for research purposes from Dutch and French journalists, and

⁴⁷ This was done by adding all items and dividing them by the number of items, creating two compound indices measuring the overall degree of social media use for sourcing and distribution from low to high.

Dutch journalists differed significantly from British and Austrian journalists (see Table 7.14).

Table 7.14: *Pairwise comparison of journalists' digital platform use for sourcing purposes by country*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-2.084	1.017	3.947**	.788
Denmark		2.947*	5.762***	2.750
France			2.750	-.229
Netherlands				-3.016*

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Looking at digital platforms for distribution purposes, younger respondents used digital platforms more frequently than older respondents, even though the correlation with age was weak, Spearman's $\rho = -.181$, $p < .001$. Moreover, while men journalists used digital platforms in general much more frequently to distribute their work ($M = 2.02$, $SD = .7$) than women ($M = 1.95$, $SD = .6$), the difference between the groups was not significant, Welch's $t(372.82) = -1.053$, $p = .293$. Comparing across countries, British journalists used digital platform most often for distribution purposes ($M = 2.29$, $SD = .72$) and Danish journalists least often ($M = 1.77$, $SD = .49$, see also Table 7.13). The distribution across countries differed significantly, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 30.913$, $p < .001$. Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that British journalists differed significantly in their use of digital platforms for distribution purposes from Austrian, Danish, and French journalists, and Dutch journalists differed significantly from Danish and French journalists (see Table 7.15).

Table 7.15: *Pairwise comparison of journalists' digital platform use for distribution purposes by country*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-1.560	-1.711	1.600	3.103*
Denmark		-.098	3.023*	4.370***
France			3.213*	4.583***
Netherlands				1.562

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

These findings align with previous research, asserting that younger freelancers adapt and employ digital tools more effortlessly while older freelancers must invest more time (Hayes & Silke, 2018). Moreover, the findings suggest that journalistic culture also

shapes how journalists use new technologies. While Dutch respondents employed different digital platforms much more often than those from other countries, they primarily differed from Danish respondents in their use. Both countries are similar in their degree of digitalization (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021; *Reuters Institute Digital News Report*, 2017; Vandenberghe & D’Haenens, 2021), suggesting that the difference might more be rooted in which sources are deemed legitimate for journalists.

Findings across countries also suggest that media systems in which competition is higher – and thus branding practices are already more prevalent (like in the UK and the Netherlands) –, atypical journalists employ these platforms more often to distribute their work and maybe even foster relationships directly with their audiences. These findings are reiterated when we look at the results from another list of items that measured to what extent journalists agree that social media is helpful for their productivity and for branding themselves (Molyneux et al., 2019; Weaver & Willnat, 2016). Table 7.16 illustrates that respondents viewed the potential for social media primarily in its benefit to promote themselves (64.2%), communicate with people relevant to their work (60.6%), develop relationships with audiences (47.1%), and gain professional respect and renown (41.1%). On the other hand, they disagreed that social media aids their productivity.

Table 7.16: *Agreement, mean and standard deviation for social media use for productivity and branding purposes*

	N	Agreement	Mean	SD
Using social media allows me to promote myself and my work much better.	424	64.2%	3.72	1.20
Because of social media, I communicate better with people relevant to my work.	424	60.6%	3.64	1.20
I use social media to develop relationships with audiences.	425	47.1%	3.22	1.37
I use social media to professionally gain respect and renown.	426	41.1%	2.98	1.39
Social media allows me to be faster in reporting news stories.	424	36.3%	2.96	1.29
Social media has improved my productivity.	424	23.6%	2.6	1.22
Social media allows me to cover more news stories.	423	22.5%	2.61	1.21
Social media has decreased my daily workload.	422	5.5%	1.98	0.92

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviation for items to the question “When you think about your professional use of social media, how much do you agree with the following?”, measured in a 5-point scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. *Agreement* shows the combined percentages of answers 4 and 5.

Two indices were formed based on these items (see chapter six, p. 174). There were no or only little relationships between social media use for productivity and age, gender, and

country. While younger respondents were more likely to agree that social media helps productivity, the correlation is only weak, Spearman's $\rho = -.163$, $p = .001$. Women and men evaluated social media for productivity similarly low, Welch's $t(401.42) = -.407$, $p = .688$. Likewise, the evaluation is similarly distributed across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 2.665$, $p = .615$. This is also illustrated in the density plots detailed in Figure 7.2, as respondents from all countries tended to lean towards the middle of the scale. In contrast, for branding purposes, the illustration shows that journalists in the UK, the Netherlands and Austria tended to agree more to its usefulness.




Figure 7.2: *Density plots of the distribution of social media use*

Note. Density plots for indices measuring social media use for productivity and branding purposes, where 1 = low agreement and 5 = high agreement.

Again, there was no or only a little relationship with age and gender for branding purposes. Younger journalists again agreed more to use social media for branding purposes, but it is a weak correlation, Spearman's $\rho = -.226$, $p < .001$. Surprisingly, men journalists did not perceive social media as more valuable for branding purposes, even though research would suggest otherwise (Hanusch & Nölleke, 2019; Maares, Lind, et al., 2021; Usher et al., 2018), Welch's $t(408.45) = .456$, $p = .649$. However, we could detect significant differences in evaluation across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 16.576$, $p = .002$. Post hoc tests indicated that Danish respondents rejected social media's benefit for branding purposes and, as such, differed significantly from Dutch and British journalists who perceived social media more valuable in this regard (see also Table 10.23).

Journalistic capital – the field-specific symbolic capital

Journalistic capital comprises cultural capital that is specific to the journalistic field as well as its symbolic effects. As outlined before (p. 63), this includes experience in the journalistic field but also experience in newsrooms, the media types and beats that journalists work for, and the symbolic recognition through awards.

When it comes to experience, women journalists had significantly less experience both in journalistic work and in atypical employment. This finding is not surprising, given that they were also significantly younger. On average, women had worked in journalism for 15.53 years ($SD = 10.64$) and men for 21.96 years ($SD = 13.26$), $t(417.856) = -5.518$, $p < .001$. Similarly, women had been working fewer years ($M = 9.6$, $SD = 8.58$) in atypical employment than men ($M = 12.46$, $SD = 10.54$), $t(418.618) = -3.077$, $p = .002$.

In general, most respondents (78.7%) had experienced newsroom socialization in some form, either through internships or employment. Only one in five (21.3%) had never been employed or completed an internship in a newsroom. Interestingly, those who had not been directly socialized through the newsroom either through employment or internships were on average significantly older ($M = 50.3$, $SD = 12.25$) than those who had ($M = 45.44$, $SD = 14.21$), $t(155.944) = 3182$, $p = .002$. Among those with no experience in the newsroom, 55.7% were over fifty. At the same time, among those with experience in the newsroom, 40.4% were 39 years and younger. There is no significant difference in gender between those who have been socialized in the newsroom and those who have not, $\chi^2(1, N = 421) = 1.012$, $p = .314$.

Moreover, almost two thirds (64.2%) had had some experience working in newsrooms through full- or part-time employment (Table 7.17). Most had been employed in the national press, followed by the regional and local press. Only a few had been employed in public or commercial broadcast media and news agencies. Across countries, French and Danish respondents reported most often to have gained experience through employment (77.5% and 74.4%), followed by respondents from the Netherlands (60.4%), UK (56.4%), and Austria (55%). These differences across countries appear to be significant, $\chi^2(4, N = 427) = 15.955$, $p = .003$.

Likewise, 54% had completed an internship in press or broadcast media (Table 7.17). Again, there appear to be significant differences in internships across countries.

Table 7.17: *Experience in newsrooms through employment or internships by country*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Full or part-time employment						
National press	30%	53.8%	57.5%	29.7%	34.6%	40.3%
Regional press	16%	16.7%	22.5%	22%	19.2%	19.2%
Local press	8%	16.7%	22.5%	11%	20.5%	15.2%
National public broadcast	6%	19.2%	8.8%	9.9%	7.7%	10.1%
Regional public broadcast	2%	11.5%	--	2.2%	3.8%	3.7%
National commercial broadcast	5%	5.1%	--	2.2%	5.1%	3.5%
Regional commercial broadcast	3%	5.1%	--	1.1%	3.8%	2.6%
Press / Photo Agencies	8%	9%	9%	7.7%	9%	8.9%
No employment	45%	25.6%	22.5%	39.6%	43.6%	35.8%
Internship						
National press	31%	35.9%	53.8%	34.1%	14.1%	33.7%
Regional press	17%	7.7%	41.3%	24.2%	10.3%	20.1%
Local press	9%	10.3%	28.7%	9.9%	9%	13.1%
National public broadcast	15%	1.3%	13.8%	6.6%	1.3%	8%
Regional public broadcast	7%	1.3%	10%	4.4%	5.1%	5.6%
National commercial broadcast	3%	1.3%	2.5%	2.2%	--	1.9%
Regional commercial broadcast	8%	--	--	1.1%	2.6%	2.6%
Press / Photo Agencies	7%	1.3%	8.8%	2.2%	1.3%	4.2%
No internship	46%	41%	21.3%	40.7%	76.9%	44.7%

Note. Frequencies across countries to the questions “Have you ever had full- or part-time employment in one of the following media organizations” and “Have you ever completed an internship in one of the following media organizations”. Multiple answers possible.

While in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands about half of the respondents had experience through an internship, in France, 78.8% had done an internship, and in the UK, 23.1%, $\chi^2(4, N = 427) = 51.587, p < .001$. This extremely low number in the UK could also be explained by the sample, which is comparatively older.

Another aspect of journalistic capital are the media types and beats journalists report for as they yield different symbolic effects in the field (Schultz, 2007; Van Leuven et al., 2021; Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019). For atypical employment, measuring media types is complex as journalists can work for various outlets. Thus, media types were surveyed as a multiple-choice question. Figure 7.3 illustrates that most respondents worked for text-dominated media types. Seven of ten produced journalistic content for magazines and more than half for newspapers and weeklies. A third worked for online only newsrooms and 27% for online only blogs. While respondents are less often involved in radio and television journalism, more work for public broadcast organizations (17.9%) than commercial broadcasters (12.8%). Less than 10% worked for news and photo agencies.




Figure 7.3: *Media types in per cent.*

Note. Frequencies in per cent to the question “What media platforms do you produce content for?” Multiple answers possible. N = 430.

When comparing media types across ages, only a few significant differences were apparent (see Table 10.24). Those working for online-only newsrooms as well as newspapers and weeklies were significantly younger. On the other hand, respondents working for photo agencies were significantly older (see also Table 10.24). Remarkably, across gender, women worked significantly less often for blogs and social media (see Table 7.18). This is surprising as social media work is often associated with being ‘female’ work (Duffy, 2017).

Table 7.18: *Media platform by gender*

	Men journalists	Women journalists	$\chi^2(1)$
Newspapers & weeklies	56.1%	57,5%	.080
Magazines	71.9%	72%	.000
Online only newsrooms	35.5%	32,1%	.539
Blogs	33.8%	20,2%	9.635**
Social Media	24.6%	16,1%	4.605*
PBS	21.1%	15%	2.540
CBS	12.3%	14%	.269
News agencies	7.9%	6,2%	.444
Photo agencies	5.7%	2,1%	3.553
N	228	193	

Note. Percentages and χ^2 values for 1x1 crosstabulations for each media platform. Values indicate the percentages within gender, i.e., 56.1% of men journalists worked for newspapers and weeklies, while 57.5% of women journalists did. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

When comparing media types across countries, there were some national differences. In Austria, most respondents (64.4%) named newspapers and weeklies as their customers; in the remaining countries, it was magazine newsrooms (see Table 7.19). While only 14% of Danish respondents and 24% of Austrian respondents worked for online-only newsrooms like the *Huffington Post*, in the Netherlands, almost half (48.9%) of respondents worked for such digital media. This difference is significant, $\chi^2(4, N = 430) = 31.250, p < .001$. Similarly, over half of all UK respondents said they published their work on blogs, but only 10% did so in France, 12.8% in Denmark, 19.8% in Austria and 38% in the Netherlands. This relationship was also significant $\chi^2(4, N = 430) = 60.735, p < .001$. While roughly a third of respondents in the UK, Austria, and Denmark published their work on social media, less than one in ten did so in France and the Netherlands, $\chi^2(4, N = 430) = 27.783, p < .001$. Lastly, while in Austria, the Netherlands, and the UK only roughly five to seven per cent worked for commercial broadcast, in France almost one-fifth (18.8%) and in Denmark almost 30% did, $\chi^2(4, N = 430) = 32.569, p < .001$.

Table 7.19: Differences of media types across countries

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	$\chi^2(4)$
Newspapers & weeklies	64.4%	50%	52.5%	59.8%	54.4%	4.935
Magazines	63.4%	78.2%	80%	66.3%	73.4%	9.219
Online only newsrooms	23.8%	14.1%	42.5%	48.9%	39.2%	31.250***
Blogs	19.8%	12.8%	10%	38%	55.7%	60.735***
Social Media	27.7%	29.5%	7.5%	8.7%	30.4%	27.783***
PBS	14.9%	25.6%	17.5%	20.7%	11.4%	6.577
CBS	6.9%	29.5%	18.8%	5.4%	6.3%	32.569***
News agencies	5.9%	2.6%	11.3%	4.3%	11.4%	8.111
Photo agencies	4%	7.7%	0%	3.3%	5.1%	6.537 [#]
N	101	78	80	92	79	

Note. Percentages and χ^2 values for 5x1 crosstabulations for each media platform. Values indicate the percentages within countries, i.e., 64.4% of Austrian journalists worked for newspapers and weeklies, while 50% of Danish journalists did, and so on.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. # five cells had an estimated frequency smaller 5.

When we combined their multiple responses and categorized them according to the diversity of the media types they worked for, 36% produced journalistic content across different types like traditional print outlets as well as online-only, social media and broadcast media.⁴⁸ However, 61.4% worked primarily for text-focused media, like online

⁴⁸ Platforms were recoded into four categories: print only, print digital, broadcast, and across media types. Journalists who selected only newspapers, magazines and weeklies were collapsed in print only; respondents who selected online-only, blogs, but also weeklies and newspapers were collapsed in print digital; journalists who selected only commercial or public radio and television were collapsed in broadcast,

only and print media types. Of these, 29.4% wrote only for magazines, newspapers, and weeklies. Not even 3% worked for broadcast media only.

Respondents were asked in an open question to name up to three topics they primarily reported on. Figure 7.4 illustrates which areas of reporting journalists named; culture, politics, health, economy, and science were the top five mentioned categories. Nevertheless, lifestyle areas like lifestyle reporting in general and, more specifically, travel and sports reporting were also mentioned often.



Figure 7.4: Wordcloud of journalists' beats.

Note. Visualization of open answers to the question "What subject areas do you generally cover? Please name up to five topics that you most frequently work on". Size of words reflects their relative frequency.

Following the procedure of *WJS* (Josephi et al., 2019, p. 71), these open answers were then recoded into soft news⁴⁹, hard news⁵⁰, and a mixed category.⁵¹ Accordingly, half of the respondents worked in so-called soft beats (50.5%), and another third worked across both soft and hard beats and could be considered generalists or mixed beat reporters. Only

and journalists who selected broadcast as well as text-based (print or digital) media types were collapsed to across media types.

⁴⁹ Including society, religion, education, science and technology, environment, health, culture, entertainment, lifestyle, and sports.

⁵⁰ Including politics, current affairs, economy, crime, and law.

⁵¹ While there is much debate what constitutes 'hard' and 'soft' news, and compiling beats as either hard or soft reduces the complexity and ignores different reporting styles and genres (cf. Reinemann et al., 2011), for better comparability with larger survey studies like the *WJS*, I followed this coding-process.

16.2% had specialized in hard beat topics such as politics and economics. Interestingly, freelancers appear to mix what is considered hard beat expertise with soft beat reporting, as this quote from a French respondent exemplifies: “Overwhelmingly economy, culture from time to time”. However, some respondents (6.7%) had only one area of expertise they reported on, and here they mentioned culture and sports most often.

There existed a significant correlation between beats and gender, $\chi^2(2, N = 417) = 12.101, p = .002$. While both men and women journalists reported primarily on soft beats, men reported much more often on hard beats in relation to the other two categories than women (see also Table 10.25). Among women journalists, almost 6 out of ten focused on soft beat topics. Moreover, while those reporting on mixed beats were on average a bit younger ($M = 44.95, SD = 14.50$) than those reporting on hard ($M = 48.44, SD = 13$) or soft news ($M = 46.88, SD = 13.88$), there are no significant differences along age, $F(2, 409) = 1.555, p = .212$. There was also no significant difference in specialization when comparing those with tertiary education and those without (see Table 7.20). Remarkably though, there was a significant relationship between specific journalism training and mixed beat or generalist reporting. Among those with a specialist journalism education, 39.5% reported on mixed beats and only 11.9% on hard beats. This could be rooted in the fact that they specialized in journalism and could thus work on any topic.

Table 7.20: *Beat across education and journalistic specialization*

	Beat			$\chi^2(2)$
	Hard	Soft	Mixed	
University degree (N = 369)	16%	50.7%	33.3%	.049
No university degree (N = 55)	16.4%	49.1%	34.5%	
Journalistic specialization (N = 172)	11.6%	48.6%	39.5%	7.199*
No journalistic specialization (N = 254)	19.3%	51.6%	29.1%	

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

The general distribution of beats was also mirrored across the different countries, however, with different weight. While in all countries, the majority reported on soft topics, followed by generalist/mixed categories and then hard beats, the distribution differed (see also Table 10.26). In France, for example, 62% worked in soft beats, 24.1% on mixed topics and 13.9% on hard beats, while in Denmark, 44% worked on soft beats,

closely followed by mixed beats (41.3%) and 14.7% worked on hard beats. The UK respondents showed the highest number of hard beat reporting (29.1%) and the lowest of soft beat reporting (43%). These differences in distribution were significant $\chi^2(8, N = 426) = 19.136, p = .014$.

Regarding manifested journalistic capital, 27% of the respondents had won an award for their work in the past, and of these, 56% had received only one award. Gender and age shaped this distribution of manifested journalistic capital, as did being connected to the journalistic field through experience in a newsroom. Accordingly, more men had received public recognition for their work, 31.3% of men respondents had won an award and only 22.2% of women respondents, $\chi^2(1, N = 416) = 4.274, p = .039$. Unsurprisingly, those who had received an award were also significantly older ($M = 50.11, SD = 14.09$) than those who did not win one ($M = 44.99, SD = 13.72$), $t(194,937) = 3.297, p = .001$. Moreover, 86.1% of awardees had experience in newsrooms either through employment or internships, $\chi^2(1, N = 422) = 4.893, p = .027$. This emphasizes the importance of social connection through newsrooms for this form of social and symbolic recognition.

Table 7.21: *Awards by country*

	One or more awards (N=115)	No award (N=308)
Austria	28%	72%
Denmark	26.7%	73.3%
France	15%	85%
Netherlands	25.3%	74.7%
UK	41.6%	58.4%

There were also differences when we look at the number of awards received across countries, $\chi^2(4, N = 423) = 14.248, p = .007$. In Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, around a fourth of respondents had received an award (see Table 7.21). In contrast, only 15 per cent had been awarded in France, and in the UK, four out of ten had won a prize for their journalistic work. This finding could indicate that award cultures differ significantly in the different media systems, which might have implications for research conceptualizing journalistic capital through awards (see also chapter nine, p. 249).

Social capital

When it comes to the social capital atypical journalists have within the journalistic field, most respondents were primarily connected to newsroom editors and other freelance journalists (see Table 7.22). Similarly, they primarily received feedback from editors-in-chief and less so from their peers.

Table 7.22: *Contact to newsrooms and feedback*

	Daily to often	Sometimes	Rarely to never
I communicate with newsroom editors via email or phone.	69.9%	20.3%	9.8%
I talk to newsroom editors in person.	28.3%	35.4%	36.3%
I talk to other employed journalists in person.	25.6%	32.3%	42.1%
I talk to other freelance journalists.	40.9%	34.2%	24.9%
I receive feedback from other journalists.	17.3%	40.0%	42.7%
I receive feedback from editors-in-chief.	29.0%	34.2%	36.8%

Note. Frequencies to the questions “When you think about your average daily work in the past six months, how often does the following happen?” and “When you think about feedback on your work, how often does the following apply to your journalistic work?”, measured from 1 = never to 5 = daily. For this table, categories 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 were collapsed to one each. $N = 407\text{--}424$.

Two compound indices were formed to compare whether gender, age or country shaped this social capital; one measuring how regularly respondents communicated with employed journalists and one measuring how regularly they received feedback from their peers. Accordingly, regular contact contained ICT-mediated communication with newsroom editors and personal contact with newsroom editors and employed journalists; regular feedback included feedback from other journalists and editors-in-chief. Results show that women journalists had much less contact to members of a newsroom ($M = 3.03$, $SD = .80$) than men ($M = 3.19$, $SD = .78$), Welch’s $t(379.26) = -2.071$, $p = .039$. However, when receiving feedback from the journalistic field, there were no significant differences between the groups, $t(403) = .945$, $p = .345$. Older journalists appeared to have slightly less contact with newsrooms, Spearman’s $\rho = -.137$, $p = .007$, and also received slightly less feedback from journalists and editors-in-chief, Spearman’s $\rho = -.117$, $p = .019$. Moreover, as the next chapter will illustrate, many, especially older, respondents had chosen atypical work deliberately to minimize contact with journalists in newsrooms. As such, minimal contact with newsrooms might not necessarily translate into isolation from the professional community.

Still, the most apparent differences occurred across countries (see Table 7.23). Accordingly, Danish respondents had significantly less contact with newsrooms than journalists from other countries, and Dutch journalists were most regularly in contact with journalists or editors-in-chief, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 28.136, p < .001$. Post hoc tests indicated that Danish journalists differed in this regard most from French and Dutch respondents, while Dutch respondents appeared also to have significantly more contact to newsrooms than those from Austria (see also Table 10.27).

Table 7.23: *Regular contact and regular feedback across countries*

	Regular contact			Regular feedback		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Austria	88	3.01	0.77	95	2.67	0.71
Denmark	76	2.78	0.76	75	2.45	0.65
France	75	3.32	0.80	78	2.83	0.63
Netherlands	88	3.36	0.76	90	2.89	0.69
UK	72	3.04	0.76	76	2.7	0.71
Total	399	3.11	0.80	414	2.71	0.69

Note. Means and standard deviation of compound indices measuring journalists' regular contact and regular feedback on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = low and 5 = high.

Likewise, Danish respondents received feedback significantly less often than Dutch or French journalists, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 20.042, p < .001$. Again, post hoc tests showed that Danish differed significantly from French and Dutch journalists (see also Table 10.28).

However, research indicates that social capital in the form of contact is necessary for atypical journalists (S. Baines, 1999; Hummel et al., 2012) and that it makes a difference if that contact is primarily ICT-mediated (Gollmitzer, 2014; Mathisen, 2019; Summ, 2013). Thus, two groups were formed to assess whether respondents' contact was chiefly mediated through emails or personal contact (see chapter six, p. 179). For more than half of the respondents (55%), contact with newsrooms and other employed journalists was primarily ICT-mediated. There were no differences between women and men journalists, $\chi^2(1, N = 418) = .082, p = .775$. However, respondents with regular personal contact to newsrooms were on average younger ($M = 44.53, SD = 13.72$) than those who were primarily in contact via email or phone ($M = 47.89, SD = 14.04$), Welch's $t(395.10) = -2.448, p = .015$. This could be explained by the fact that contract workers and those who regularly work in the newsroom were also younger.

Moreover, contrary to what we would assume based on the degree of digitization of the countries, significantly more Dutch journalists had personal contact to newsrooms

(62%), followed by French (59%) journalists. While in Austria (39.6%) and the UK (34.6%) fewer journalists had personal contact, in Denmark 74% were primarily connected with newsrooms and other journalists via ICTs, $\chi^2(4, N = 426) = 32.718, p < .001$.

Chapter summary

As outlined in chapter five (p. 128), the forms of capitals allow us to visualize and understand the stratification of the journalistic field. Findings reiterate what has been asserted by previous studies, atypical journalists largely earn little (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Hayes & Silke, 2018), are well-educated (Buckow, 2011; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009) but have only moderate levels of journalistic capital (J. Jenkins, 2017; Mathisen, 2017; Van Leuven et al., 2021), and relatively little social capital with the professional community (Buckow, 2011; Frisque, 2014; Gollmitzer, 2014; Summ, 2013).

When we consider the different forms of capital more closely, the field is characterized by a division between a few earning a lot and many earning very little with their journalistic work. Men and older journalists are among the “high-earning stars” (Lee-Wright, 2012, p. 21). While economic capital is shaped by journalists’ working hours, other factors play into it as well. One of ten still earned the minimum income of annually EUR 8.000 after taxes despite working more than 20 hours per week. Findings reiterate that atypical journalists are not remunerated for the time they spend on a story; spending more hours sourcing, conducting interviews, and writing affects their income negatively (Hayes & Silke, 2018; Rosenkranz, 2019; Salamon, 2019). What compounds this even further is that being well-educated does not contribute to financial security. While atypical journalists in this study have relatively high amounts of embodied and institutionalized cultural capital, both through their parents’ education and occupation as well as their own studies, this background does not appear to be an advantage. Quite to the contrary, older men journalists who are often not as well-educated and have parents with lower cultural capital earn more.

Still, while especially younger and women journalists could be considered working under precarious conditions, it is also true that they come primarily from a middle to upper-middle-class upbringing. This finding supports arguments made in previous studies that (atypical) journalism is an occupation that only those with enough

cultural and economic capital in the background can afford (Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Gollmitzer, 2014; Pereira, 2020). Moreover, even then, only very few can sustain their living only through their work in journalism. Fourteen per cent receive financial support from family or governmental institutions, and almost two-thirds pursue other work, primarily in other communication areas, to compensate for the low and fluctuating income from journalism. However, while many are dependent on these other sources of income, respondents also enjoy working in other areas. This is reminiscent of other studies' findings (Fröhlich et al., 2013) and speaks to the general observations that journalists seek variety (Hanusch et al., 2014).

Regarding respondents' journalistic capital, while they have high amounts of institutionalized capital like specialist education, they lack other indicators of journalistic capital. The majority work in soft news beats, and for magazines and weeklies, only 16% worked exclusively on hard beat topics which are often associated with more prestige (Schultz, 2007; Van Leuven et al., 2021). Likewise, only a few had received public renown for their work. Only a third had won an award, the materialized indicator for journalistic capital. Again, women and younger journalists appear to have lower amounts of journalistic capital, as they more often work on soft beat news and produce for online-only media. On the other hand, men and older journalists report more often on hard beat news and have won most often public recognition for their work.

Atypical journalists in this study are primarily connected with editors-in-chief and other atypical journalists. Men and younger journalists have higher amounts of social capital through their regular contact with newsrooms. This might be rooted a) in the fact that younger respondents also worked more often within newsrooms as they are more often contract workers (Antunovic et al., 2019; Meyen & Springer, 2009) and b) men maintaining relations to newsrooms more frequently. As results in chapter eight (p. 217) illustrate, it could also be that women are satisfied with the little contact with newsrooms. This would speak to other findings that women leave employed news work due to the toxic newsroom culture (Antunovic et al., 2019; Elmore, 2009; Örnebring & Möller, 2018). Moreover, they seldomly receive feedback from other journalists, indicating that they are not embedded within the professional community.

Regarding their digital capital, unsurprisingly, younger respondents are more likely to embrace digital platforms for sourcing and distributing their work. Their answers also indicate a cautious use of information found on platforms for sourcing, reiterating general findings that journalists tend to ascribe more authority to other journalists instead

of more ‘ordinary’ experts and citizens (Carlson, 2017; Örnebring, 2013). Moreover, journalists’ use of digital platforms was not particularly sophisticated, and most use Twitter and Facebook to share their work. Likewise, journalists do not think social media helps their productivity. Younger journalists believe that social media aids them in branding themselves, suggesting that they have internalized the discourses surrounding entrepreneurialism and digital media work (Duffy, 2017). These findings also align with previous research, asserting that younger freelancers adapt and employ digital tools more effortlessly while older freelancers must invest more time (Hayes & Silke, 2018).

Compared across countries, there is variation in the overall composition of accumulated capitals visible as well. Summarising the key findings, Austrian atypical journalists were the most precarious in terms of income, while British atypical journalists are much more likely to earn well. French and Danish atypical journalists have the highest amounts of embodied and institutionalized cultural capital, while British freelancers tend to have no tertiary degree and no specialist journalistic education. Likewise, French journalists had most journalistic capital in having been employed and completed an internship in newsrooms. Still, only a few French journalists have won an award, while British journalists have received this public renown the most. When it comes to their use of technology, we find the most striking contrasts between journalists from Denmark on the one hand and journalists from the UK and the Netherlands on the other. Danish journalists neither use digital media for sourcing nor distributing purposes and do not perceive social media as important to brand themselves. In contrast, Dutch journalists often use digital platforms to source their stories (they also work most often for online-only news media), and British journalists often share their work on digital platforms. Likewise, both British and Dutch journalists believe social media to be an important tool for branding. These findings suggest that journalistic culture also shapes how journalists use new technologies. As such, Danish journalistic culture might be more critical of digital platforms and social media in general, while Dutch and British journalists have already internalized the tacit rule to self-brand.

Cross-national differences will be explored more in chapter nine; the next chapter, chapter eight, will present and discuss the results to research questions 1 and 2, how economic and technological transformations impact journalists’ *illusio*, *doxa* and *habitus*.

Chapter 8: Technological and Economic Influences on atypical journalists' work

At the heart of this project lies the question of how technological and economic forces shape atypical journalists' professional culture. Therefore, this chapter will present and discuss results pertaining to the research questions posed in chapter five (p. 147). First, I will address general findings regarding journalists' *illusio*, *doxa* and *habitus*, followed by results on how these are shaped or affected by ICT-mediated work and economic constraints.

Atypical journalists' *illusio*

As outlined in chapter two (p. 58), the concept of *illusio* relates to the journalistic mission and the personal and idealistic motivations to participate in the field. As such, it concerns journalists' choice, autonomy, and perception of influences.

Choice

One argument often raised in the literature claims that increasingly more journalists have no other choice than to work in atypical employment arrangements (see also chapter four, p. 124). To assess respondents' degree of choice, they were asked to check all reasons for atypical work that applied to them out of a list of four. One of these reasons measured an intrinsic motivation, three measured external motivations (see chapter six, p. 179). Moreover, respondents could give more reasons in an open answer. This option offered a glimpse into the multi-faceted motives for self-employment, including personal health reasons and caring for sick family members or animals, as well as wanting to escape a toxic work environment.

The majority (64.2%) quoted the freedom and flexibility to work on the topics they enjoyed as a reason for their atypical employment (intrinsic motivation). Some also chose extrinsic motivations, for example, that freelancing offered them a way into journalism by building a portfolio (20.5%) and allowed them to take care of their family while working in journalism (18.6%). Slightly more than one in ten said they were laid off and other employment was not possible anymore, which is why they stayed in freelancing (extrinsic motivation). This bleak perception was reiterated by 7.2% who

stated in open answers that there were no jobs and other opportunities for them. Another dominant option appeared among the open answers: more than one in ten (11.2%) said they wanted to be their own boss. Some respondents, especially from the UK, resigned and could not find new employment: “I got stressed at a previous workplace and had to stop before I had anything fixed”, wrote one respondent. While such explanations sound bad, it is not always as terrible as the following statements show. Wrote one respondent, “My features editor job had become too admin-heavy and I wanted to write again. I couldn’t find another employee job in my field that I wanted to apply for and had been looking for some time”. Another said, “Initially as a way to earn money quickly after quitting a job abroad and returning to the UK, but maintained it as a way to be able to travel abroad regularly.” For some, it was also a pure coincidence, as an Austrian respondent wrote “Plan D and stuck with it”. Only five respondents claimed earning more as freelancers as reasons.

Women said more often that they chose their current work context because it gave them freedom and flexibility to work on topics they enjoy (see also Table 10.29), $\chi^2(1, N = 421) = 5.774, p = .019$. On the other hand, men said more often that they were laid off and could not find other employment, $\chi^2(4, N = 421) = 5.736, p = .023$. When looking at age, unsurprisingly, younger respondents took to freelancing as an opportunity to enter journalism (see also Table 10.30), Welch’s $t(125.46) = 6.271, p < .000$. Moreover, older respondents tended to enter atypical journalism more often after job loss, Welch’s $t(63.98) = -3.425, p = .001$. Interestingly, respondents who chose atypical work for its freedom and flexibility were significantly younger, Welch’s $t(300.37) = 2.251, p = .025$. Generally, this distribution of choices could also be found across countries (see Table 10.31); however, there was no correlation between the different options and country⁵².

From the original four options in the survey and open answers, a binary variable to assess the degree of choice was computed (see chapter six, p. 179). According to this, the majority (58.9%) voiced having little intrinsic choice in their decision to do freelance work. There were, however, no differences across gender, age, and country apparent.⁵³

⁵² Correlation between variables and variable country (no expected frequencies were below 5): “It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy”, $\chi^2(4) = 6.770, p = .149, n = 430$. “I tried to enter journalism and build a portfolio with my freelance work”, $\chi^2(4) = 3.092, p = .543, n = 430$. “I was laid off and other employment was not possible.”, $\chi^2(4) = 3.696, p = .449, n = 430$. “It allowed me to take care of my family and work in journalism”, $\chi^2(4) = 3.419, p = .490, n = 430$. “I wanted to be my own boss”, $\chi^2(4) = 4.428, p = .351, n = 430$.

⁵³ Statistical test for gender: $\chi^2(1, N = 412) = .667, p = .414$; for age: Mann-Whitney-U test $z = .158, p = .875$. For country: $\chi^2(4, N = 421) = 6.405, p = .177$

Relating to this, respondents were generally satisfied with their working situation. On a scale from zero to ten, where zero equalled dissatisfaction and ten high satisfaction, half of the respondents chose eight and higher ($M = 6.99$, $SD = 2.18$). Regarding aspects of their work that contribute to job satisfaction, they were most satisfied with factors that generally motivate journalists to pursue this occupation (Hanusch et al., 2014): their daily workload, the topics they work on and the variety of journalistic work (see Table 8.1). In contrast and unsurprisingly, they were least satisfied with the financial and vocational security, the career opportunities, and their income from journalistic work. This also indicates that journalists *perceived* their situation to be precarious, i.e., they have a subjective feeling of precarity, which might be more or less reflected in their objective precarity of economic capital (see chapter seven, p. 185).

Table 8.1: *Journalists' job satisfaction*

	N	Satisfied*	Mean	SD
The freedom to plan my own work schedule.	430	87.9%	4.34	0.84
The topics I work on.	426	85.4%	4.25	0.81
The variety of journalistic work.	423	77.8%	4.06	0.96
My daily workload.	418	64.8%	3.66	1.03
The time for research and investigation.	428	59.1%	3.59	1.05
The relationships I have with other journalists.	427	49.6%	3.44	1.03
The separation between professional and private life.	429	41.5%	3.17	1.12
The amount of contact with other journalists.	426	41.1%	3.28	1.02
The appreciation for my work by the journalistic community.	422	38.4%	3.22	1.01
My depth of contact with commissioning newsrooms.	421	38.2%	3.1	1.04
The quality of feedback I receive from my audience.	422	34.1%	3.18	0.97
The opportunity to discuss work in progress with other journalists.	423	32.4%	3.05	1.03
My income from journalistic work.	425	29.4%	2.6	1.26
The career opportunities in journalism.	424	20.5%	2.57	1.13
The vocational security.	427	18.3%	2.37	1.14
The financial security.	427	15%	2.19	1.13

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviations to items from the question "To what extent are you satisfied with the following?", measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *not satisfied at all* and 5 = *very satisfied*. *Combined frequencies for answers 4 and 5.

Based on the items listed in Table 8.1, three composite indices were formed (see chapter six, p. 175), capturing three facets of job satisfaction: The satisfaction with the contact

with the professional community⁵⁴, with the content of work⁵⁵, and with the overall job security and workload⁵⁶. Journalists scored highest on the index of satisfaction with the content of their work ($M = 4.07$; $SD = .69$) and lowest on the security and work-life balance the job brings about ($M = 2.79$, $SD = .74$, see Table **10.32** in appendix). Moreover, they were relatively satisfied with their contact with the professional community. Unsurprisingly, journalists who chose atypical work voluntarily were significantly more satisfied with the different aspects of their job, even the satisfaction with job security and workload (see Table **10.33** in appendix).

Perceptions of autonomy and perceived influences

Journalists reported high satisfaction with their ability to choose the topics they work on, and similarly, they reported great freedom in selecting stories and choosing the focus of a story. More generally, regarding their success in pitching topics to newsrooms, more than half said they always or often got their ideas covered in the news stories they produced. Only 7.2% said they rarely managed to do so, and 6.1% claimed they did not make such offers, possibly respondents who primarily worked as free contract workers. Moreover, Table **8.2** illustrates that almost seven of ten said they had complete or a great deal of freedom in selecting stories. Only 8.1% said they had little freedom, and less than one per cent believed they had no freedom at all. Similarly, almost 80% said they had complete or a great deal of freedom in putting focus in a story.

Table 8.2: *Freedom in story selection and story angle*

	Complete to a great deal of freedom	Some freedom	Little to no freedom
Freedom in selecting stories	70%	20.9%	9%
Freedom in putting focus in stories	78.7%	19.1%	2.1%

Note. $N = 429-430$

⁵⁴ Containing the items *relationships with other journalists*, *amount of contact with other journalists*, *opportunity to discuss work in progress with other journalists*, and *appreciation of work by the journalistic community*.

⁵⁵ Containing the items *topics I work on*, *variety of journalistic work*, *time for research and investigation*, and *freedom to plan my own work schedule*.

⁵⁶ Containing the items *financial security*, *vocational security*, *income from journalistic work*, *career opportunities in journalism*, *separation between professional and private life*, *depth of contact with commissioning newsrooms*, and *daily workload*.

Journalists who intrinsically chose freelance journalism differed significantly in their perception of freedom and autonomy from involuntary atypical journalists. High-choice respondents, on average, evaluated their autonomy higher as they reported they *often* got their ideas covered, *often* had the freedom to select stories and put focus in them (see Table 10.34). Compared to the WJS Austrian and French atypical journalists reported similar levels of editorial freedom to all journalists (Hamada et al., 2019). However, Danish, Dutch, and British atypical journalists reported less freedom in choosing the topics they report on and emphasizing a specific angle (see also Table 10.35). Accordingly, Austrian atypical journalists reported the highest perceived editorial freedom.

When it comes to perceived influences, respondents claimed that conventions and ethics were most influential for their work, followed by their personal interests and deadlines (see Table 8.3). Only 57.4% believed their editorial supervisors or commissioning editors were influential for their work, indicating another layer of perceived autonomy.

Table 8.3: *Perceived influences on their journalistic work*

	N	Influential*	Mean	SD
Conventions and ethics of the profession	425	76.7%	4.01	0.98
My personal interests	424	74.8%	3.99	1.00
Deadlines	428	65.9%	3.79	1.10
My editorial supervisors, higher editors and commissioning editors	427	57.4%	3.5	1.03
Media laws and regulation	423	49.4%	3.46	1.16
Relationships with sources	428	49.3%	3.34	1.00
My own financial resources	425	36.0%	2.93	1.24
My friends, acquaintances and family	426	28.4%	2.81	1.09
Social media	425	27.8%	2.82	1.08
Other journalists	427	26.2%	2.85	0.97
Feedback from the audience	425	19.3%	2.55	1.07
Audience research and data, e.g., web analytics/metrics	421	16.9%	2.19	1.20
Public relations	426	12.7%	2.14	1.08
Advertising considerations	427	4.9%	1.66	0.90
Free products and services	426	1.6%	1.38	0.71

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviations to items from the question “Here is a list of potential sources of influence. Please tell me how much influence each of the following has on your work.”, measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *not at all influential* and 5 = *extremely influential*. *Combined frequencies for answers 4 and 5.

Moreover, they claimed that indicators of commercial influence were least important for their work: audience research and data, public relations, advertising considerations and free products and services.

On the aggregate level, we found that procedural influences⁵⁷ were rated the highest ($M = 3.76$, $SD = .81$), followed by relationship influences⁵⁸ ($M = 3.11$, $SD = .63$) and commercial influences⁵⁹ ($M = 1.84$, $SD = .69$). Women and men perceived these influences similarly important, except for procedural influences, which women perceived slightly more strongly, Welch's $t(410.96) = 2.263$, $p = .024$ (see also Table 10.36). There were no correlations between influences and age.⁶⁰ We found differences in the distribution of personal networks and procedural influences on the country level. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that the distribution of personal networks influences was different across countries (H -test $\chi^2(4) = 25.303$, $p < .000$). However, post hoc tests could not find significant differences (see also Table 10.37).




Figure 8.1: Density plots of perceived influences across countries

Note. Density plots illustrate indices measuring perceived personal networks, commercial, and procedural influence on journalists' work, where 1 = low agreement and 5 = high agreement.

⁵⁷ Containing the items *conventions and ethics of the profession, media laws and regulation, and deadlines*.

⁵⁸ Containing the items *friends, acquaintances and family, personal interests, other journalists, relationships with sources, and feedback from the audience*.

⁵⁹ Containing the items *advertising considerations, public relations, free products and services, and audience research and data, e.g. web analytics/metrics*.

⁶⁰ Correlation between age and procedural influences: Pearson's $r = -.039$, $p = .436$; between age and commercial influences: Pearson's $r = .015$, $p = .763$; between age and procedural influences: Pearson's $r = -.076$, $p = .129$.

Likewise, while the density plot in Figure 8.1 would suggest otherwise, there were no significant differences in the distribution of commercial influences across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 8.918, p = .063$. Only procedural influences appeared to be differently distributed across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 25.303, p < .000$. Post hoc tests showed that Danish respondents perceived procedural influences significantly less important than French and British journalists (see also Table 10.38).

Compared to results from the *WJS*, strikingly, atypical journalists perceived personal networks or relationship influences as much more influential on their work than all journalists surveyed by Hanitzsch and colleagues (2019). Moreover, commercial forces were much less influential for freelancers. As Table 10.39 in the appendix illustrates, while Austrian, Danish, French, Dutch and even British journalists surveyed by *WJS* on average did not report high commercial influences (means were between 2.17 and 2.72), atypical journalists claimed to be even less affected by commercial influences in their work (means between 1.68 and 1.93). However, procedural influences were assessed as more essential among freelancers than all journalists.

Technological and economic influences on journalists' illu

This brings us to questions about how technological and economic forces affect journalists' illu. Based on existing research, we assume that atypical journalists with weak ties to newsrooms feel at the mercy of editor-in-chiefs' decisions and thus perceive their autonomy over their work as frail (Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019). Therefore, to answer **RQ1c**, *to what extent ICT-mediated work and the degree of embeddedness within a newsroom shape whether atypical journalists experience autonomy and control over their work*, one composite indicator of journalists' perceived editorial autonomy was submitted to multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis with ICT-mediated work, regular contact, and regular feedback, and in a second step, country as predictor variables. For this, journalists' perceived freedom in story and angle selection were combined to form one composite index of their perceived editorial autonomy. ICT-mediated work, regular contact, and regular feedback were dummy coded (see chapter six, p. 179). Table 8.4 illustrates that ICT-mediated work and being embedded within newsrooms (through regular feedback and contact) did not predict journalists' perceived freedom in story and angle selection, $F(3, 419) = .403, p = .751$. Comparing the model across countries explained more of the variance, $F(7, 415) = 2.903, p = .006$. Accordingly, Danish, French,

and British journalists articulated significantly less autonomy when selecting a story and choosing an angle (18-20% of the variance explained).

Table 8.4: *MLR predicting journalists' perceived freedom in story and angle selection*

	Freedom in story and angle selection	
	Model 1	Model 2
ICT-mediated work	.045	.056
Regular contact	.013	.015
Regular feedback	.037	.033
Denmark		-.185**
France		-.184**
Netherlands		-.082
UK		-.202**
Variance explained (R^2)	-.004	.031
Change in R^2		.044**

Note. MLR models of ICT-mediated work, regular contact and feedback on journalists' perceived creative autonomy. *Freedom in story and angle selection* is a composite index measured from 1 to 5, where 1 = *no freedom at all* and 5 = *complete freedom*. ICT-mediated work, regular contact, and regular feedback were dummy coded, as was country, with Austria as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset. Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Moreover, journalists' satisfaction with their creative autonomy is also shaped by economic constraints and the degree to which they chose atypical employment voluntarily (Antunovic et al., 2019; Corsani, 2012; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019).

Thus, to answer **RQ2c**, *how atypical journalists perceive economic constraints to affect their illutio*, we examined this assumption with an MLR analysis of journalists'

satisfaction with the content of their work as the outcome variable, and choice to freelance and dependency on other sources of income⁶¹ as dummy predictor variables.

Choice and dependency on other income both significantly predicted journalists' satisfaction with the content of their work, $F(2, 404) = 10.183$, $p < .000$. As such, respondents who had chosen atypical work *only* because it offered them freedom and flexibility were more satisfied with the topics they worked on, the variety of the journalistic work, the time they had for research and investigation and the freedom to plan their work schedule (see Table 8.5). Likewise, journalists who depended on other forms of income were, on average, significantly less satisfied with their creative autonomy. If we add in the country level, the prediction remained significant, $F(6, 400) = 5.557$, $p < .000$. Compared across countries and controlling for journalists' choice and other sources

⁶¹ Through other work, familial support, or financial aid from governmental institutions.

of income, Danish journalists were significantly less satisfied with their creative autonomy.

Table 8.5: *MLR predicting journalists' satisfaction with the content of their work*

	Satisfaction with content of work	
	Model 1	Model 2
High intrinsic choice	.176***	.162**
Dependency on other income	-.103*	-.106*
Denmark		-.204***
France		-.111
Netherlands		-.096
UK		-.096
Variance explained (R^2)	.043	.063
Change in R^2		.029*

Note. MLR models of choice and preference for stable employment on journalists' satisfaction with their job security and workload. *Satisfaction* is a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = *very dissatisfied* and 5 = *very satisfied*. Predictors *high intrinsic choice* and *dependency on other income* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset. Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Summarizing the results for RQ1c and RQ2c, ICT-mediated work does not shape journalists' illusion in the form of their perceived creative autonomy. However, depending on other sources of income like familial support, government aid, or other work affects journalists' satisfaction with their creative autonomy. At the same time, when journalists choose atypical work voluntarily, they are more satisfied with the content of their work. This reiterates findings from previous studies which show that the "feast or famine life" (Antunovic et al., 2019) of atypical journalistic work can be anxiety-inducing and minimize perceptions of autonomy and freedom (Corsani, 2012). Moreover, this relates to the illusion of freedom and creative autonomy (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019): As income can be discontinued at any time, freelance journalists must always be available unless they have the economic capital and thus privilege to endure such periods of no work.

Atypical journalists' doxa

As outlined in chapter two (p. 55), doxa refers to the taken-for-granted truths and a "set of professional beliefs which tend to appear as evident, natural and self-explaining norms of journalistic practice" (Schultz, 2007, p. 194). Accordingly, I have conceptualized doxa as journalists' professional norms concerning their practice and the normative perceptions of their role in society. The first dimension relates to objectivity and transparency norms, the

normative separation between journalism and other communication work, and ethical editorial decision-making, the second to journalists' role perceptions.

Doxa as professional norms

Concerning journalists' ethical norms, respondents agreed primarily with professional norms of objectivity and transparency. Almost 90% agree they wrote stories around verifiable facts, and 77.5% claim it was important to tell their audience where their facts originated (Table 8.6).

Table 8.6: *Frequencies of journalists' ethics*

	N	Agreement*	Mean	SD
I write stories around verifiable facts.	425	89.9%	4.44	0.74
I select my clients carefully and never accept assignments from organizations with questionable objectives.	426	87.8%	4.35	0.86
Telling everyone where my facts originated is important to me.	426	77.5%	4.11	0.98
As long as I don't willfully suppress relevant information, I will write truthful stories.	414	67.4%	3.88	1.11
When I engage in other communication work (...), it does not compromise the quality of my journalistic work.	426	65%	3.74	1.26
My credibility is vital, therefore I do not accept changes made (...) that go beyond the scope of the story.	424	63.2%	3.76	1.04
I show anyone that I include all concerned parties in my news stories.	422	60.4%	3.72	1.01
I prefer to withdraw stories rather than publish them if the commissioning editor changes them too much.	426	50.7%	3.49	1.15
The way I write stories should not nudge readers to take a particular side.	420	41.9%	3.2	1.27
It is not acceptable to cause readers to feel one way or another.	416	25.7%	2.83	1.21
I include user-generated information in my work.	419	22.4%	2.81	1.06
I don't oppose changes made by my commissioning editor, because I fear I will lose a client.	424	20.3%	2.47	1.09
I would never engage in other communication work, such as corporate publishing or PR.	426	17.6%	2.21	1.29
Ethical breaches will happen anyway, opposing critical changes (...) will not make a difference.	421	6.4%	1.88	1.02

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviations to items from the question "Here is another list of things that could be important for your daily journalistic work. How much do you agree with these statements?", measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. *Combined frequencies for answers 4 and 5.

Even less agreed that journalism should not cause audiences to feel a particular way (25.7%). Likewise, journalists claimed to make conscious efforts about whom they

wanted to work for; 87.8% said they selected their commissioning newsrooms carefully. Moreover, roughly two-thirds said they would not accept too broad changes made to their stories as their credibility was vital for them. Generally, respondents agreed least with statements of ethical decision-making during the editing process. While half said, they would withdraw a story if their commissioning editor changed it too much, only 20.3% would not oppose changes made to their work out of fear to lose a client. Still, 6.4% believed that ethical breaches happened regardless, and therefore opposing commissioning editors would not make a difference. Regarding the boundary between journalism and communication work, only 17.6% claimed they would never engage in communication work. The majority (65%) believe that their PR or corporate publishing work would not compromise their journalistic work.

On the level of aggregate indices, we found that journalists agreed mostly to ethical editorial decision-making⁶² ($M = 3.85$, $SD = .72$), followed by objectivity norms⁶³ ($M = 3.67$, $SD = .67$). Regarding other communication work, they were, however, less critical. The majority disagreed that it is important that they strictly separate themselves from PR and other communication work ($M = 2.23$, $SD = 1.14$).⁶⁴ There were no differences across gender apparent (see also Table 10.40). Younger respondents agreed more strongly that editorial ethics were important for their work, Pearson's $r = -.206$, $p < .000$. Likewise, although it was a weak correlation, older respondents did not believe it was necessary to avoid communication work, Pearson's $r = .109$, $p < .027$. Otherwise, age did not correlate with the professional norms of objectivity and transparency.

On the country level, differences were more significant. While journalists across the countries generally believed a strict separation of journalistic and communication work was unnecessary, the distribution within countries differed significantly, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 33.505$, $p < .000$. Figure 8.2 illustrates that French and Austrian journalists believed more strongly in such a separation than the other respondents (see also Table 10.41). Moreover, professional norms of objectivity and transparency were rated high in

⁶² Containing the items *prefer to withdraw stories if changed too much*, *do not accept changes that go beyond the scope of the story*, *careful selection of clients*, *ethical breaches happen regardless of my opposition*, and *no opposition to changes for fear of losing a client*.

⁶³ Containing the items *it is not acceptable to cause readers to feel one way or another*, *the way I write stories should not nudge readers to take a particular side*, *I show anyone that I include all concerned parties in my news stories*, *telling everyone where my facts originated is important to me*, and *I write stories around verifiable facts*.

⁶⁴ Compound index containing the items *communication work does not compromise the quality of my journalistic work*, and *I would never engage in other communication work*.

all countries, particularly in Austria, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 56.264$, $p < .000$. Post hoc tests revealed Austrian journalists differed significantly from Danish, Dutch and British respondents in evaluating objectivity norms (see also Table 10.42). Lastly, the distribution of ethical editorial decision-making was not significantly different across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 7.992$, $p = .092$.




Figure 8.2: *Density plots of journalists' doxic professional norms across countries*

Note. Density plots for compound indices measuring three professional norms, where 1 = low agreement and 5 = high agreement.

Doxa as normative roles

Regarding journalists' beliefs of their role in society, almost all respondents said it was extremely to very important to report things as they are (Table 8.7). Moreover, 80.4% wanted to tell stories about the world, 75.8% aimed to provide analysis of current affairs in their work, and 67.8% aimed to be a detached observer. These findings are consistent with previous studies researching journalists' role conceptions with such item batteries and thus represent a strong journalistic doxa as "the professional principles of realism, analysis, inclusiveness, and detachment seem to be canonical around the world" (Hanitzsch et al., 2019, 173).

Unsurprisingly, roles that aim to be collaborative and supportive of the government were perceived least important. However, remarkably, atypical journalists tended to refrain from monitorial and accommodative role items. Only around half believed it is important to provide political information (52.9%) and monitor and scrutinize businesses (51.3%) and politicians (45.5%). Only a third believed it is

important to motivate people to participate in political activity. These findings support arguments that atypical employment is less associated with watchdog journalism (Gollmitzer, 2014; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012). In part, it could also be explained by the fact that most respondents reported on topics other than politics (see chapter seven, p. 208).

Table 8.7: *Frequencies of journalists' doxic role conceptions*

	N	Extremely to very important*	Mean	SD
Report things as they are.	421	92.4%	4.43	0.70
Tell stories about the world.	423	80.4%	4.12	1.00
Provide analysis of current affairs.	425	75.8%	4.04	0.96
Be a detached observer.	423	67.8%	3.85	0.97
Promote tolerance and cultural diversity.	423	65.2%	3.85	1.19
Educate the audience.	420	62.9%	3.7	1.14
Provide information people need to make political decisions.	416	52.9%	3.32	1.36
Monitor and scrutinize business.	421	51.3%	3.34	1.30
Let people express their views.	415	49.2%	3.39	1.19
Monitor and scrutinize political leaders.	415	45.5%	3.19	1.36
Advocate for social change.	421	45.1%	3.24	1.23
Motivate people to participate in political activity.	413	36.3%	2.81	1.39
Influence public opinion.	419	33.4%	3.01	1.15
Provide advice, orientation and direction for daily life.	417	32.9%	2.85	1.24
Provide entertainment and relaxation.	419	26.5%	2.62	1.27
Set the political agenda.	416	19.0%	2.5	1.12
Provide the kind of news that attracts the largest audience.	418	17.5%	2.42	1.15
Be an adversary of the government.	413	16.5%	2.21	1.24
Convey a positive image of political leadership.	413	1.7%	1.44	0.76
Support government policy.	414	1.7%	1.37	0.70

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviations to items from the question "When you think about how you identify as a professional journalist, how important are the following aspects for you?", measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *extremely important* and 5 = *not important at all*. *Combined frequencies for answers 4 and 5.

Likewise, it appears that journalists did not view their audience as consumers. They did not perceive providing advice, orientation, and direction for daily life important (32.9%), nor did they aim to provide entertainment and relaxation (26.5%) and news that attracts the largest audience (17.5%). This finding might appear remarkable, as journalists reported primarily on soft news beats, which are associated more with such role perceptions (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018). However, it also reiterates findings throughout this study indicating that the audience was not particularly important for respondents (see

their perceived influence or their satisfaction with audience feedback). As such, this finding also supports assumptions that view the primary ‘audience’ of atypical journalists in their commissioning newsrooms as these are the ones that need to be satisfied (Accardo, 2007; Meyen & Springer, 2009).

Still, when we look at the composite indices of accommodative⁶⁵, monitorial⁶⁶, interventionist⁶⁷, and collaborative roles⁶⁸ we find that contrary to what previous research has argued (Buckow, 2011; Gollmitzer, 2014; Meyen & Riesmeyer, 2012), respondents firstly perceived a monitorial role as important ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.05$), followed by the interventionist role ($M = 2.91$, $SD = .96$), and accommodative role ($M = 2.61$, $SD = .96$). The collaborative role was mostly rejected ($M = 1.40$, $SD = .68$). There were no correlations between role perceptions and gender or age apparent⁶⁹.

At the country level, there were significant differences. As Figure 8.3 illustrates, the accommodative role was perceived as most important in Austria, while in France, respondents most disagreed with this role perception, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 37.941$, $p < .000$. Post hoc tests showed that Austrian respondents differed significantly from other countries (see also Table 10.43 in appendix). As such, again, it is striking that atypical journalists in all countries agreed less to an accommodative role. In contrast, the monitorial role found more acceptance in most countries except for France, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 16.639$, $p = .002$. Here, post hoc tests indicated that Austrian respondents differed significantly from other journalists as they embraced this role most strongly (see also Table 10.44 in appendix). The interventionist role found much support across countries but particularly in Austria, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 23.540$, $p < .000$. Post hoc tests showed that French respondents differed significantly from all other journalists as they perceived an interventionist role less important than Austrian, Danish, Dutch and British journalists (see also Table 10.45). Lastly, while the collaborative role was mostly rejected in all countries, the distribution still differed across countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 39.026$, $p < .000$.

⁶⁵ Containing the items *provide entertainment and relaxation, provide the kind of news that attracts the largest audience, and provide advice, orientation and direction for daily life*.

⁶⁶ Containing the items *monitor and scrutinize political leaders, monitor and scrutinize business, provide information people need to make political decisions, and motivate people to participate in political activity*.

⁶⁷ Containing the items *set the political agenda, influence public opinion, and advocate for social change*.

⁶⁸ Containing the items *convey a positive image of political leadership and support government policy*.

⁶⁹ Test statistics for gender: accommodative role: Welch's $t(388.73) = -1.588$, $p = .113$; monitorial role: Welch's $t(389.01) = 1.870$, $p = .062$; collaborative role: Welch's $t(366.30) = -1.061$, $p = .289$; interventionist role: Welch's $t(398.98) = -1.388$, $p = .166$. Test statistics for age: accommodative role: Pearson's $r = -.004$, $p = .929$; monitorial role: Pearson's $r = -.006$, $p = .908$; collaborative role: Pearson's $r = -.030$, $p = .551$; interventionist role: Pearson's $r = -.061$, $p = .219$.

In particular, Dutch and British respondents were less critical of it than Danish and French journalists (see also Table 10.46).




Figure 8.3: *Density plots of journalists' doxic role perceptions across countries*

Note. Density plots for indices measuring journalists' role perceptions, where 1 = low agreement and 5 = high agreement.

When comparing means of the composite indices to those from the *WJS* (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019), atypical journalists also perceived their role for society differently than all journalists in their respective countries (see also Table 10.47). While respondents in all countries thought a monitorial role was important, Danish and French respondents perceived it as less important than respondents surveyed for *WJS*. Moreover, as Table 10.47 illustrates, only the results from Denmark follow a similar pattern among atypical journalists and all journalists. In both cases, the monitorial role was followed by the interventionist, accommodative, and collaborative role. This could be interpreted as an

indicator of strong homogeneous doxa in the field, which is also transported through the homogeneity of Danish journalism education (Willig, 2016). Moreover, in all countries except Austria, atypical journalists perceived an interventionist role as more important than an accommodative role. This contrasts with the responses from the *WJS*, where Western European journalists were mainly accepting of accommodating the audiences' needs with their work. As such, this finding again reiterates that atypical journalists were less oriented towards the audience as consumers. Lastly, the collaborative role was rejected by atypical journalists, just like by respondents from *WJS*.

Technological and economic influences on journalists' doxa

Investigating the impact of technological and economic influences on journalists' doxa, we assumed that ICT-mediated work and work in other non-journalistic areas would affect their understanding of ethical norms and role perceptions.

More specifically, as outlined in chapter four (p. 119), research suggests that the degree to which atypical journalists are embedded within a professional community and the particular newsroom they are working for can affect their doxa. As such, ICT-mediated work can prevent a sense of belonging, which would be needed to negotiate difficult ethical decision-making (Accardo, 2007; Mathisen, 2019). While Deuze and Witschge (2017) argue that journalists have an intrinsic set of professional values, those with little socialization in a newsroom and little contact with the newsroom express anxiety of not being aware of the rules (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Summ, 2013; T. J. Thomson, 2018). Thus, to answer **RQ1a**, *how ICT-mediate work affects the socialization of atypical journalists through newsrooms and how it informs their understanding of their journalistic doxa*, different composite indices of doxa were submitted to MLR analysis which included variables measuring ICT-mediated work and two indicators of journalists' socialization, namely their experience in years and a dummy variable measuring whether had experience in newsrooms either through employment or an internship. In a second step, country variables were included to compare differences in doxa across countries while controlling for ICT-mediated work and socialization.

Likewise, research suggests that other communication work next to journalism could affect journalists' role perception (Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Moreover, being dependent on this other work to make ends meet can bring journalists in challenging situations, especially regarding their ethics (Buckow, 2011; Mathisen, 2019;

Rosenkranz, 2016). Thus, to answer **RQ2b**, *how additional work in non-journalistic areas affect journalists' doxa*, the same doxa indices were analyzed with MLR and whether respondents worked in PR and were dependent on that work as predictor variables.

First, looking at the results to **RQ1a**, ICT-mediated contact with newsrooms, work experience in newsrooms and overall experience in years do not significantly predict whether journalists are accepting of PR-work ($F(3, 413) = 2.204, p = .087$) or objectivity norms ($F(3, 399) = .572, p = .634$). However, it appears that having primarily ICT-mediated contact with newsrooms, work experience, and experience in newsrooms significantly predict whether journalists struggle in ethical decision-making, $F(3, 402) = 6.084, p < .000$. As Table 8.8 illustrates, experience in years explains 20 to 22% of the variance in ethical decision-making. Accordingly, the more experience journalists have, the more likely they are to exhibit strong ethics during the editorial process. In other words, they are more likely to withdraw stories and oppose critical editing of their stories.

Table 8.8: MLR of ICT-mediated work on doxa (professional norms)

	Separation from PR		Objectivity norms		Editorial decision-making	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
ICT-mediated work	-.046	-.018	-.052	-.053	-.052	-.053
Experience in newsroom	.05	.027	.029	-.018	-.038	-.066
Experience in years	-.101	-.04	-.02	.044	.202***	.227***
Denmark		-.239***		-.252***		-.046
France		.022		-.129*		-.053
Netherlands		-.137*		-.308***		-.083
UK		-.174**		-.425***		-.194**
Variance explained (R^2)	.009	.06	-.003	.128	.036	.053
Change in R^2		.06***		.139***		.026*

Note. MLR models of ICT-mediated work and experience on journalists' ethics. *Separation from PR*, *Objectivity norms* and *Ethical decision-making* are indices with scales from 1 to 5, where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. Predictors of *ICT-mediated work* and *experience in the newsroom* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset.

Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 . * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Adding countries into the models significantly predicts whether journalists are accepting of PR-work, ($F(7, 409) = 4.785, p < .000$), perceive professional norms of objectivity important ($F(7, 395) = 9.403, p < .000$), and have difficulty in ethical editorial decision-making ($F(7, 398) = 4.258, p < .000$). The predictions follow the differences between countries outlined before. Danish journalists are least likely to agree with a strict

separation from PR and other communication work and professional norms of objectivity and transparency.

Likewise, ICT-mediated contact with newsrooms, work experience in newsrooms and experience in years do not predict whether journalists embrace an accommodative role ($F(3, 404) = .736, p = .531$), monitorial role ($F(3, 389) = .439, p = .725$), or interventionist role ($F(3, 401) = 1.181, p = .317$). However, the model predicts journalists' collaborative role perception ($F(3, 404) = 2.795, p = .040$). Albeit the variance explained by this model is negligible, experience in a newsroom appears to equip atypical journalists with the tacit knowledge that a collaborative role is not part of the journalistic role for society in Western countries (see Table 8.9). However, this result is irrelevant when including the country level into the model. Unsurprisingly, the country level predicts journalists' role perception much better, even when controlling for journalists' experience and whether they work ICT-mediated.⁷⁰ These differences follow the pattern between the countries discussed above.

⁷⁰ Test statistic for accommodative role: $F(7,400)=6.774, p < .000$; for monitorial role: $F(7,394)=2.741, p = .009$; for interventionist role: $F(7,397)=3.449, p = .001$; and for collaborative role: $F(7,400)=5.543, p < .000$.

Table 8.9: *MLR of ICT-mediated work on doxa (normative roles)*

	Accommodative Role		Monitorial Role		Interventionist Role		Collaborative Role	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
ICT-mediated work	-.021	-.05	-.043	-.078	.035	.003	-.068	-.04
Experience in newsroom	-.032	.014	.021	.055	-.04	.007	-.131**	-.07
Experience in years	-.063	-.076	.032	.004	.073	.027	-.009	-.044
Denmark		-.264***		-.1		-.055		-.121*
France		-.364***		-.252***		-.258***		-.139*
Netherlands		-.257***		-.145*		-.093		.135*
UK		-.202**		-.074		-.023		.085
Variance explained (R ²)	-.002	.09	-.004	.029	-.001	.040	.013	.072
Change in R ²		.10***		.043**		.048***		.068***

Note. MLR models of work in other communication areas and dependency on that income on accommodative, monitorial, interventionist, and collaborative role perception. Role perceptions are composite indices with scales from 1 to 5, where 1 = *not important at all* and 5 = *extremely important*. Predictors of *ICT-mediated work* and *experience in the newsroom* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset.

Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R².

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Regarding the results to **RQ2b**, when it comes to journalists' professional norms, communication work and dependency on that income impact journalists' doxa (Table 8.10). Unsurprisingly, working in other communication work and public relations and dependency on that other income significantly predicts whether journalists accept PR-work, $F(2, 420) = 23.352, p < .000$. Here, a third of the variance is explained by journalists doing other communication work, as they are less likely to perceive a strict separation from PR and communication work relevant. Moreover, both predictors slightly explain journalists' agreement to objectivity norms $F(2, 405) = 3.198, p = .042$. Surprisingly, being dependent on other sources of income weakly predicts whether journalists perceive professional norms of objectivity and transparency as important for their work. However, when it comes to ethical editorial decision-making, working in other communication areas and dependency on that other income do not significantly predict whether journalists struggle here, $F(2, 408) = 1.130, p = .324$.

Table 8.10: *MLR of communication work and financial dependency on doxa (professional norms)*

	Separation from PR		Objectivity norms		Editorial decision-making	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Work in PR and communication	-.333***	-.320***	-.007	.004	-.057	-.063
Dependency on other income	.056	.038	.127*	.091	-.031	-.037
Denmark		-.220***		-.251***		-.021
France		.041		-.134*		-.096
Netherlands		-.116*		-.284***		-.067
UK		-.197***		-.413***		-.164**
Variance explained (R^2)	.096	.156	.011	.135	.001	.013
Change in R^2		.068***		.132***		.022

Note. MLR models of work in other communication areas and dependency on that income on journalists' ethics. *Separation from PR*, *Objectivity norms* and *Ethical decision-making* are composite indices from 1 to 5, where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. Predictors *work in PR and communication* and *dependency on other income* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset.

Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Controlling for communication work and dependency on other income, the country level predicts both journalists' acceptance of PR work ($F(6, 416) = 14.038, p < .000$) and to what extent journalists embrace professional norms of objectivity and transparency ($F(6, 401) = 11.559, p < .000$). However, journalists' ethical decision-making is not predicted better with

the country level, $F(6, 404) = 1.887, p = .082$, even though British journalists are significantly less likely to agree to strong ethical decisions when negotiating with editors.

Likewise, working in other communication work and public relations as well as dependency on that other income do not predict to what extent journalists embrace an accommodative role, ($F(2, 409) = 1.072, p = .343$), monitorial role ($F(2, 403) = 1.754, p = .174$), interventionist role ($F(2, 406) = 1.878, p = .154$), or collaborative role ($F(2, 409) = 1.192, p = .305$). As Table 8.11 illustrates, the strongest predictor, while controlling for communication work and dependency on income, is still the country level for all role perceptions and follows the general distribution between countries outlined above⁷¹.

Summarizing the results to both research questions, journalistic doxa is generally not affected by ICT-mediated work and work in other communication fields. However, when working primarily from home, experience can shape some aspects of doxa, as examined here. Accordingly, journalistic experience offers respondents a better foundation to handle difficult ethical decisions in the editing process. Moreover, having worked in a newsroom in the past equips journalists with the dominant doxa of Western democracies that journalists should not engage as supporters and collaborators of the government. Likewise, journalists' doxa is mostly not affected when they work in other communication fields, not even when they depend on that other income. Unsurprisingly, only the professional norm keeping PR and journalistic work separated is challenged by those working in public relations and other communication areas. Other professional norms and normative role perceptions are, however, not affected by this work in PR. All of this suggests that atypical journalists generally share the tacit understanding of the journalistic field. This suggestion is further strengthened as all significant differences in doxa occur on the country level.

⁷¹ Test statistic for model 2 for accommodative role: $F(6, 405) = 7.803, p < .000$.; monitorial role: $F(6, 399) = 2.970, p = .008$.; interventionist role: $F(6, 402) = 4.083, p < .000$.; collaborative role: $F(6, 405) = 6.200, p < .000$.

Table 8.11: *MLR of communication work and financial dependency on doxa (normative roles)*

	Accommodative Role		Monitorial Role		Interventionist Role		Collaborative Role	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Work in PR and communication	.078	.094	-.067	-.064	-.081	-.082	-.01	-.006
Dependency on other income	-.028	-.062	.094	.082	-.028	-.039	-.072	-.067
DK		-.283***		-.092		-.046		-.143*
FR		-.343***		-.22***		-.26***		-.135*
NL		-.258***		-.115		-.093		.134*
UK		-.208***		-.077		-.022		.083
Variance explained (R ²)	0	.090	.004	.028	.004	.051	.001	.071
Change in R ²		.098***		.034**		.056***		.078***

Note. MLR models of work in other communication areas and dependency on that income on accommodative, monitorial, interventionist, and collaborative role perception. Role perceptions are composite indices with scales from 1 to 5, where 1 = *not important at all* and 5 = *extremely important*. Predictors *work in PR and communication* and *dependency on other income* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset.

Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R².

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Atypical journalists' habitus

Regarding their daily practice as atypical journalists, most respondents claimed to be dedicated to long working hours to meet deadlines (76.6%, see Table 8.12). While another two-thirds claimed they would react immediately to a call from their commissioning editor, regardless of the time of the day, other indicators for a marginalized habitus were less prominent – still, a third claimed to work every weekend in the month.

Table 8.12: *Frequencies of habitus items*

	N	Agreement*	Mean	SD
If need be, I work for long stretches without a break until my deadline is met.	428	76.6%	4.07	1.053
I know my marketplace, my customers, and my unique selling points.	428	73.1%	3.99	.999
My focus is on in-depth reporting and not breaking news.	426	67.4%	3.9	1.091
If my commissioning editor contacts me, I react immediately regardless of the time of day.	428	66.4%	3.73	1.108
I purposely select news organizations I want to produce journalistic content for.	422	63.3%	3.56	1.377
Part of my job is maintaining contacts with newsroom editors in order not to be forgotten.	425	57.9%	3.46	1.283
Part of my daily work is pitching new ideas to news organizations.	427	57.8%	3.45	1.363
When I produce my stories I think of the news organization as the customer.	423	55.8%	3.39	1.35
Oftentimes I get stories assigned by a commissioning newsroom.	423	52.2%	3.35	1.34
I sometimes produce stories that I think are important, even if I don't get paid for them.	427	38.5%	2.77	1.466
I reuse interviews and research for multiple articles and news stories.	426	38.3%	2.95	1.243
I work every weekend in the month.	420	33.8%	2.75	1.358
I am prepared to produce stories for any news organization who will buy my work.	426	27.7%	2.53	1.364
For most of my stories, I research information solely online.	427	23.9%	2.41	1.219
I regularly report directly from my phone (mobile journalism).	425	13.2%	1.88	1.211
I frequently live-tweet or live-blog for news organizations.	424	4.2%	1.4	.839
For some of my work, I am paid on a basis of clicks received, rather than words written.	426	2.3%	1.15	.585

Note. Frequencies, mean and standard deviations to items from the question "Here is another list of things that could be important for your daily journalistic work. How much do you agree with these statements?", measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *strongly agree* and 5 = *strongly disagree*. *Combined frequencies for answers 4 and 5.

More respondents agreed to indicators of an entrepreneurial habitus. Almost two-thirds agreed that they purposely selected news organizations to work for, 57% said maintaining contacts and pitching new ideas was part of their daily routine, and 55.8% thought of the news organizations they worked for as customers. However, only a few claimed to spread the labour of investigation and research across multiple publications. Respondents least agreed with items measuring a digital habitus. Less than a fourth said they researched information solely online (23.9%), regularly reported directly from their phone (13.2%), and frequently live-blogged or live-tweeted (4.2%). Moreover, only 2.3% claimed they were paid based on clicks received for some of their work.

Looking at the aggregate level of these indices, respondents mostly embraced an entrepreneurial habitus⁷² ($M = 3.36$, $SD = .85$), closely followed by a marginalized habitus⁷³ ($M = 3.26$, $SD = .76$). A digital habitus was rarely incorporated in this sample ($M = 1.71$, $SD = .61$)⁷⁴. There were no differences in habitus between women and men (see also Table **10.48**). Younger journalists expressed an entrepreneurial habitus slightly more strongly (Pearson's $r = -.197$, $p < .000$), as well as a digital habitus (Pearson's $r = -.192$, $p < .000$). A marginalized habitus and age did not correlate, indicating that respondents experienced precarity regardless of age.

Comparing across countries, while the pattern generally followed a similar distribution (Figure **8.4**), it still differed significantly. The different distribution was most pronounced for the entrepreneurial habitus, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 26.541$, $p < .000$. Post hoc tests indicated that Danish journalists differed significantly from all other respondents, as they embraced this habitus less (see also Table **10.49**). As such, and answering **RQ 2d**, entrepreneurial ideology was highly implemented into atypical journalists' practices across countries except in Denmark. While most journalists disagreed that their practice was primarily digital, there were significant differences between countries, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 26.681$, $p < .000$. Only a few journalists in Austria and Denmark agreed to a digital habitus, and post hoc tests showed that only Danish respondents differed significantly

⁷² Containing the items *part of my job is maintaining contacts with newsroom editors*, *part of my daily work is pitching new ideas to news organizations*, *I purposely select news organizations I want to produce journalistic content for*, *I reuse interviews and research for multiple articles and news stories*, and *I think of the news organization as the customer*.

⁷³ Containing the items *I am prepared to produce stories for any news organization*, *I react to requests from my commissioning editor immediately regardless of the time of day*, *work every weekend in the month*, and *I work for long stretches without a break until my deadline is met*.

⁷⁴ Containing the items *I frequently live-tweet or live-blog*, *I regularly report directly from my phone*, *I am paid on a basis of clicks received*, and *I research information solely online*.

from French, British and Dutch journalists (see also Table 10.50). Lastly, there were no differences across countries regarding the marginalized habitus, H -test $\chi^2(4) = 5.449$, $p = .244$.




Figure 8.4: *Density plots of journalists' habitus across countries*

Note. Density plots illustrate indices measuring journalists' entrepreneurial, digital, and marginalized habitus, where 1 = low agreement and 5 = high agreement.

This indicates that a marginalized habitus in the form of working every weekend, working long hours until a deadline is met, producing for any newsroom that buys their work and permanent availability to commissioning editors were a universal experience of atypical journalists in Europe.

Technological and economic influences on journalists' habitus

Assuming that ICT-mediated work and journalists' expertise similarly shape journalists' habitus, we asked in **RQ1a** *how ICT-mediated work affects the socialization of atypical journalists through newsrooms and how it informs their understanding of their journalistic habitus*. To answer RQ1a, the composite indices of habitus were submitted to MLR analysis which included variables measuring ICT-mediated work and journalists' socialization. In a second step, country variables were included to compare differences in doxa across countries while controlling for ICT-mediated work and socialization. Moreover, research suggests that entrepreneurial journalists are more willing to work in various communication fields, not only journalism (Frisque, 2014; Fröhlich et al., 2013; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Thus, to answer **RQ1b**, *how additional work in non-*

journalistic areas affects journalists' habitus, the same habitus indices were analyzed with MLR and whether respondents worked in PR and were dependent on that work as predictor variables.

First, regarding the results to RQ1a, ICT-mediated contact with newsrooms, work experience in newsrooms and experience predict whether journalists embrace an entrepreneurial habitus ($F(3, 406) = 23.919, p = .003$) and digital habitus ($F(3, 410) = 5.571, p = .001$). Accordingly, experience in years explains most of the variance. Journalists with more experience in years are significantly less likely to exhibit an entrepreneurial or digital habitus – 10 to 17% of the variance is explained by this variable in the model (see Table 8.13). However, a marginalized habitus is not significantly predicted by ICT-mediated contact with newsrooms, work experience in newsrooms, and overall experience, $F(3, 406) = 1.561, p = .198$.

If we add the country-level to the model, the results remain similar. Thus, when controlling for ICT-mediated work, experience in newsrooms, and experience in years, the country level still significantly predicts variances in entrepreneurial habitus ($F(7, 402) = 6.508, p < .000$) and digital habitus ($F(7, 406) = 5.733, p < .000$), but not in the marginalized habitus ($F(7, 402) = 1.374, p = .215$). The findings generally reiterate the differences between countries outlined above, even while controlling for ICT-mediated work. Danish respondents embrace an entrepreneurial habitus the least. British and French journalists are significantly more likely to exhibit a digital habitus in this model.

Table 8.13: MLR for technological influence on journalists' habitus

	Entrepreneurial habitus		Digital habitus		Marginalized habitus	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
ICT-mediated work	-.070	-.013	-.081	-.058	-.079	-.091
Experience in newsroom	.094	.139**	-.029	-.006	.064	.055
Experience in years	-.110*	-.100*	-.174***	-.175***	-.013	-.009
Denmark		-.233***		-.044		.036
France		-.030		.125*		.067
Netherlands		.100		.085		-.056
UK		.037		.211***		.048
Variance explained (R^2)	.021	.086	.032	.074	.004	.006
Change in R^2		.074***		.051***		.012*

Note. MLR models of ICT-mediated work and experience on journalists' habitus. *Entrepreneurial habitus*, *Digital habitus* and *Marginalized habitus* are indices with scales from 1 to 5, where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. Predictors of *ICT-mediated work* and *experience in newsrooms* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset. Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Second, looking at the results for **RQ2b**, working in other communication work and public relations and being dependent on that income do not predict whether journalists embrace an entrepreneurial habitus ($F(2, 412) = .656, p = .520$) or marginalized habitus, $F(2, 413) = 2.607, p = .075$. However, the model significantly predicts whether journalists exhibit a digital habitus ($F(2, 416) = 3.684, p = .026$). Respondents who work in PR and other communication work are less likely to exhibit a strong digital habitus (Table 8.14). However, being dependent on the income from other work makes a digital habitus more likely. Moreover, even though the model does not fit well, journalists working in PR are significantly less likely to exhibit a marginalized habitus.

Again, most variance is explained in the comparison between countries. That means that when we control for work in other communication areas and dependency of other income, the country level significantly predicts whether journalists embrace an entrepreneurial habitus, ($F(6, 408) = 5.624, p < .000$) and digital habitus, $F(6, 412) = 5.911, p < .000$. A marginalized habitus is again not predicted by the model ($F(6, 409) = 1.923, p = .076$).

Table 8.14: MRL for economic influence on journalists' habitus

	Entrepreneurial habitus		Digital habitus		Marginalized habitus	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Work in PR and communication	-.058	-.051	-.112*	-.104*	-.117*	-.115*
Dependency on other income	.004	.012	.121*	.129*	.020	.017
Denmark		-.224***		-.058		.041
France		.016		.173**		.103
Netherlands		.104		.107		-.035
UK		.003		.201**		.058
Variance explained (R^2)	-.002	.063	.013	.066	.008	.013
Change in R^2		.073***		.062***		.015

Note. MLR models of work in other communication areas and dependency on that income on journalists' habitus. *Entrepreneurial habitus*, *Digital habitus* and *Marginalized habitus* are scales from 1 to 5, where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*. Predictors of *ICT-mediated work* and *experience in the newsroom* were coded as dummy variables, as was country. Here, Austria was selected as baseline as it is the largest group in the dataset.

Models show standardized beta coefficients and adjusted R^2 .

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

In summary, journalists' habitus is shaped differently by technological (ICT-mediated work) and economic (being dependent on work in other areas) transformations. While ICT-mediated work does not directly predict an entrepreneurial and digital habitus, older journalists are less likely to exhibit both. These findings suggest that the necessity for

being entrepreneurial or having the capital for digital journalism is more pronounced among younger journalists because older atypical journalists have their portfolio of contacts who might even reach out to them and offer work (Ladendorf, 2012; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Moreover, newcomers in the field might have learned through education and metajournalistic discourse that being entrepreneurial is required to ‘make it’ (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Gollmitzer, 2014; Singer & Broersma, 2020; Sivek, 2014). Likewise, neither whether journalists are established journalists or newcomers, nor the degree of ICT-mediated contact predicts journalists’ marginalized habitus. On the other hand, journalists working in PR and other communication work are less likely to experience a marginalized habitus. This could be as they are 1) not as dependent on their journalistic work, and 2) have established a more nuanced relationship to journalism as work. As such, respondents working in PR and journalism might perceive journalistic work less as a calling and passion, allowing them to establish more refined work-life boundaries (Frisque, 2014; Fröhlich et al., 2013). Lastly, respondents who depend on income from other work are also more likely to have a digital habitus. This speaks to other research that describes digital journalism as low-paying and precarious (Cohen et al., 2019; Hayes & Silke, 2018).

Chapter summary

Atypical journalists in Europe voice a similar *illusio* and *doxa* to all journalists from their respective countries, affirming that atypical journalists still share an intrinsic traditional set of values with the field (Deuze & Witschge, 2017). Moreover, their *illusio*, *doxa*, and *habitus* are only slightly affected by ICT-mediated work and economic influences. While almost two-thirds of the sample chose atypical employment for the freedom and flexibility it provides, most also quote other external motivations like freelancing to join or stay in the profession. As such, they have entered atypical work less voluntarily and more as a consequence of the structural conditions in the field. However, they are mainly satisfied with the creative autonomy their working conditions provide them, which is reflected in their perceived autonomy when it comes to freedom on story angle. Generally, atypical journalists report high levels of freedom emphasizing a story and a little less freedom in choosing the topic of a story. Unsurprisingly, respondents are least satisfied with their work’s financial and vocational security, indicating that they do not only experience objective financial precarity but also perceive it as such subjectively.

Moreover, atypical journalists largely adhere to the naturalized rules of the journalistic profession. They voice similarly strong adherence to the principles of journalism that are “canonical around the world” (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019, p. 173). They believe professional norms of objectivity and transparency to be essential and follow strict ethical principles during the editing process. However, they are more lenient when it comes to a strict separation between journalistic and public relations work, which also illustrates that atypical journalists as entrepreneurs are similarly negotiating boundaries between commercial and journalism just like news organizations (Coddington, 2015). They also primarily embrace an entrepreneurial habitus, incorporating entrepreneurial ideology in their everyday work. However, many also exhibit a marginalized habitus that encompasses working long hours and weekends and always being available to potential customers. A digital habitus is least implemented in this sample.

Journalists’ perception of their creative autonomy and their understanding of professional norms and roles are largely not determined by whether they are personally in contact with newsrooms and other journalists or through email or other personal technology tools. However, journalists who have long worked in journalism are better equipped to handle difficult ethical situations during the editing process. This speaks to other findings indicating that newcomers in atypical employment with little socialization within newsrooms have difficulty knowing the hidden rules in specific newsrooms (Gollmitzer, 2014; Summ, 2013). Moreover, having worked in a newsroom in the past equips journalists with the dominant doxa of Western democracies that journalists should not engage as supporters and collaborators of the government. Lastly, while ICT-mediated work does not directly predict an entrepreneurial and digital habitus, older journalists are less likely to exhibit both. This suggests that the necessity for being entrepreneurial or having the capital for digital journalism is more pronounced among younger journalists because older atypical journalists have their portfolio of contacts who might even reach out to them and offer work. Moreover, newcomers in the field might have learned through education and metajournalistic discourse that ‘making it’ in the field requires being entrepreneurial (De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Gollmitzer, 2014; Singer & Broersma, 2020).

Similarly, journalists’ doxa is not affected when journalists work in other communication fields, not even when they depend on that other income. This suggests that atypical journalists generally share the tacit understanding of the journalistic field. Journalists working in PR and communication challenge only the professional norm of

maintaining a “wall” between PR and journalism. On the other hand, working in PR and other communication work enables journalists to achieve independence from the precarious nature of atypical journalistic work.

Respondents who depend on income from other work are more likely to have a digital habitus. This resembles findings describing especially digital journalism as low-paying and precarious (Cohen, 2019; Cohen et al., 2019). Likewise, economic constraints negatively affect journalists’ creative autonomy satisfaction. At the same time, when they chose atypical work with intrinsic motivations, they are more satisfied with the content of their work. This reiterates findings from previous studies which show that the “feast or famine life” (Antunovic et al., 2019) of atypical journalistic work can be anxiety-inducing and minimize perceptions of autonomy and freedom (Corsani, 2012). Moreover, it relates to the illusion of freedom and creative autonomy (Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019): As income can be discontinued at any time, freelance journalists must always be available unless they have the economic capital and thus privilege to endure such periods of no work.

However, most significant differences of *illusio*, *doxa* and *habitus* occur on the country-level, suggesting that national field contexts shape which aspects of their work are perceived as important. Thus, the next chapter will discuss the different fields of atypical journalistic work.

Chapter 9: Mapping the fields of atypical journalism

As the previous chapter illustrated, differences in *illusio*, *doxa*, and *habitus* were most strongly pronounced on the country-level, indicating that we cannot speak of a unified atypical journalism culture but that national contexts shape journalists' perception of journalism as a professional field, their *illusio* to participate in it and the taken-for-granted rules which determine their membership. Just as all journalists in these countries perceive different aspects of journalistic work more important than others (Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019), atypical journalists emphasize these aspects within the bounds of the journalism culture they have been socialized in. Thus, it is relevant to investigate which positions atypical journalists in this study occupy in different fields, whether the fields of atypical journalism share similarities across national contexts and which aspects might explain differences. Moreover, this allows us to see whether those more established in the particular field voice similar agreement to professional norms and roles (*doxa*) or act as change agents by introducing more heretic ideas (Bourdieu, 1996).

A first step to investigate these differences between countries is to explore where atypical journalists can be located in the journalistic field. Thus, to answer **RQ2a**, we first look at their *distribution in the space of journalistic work*. Applying the theoretical model by Örnebring and colleagues (2018), Figure 9.1 shows atypical journalists' position in the space of journalistic work. Accordingly, I plotted respondents' material security (income), access to resources from newsrooms, and journalistic capital (number of awards received). As their status within the field cannot be measured by their status within newsrooms, the number of awards is the only indicator we can draw on to assess their journalistic capital. We can thus assume that only a small group of respondents has received public recognition for their work from the findings.

Accordingly, most respondents in all countries occupied the quadrant of low material security, low access to resources, and low journalistic capital in the space of journalistic work. However, while the distribution within the space was not widespread in Austria and Denmark, respondents were more stratified in France, the Netherlands, and the UK. In Austria, the majority had low journalistic capital in the form of award recognition, low access to resources from newsrooms that they work for and earn a disposable income with their journalistic work up to 16.000 Euro per year. Compared to the other countries, more Austrian journalists had won an award. However, even when




Figure 9.1: *The spaces of journalistic work across countries*

Note. 3D-Ball-Plot of journalists' salary, awards and access to resources. The size of balls indicates the frequency of cases with identical values. $N = 89$ (AT); 70 (DK); 72 (FR); 86 (NL); 70 (UK)

they had earned that peer recognition, most had low access to resources and a low income. While there was some variation apparent in access to resources even among those with little income in Austria, in Denmark, the vast majority had no access to resources at all. Even when journalists earned better or have received an award, having access to newsrooms' hard- or software is uncommon in Denmark for atypical journalists. A few respondents had more access, and interestingly these were journalists with high income but little or no recognition through awards. This might mean that awards are not a good indicator to measure journalistic capital in Denmark.

In the French journalistic space of work, respondents were more dispersed along the axes of income and access to resources. While still many earned little, almost a third was located at the medium income level. Similarly, while most had little access to resources, some had at least medium access. However, it was also apparent that very few have journalistic capital in the form of awards. Those with journalistic capital tend to have little access to newsroom resources but earn better.

In the Netherlands and UK, more respondents had won an award, and they were also more dispersed along the axes of income. In the Netherlands, winning an award was more common among respondents with low access to resources and higher income. While most Dutch respondents were still below a moderate income, more earned a medium salary like in France. Moreover, quite a few Dutch respondents across all lower to mid-income levels had more access to newsroom resources; the higher their income, the more they depended on their own resources. This indicates that we could distinguish between lower-paid dependant atypical workers or contract workers and well-earning entrepreneurial freelancers in the Netherlands. In the UK, journalists had little or medium access to resources, but they were also most dispersed along the axes of income and journalistic capital. What distinguishes the UK from other countries is that both respondents with low and higher income had won awards. Still, most award-winners had low access to resources.

According to Örnebring and colleagues' (2018) theoretical model, atypical journalists in this doctoral study largely occupy positions of low status. However, contrary to their argument, atypical journalists comprise in large parts the "amateur blogger who engages affectively in producing and distributing news online, without necessarily having any journalistic education or background to speak of" (Örnebring et al., 2018, p. 413). Instead, as we could see from the results discussed in chapter seven, many have experienced journalistic socialization. Since one sampling criterion was that

respondents earned money at least once a month, none of them occupied a space with no material security at all as an unpaid amateur blogger might do. Regardless, it is safe to argue that West-European atypical journalists in large parts are closely located to these marginalized and outer areas of the journalistic space.

However, it could also be that awards as the only indicator for journalists' recognition is insufficient to map respondents' journalistic capital in the field. Therefore, in a second step, I constructed five fields of atypical journalism for each country with respondents' economic, cultural, journalistic, and social capital through multiple correspondence analysis (MCA, see also chapter six, p. 179). This approach also enables us to discern which forms of (primarily) cultural, journalistic, and economic capital contribute more to the stratification of each field. Moreover, it allows us to consider the specific historical formation of the respective journalistic field when discussing the stratification of atypical journalistic work. However, as this MCA only includes atypical journalists, the fields discussed here do not represent the entire journalistic field.

The Austrian field of atypical journalism

Figure 9.2 illustrates the distribution of capitals in the Austrian field of atypical journalism. The first two dimensions of the MCA explain most of the variance in the active variables (23.6%)⁷⁵ and are therefore used for the spatial visualization (see Table 10.51 for Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance). The first dimension is primarily characterized by journalistic and cultural capital indicators like *experience in years*, *journalistic specialization*, *education*, and *parent's education* (see Table 10.52). Thus, this dimension could also be interpreted as distinguishing the established or experienced from the newcomers, mainly as it includes experience in national newsrooms through internships and employment. Remarkably, these indicators of experience plot in opposite directions. Whereas experience in national newsrooms through employment can be found in the upper right quadrant, experience through internships is located opposite along the first dimension in the upper left quadrant. Similarly, journalistic education,

⁷⁵ In MCA, it is common to reach relatively low percentages of inertia (variance explained) as the method explores the “more general relationships and at least $\min(K_j, K_i) - 1$ dimensions are required in order to represent the relationship between two variables, each of which has K_j and K_i categories” (Husson et al., 2011, p. 144).





Figure 9.2: *The Field of Austrian atypical journalism*

Note. MCA of Dimensions 1 and 2 of the 12 active variables (above) and of supplementary variables projected in that space (below). Supplementary variables clustering too close around the centre were omitted. $N = 81$. Visualization of data with R package *factoextra*.

higher levels of education and two parents with tertiary education are all located opposed to experience in years. This observation suggests that the first dimension distinguishes between experienced freelancers with lower cultural capital and younger newcomers with high embodied and institutionalized cultural capital. Respondents' *annual income* characterizes the second dimension, as does whether they *work in a newsroom*, *attend editorial meetings*, and have *experience in national newsrooms through internships* (see Table 10.53). Dimension 2 could thus be described as a stratification between economically and socially marginalized atypical journalists and those who have high volumes of social capital within newsrooms (through working in newsrooms and attending editorial meetings) and high(er) volumes of economic capital.

We can thus summarize the Austrian field of atypical journalism built by the 12 variables presented in chapter six (p. 181) as follows: The upper half includes what we could name the better situated among Austrian atypical journalists: well-educated, well-connected, and well-paid atypical journalists. In the left quadrant, we find highly educated respondents with high embodied cultural capital with less than 14 years of experience in journalism. They have experienced socialization through internships but only rarely attend editorial meetings. In the upper right quadrant, we find respondents with high economic capital, high social capital to newsrooms, and high journalistic capital as they have received awards, have been employed in national newsrooms, and report on hard beats. The lower half of the Austrian journalistic space comprises the disregarded atypical journalists, and the lower-left quadrant includes the most marginalized. They lack social capital and have little economic and journalistic capital. The lower right quadrant contains the older atypical journalists. They have low amounts of institutionalized cultural capital but have the highest experience in years. Accordingly, we could argue that the lower half of Figure 9.2 comprises those journalists who are most likely to be found in the marginalized area of the space of journalistic work (Örnebring et al., 2018), as they lack recognition in the field as well as material security.

However, when we project supplementary variables into the space tented through the active variables (lower part of Figure 9.2) to illustrate journalists' positions in the journalistic field in more detail, we can see that marginalized respondents often chose atypical work voluntarily and supplement their journalistic income with work in non-related fields. They are often over 50 years and have a working-class background. On the other hand, respondents in the upper part of the field either only work in journalism or

supplement their income with work in related communication fields. They are younger; in the left upper quadrant, we find atypical journalists below 39 years, which we could arguably still consider the “newcomers” to the field. On the upper right side, we find freelancers between 40 and 49 years. The atypical journalists younger than 39 years often have an upper- to middle-class background, which reiterates previous findings that entering the profession through freelancing requires enough existing economic capital through family support (Gollmitzer, 2014; Pereira, 2020). Moreover, the younger journalists did not enter atypical journalism voluntarily, supporting observations by Nölleke et al. (2022) that younger Austrian journalists perceive employment as a privilege and that journalism is a difficult profession to enter. However, Austrian respondents also voiced the highest level of intrinsic choice; 48% said they chose their working situation voluntarily.

Austrian atypical journalists embrace foremost an entrepreneurial habitus, followed by a marginalized and digital habitus. However, the different categories of entrepreneurial and marginalized habitus cluster around the centre of the field and do not add meaning to the field’s stratification (Figure 9.2, supplementary variables). Moreover, while most indicators of doxa are also located at the centre point, some observations can add to a further understanding of the different positions in the field. Generally, high agreement to monitorial and accommodative role perceptions are more likely to be found among the established well-off atypical journalists in the right upper part of the field. Only the interventionist role is rejected here. This observation suggests that the established atypical journalists are most similar to the average Austrian journalist who believes it essential to monitor those in power and offer audiences information and services they seek (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019; Hanitzsch & Lauerer, 2019; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2020). Moreover, a moderate view on the strict separation between PR and journalistic work is in close proximity to respondents working in PR and other communication fields. Thus, while they are less strict regarding this long-held journalistic norm, they still believe it to be relatively important. This is in line with discourse among Austrian and German freelancers who have set up a code of conduct that allows PR work in unrelated fields of expertise (Buckow, 2011). However, they also perceive commercial influences the highest, suggesting that they are aware of the difficult ethical decisions they are facing (Ladendorf, 2012; Mathisen, 2019).

Younger respondents in the upper part of the field tend to embrace moderate monitorial and interventionist role perceptions suggesting that they have entered

journalism to serve society and make a difference (Nölleke et al., 2022). Likewise, they express low agreement with the professional norms of objectivity and strong principles in the editing process. This observation suggests that younger atypical journalists are less focused on impartial reporting, which would correspond to their more interventionist perception of journalism's doxa. Therefore, this could be viewed as heresy to the prevailing doxa of detached and objective reporting. Second, as newcomers who still must adequately position themselves in the field, they might not have the strength yet to disagree with decisions from their commissioning editor that would exaggerate the scope of a story (Mathisen, 2019). Lastly, respondents in the lower part of the field tend to reject an accommodative role perception and embrace strong professional norms like strict separation of PR and journalism work and firm ethics in the editing process as important. This means that even though we could consider them 'not really journalists' by their working hours and income, they indeed adhere to long-held professional norms.

The Danish field of atypical journalism

The Danish field of atypical journalism is stratified along two axes of economic and journalistic capital (Figure 9.3). Again, the first two dimensions explain most of the variance in the active variables (23.9%; see Table 10.54). The first dimension is primarily characterized by respondents' economic capital – their *annual income* and whether it is *sufficient*. Moreover, *experience in newsrooms through employment* and *experience in years* correlate with the first dimension (see Table 10.55). As such, this dimension distinguishes between well-off and precarious respondents. This illustrates that in the Danish field, atypical journalists with high amounts of journalistic capital in the form of experience are also generally better remunerated and sustain their living through their journalistic work. The second dimension is characterized chiefly by journalistic capital indicators *journalistic education* and *beat* (see Table 10.56). Thus, dimension 2 distinguishes those reporting on hard beat news who usually have no degree in journalism or communication studies and generalists or journalists working on soft news with a journalistic education. Moreover, social capital is less relevant in constructing the atypical journalistic field through the first two dimensions, which explain most of the variance. Likewise, embodied cultural capital inherited through their parents appears to be irrelevant.




Figure 9.3: *The field of Danish atypical journalism*

Note. MCA of Dimensions 1 and 2 of the 12 active variables (above) and of supplementary variables projected in that space (below). Supplementary variables clustering too close around the centre were omitted. $N = 74$. Visualization of data with R package *factoextra*.

We can thus interpret the Danish atypical field as one between better-paid, more experienced, and better-connected journalists on the right side and precarious journalists yet well-educated on the left. Moreover, we can identify a distinction of experience or age between the upper and lower half as experience in years lies almost like a horseshoe in the plane of the first and second dimensions. Accordingly, the upper left quadrant comprises journalists who resemble the isolated in the space of journalistic work the most (Örnebring et al., 2018). While they are well-educated (master's degree and higher), they have no journalistic specialization and no experience in national newsrooms through internship or employment. Their income lies below 140.000 DKK, and they depend on other sources of income. As such, the belonging to the field of these agents is probably most debated.

The lower left quadrant comprises journalists who report on soft beats and have similarly low social capital to newsrooms and earn little. However, they are most likely younger atypical journalists, as they have less than 14 years of experience, and their parents both have a tertiary degree. Atypical journalists with better perspectives occupy positions on the right side of the field. The upper right quadrant includes well-connected journalists and well-paid journalists. They have a medium experience in years, work in newsrooms and are somewhat connected to them as they rarely to sometimes attend editorial meetings. They work on hard news beats, have previously been employed in newsrooms and reach a high economic capital. The lower right quadrant comprises journalists who have most likely been educated in the Danish journalism education system and are therefore much better connected to the general field (Willig 2016). Moreover, they have received recognition through awards and have the most experience.

This is also reflected when including the supplementary variables in the visualization (see supplementary variables in Figure 9.3). Journalists with high choice occupy the lower right quadrant, while those on the left have reported less intrinsic choice. Those well-remunerated are between 40 and 49 years, work more than 20 hours per week and only engage in journalistic work. Likewise, younger and women journalists who earn in the medium category occupy the lower left quadrant of the field. They often have an upper to middle-class upbringing. In contrast, journalists who did not choose atypical work voluntarily earn less than 140.000 DKK, depend on other sources of income, and work in PR and communication to sustain their living (upper left). They are also older, however, not yet in the age to retire and thus presumably comprise journalists

who have been made redundant (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2021; Sherwood & O'Donnell, 2018).

Danish respondents generally voice a marginalized habitus and are less entrepreneurial (see chapter eight, p. 239). Surprisingly, a high marginalized habitus is most closely located to the highest annual income, suggesting that working long hours every weekend and being ever-available to commissioning editors is not necessarily associated with economic precarity in Denmark. A high entrepreneurial habitus can be found among respondents who chose atypical work out of intrinsic motivations. While indicators of doxa generally cluster around the centre of the plot, a few observations can be made. Journalists earning the lowest annual income and supplementing their journalistic income with PR and communication work tend to embrace a strong accommodative role perception. As such, they perceive audiences more as consumers and are most likely not interested in pursuing a specific service to society (Meyen & Springer, 2009). This group of journalists is also most heretic to the dominant journalistic culture, which focuses more on monitorial and interventionist role perceptions (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). Moreover, both high and low agreement to interventionist role perspectives can be found in the lower part of the field. This suggests that the younger and women newcomer journalists believe it is important to be interventionist, while older established respondents reject this role perception. Like in Austria, the younger journalists appear to believe that advocating for social change is an important part of journalism's doxa. This is also in line with previous findings, which found Danish freelancers pursuing more critical-active roles (Skovsgaard et al., 2012). Generally, the little variance in journalistic doxa in the Danish field reiterates previous scholarship finding homogenized professional norms. As such, we can interpret this as a representation of the strong institutionalization of what journalism *should be* in the past century (Willig, 2016).

The French field of atypical journalism

The indicators that explain the first two dimensions of the French field of atypical journalism (Figure 9.4) are similar to those of the Austrian field (24.1% of the variance explained, see Table 10.57). The first dimension primarily characterizes respondents' *journalistic education, experience in national newsrooms through internships, experience in years, and beats* (see Table 10.58). Like in Austria, *specialized journalistic education and internships are located opposite of experience in years*.




Figure 9.4: *The field of French atypical journalism*

Note. MCA of Dimensions 1 and 2 of the 12 active variables (above) and of supplementary variables projected in that space (below). Supplementary variables clustering too close around the centre were omitted. $N = 74$. Visualization of data with R package *factoextra*.

Moreover, *hard news beats* are associated with no journalistic education. This dimension could be interpreted as distinguishing the established or experienced from the newcomers, mainly as it includes experience in national newsrooms through internships and employment. The second dimension of the French field comprises respondents' *annual income, their experience in years*, whether they *work in a newsroom, attend editorial meetings*, and also their *parents' education* (see Table 10.59). Both respondents' annual income and experience follow a similar pattern, where higher income is closely located to more years of experience. Dimension 2 could thus be described as a stratification between economically and socially marginalized atypical journalists in the lower part of the field and well-connected, better-paid journalists in the upper segment. However, the indicator measuring whether their income is sufficient is slightly correlated with the first dimension (see Table 10.58). Consequently, atypical journalists located on the left side of the field are dependent on other sources of income, while those on the right side sustain their living from their journalistic work.

Accordingly, the upper left quadrant includes atypical journalists with inherited cultural capital and a journalistic education. They also have experience through internships in newsrooms and some work in newsrooms, yet their income can be insufficient. Respondents in this area of the field attend editorial meetings most often compared to the others – even though this is still rarely or never. Moreover, as these categories of attending editorial meetings are in the same quadrant as is *work in a newsroom*, it can be assumed that in France, these variables measure not necessarily social capital but whether someone is a contractor or otherwise atypical journalist *within a newsroom*. Likewise, we find the association between a journalistic education and mixed beat reporting, which we could also observe in Denmark. In the upper right quadrant, we find the experienced and well-paid freelancers who have previously worked in national newsrooms through employment, report on hard beat news and have won awards with their work. The lower half includes journalists with low amounts of cultural, journalistic, social, and economic capital. Accordingly, journalists with no journalistic specialization, a bachelor's degree or lower, no experience in national newsrooms through internships, who do not work in newsrooms and attend editorial meetings occupy the lower right quadrant. Contrary to those in the lower-left quadrant, they are not dependent on other sources of income. It can be assumed that the lower left and right quadrants differ primarily according to respondents' age.

This is supported when we include the supplementary variables in the plots. The lower half is populated with younger journalists, while older journalists all occupy the upper part of the field. French respondents were, on average, the youngest, which also reflected the overall age distribution in France (Josephi et al., 2019, see also chapter seven). According to the MCA plot, respondents under the age of 29 (25% of the sample) are more likely to work less than 20 hours per week, presumably because they are still advancing their studies which are often extended in France (Naït-Bouda, 2008; Vera-Zambrano & Powers, 2019). Moreover, they often have an upper- to-middle class background, supporting findings by Pereira (2020) that only those from specific sociodemographic backgrounds can afford the years of underpaid and unpaid labour that aspiring journalists must undergo. Moreover, they also express a strong marginalized habitus, working long hours and being always available to commissioning editors, reiterating previous observations that discontinuity of work caused French freelancers to be continuously working and never taking time off (Corsani, 2012, p. 506). Also typical for those pursuing a career in fields of cultural production, they supplement their income with work in other non-related areas (M. Scott, 2012). In contrast, the upper half includes men and older journalists with a working-class background. Those who earn a moderate income supplement it with PR and other communication work, which is reminiscent of other findings illustrating that atypical journalists in France must often turn to communication work (Frisque, 2014). While French journalists voiced a relatively high intrinsic choice for atypical work (43%), the category does not distinguish between the different groups plotted on the first and second dimensions.

When it comes to the taken-for-granted truths, we can observe that, again, most of them cluster in the centre, suggesting that they cannot be easily distinguished along the different hemispheres of the field. The newcomers exhibit strong interventionist and monitorial, and moderate accommodative role perceptions. As such, they are most like the average French journalists surveyed by the *WJS* (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). A moderate view on the separation between journalistic and communication work can be found in the upper half, in proximity to journalists working in PR and communication. Again, this suggests that journalists are at least aware of the potential conflict when working in both areas.

The Dutch field of atypical journalism

Likewise, the first two dimensions of the Dutch field of atypical journalism explain 23.3% of the variance (Figure 9.5, see Table 10.60) and span a field between one axis of journalistic capital and one of economic and social capital. The first dimension consists again primarily of journalistic capital indicators – *experience in years*, *experience in national newsrooms through internships*, *beat*, and *education* (see Table 10.61). Again, journalistic specialization and internships are located opposite of experience in years, reflecting the increase of journalistic education programs in the past 30 years in the Netherlands (Drok, 2019). Likewise, journalistic education is more associated with mixed beat reporting and like in Austria, atypical journalists with the most experience in years also have the lowest institutionalized cultural capital (undertook some studies and lower). The first dimension again distinguishes between the less-educated but experienced and the well-educated but inexperienced. The second dimension illustrates an association between economic capital and journalistic capitals that benefit higher volumes of economic capital: *Annual income*, *experience in a national newsroom through employment*, and *winning an award* (see Table 10.62). Dimension 2 could thus be described as a stratification between well-connected, well-known, and well-paid freelancers and precarious atypical journalists. Thus, the Dutch field of atypical journalism is divided between well-educated, well-connected, and better-paid freelancers in the upper half and marginalized or precarious atypical journalists in the lower half.

This is further exemplified when looking at the supplementary variables (see plot of supplementary variables, Figure 9.5). While journalists in the lower half work in other jobs, those in the upper half work more than 20 hours per week in journalism and have chosen atypical work voluntarily. The marginalized lower part of the field can be divided into younger (and women) journalists trying to enter the profession on the left and older journalists and pensioners on the right. These respondents did not choose atypical work out of intrinsic motivation and were most likely made redundant (right side) or aspire to permanent employment (left side). The findings illustrated through this MCA thus reflect previous studies which indicate that young Dutch journalists anticipate that they must work as freelancers and in other insecure work (Singer & Broersma, 2020; Vandenberghe & D'Haenens, 2021). While the younger ones supplement their journalistic income with PR and other communication work, the older respondents work in unrelated areas.




Figure 9.5: *The field of Dutch atypical journalism*

Note. MCA of Dimensions 1 and 2 of the 12 active variables (above) and of supplementary variables projected in that space (below). Supplementary variables clustering too close around the centre were omitted. $N = 85$. Visualization of data with R package *factoextra*.

Moreover, and contrary to what we would expect from the discourse surrounding the future of journalistic work in the Netherlands (Brems et al., 2017; Slot, 2021), especially the younger respondents exhibit a low entrepreneurial habitus, while a strong marginalized habitus can be found more in proximity to the older ones. Those exhibiting a strong entrepreneurial habitus have chosen atypical work voluntarily, work more than 20 hours per week and are between 40 and 49 years old. As such, it could be that they entered freelancing after employment and are less in the “survival mode” described by Slot (2021, p. 426).

Regarding the distribution of doxa, all role perceptions find more substantial agreement among the better-established. Especially the accommodative role perception is spread out between the two hemispheres indicating that the better-connected, better-educated, and better-remunerated journalists tend to embrace the journalistic doxa that is most dominant in the Dutch field (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). Likewise, the older of the well-positioned on the right side also embrace a strong interventionist role. Thus, unlike in Austria, Denmark, and France, in the Netherlands, the older freelancers believe it is essential to advocate for social change. This observation could indicate that an interventionist role is becoming less relevant for newer Dutch journalists, especially those in atypical employment. In contrast, marginalized journalists over the age of 60 disagree with the interventionist role, complicating this interpretation.⁷⁶

Moreover, established freelancers embrace a strict separation of journalistic and other communication work and follow firm ethics during editorial decision-making. They are highly entrepreneurial and do not pursue other work, so they can easily follow these professional norms. On the other hand, the newcomers who supplement their income with work in PR and communication perceive such a division as less critical, maybe also to protect themselves from inter-role conflict (Frisque, 2014; Fröhlich et al., 2013; Obermaier & Koch, 2015). On the other hand, they value professional norms of objectivity and transparency much more strongly than established journalists.

⁷⁶ A longitudinal interpretation of Dutch role perceptions is difficult as previous scholarship has only recently focused on these possible roles and does not distinguish between freelancers and other journalists (Deuze, 2002; Pleijter et al., 2012).

The British field of atypical journalism

Lastly, while most of the other fields had only a few categories located close to the centre of the coordinates, the mapping of the British field of atypical journalism (Figure 9.6) indicates that most indicators do not stratify the field very well.⁷⁷ Still, the first two dimensions explain 22.9% of the variance (see Table 10.63). Like in Austria, France, and the Netherlands, the first dimension primarily comprises indicators of journalistic capital – *experience in years*, *experience in a national newsroom through internships*, and *beat* (see Table 10.64). Experience and internships are likewise located in opposite directions, and hard news beat reporting is more associated with experience. As such, the first dimension again primarily distinguishes between the experienced and the newcomers. The second dimension is characterized by both respondents' economic capital (*annual income* and whether it is *sufficient*) and journalistic capital *journalistic education* and *beat* (see Table 10.65). This axis thus distinguishes between the well-paid and precarious – a distinction that appears to be associated with journalistic education.

We can thus summarize the British field of atypical journalism as follows: The upper half includes the better paid atypical journalists with more extended experience. In the upper-left quadrant, we find respondents with moderate and sufficient income who have worked over 30 years in journalism, report on hard beat news and work in newsrooms. Opposite, the upper-right quadrant includes freelancers with less experience in years but high economic capital. They have little institutionalized cultural capital but higher inherited cultural capital. Some have a journalistic education – but as this category is located relatively far away from the rest of the stratification, it can be assumed that not many British journalists have completed a journalism degree. The lower half of the field includes the precarious and less well-paid who have to sustain their living with other sources of income – even though this is again not common in the British field of atypical journalism. The journalists located in the lower-right quadrant are much better educated and have completed an internship. Moreover, they have less than 14 years of experience. The lower-left quadrant comprises journalists who do not

⁷⁷ For example, experience through employment and education cluster relatively closely around the coordinate centre.




Figure 9.6: *The field of British atypical journalism*

Note. MCA of Dimensions 1 and 2 of the 12 active variables (above) and of supplementary variables projected in that space (below). Supplementary variables clustering too close around the centre were omitted. $N = 63$. Visualization of data with R package *factoextra*.

work in newsrooms and have no journalistic specialization. They report on soft news topics. Lastly, what is surprising compared to the other fields, winning an award is associated with soft news reporting, suggesting that awards indeed cannot act as a substantial indicator of journalistic capital in the UK.

These observations are also reflected when we include the supplementary variables in the plot (see the plot of supplementary variables, Figure 9.6). The upper half includes journalists working only in journalism and more than 20 hours per week. They tend to be over the age of 60, which makes up 27% of the sample. Previous research observed that British atypical journalists tend to be older and left permanent employment or were made redundant in recent restructuring (Spilsbury, 2016). As such, it can be assumed that these journalists, despite their age, are the most dominant in the atypical field as they have the highest level of overall capital. Moreover, while most British respondents report external factors for their atypical employment, those in the upper hemisphere have chosen to freelance voluntarily. Respondents between 50 and 59 years are located more closely to the centre of the plot; however, they still occupy positions with lower levels of social and economic capital. The area of the “newcomers” comprises those below the age of 49 and women journalists on the lower right side. These respondents are also more likely to work in PR and communication.

Considering their habitus, established journalists tend to be more entrepreneurial. At the same time, we can observe that a high marginalized habitus co-localizes with a high entrepreneurial habitus, indicating that for atypical journalists in the UK, approaching journalistic work with an entrepreneurial mind-set does not protect them from having to work long hours, being always available and working every weekend. Younger respondents are less entrepreneurial. While this might appear surprising, it speaks to findings from Singer and Broersma (2020), who found that British journalism students were less entrepreneurial-oriented than Dutch students.

Regarding journalists’ doxa, while indicators of role perception are primarily located close to the centre, indicators of professional norms are stratified across the field’s different spheres. Accordingly, moderate monitorial and weak interventionist role perceptions are located in the upper left part of the field, indicating that those most established are less interested in controlling those in power and least interested in contributing to social change. As such, these journalists adhere more to the doxa of the British journalistic field in which monitorial and interventionist role perceptions are not

dominant (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). However, a strong accommodative role co-localizes with a strong interventionist role perception in the right part of the upper field. This suggests that while successful freelancers adhere to the dominant doxa in market-driven journalistic fields, they are also more critical of societal developments. It could well be that these freelancers are idealists specialized in acting for social change and have left (or never entered) stable employment to be less constricted in doing so (Mathisen, 2017). Lastly, more dominated journalists reject a monitorial role, supporting arguments made by previous research that those more marginalized will be less interested in a watchdog role (Gollmitzer, 2014; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Likewise, the established moderately agree with the professional norm of objectivity. The middle-aged “newcomers” agree to it more strongly, indicating a shift towards more objectivity. Moreover, while British respondents generally do not think a strict separation between PR and journalistic work is essential (see Table 10.41), those favouring such a separation also do not pursue any other work.

Chapter summary

Summarising, journalists surveyed in this study can chiefly be described as precarious due to a lack of economic capital, material resources, and embeddedness in a professional community. Moreover, they largely occupy marginalized positions within the space of journalistic work. However, the MCA based on theoretical assumptions of cultural, journalistic, economic, and social capitals offers a more nuanced understanding of European atypical journalism which is stratified between established and marginalized agents. While MCA is inductive and the plots need to be interpreted against existing assumptions (Lindell et al., 2020), we find in all countries except Denmark a vertical division between dominating (established) and dominated (newcomers or marginalized older members) agents. Moreover, all fields are further divided along the horizontal axis between young and old journalists. In Denmark, this stratification is flipped by 90° but otherwise follows a similar separation.

The analysis only included information on atypical journalists, and we cannot generalize their position-taking in the broader fields of journalism. However, the findings indicate that those occupying dominant positions are unquestionably members of their respective journalistic fields while the dominated would most likely be found in more peripheral positions, and their membership might be disputed. Where a stratification of

doxa is visible, the established also tend to pursue the dominant role perceptions of their respective journalism culture and adhere to dominant professional norms. For instance, established freelancers in the Netherlands and the UK tend to embrace an accommodative role perception which is more strongly articulated in more competitive liberal media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019). Likewise, in the democratic-corporatist fields, newcomers are more radical in their doxa. In Denmark and Austria, high agreement to roles advocating for social change can be found among the younger dominated. This is reminiscent of findings indicating that freelancers in Denmark are more idealists in this regard and, at the same time, reminds of young journalists' expectations of the profession (Nölleke et al., 2022; Skovsgaard et al., 2012). The French field is in stark contrast to this observation. Here, the newcomers resemble the general journalistic field more with strong articulations of monitorial roles and moderate agreement to accommodative role perceptions (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). As these respondents have also most often completed a specialized journalistic education, it could be that this conformity with the field at large is a result of their socialization.

Journalists' professional norms map in less distinct patterns across countries. In Denmark, they do not stratify between groups, except for the agreement to objectivity which is highly articulated among younger established freelancers who have completed a specialized journalism education and less pronounced among older dominated respondents (Willig, 2016). Likewise, objectivity is perceived as necessary among dominated agents in Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands. While in liberal media systems, young newcomers are primarily embracing this professional norm, older journalists perceive it as important in Austria. Moreover, a strict separation of PR and journalistic work is only distinctively present in the French and Austrian atypical fields. In both cases, established journalists supplementing their journalistic income with communication work also moderately agree to such a separation. In both cases, this could have been prompted by discourse in the field, which acknowledges that freelancers must supplement their journalistic income and should be able to use their skills for this additional work while at the same time acting by journalism's professional norms of autonomy and transparency (Buckow, 2011; Frisque, 2014). In other countries, established freelancers do not do PR and communication work, and such delineations appear not to be reflected as strongly.

Likewise, in all fields except France, established older journalists have embraced an entrepreneurial habitus that includes establishing and maintaining relationships with commissioning newsrooms and approaching their work as tailored to the newsroom as the customer. It appears that in these media systems, journalists with existing social networks approach their work as a business while newcomers struggle to establish or embrace such a habitus even though it has long been part of the journalistic discourse and curriculum in some of these countries. This also highlights once more that being aware of the need to be entrepreneurial is not enough to act accordingly but that an entrepreneurial habitus also requires starting social capital (Cohen, 2015b; De Cock & De Smaele, 2016; Gollmitzer, 2014). Notably, an entrepreneurial habitus is not even stratified between dominant or dominated journalists in the French atypical field. However, the most dominated newcomers also report the highest marginalized habitus. This is in line with research suggesting that aspiring journalists in France are especially affected by precarity (Accardo, 2007; Frisque, 2014; McMane, 2012).

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The previous three chapters presented the composition of capitals that atypical journalists tend to amass, how technological and economic influences shape their *illusio*, *doxa* and *habitus*, and the stratification of atypical journalism across the countries under study. The empirical work of the dissertation has shown that while their work is financially precarious and primarily ICT-mediated, atypical journalists largely adhere to dominant understandings of what journalism is about. This chapter will mark the end of this doctoral thesis by briefly addressing the aims of this project and the results to my research questions presented in the introduction and chapter five (p. 147), and how these findings contribute to our knowledge on atypical journalism and journalism research in general. Moreover, I will discuss the limitations of my study and close with questions that future research should answer.

Technological and economic influences on atypical journalistic work

One key aim of this doctoral thesis was to build a theoretical framework to understand how influences external to the journalistic field can shape journalists' understanding of their journalistic role. By employing a field-theoretical perspective, we can deduct how power relations within the broader social space shape the journalistic field and consequently impact which resources are perceived as necessary and valuable within the field and which beliefs and perceptions are taken-for-granted. As research in the European context points to journalistic crises shaped by economic and technological forces, this study specifically addressed these and how they affect those most susceptible to them – journalists in atypical employment.

Little digital capital and *habitus*

First, looking at how new forms of technology are incorporated as digital capital and digital *habitus*, results reiterate findings from qualitative research. Most digital platforms are not employed to enhance digital capital. Atypical journalists are generally reluctant to use digital platforms like blogs, social media, and messenger services to source information and, as such, adhere to boundary work journalists generally employ to maintain their legitimate authority (Carlson, 2017; Örnebring, 2013). Remarkably, atypical journalists also do not really view digital platforms as tools to distribute their

work. Thus, even though respondents were sampled through platforms where they advertised their skills, only a few had a personal blog, and most turned to Facebook and Twitter when it came to sharing their work, indicating that these platforms appear to be most relevant for journalists generally. Moreover, while atypical journalists do not perceive social media as beneficial for their productivity, they tend to use them more for branding purposes, albeit reluctantly. What is especially remarkable is that only four in ten journalists think social media will help them gain respect and renown, and only half use them to foster and maintain direct contact with audiences. This finding provides more nuance to studies investigating how journalists employ social media, which found that atypical journalists use them more to brand themselves explicitly than employed journalists (Brems et al., 2017; Molyneux & Holton, 2015). As such, while atypical journalists employing social media might be more likely to use them for branding purposes, still using social media at all is not as common a practice as scholarship might assume. Likewise, and contrary to assumptions based on current developments in Western media systems, only a few and primarily young journalists agreed to statements of a digital habitus. Generally, while two-thirds produce for digital media organizations, only a few are paid for clicks received, suggesting that these practices are not as prominent in digital news work across Europe (Cohen et al., 2019; Hayes & Silke, 2018).

Moreover, findings illustrate that atypical journalists are primarily connected to the professional community through Internet and Communication Technology (ICTs). Their main contact to the newsrooms they work for is through newsroom editors, and only a few receive feedback from other journalists. Moreover, only three in ten is satisfied with the opportunity to discuss their work with other journalists, and only 38% are content with the appreciation they receive from the journalistic community. Thus, the findings reiterate that ICT-mediated work objectively isolates atypical journalists from the professional community, which is also felt subjectively as they do not necessarily enjoy the lack of contact (Buckow, 2011; Gollmitzer, 2014). Still, four in ten are regularly in contact with other freelance journalists, suggesting that there might be a companionship among freelance journalists to overcome difficulties with atypical work (Norbäck & Styhre, 2019). However, the relationship between ICT-mediated work and isolation from the professional community might also be more nuanced. Half of the respondents are satisfied with the contact they have with other journalists, and in open answers, journalists often pointed to conflicts within the newsroom that led them to work freelance. While these open answers cannot be generalized, it reiterates findings from

other studies on why journalists leave full-time employment (Antunovic et al., 2019; Edstrom & Ladendorf, 2012) and might also indicate that freelancing enables journalists to focus on their work away from the buzz of open-plan offices.

Low economic capital and high entrepreneurial habitus

Likewise, findings support arguments that atypical journalism is marked by economic precarity. Most respondents earned relatively little and were primarily remunerated for the final product, not their working hours. This also strengthens arguments made by Meyen and Riesmeyer (2012), Gollmitzer (2014), and Mathisen (2019) that atypical journalists often do not have the resources to engage in more time-intensive investigative reporting as spending more hours on a story reduces their hourly rates. Moreover, this actual precarity is reflected in their perception of financial precarity, even among those earning comparatively better. Only few are satisfied with their financial and occupational security and career opportunities. As such, it is not surprising that atypical journalists pursued work in other areas to overcome uncertainty. Most of them turned to other communication work, supporting previous scholarship about the blurring of journalistic and communication (Deuze, 2007; Koch & Obermaier, 2014; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Still, atypical journalists are highly satisfied with the content of their work. This finding reiterates previous scholarship situating atypical journalism at the intersection of precarity and following a passion (Cohen, 2015b; Gollmitzer, 2014; Mathisen, 2017). Through a Bourdieusian perspective, this over-identification with their work, rendering it their “raison d’être” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 245), opens up an opportunity for the media industry to exploit their passion and hope in turn of potential stability in the future (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 89).

Consequently, journalists could embrace a more entrepreneurial habitus offering them more agency and a sense of independence (D. Baines & Kennedy, 2010), or they could let work delineate the separation between work and personal time. Whereas I conceptualized an entrepreneurial and marginalized habitus to measure these two reactions, both forms of habitus appear to co-exist in large parts. While journalists agreed most to statements of an entrepreneurial habitus, 76% also work long hours without a break to meet a deadline, and 66% react immediately to calls or emails from commissioning editors. As such, these findings contribute to the uneasiness voiced in the academic discourse surrounding solo-entrepreneurialism (Cohen, 2015b; Ladendorf,

2012; Norbäck & Styhre, 2019). While approaching journalistic work more as a business might be beneficial for start-ups and other journalistic collectives, on the individual level, embracing an entrepreneurial mind- and skill set does not necessarily improve journalists' working situation. It can offer them a sense of independence; however, discourses around thinking entrepreneurially also veil the precarity and self-exploitative nature of cultural work. Moreover, younger respondents more often exhibited an entrepreneurial habitus, demonstrating that they have already internalized discourses around entrepreneurial thinking as relevant to remain in the field (Gollmitzer, 2014; Singer & Broersma, 2020). Still, it does not protect them from precarity. Thus, findings have fundamental implications for journalism education. While it is relevant to equip aspiring journalists with knowledge about the competitiveness of the field and offer them entrepreneurial skills to 'make it', even more important is fostering a critical awareness of exploitation and equipping them with the confidence to challenge such working conditions.

Unsurprisingly, and similar to European journalists in general, atypical journalists do not perceive strong commercial influences on their work (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019). Even though atypical journalists primarily report on soft news beats, they do not regard advertising considerations, public relations, or free products as influential on their work. While it could be that public relations officers approach atypical journalists less to promote products and services, it could also be that respondents underestimate the commercial influences. Moreover, only 17% think web analytics and audience research are influential. In general, atypical journalists appear to be less oriented towards the audience, as the findings of branding practices also illustrated. Thus, while Meyen and Springer (2009) suggest that atypical journalists have two sets of customers—the audience and the newsroom—it appears that atypical journalists in this study are primarily oriented towards the newsroom. This is further supported by more than half saying they think of the news organization as a customer when producing their stories. Both findings are notable and need further investigation.

Economic and technological influences on journalists' *illusio*, *doxa* and *habitus*

However, as the results of this thesis illustrate, specific technological and economic transformations only slightly affect journalists' *illusio*, *doxa*, and *habitus*, supporting arguments that atypical journalists share an intrinsic understanding of what journalism is and who belongs to it with the journalistic field at large (Deuze & Witschge, 2017;

Örnebring et al., 2018). Accordingly, atypical journalists generally voice similarly strong adherence to the principles of journalism that are “canonical around the world” (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019, p. 173). They believe professional norms of objectivity and transparency to be essential and follow strict ethical principles during the editing process. However, they are less strict when maintaining a separation between journalistic and public relations work, suggesting that atypical journalists as entrepreneurs similarly negotiate boundaries between commercial and journalism just like news organizations (Coddington, 2015). ICT-mediated work primarily does not affect journalists’ understanding of the taken-for-granted truths about journalistic work (doxa). However, in some cases, their socialization equips them with a better sense of doxa. For instance, atypical journalists who have long worked in journalism are better equipped to handle difficult ethical situations during the editing process. This speaks to other findings indicating that newcomers in atypical employment with little socialization within newsrooms have difficulty knowing the hidden rules in specific newsrooms and suggests that seniority and having built a network of customers makes journalists less vulnerable to demands from commissioning newsrooms (Elmore & Massey, 2012; Gollmitzer, 2014; Ladendorf, 2012; Summ, 2013). Moreover, having worked in a newsroom in the past equips journalists with the dominant doxa of Western journalism that journalists should not engage as supporters and collaborators of the government. This finding is relevant, especially in light of the blurring boundaries of the journalistic field, where other atypical contributors like bloggers and party news media enter (Heft et al., 2020; Maares & Hanusch, 2020b; Vos et al., 2012). It suggests that the doxa of being more adversarial towards the government and as such the nomos of journalism as a fourth estate might be questioned more by (semi-) journalistic actors with no direct point of contact to the dominant journalistic culture. Concerning economic influences, journalists’ doxa is not affected when journalists work in other communication fields, not even when they depend on that other income. This suggests that atypical journalists generally share the tacit understanding of the journalistic field. Only journalists working in PR and communication challenge the professional norm of maintaining a “wall” between PR and journalism. On the other hand, working in PR and other communication work enables journalists to achieve independence from the precarious nature of atypical journalistic work.

Atypical journalists' trajectories and access to resources

Another aim of this study was to consider journalists' trajectories, that is, their accumulated resources and life-story, and their access to resources more explicitly. As recent studies suggest, journalists often have a middle- to upper-class background (Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Pereira, 2020). To fully understand why journalists remain in precarious conditions, it is necessary to reflect on their upbringing. Moreover, while scholarship recently called for a reconsideration of the materiality of journalistic work (Deuze & Witschge, 2018; Örnebring et al., 2018), it is even more important to investigate them outside the newsroom and investigate the resources of atypical journalists. Lacking access to material resources such as equipment and immaterial resources like relations with informants complicates atypical journalistic work immensely (Deuze & Witschge, 2020; Meyen & Springer, 2009). Cohen (2015b) criticizes that research has long ignored the material conditions of freelance journalistic work. While we would expect freelancers as self-employed journalists to work with their own resources, they are still investments that atypical journalists must make upfront. However, as current remuneration rates in journalism do not allow journalists to cover maintenance of these resources through their invoices to customers and as more and more newcomers to the field must endure years of un- and underpaid labour, examining their material resources allows us to a) fully understand who can afford to enter the field and b) the degree of precarity of atypical journalists.

Regarding their trajectory leading them to atypical journalistic work, most entered atypical journalism because of the structural conditions in the field. As such, following De Cock and De Smaele (2016, p. 261), the majority can be categorized more as 'forced' freelancers. Findings also illustrate that choice is a relevant aspect of journalists' satisfaction with their working arrangement. Concerning their overall volume of capital, results support findings from mostly qualitative research: atypical journalists generally earn little, are well-educated but have accumulated only moderate levels of journalistic capital, and relatively little social capital with the professional community. Moreover, findings illustrate strikingly that being better educated does not contribute to a higher income. While atypical journalists have relatively high amounts of embodied and institutionalized cultural capital, both through their parents' education and occupation as well as their own education, this background is no advantage. As this especially concerns younger journalists with a tertiary degree, it supports findings that social capital in the

form of a broad network of customers is more relevant than cultural capital to be a successful freelancer (Hummel et al., 2012). This finding further contributes to arguments that newcomers should not start as freelancers as it requires more time-labour to reach the necessary social capital (Elmore & Massey, 2012).

Moreover, these findings again question to what extent teaching entrepreneurial journalism empowers journalism students to enter the journalistic field in a less exploitative way. Still, while especially younger and women journalists could be considered working under precarious conditions, it is also true that they come primarily from a middle to upper-class upbringing. This further supports findings from scholarship that while the boundaries of the journalistic field are highly permeable for lack of professional barriers like educational credentials (Lewis, 2015), the entry barrier for people from low-income families are still high (Gollmitzer, 2014; Matos, 2020; Pereira, 2020). From a Bourdieusian (1993, 1996) perspective, journalistic work has been transforming from the ‘day job’ to support aspirations in art or literature to an aspiration itself, supplemented through work in fields governed even more by economic logic.

Economic capital is also directly related to the access to resources that atypical journalists need to pursue their work. Findings show that atypical journalists mostly rely on their own hard- and software and personal network of experts and sources. Unsurprisingly, whether atypical journalists are supported by commissioning newsrooms in this regard is also shaped by the type of content journalists produce. Slightly more than half working for broadcast media had access to cameras and audio equipment as well as editing software – by far more than journalists working for text-based media types did. Still, this means that more than four in ten broadcast journalists have bought their own cameras, recorders and software, which are considerable investments. While such sacrifices might appear reasonable for the freedom that atypical journalists receive, especially as broadcast remuneration rates are said to be higher, at least in public service (Summ, 2013), this argument cannot be supported by my findings. There were no differences apparent in income along different media types, and as such, having to buy a camera, a high-quality audio recorder, and editing software are more considerable investments than for other media types. Likewise, journalists working for online-only media primarily used their personal computers and software. As such, especially the young who earn little to nothing (Hayes & Silke, 2018) are most likely to invest in equipment. Remarkably, when it comes to immaterial resources like the social capital of

newsrooms, their network of experts and sources, more respondents across the platforms had access to these. This implies that journalists are more dependent on newsrooms than their material access suggests – if they were independent freelancers, they would rely on their personal network of resources. Overall, these results reiterate that news media benefit from buying from atypical journalists in two ways. First, buying the single text, feature or story is less expensive than buying journalists' labour, and second, they save the cost of investing and sustaining equipment and software. Likewise, journalists accept this either because they are independent freelancers and can afford this investment to maintain their freedom or because they take their personal hardware as a taken-for-granted resource for employment.

Mapping atypical journalistic fields –same but different?

Lastly, this study set out to compare atypical journalistic work in different European media systems to deepen our knowledge of how atypical journalistic culture is shaped. While comparative research often focuses on unearthing differences (Hanitzsch et al., 2010), the key findings point to a pattern of similarity across countries. Generally, journalists in all media systems under investigation can chiefly be described as precarious due to a lack of economic capital, material resources, and embeddedness in a professional community. Moreover, atypical journalists' perceptions differ from those of all journalists surveyed in the past in similar ways. For instance, they perceive personal relationships and conventions of the profession as more influential and commercial influences less significant for their work than their employed colleagues, which illustrates that working outside the newsroom shapes journalistic practice differently (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019). As such, deadlines might be felt more flagrantly when working primarily remote and self-organized than working within the newsroom's routines (Antunovic et al., 2019; S. Baines, 1999; Gollmitzer, 2014), and ethical decisions appear more pronounced influential when working alone (J. Jenkins, 2017; Mathisen, 2019). Similarly, atypical journalists might be less confronted with audience ratings and advertising considerations than journalists working in a newsroom. However, it is noteworthy that they also report relatively little influence from public relations and freebies as qualitative research suggests such economic influences might be relevant for atypical journalists, at least in lifestyle journalism (Rosenkranz, 2019). Likewise, atypical journalists are generally less interested in accommodating the audience and more interested in

advocating for social change compared to all journalists (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019). In line with other findings from this thesis, this suggests that atypical journalists are less oriented towards the audience. This suggests that unless they produce for online media, they might not be confronted with audience behaviour and audience feedback as much and thus adhere more to other long-held ideals like monitoring those in power or changing society for the better.

Moreover, atypical journalists largely occupy marginalized positions within the space of journalistic work, but there is variation within the atypical journalistic field, and the stratification along different indicators of relevant resources follows similar patterns across countries. Accordingly, we can distinguish between dominating (established) and dominated (marginalized) journalists. The marginalized comprise agents whose status as ‘real journalists’ might be debated in the field as they are either aspiring young students who lack social capital or older (and retired) journalists lacking cultural capital. This indicates that to pursue atypical journalistic work across Western European countries successfully, agents require both relationships to the field and specific education. Where a stratification of doxa is visible, the established also tend to pursue the dominant role perceptions of their respective journalism culture and adhere to dominant professional norms. For instance, established freelancers in the Netherlands and the UK tend to embrace an accommodative role perception, which is more strongly articulated in more competitive liberal media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2019). Likewise, in more democratic-corporatist fields, newcomers are more radical in their doxa. In Denmark and Austria, high agreement to roles advocating for social change can be found among the younger and less established journalists. This is reminiscent of findings indicating that freelancers in Denmark are more idealists in this regard and, at the same time, reminds of young journalists’ expectations of the profession (Hartley & Olsen, 2016; Nölleke et al., 2022; Skovsgaard et al., 2012).

However, and this might also be since the study only compares five countries, there are also differences apparent, most profoundly at the level of journalists’ accumulated capital and their doxa. The differences in capital composition are partially rooted in the fact that atypical journalistic work in Denmark and the UK is more often done by older experienced journalists, whereas in Austria, France, and the Netherlands, the atypical journalistic field is much younger. As such, age shapes economic and social capital as time-labour allows journalists to amass more of both over the years (Bourdieu,

1986). Still, differences in cultural capital are also rooted in the historical contexts of the journalistic fields. Generally, while both institutionalized and embodied cultural capital tend to increase as younger journalists are more often from middle- and upper-class families and have a tertiary degree, in countries where journalism was historically primarily done by intellectuals and other members of the elite – like France and Denmark – atypical journalists are better educated.

Still, the national space and the media system shape the composition of atypical journalists. In Denmark, where entry barriers are regulated by admitting fewer students to journalism programs (Willig, 2016), respondents often entered atypical journalism because it led them to take care of their family while still working in journalism or because they were made redundant. Likewise, British journalists wanted to take care of their families or did not find a new position after being laid off. In Austria, France, and the Netherlands, on the other hand, journalists more often said they tried to enter journalism through freelancing. This suggests that labour laws protect employed journalists, and aspiring journalists must most likely enter through years of uncertain employment (Frisque, 2014; Nölleke et al., 2022; Powers & Vera-Zambrano, 2018a).

When it comes to their use of digital platforms, we find the most striking contrasts between journalists from Denmark on the one hand and journalists from the UK and the Netherlands on the other. Danish journalists use such platforms much less for sourcing, distributing their work, and branding themselves. In contrast, Dutch journalists use social media most often to source their stories, British journalists share their work most often on digital platforms, and both British and Dutch journalists believe social media to be an essential tool for branding. These findings indicate that Danish journalistic culture might be more critical of digital platforms and social media in general, while Dutch and British journalists' platform use has already been implemented in their digital capital. Moreover, and in line with expectations about highly competitive media markets, British and Dutch journalists have internalized the tacit rule of self-branding (Brems et al., 2017). Likewise, in all fields except France, established older journalists have embraced an entrepreneurial habitus that includes forming and maintaining relationships with commissioning newsrooms and approaching their work as tailored to the newsroom as the customer. Thus, it appears that, especially in media systems with high media concentration and highly competitive journalistic labour markets like Austria, the Netherlands, and the UK, journalists with existing social networks approach their work as a business while newcomers struggle to establish or embrace such a habitus.

Lastly, professional norms like objectivity and a strict separation between journalism and other communication work vary across countries. While journalists generally believed that objectivity was necessary, significant differences were apparent. Austrian atypical journalists more likely claim to be objective and impartial in their reporting, British, Danish and Dutch journalists disagreed more with this norm. In all countries except Denmark and France, objectivity is also perceived as more important among the dominated within the field, most often the older dominated. This indicates that established atypical journalists in Austria, the Netherlands, and the UK are more critical of objectivity as a professional norm. In contrast, younger, established freelancers in Denmark and France articulate this norm most strongly as a result of their institutionalized journalism education (Willig, 2016). Moreover, French and Austrian journalists believe more strongly that a strict separation of PR and journalistic work is essential. Remarkably, in both cases, established journalists supplement their journalistic income with communication work, whereas in other countries, only marginalized journalists work in other communication areas. As such, despite belonging to the established within their field, they must supplement their income and have turned to communication work as it is within their skills and interests. Nevertheless, these journalists also believe it is crucial to separate between PR and journalistic work, and they are aware of the tensions between both. As such, this is reminiscent of discourses in Austria and France, which acknowledge that precarious journalistic work must be supplemented through a more stable income and that this income can come from communication work if journalists aim to implement some form of ‘watertightness’ or personal ethics when negotiating their different customers (Buckow, 2011; Frisque, 2014).

Concluding, this is the first comparative study that investigates both atypical journalists’ working conditions and their perception of professional norms and journalism’s role in society. As such, it bridges research on atypical journalists, which in recent years has primarily focused on their precarious working conditions and their reactions to it by embracing an entrepreneurial mind- and skill-set with comparative research investigating how country-level influences shape journalistic culture.

Limitations and future research

Of course, the study comes not without its limitations and had I known in 2017, when I first planned this project, what I know now, I would reconsider some of my decisions. I have deliberately chosen a survey approach since most knowledge on atypical journalists is based on interview studies, and it allowed me to compare journalistic cultures that I would have otherwise had no access to due to language barriers. However, compiling a survey is always tricky as every question is one too many for the respondent (REFs). In hindsight, questions regarding journalists' income per piece or hour and the remuneration practices of media organizations would have offered valuable insight. While considerable thought and time was put into developing the questionnaire, some items appear a bit ambiguous in retrospection and could have been improved before data collection – had the questionnaire not already been professionally translated and back-translated. Moreover, while this process of translation and back-translation was employed to minimize any variance between the questionnaires, it can still be that differences between countries are also grounded in different wording and thus overestimated. Likewise, while I tried in the past four years to learn as much as possible about the journalistic cultures in the respective countries, my knowledge to interpret the results is primarily based on literature as I lack the experience of the Danish, French, Dutch, or British journalistic field.

Moreover, atypical journalists are incredibly difficult to sample and ideally, we would approach them through the news media for which they work. However, it soon became apparent that such a procedure would not be feasible as it a) would be beyond the scope of the time available, and b) media organizations were unwilling to share contact details of their freelance and contract work contributors. Moreover, media organizations (and unions) both pointed to the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as a reason why they could not share contributors' contact details. As a result, respondents were sampled through publicly available data on different databases showcasing journalists' portfolios and LinkedIn. While this approach provides functional equivalence across countries, it also might overrepresent journalists with a more entrepreneurial mind-set. Likewise, while the thesis aimed at allowing for more variety in defining who could be considered a journalist, it still required them to earn pay with their journalistic work once a month in the past half-year. However, this working definition still excluded many who might not be paid every month or who have longer stretches of journalistic work

combined with stretches of non-journalistic work. From my personal experience as a freelancer for public radio, I know that continuous monthly income is at times difficult to achieve. Thus, my arguably less strict sampling criteria still excluded some journalistic contributors from the most marginalized spectrum.

Lastly, the overall population of atypical journalists is generally unknown, and my sample is small even compared to the estimations of freelance journalists in the respective countries (see chapter six, p. 169). What is more, the effects of my findings are generally minor as well. Thus, while the findings still provide valuable insight and are helpful for the cross-national comparison, they are not representative. Generally, reflecting on the experience of sampling atypical journalists for my doctoral research, I believe we must reconsider to what extent representative samples of journalists are truly achievable as the general population of working journalists is increasingly difficult to assess. In hindsight, I can understand sampling strategies that focus exclusively on employed or full-time journalists as they offer at least a sense of representativeness. However, such representativeness will always be flawed if we continue to exclude journalistic workers because we do not know their overall population.

This being said, this thesis still provides a sound basis for further research into atypically employed journalists. While the findings have once more underscored the precarity of atypical journalistic work, recent developments like the COVID-19 pandemic have illustrated that atypical journalistic work is not that different from what we have long considered ‘normal’ journalistic work. As more and more journalists moved to remote work in recent years, issues of access to resources and the subjective dimensions of precarious work like the delineation of work and personal time and social isolation become more pertinent for journalists in general. When I began this thesis project, the material conditions shaping journalistic work were not at the heart of scholarly inquiry, and I am pleased to see the increasing interest in journalistic labour and precarity in journalism in general (cf. Hanitzsch & Rick, 2021; Örnebring et al., 2018). However, I also believe that we must tease out how specific working conditions shape journalistic practice and doxa. As such, future research should aim to sample respondents deliberately across employment status when investigating journalistic practice in general, both in quantitative and qualitative research. Likewise, while it might appear unnecessary or uncomfortable, we must consider journalists’ “trajectories” or life stories, including their familial background into the analysis.

Moreover, there still remain questions unanswered regarding atypical journalistic work. Generally, to understand atypical journalistic work and atypical journalistic culture across media systems more comprehensively, it would be necessary to expand the scope of this study. As such, more countries should be compared, especially from Scandinavia, which tends to have better laws protecting workers, and Southern Europe, in which especially younger generations have difficulty entering the job market across sectors. Second, the findings suggest a complex relationship of atypical journalists to the rest of the professional community. While some appear to experience social isolation, others are content with their self-employment as they have deliberately chosen to exit standard employment. However, colleagues and the professional community could also function as an immaterial resource of journalistic work. As questions of remote work and social isolation were not at the core of this project, this relationship remains unanswered and should be addressed by future research. Lastly, atypical journalists were generally less focused on accommodating the audience with their work and did not perceive their readers, viewers, and listeners particularly influential for their everyday practice. Still, about half aim to reach their audience directly on social media; however, it appears that journalists are generally dissatisfied with the feedback from their audience. Work by Norbäck and Styre (2019) indicates that freelancers ignore what happens with their work after publication as a means to protect themselves from over-identification. Thus, engaging with and being oriented towards the audience could be damaging to journalists' mental health. Here, more qualitative research could tease out the relationship between atypical journalists and their audience and how it contributes to their journalistic doxa.

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Appendix

I. Questionnaire and Invitation Letter



page 01

Dear Madam or Sir,

Thank you for participating in this study on atypical journalistic work. Due to the massive changes in journalism over the past few decades, a range of new kinds of journalists have emerged, many of whom work outside established newsrooms. These include freelancers, contract workers, entrepreneurial journalists, bloggers, social media journalists and many more, who produce more and more journalistic work. However, while it might increasingly occur outside newsrooms, journalistic work still encompasses similar basic routines such as selection and research of topics, writing and producing of news items and stories.

However, we have an incomplete understanding of such journalists' working conditions. To shed light on this important trend, this study aims to compare producers of atypical journalistic work in six European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Poland, the Netherlands, and the UK). With your help, we can contribute to a further understanding of journalistic work outside of the newsroom and make your everyday working reality more visible.

To ensure we cover as many producers and as wide as possible a range of types of work, we kindly ask you to participate in the following survey. We will ask you questions about your work experience, working routine, working conditions and your perception of journalistic work. It will take you approximately 15-20 minutes to answer all questions.

Your participation is entirely voluntary. Apart from the first two questions you do not have to complete any questions you are uncomfortable answering. You can withdraw from the survey during your participation at anytime. However, as the questionnaire is completely anonymous, once it has been commenced, it will not be possible to withdraw submitted answers. All answers will be anonymous and stored securely.

If you have any questions or require further information please don't hesitate to contact us at phoebe.maeres@univie.ac.at.

Many thanks in advance!

Mandatory question 1**page 02**

1. Which of the following best describe your current employment? Tick all that apply. [filter: atypical journalists]

- ☐ Full-time employment, permanent contract
- ☐ Part-time employment, permanent contract
- ☐ Full-time employment, temporary contract (e.g. 6 months contract)
- ☐ Part-time employment, temporary contract (e.g. 6 months contract)
- ☐ [country specific for freelancer]
- ☐ [country specific for contract worker]
- ☐ Other, please specify

Mandatory question 2**page 03**

2. In the past six months, did you earn money with **journalistic work** at least once a month? [filter: UGC etc.]

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

page 04

3. There are many ways to describe journalistic work. How would you describe your current occupational role?

.....

4. How long have you been producing journalistic work for?

... years

5. And how long have you been producing journalistic work for in your current occupational role (e.g. freelancer, [country specific], etc.)?

... years

6. What subject areas do you generally cover? Please name up to five topics that you most frequently work on (i.e. politics, culture, finance etc.)

.....

7. What media platforms do you produce content for?

- ☐ Newspapers and Weeklies
- ☐ Magazines
- ☐ Online Only newsrooms (e.g. [country specific online only])
- ☐ Online Only Media such as blogs
- ☐ Social media such as Facebook
- ☐ Public Broadcast
- ☐ Commercial Broadcast
- ☐ News Agencies
- ☐ Photo Agencies
- ☐ Other, please specify:

8. When you think about your average daily work routine, how much time do you spend working in the following contexts?

1. 100-76%
2. 75-51%
3. 50-26%
4. 25-1%
5. Never

Work from home.

Work in a rented office.

Work in a flexible co-working space.

Work in a coffeehouse.

Work in a newsroom.

9. When you think about your average daily work in the past six months, how often does the following happen?

1. Daily
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

I communicate with newsroom editors via email or phone.

I talk to newsroom editors in person.

I talk to other employed journalists in person.

I talk to other freelance journalists.

10. Do you regularly attend editorial meetings?

1. Always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

11. When you think about feedback on your work, how often does the following apply to your journalistic work?

1. Daily
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

I receive feedback from other journalists.

I receive feedback from editors-in-chief.

I receive feedback from audiences.

12. When you think about the access you have to resources, which of the following applies to your current working situation?

	both equally					
I have access to hardware (computers, cameras, audio-equipment) from a news organisation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	I use my own hardware (computers, audio-equipment).
I have access to software (audio/visual editing software etc.) from a news organisation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	I use my own software (audio/visual editing software etc.).
I have access to the network of experts and sources of my commissioning newsroom.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	I only use my own networks of sources and experts.

13. How often do you use the following for sourcing stories?

1. Daily
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

Blogs authored by journalists or other experts (e.g. scientists, lawyer)

Blogs authored by regular citizens

Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter

Visual micro-blogging sites, such as Instagram, or Tumblr

Social networking sites, such as Facebook

Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn

Audio–visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr

Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud

Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or SnapChat

Content communities and crowd-sourcing sites, such as Wikipedia.

14. How often do you use the following to disseminate your journalistic work?

1. Daily
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

Your personal blog

Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter

Visual micro-blogging sites, such as Instagram, or Tumblr

Social networking sites, such as Facebook

Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn

Audio–visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr

Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud

Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or SnapChat

15. When it comes to what is important in your daily routine, how strongly do you agree with the following aspects of your journalistic work?

1. strongly agree
2. somewhat agree
3. neither agree, nor disagree
4. somewhat disagree
5. strongly disagree

Part of my daily work is pitching new ideas to news organizations.

Often times I get stories assigned by a commissioning newsroom.

When I produce my stories I think of the news organization as customer.

I reuse interviews and research for multiple articles and news stories.

I work every weekend in the month.

I regularly report directly from my phone (mobile journalism).

I sometimes produce stories that I think are important, even if I don't get paid for them.

For some of my work, I am paid on a basis of clicks received, rather than words written.

I purposely select news organizations I want to produce journalistic content for.

Part of my job is maintaining contacts with newsroom editors in order not to be forgotten.

I know my marketplace, my customers, and my unique selling points.

I am prepared to produce stories for any news organization who will buy my work.

For most of my stories, I research information solely online.

I frequently live-tweet or live-blog for news organisations.

If need be, I work for long stretches without a break until my deadline is met.

My focus is on in-depth reporting and not breaking news.

If my commissioning editor calls, I pick up regardless of the time of day.

16. When you think about your professional use of social media, how much do you agree with the following?

1. strongly agree
2. somewhat agree
3. neither agree, nor disagree
4. somewhat disagree
5. strongly disagree

Using social media allows me to promote myself and my work much better

Because of social media, I communicate better with people relevant to my work

Social media has improved my productivity

Social media has decreased my daily workload

Social media allows me to be faster in reporting news stories

Social media allows me to cover more news stories

I use social media to professionally gain respect and renown.

I use social media to develop relationships with audiences.

17. Here is another list of things that could be important for your daily journalistic work. How much do you agree with these statements?

1. strongly agree
2. somewhat agree
3. neither agree, nor disagree
4. somewhat disagree
5. strongly disagree

My credibility is vital, therefore I do not accept changes made by my commissioning editor that go beyond the scope of my story.

I select my clients carefully and never accept assignments from organizations with questionable objectives.
 I prefer to withdraw stories rather than publish them if the commissioning editor changes them too much.
 I would never engage in other communication work, such as corporate publishing or PR.
 I don't oppose changes made by my commissioning editor, because I fear I will lose a client.
 Ethical breaches will happen anyway, opposing critical changes made by my commissioning editor will not make a difference.
 When I engage in other communication work (such as PR or corporate publishing), it does not compromise the quality of my journalistic work.
 Telling everyone where my facts originated is important to me
 I show anyone that I include all concerned parties in my news stories
 I include user-generated information in my work
 I write stories around verifiable facts
 As long as I don't willfully suppress relevant information I will write truthful stories
 It is not acceptable to cause readers to feel one way or another
 The way I write stories should not nudge readers to take a particular side

page 09

18. If you have a good idea for a subject that you think is important and should be followed up, how often are you able to get the subject covered?

1. Always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never
6. I do not make such proposals

19. Thinking of your work overall, how much freedom do you personally have in selecting the stories you work on?

1. Complete freedom
2. A great deal of freedom
3. Some freedom
4. Little freedom
5. No freedom at all

20. How much freedom do you usually have in deciding which aspects of a story should be emphasized?

1. Complete freedom
2. A great deal of freedom
3. Some freedom
4. Little freedom
5. No freedom at all

page 10

21. Why did you start to do journalistic work outside of full-time employment? Tick all that apply.

- ☐ It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy.
- ☐ I tried to enter journalism and build up a portfolio with my freelance work.
- ☐ I was laid off and another employment was not possible.
- ☐ It allowed me to take care of my family and work in journalism.
- ☐ Other, please specify:

22. If you think about all the journalistic stories that you produced last year, how many did you produce in an average month?

...

23. In an average week, how many hours do you work in journalism?

24. Do you do any other work apart from journalistic work?

Yes, please specify....

No

page 11

[if Q24 =1] Why do you do this other work? Tick all that apply.

- ☐ My income from journalism is not sufficient.
- ☐ I enjoy working in this other field.
- ☐ This other work helps me overcome times when I do not have enough contract work in journalism.
- ☐ Other, please specify

[if Q24 =1] In an average week, how much time do you spend on your journalistic work compared to your non-journalistic work?

1. 0-25% journalistic work
2. 26-50% journalistic work
3. 51-75% journalistic work
4. 76-100% journalistic work

[if Q24 = 2] Do you depend on other sources of income?

- ☐ No
- ☐ I receive financial support from my spouse / partner.
- ☐ I receive financial support from my parents.
- ☐ I receive financial support from governmental institutions.
- ☐ Other, please specify

page 12

25. To what extent are you satisfied with the following?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied
4. Somewhat dissatisfied
5. Not satisfied at all

My daily workload.

The variety of journalistic work.

The topics I work on.

The time for research and investigation.

The career opportunities in journalism.

The separation between professional and private life.

My income from journalistic work

My depth of contact with commissioning newsrooms.

The freedom to plan my own work schedule.

The quality of feedback I receive from my audience.

The amount of contact with other journalists.

The appreciation for my work by the journalistic community.

The vocational security.

The financial security.

The opportunity to discuss work in progress with other journalists.

The relationships I have with other journalists.

26. In general, how satisfied are you with your current working situation? 10=very satisfied; 0= very dissatisfied

27. If you were offered a permanent full-time contract in a newsroom, would you accept it?

- Yes
- No, because...
- It depends, please specify...
- I already have full-time employment

page 13

28. Here is a list of potential sources of influence. Please tell me how much influence each of the following has on your work. ?

1. Extremely influential
2. Very influential
3. Somewhat influential
4. Little influential
5. Not at all influential

My personal interests

My friends, acquaintances and family

Other journalists

My editorial supervisors, higher editors and commissioning editors

Advertising considerations

Public relations

Free products and services

My own financial resources

Relationships with sources

Feedback from the audience

Audience research and data, e.g. web analytics/metrics

Deadlines

Conventions and ethics of the profession

Media laws and regulation

Social media

page 14

29. When you think about how you identify as a professional journalist, how important are the following aspects for you?

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Somewhat important
4. Little important
5. Not important at all

Be a detached observer.

Report things as they are.

Provide analysis of current affairs.

Monitor and scrutinize political leaders.

Monitor and scrutinize business.

Set the political agenda.

Influence public opinion.

Advocate for social change.

Be an adversary of the government.

Convey a positive image of political leadership.

Support government policy.

Provide entertainment and relaxation.

Provide the kind of news that attracts the largest audience.

Provide advice, orientation and direction for daily life.

Provide information people need to make political decisions.

Motivate people to participate in political activity.

Let people express their views.

Educate the audience.
Tell stories about the world.
Promote tolerance and cultural diversity.

page 15

30. In the past, have you personally ever received an award for your journalistic work? If yes, how many?

- ☐ Yes...
- ☐ I have not won an award.

31. What is your highest grade of school or level of education you have completed?

Not completed high school

- ☐ Completed high school
- ☐ Bachelor's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Master's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Undertook some university studies, but no degree

page 16

32. During your studies, in which field did you specialize? Tick all that apply.

- ☐ Specialized in journalism
- ☐ Specialized in another communication field
- ☐ Other, specify

page 17

[if Q32 = 3] Did you specialize in a field that relates to your area of coverage?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

33. Have you ever had full- or part-time employment in one of the following media organisations? Tick all that apply.

- ☐ National press
- ☐ Regional press
- ☐ Local press
- ☐ National Public Broadcast
- ☐ Regional Public Broadcast
- ☐ National commercial broadcast
- ☐ Regional commercial broadcast
- ☐ Press / Photo Agency
- ☐ I have never had full- or part-time employment in any of the above.

34. Have you ever completed an internship in one of the following media organisations? Tick all that apply.

- ☐ National press
- ☐ Regional press
- ☐ Local press
- ☐ National Public Broadcast
- ☐ Regional Public Broadcast
- ☐ National commercial broadcast
- ☐ Regional commercial broadcast
- ☐ Press / Photo Agency
- ☐ I have never completed an internship in any of the above.

35. Do you have any close relatives or a spouse / partner who work or have worked as a journalist?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

This final set of questions is being asked to make some general statistical comparisons within the study. None of it will be used to identify you or anyone else participating in the study.

36. When you think of remuneration of your journalistic work, what was your annual income last year after taxes and working expenses?
...after taxes and working expenses

37. In what year were you born?

...

38. What is your gender?

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Nonbinary
- ☐ Not specified

39. Please name the region or city in which you spent most of your childhood.

...

40. Where do you currently live? Please name region or city.

...

41. When growing up, what was your father's occupation?

...

42. When growing up, what was your mother's occupation?

...

43. What was/is the highest grade of school your father has completed?

- ☐ Not completed high school
- ☐ Completed high school
- ☐ Bachelor's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Master's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Undertook some university studies, but no degree

44. What was/is the highest grade of school your mother has completed?

- ☐ Not completed high school
- ☐ Completed high school
- ☐ Bachelor's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Master's degree or equivalent
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Undertook some university studies, but no degree

45. Do you live with a partner or spouse?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Not specified

46. Do you have children?

- ☐ Yes, please specify how many...
- ☐ No

47. And how many children live with you, currently?

...

Is there anything you would like to add that we haven't touched on in our questions?

....

page 19

Thank you for participating in this study!

A201

If you would like to hear about the results, please leave us your email address. You will be directed to a separate website, ensuring that this information is anonymous, as it will not be connected with your previous answers. All email addresses will be stored separately and used to send out a brief report about key results upon completion of the study.



I am interested in **the results of this study**. Please send me an abstract by e-mail.

Last page

Thank you for participating in this study!

We would like to thank you very much for your help.

Please don't hesitate to contact us via phoebe.maares@univie.ac.at. if you have any further questions Your answers have been saved, you can now close the browser.

Mag. Phoebe Maares, Journalism Studies Center, Institut für Publizistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Wien

II. Translated versions of survey and invitation letters

Austrian Version

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie über atypische journalistische Arbeit. In den letzten Jahrzehnten sind durch die massiven Veränderungen im Journalismus eine Reihe neuer Arten von Journalisten entstanden, von denen viele außerhalb etablierter Redaktionen arbeiten. Dazu gehören Freie Journalist*innen, Projektmitarbeiter*innen, unternehmerische Journalist*innen, Blogger*innen, Social Media Journalist*innen und viele mehr, die immer mehr journalistische Arbeit leisten. Auch wenn diese Arbeit zunehmend außerhalb von Redaktionen stattfinden kann, umfasst die journalistische Arbeit immer noch die gleichen Grundroutinen wie die Auswahl und Recherche von Themen, das Schreiben und Produzieren von Nachrichten und Geschichten.

Wir haben allerdings ein unvollständiges Wissen über die Arbeitsbedingungen solcher Journalist*innen. Um diese wichtigen Entwicklungen genauer zu verstehen, vergleichen wir in dieser Studie Produzent*innen atypischer journalistischer Arbeit in sechs europäischen Ländern (Österreich, Dänemark, Frankreich, Polen, Niederlande und Großbritannien) miteinander. Mit Ihrer Hilfe können wir zu einem besseren Verständnis der journalistischen Arbeit außerhalb der Redaktion beitragen und Ihre tägliche Arbeitsrealität sichtbarer machen.

Um sicherzustellen, dass wir so und eine möglichst breite Palette von Arbeitsarten abdecken, bitten wir Sie, an der folgenden Umfrage teilzunehmen. Wir stellen Ihnen Fragen zu Ihrer Berufserfahrung, Ihrem Arbeitsalltag, Ihren Arbeitsbedingungen und Ihrer Wahrnehmung der journalistischen Arbeit. Es wird ca. 15-20 Minuten dauern, bis Sie alle Fragen beantwortet haben.

Ihre Teilnahme ist völlig freiwillig. Abgesehen von den ersten beiden Fragen müssen Sie keine Fragen beantworten, wenn diese Ihnen unangenehm sind. Sie können die Umfrage während Ihrer Teilnahme jederzeit abbrechen. Da der Fragebogen jedoch völlig anonym ist, ist es nach Beginn des Fragebogens nicht möglich, die eingereichte Antwort zurückzuziehen. Alle Antworten werden anonymisiert und sicher gespeichert.

Wenn Sie Fragen haben oder weitere Informationen benötigen, zögern Sie nicht, uns zu kontaktieren unter phoebe.maares@univie.ac.at.

Vielen Dank im Voraus!

1. Welcher der folgenden Punkte beschreibt am besten Ihre derzeitige Tätigkeit? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Vollzeitbeschäftigung, unbefristeter Vertrag
- Teilzeitbeschäftigung, unbefristeter Vertrag
- Vollzeitbeschäftigung, Zeitvertrag (z.B. 6 Monate Vertrag)
- Teilzeitbeschäftigung, Zeitvertrag (z.B. 6 Monate Vertrag) Frei*e Journalist*in
- Fest*e Frei*e / Pauschalist*in
- Andere, und zwar:

2. Haben Sie in den letzten sechs Monaten mindestens einmal im Monat mit journalistischer Arbeit Geld verdient?

Ja; Nein

3. Es gibt viele Möglichkeiten, journalistische Arbeit zu beschreiben. Wie würden Sie Ihre aktuelle Tätigkeit beschreiben?

4. Wie lange sind Sie bereits journalistisch tätig? ____ Jahre

5. Und wie lange sind Sie in Ihrer aktuellen beruflichen Rolle tätig (z.B. Freiberuflich, feste Freie/ fester Freier)? ____ Jahre

6. Welche Themenbereiche decken Sie in der Regel ab? Bitte nennen Sie bis zu fünf Themen, an denen Sie am häufigsten arbeiten (z.B. Politik, Kultur, Finanzen etc.).

7. Für welche Medienplattformen produzieren Sie Inhalte? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Zeitungen und Wochenzeitungen
- Zeitschriften
- Online-Only Redaktionen (z.B. VICE, paroli-magazin) Online-Only Medien wie Blogs
- Soziale Medien wie Facebook, Twitter, Instagram Öffentlicher Rundfunk
- Privater Rundfunk
- Nachrichtenagenturen
- Fotoagenturen
- Andere, und zwar:

8. Wenn Sie an Ihren durchschnittlichen Arbeitsalltag denken, wie viel Zeit arbeiten Sie dann in den folgenden Kontexten?

100-76%; 75-51%; 50-26%; 25-1%; Niemals

- Von zu Hause aus.
- In einem gemieteten Büro. In einem Co-Working Space.
- In einem Kaffeehaus.
- In einer Redaktion.

9. Wenn Sie an Ihre durchschnittliche tägliche Arbeit in den letzten sechs Monaten denken, wie oft passiert dann Folgendes?

Täglich; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie

- Ich kommuniziere mit RedakteurInnen der Redaktion per E-Mail oder Telefon.
- Ich spreche persönlich mit RedakteurInnen der Redaktion.
- Ich spreche mit anderen angestellten JournalistInnen persönlich.
- Ich spreche mit anderen freiberuflichen JournalistInnen.

10. Nehmen Sie regelmäßig an Redaktionssitzungen teil?

Immer; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie

11. Wenn Sie über Feedback und Rückmeldungen zu Ihrer Arbeit nachdenken, wie oft gilt Folgendes für Ihre journalistische Arbeit?

Täglich; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie

- Ich erhalte Feedback von anderen JournalistInnen.
- Ich erhalte Feedback von ChefredakteurInnen.
- Ich erhalte Feedback vom Publikum.

12. Wenn Sie über den Zugriff auf Ressourcen nachdenken, welche der folgenden Punkte gilt für Ihre aktuelle Arbeitssituation?

			Beide gleich			
Ich habe Zugang zu Hardware (Computer, Kameras, Audiogeräte) von einer Nachrichtenorganisation.						Ich benutze meine eigene Hardware (Computer, Audio-Geräte).
Ich habe Zugang zu Software (Audio-/Videobearbeitungssoftware usw.) einer Nachrichtenorganisation.						Ich benutze meine eigene Software (Audio-/Videobearbeitungssoftware usw.).
Ich habe Zugang zum Netzwerken von Expert*innen und Quellen der auftraggebenden Redaktion.						Ich nutze nur meine eigenen Netzwerke von Quellen und Experten.

13. Wie oft nutzen Sie das Folgende beim Finden und Recherchieren von Geschichten?

Täglich; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie

- Blogs von Journalist*innen oder anderen Expert*innen (z.B. Wissenschaftlern, Juristen).
- Blogs von normalen Bürger*innen. Micro-Blogging-Seiten, wie z.B. Twitter.
- Visuelle Micro-Blogging-Seiten wie Instagram oder Tumblr.
- Social-Networking-Seiten, wie z.B. Facebook.
- Berufsbezogene Social-Networking-Seiten, wie z.B. LinkedIn.
- Audio-visuelle Plattformen wie YouTube oder Flickr.
- Audio-Plattformen wie Apple Podcasts oder SoundCloud.
- Persönliche Messenger-Tools wie WhatsApp oder SnapChat.
- Content-Communities und Crowd-Sourcing-Seiten wie Wikipedia.

14. Wie oft nutzen Sie die folgenden Möglichkeiten zur Verbreitung Ihrer journalistischen Arbeit?

Täglich; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie

- Ihren persönlicher Blog. Micro-Blogging-Seiten, wie z.B. Twitter.
- Visuelle Micro-Blogging-Seiten wie Instagram oder Tumblr.
- Social-Networking-Seiten, wie z.B. Facebook.
- Berufsbezogene Social-Networking-Seiten, wie z.B. LinkedIn.
- Audio-visuelle Plattformen wie YouTube oder Flickr.
- Audio-Plattformen wie Apple Podcasts oder SoundCloud.
- Persönliche Messenger-Tools wie WhatsApp oder SnapChat.

15. Wie sehr stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen über Ihren journalistischen Arbeitsalltag zu?

stimme voll und ganz zu; stimme eher zu; teils/teils; stimme eher nicht zu; stimme gar nicht zu

- Ein Teil meiner täglichen Arbeit ist, Redaktionen neue Ideen für Geschichten vorzuschlagen.
- Oftmals werde ich mit Geschichten von einer Redaktion beauftragt.
- Wenn ich meine Geschichten produziere, betrachte ich die Nachrichtenorganisation als Kunden.
- Ich verwende Interviews und Recherchen für mehrere Artikel und Berichte.

- Ich arbeite jedes Wochenende im Monat.
- Ich berichte regelmäßig direkt von meinem Handy aus (mobiler Journalismus).
- Manchmal produziere ich Geschichten, die ich für wichtig halte, auch wenn ich dafür nicht bezahlt werde.
- Für einige meiner Arbeiten werde ich auf der Grundlage der erhaltenen Klicks und nicht auf der Grundlage geschriebener Wörter bezahlt.
- Ich wähle bewusst Nachrichtenorganisationen aus, für die ich journalistische Inhalte produzieren möchte.
- Zu meiner Arbeit gehört es, Kontakte zu Redakteur*innen zu pflegen, um nicht vergessen zu werden.
- Ich kenne meinen Markt, meine Kund*innen und meine Alleinstellungsmerkmale.
- Ich bin bereit, Geschichten für jede Nachrichtenorganisation, die meine Arbeit kaufen möchte, zu produzieren.
- Für die meisten meiner Geschichten recherchiere ich Informationen ausschließlich online.
- Ich live-tweete oder live-blogge regelmäßig für Nachrichtenorganisationen.
- Bei Bedarf arbeite ich lange ohne Unterbrechung, um eine Frist einhalten zu können.
- Mein Fokus liegt auf einer tiefgreifenden Berichterstattung und nicht auf aktuellen Nachrichten oder „breaking news“.
- Wenn mich meine auftraggebenden Redakteur*innen kontaktieren, reagiere ich sofort, unabhängig von der Tageszeit.

16. Wenn Sie über Ihre professionelle Nutzung von Social Media nachdenken, wie sehr stimmen Sie den folgenden Punkten zu?

stimme voll und ganz zu; stimme eher zu; teils/teils; stimme eher nicht zu; stimme gar nicht zu

- Die Nutzung von Social Media ermöglicht es mir, mich und meine Arbeit viel besser zu präsentieren.
- Social Media verbessert meine Kommunikation mit Menschen, die für meine Arbeit relevant sind.
- Social Media hat meine Produktivität verbessert.
- Social Media hat meine tägliche Arbeitsbelastung verringert.
- Social Media ermöglicht es mir, schneller bei der Berichterstattung von Ereignissen zu sein.
- Social Media erlaubt es mir, mehr Nachrichten zu berichten.
- Ich nutze Social Media, um unter JournalistInnen an Respekt und Ansehen zu gewinnen.
- Ich nutze Social Media, um Beziehungen zu meinem Publikum aufzubauen.

17. Hier ist eine weitere Liste von Aspekten, die für Ihre tägliche journalistische Arbeit wichtig sein könnten. Wie sehr stimmen Sie diesen Aussagen zu?

stimme voll und ganz zu; stimme eher zu; teils/teils; stimme eher nicht zu; stimme gar nicht zu

- Meine Glaubwürdigkeit ist wichtig, deshalb akzeptiere ich keine Änderungen meiner Auftragsredakteur*innen, die über den Rahmen meiner Geschichte hinausgehen.
- Ich wähle meine Kund*innen sorgfältig aus und nehme niemals Aufträge von Unternehmen mit fragwürdigen Zielen an.
- Ich ziehe es vor, Geschichten zurückzuziehen anstatt sie zu veröffentlichen, wenn die Auftraggeber*innen sie zu sehr verändern.
- Andere Kommunikationsarbeit wie Corporate Publishing oder PR würde ich nie betreiben.
- Ich lehne Änderungen meiner Auftraggeber*innen nicht ab, weil ich befürchte, dass ich einen Kunden verlieren werde.
- Ethische Verstöße werden ohnehin vorkommen - es macht keinen Unterschied, problematische Änderungen durch meine Auftraggeber*innen abzulehnen.
- Wenn ich andere Kommunikationsarbeit (z.B. PR oder Corporate Publishing) mache, beeinträchtigt das nicht die Qualität meiner journalistischen Arbeit.
- Es ist mir wichtig, jedem zu sagen, woher meine Fakten stammen.
- Ich zeige jedem, dass ich alle betroffenen Parteien in meine Nachrichten einbeziehe.
- Ich nehme benutzergenerierte Informationen in meine Arbeit auf.
- Ich schreibe Geschichten über nachprüfbare Fakten.
- Solange ich relevante Informationen nicht absichtlich unterdrücke, schreibe ich wahrheitsgetreue Geschichten.
- Es ist nicht akzeptabel, Leser*innen darin zu beeinflussen, wie sie zu etwas stehen.
- Die Art und Weise, wie ich Geschichten schreibe, sollte die Leser*innen nicht daran hindern, eine bestimmte Seite einzunehmen.

18. Wenn Sie eine gute Idee für ein Thema haben, das Ihrer Meinung nach wichtig ist und weiterverfolgt werden sollte, wie oft können Sie solche Geschichten umsetzen?

Immer; Oft; Manchmal; Selten; Nie; Ich mache solche Vorschläge nicht.

19. Wenn Sie an Ihre Arbeit insgesamt denken, wie viel Freiheit haben Sie persönlich bei der Auswahl der Geschichten, an denen Sie arbeiten?

Völlige Freiheit; Viel Freiheit; Etwas Freiheit; Geringe Freiheit; Überhaupt keine Freiheit

20. Wie viel Freiheit haben Sie normalerweise bei der Entscheidung, welche Aspekte einer Geschichte hervorgehoben werden sollen?

Völlige Freiheit; Viel Freiheit; Etwas Freiheit; Geringe Freiheit; Überhaupt keine Freiheit

21. Warum haben Sie angefangen, außerhalb der Vollzeitbeschäftigung journalistisch zu arbeiten? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Es gibt mir die Freiheit und Flexibilität, an den Themen zu arbeiten, die mir Spaß machen.
- Ich versuche, in den Journalismus einzusteigen und mir mit meiner freiberuflichen Tätigkeit ein Portfolio aufzubauen.
- Ich wurde entlassen und eine andere Beschäftigung war nicht möglich.
- Es erlaubt(e) mir, mich um meine Familie zu kümmern und im Journalismus zu arbeiten.
- Andere Gründe, und zwar:

22. Wenn Sie an all die journalistischen Geschichten denken, die Sie im letzten Jahr produziert haben, wie viele haben Sie in einem durchschnittlichen Monat produziert?

23. Wie viele Stunden verbringen Sie in einer durchschnittlichen Woche mit journalistischer Arbeit?

24. Arbeiten Sie neben der journalistischen Arbeit noch in anderen Gebieten?

Ja, und zwar ____; Nein

25. Warum machen Sie diese andere Arbeit? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Mein Einkommen aus dem Journalismus ist nicht ausreichend.
- Ich arbeite gerne in diesem anderen Bereich.
- Diese andere Arbeit hilft mir, Zeiten zu überbrücken, in denen ich nicht genügend Vertragsarbeit im Journalismus habe.
- Andere, und zwar:

26. Wie viel Zeit verbringen Sie in einer durchschnittlichen Woche mit Ihrer journalistischen Arbeit im Vergleich zu Ihrer nicht-journalistischen Arbeit?

0-25% journalistische Arbeit; 26-50% journalistische Arbeit; 51-75% journalistische Arbeit; 76-100% journalistische Arbeit

27. Sind Sie auf andere Einkommensquellen angewiesen?

- Nein
- Ich erhalte finanzielle Unterstützung von meinem (Ehe)partner / meiner (Ehe)partnerin.
- Ich erhalte finanzielle Unterstützung von meinen Eltern.
- Ich erhalte finanzielle Unterstützung von staatlichen Institutionen.
- Andere, und zwar:

28. Inwieweit sind Sie mit den folgenden Punkten zufrieden?

Sehr zufrieden; Etwas zufrieden; Teils/teils; Etwas unzufrieden; Sehr unzufrieden

- Meine tägliche Arbeitsbelastung.
- Die Vielfalt der journalistischen Arbeit.
- Die Themen, an denen ich arbeite.
- Die Zeit für Nachforschung und Recherche.
- Die Karrieremöglichkeiten im Journalismus.
- Die Trennung zwischen Arbeits- und Privatleben.
- Mein Einkommen aus der journalistischen Arbeit.
- Die Tiefe des Kontakts zur auftraggebenden Redaktion.
- Die Freiheit, meinen eigene Arbeit einzuteilen.
- Die Qualität des Feedbacks, das ich von meinem Publikum erhalte.
- Der Umfang des Kontakts mit anderen JournalistInnen.
- Die Wertschätzung für meine Arbeit durch die journalistische Gemeinschaft.
- Die berufliche Sicherheit. Die finanzielle Sicherheit.
- Die Möglichkeit, laufende Arbeiten mit anderen Journalist*innen zu besprechen.
- Die Beziehungen, die ich zu anderen Journalist*innen habe.

29. Wie zufrieden sind Sie im Allgemeinen mit Ihrer aktuellen Arbeitssituation?

sehr unzufrieden -- sehr zufrieden

30. Wenn Ihnen ein unbefristeter Vollzeitvertrag in einer Redaktion angeboten würde, würden Sie diesen akzeptieren?

- Ja
- Nein
- Es kommt darauf an (bitte spezifizieren Sie):
- Ich habe bereits eine Vollzeitstelle.

31. Hier ist eine Liste von möglichen Einflussquellen. Bitte sagen Sie uns, wie viel Einfluss die folgenden Punkte auf Ihre Arbeit haben.

extrem einflussreich -- gar nicht einflussreich

- Meine persönlichen Interessen
- Meine Freunde, Bekannten und Familie
- Andere Journalist*innen
- Meine redaktionellen Betreuer*innen, höhere Redakteur*innen und auftraggebende RedakteurInnen
- Berücksichtigung von Werbetreibenden Öffentlichkeitsarbeit / PR
- Kostenlose Produkte und Dienstleistungen
- Meine eigenen finanziellen Ressourcen
- Meine Beziehungen zu Quellen
- Feedback aus dem Publikum
- Publikumsforschung und -daten, z.B. Webanalyse/Metriken
- Fristen / Deadlines
- Konventionen und ethische Standards des Berufsstandes
- Mediengesetzgebung und -regulierung
- Soziale Medien

32. Wenn Sie darüber nachdenken, wie Sie sich als professionelle*r Journalist*in identifizieren, wie wichtig sind Ihnen die folgenden Aspekte?

Äußerst wichtig; Sehr wichtig; Etwas wichtig; Wenig wichtig; Überhaupt nicht wichtig

- Ein unparteiischer Beobachter / eine unparteiische Beobachterin sein.
- Die Dinge so zu berichten, wie sie sind.
- Aktuelles Geschehen einordnen und analysieren.
- Die Regierung kontrollieren.
- Die Wirtschaft kontrollieren.
- Die politische Tagesordnung bestimmen.
- Die öffentliche Meinung beeinflussen
- Für sozialen Wandel eintreten.
- Ein Gegengewicht zur Regierung bilden.
- Ein positives Bild der Regierung vermitteln.
- Regierungspolitik unterstützen.
- Unterhaltung und Entspannung anbieten.
- Inhalte anbieten, die ein möglichst großes Publikum anziehen.
- Rat, Orientierung und Hilfestellung für den Alltag anbieten.
- Informationen vermitteln, die Menschen zu politische Entscheidungen befähigen.
- Menschen zur Teilhabe am politischen Geschehen motivieren.
- Den Menschen die Möglichkeit geben, ihre Ansichten zu artikulieren.
- Das Publikum aufklären.
- Als Erzähler die Welt in Geschichten vermitteln. Toleranz und kulturelle Vielfalt fördern.

33. Haben Sie in der Vergangenheit schon einmal eine Auszeichnung für Ihre journalistische Arbeit erhalten?

Wenn ja, wie viele?

Ja, ____; Ich habe keinen Preis gewonnen.

34. Was ist bislang Ihr höchster Bildungsabschluss?

- Pflichtschule
- AHS, BHS, BMS oder gleichwertig
- Bachelor-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Master-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Doktorat
- Studium begonnen, aber keinen Abschluss

35. Welches Fachgebiet haben Sie studiert? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Spezialisiert auf Journalismus
- Spezialisiert auf ein anderes Kommunikationsfeld
- Andere, und zwar:

36. Entspricht Ihr journalistischer Themenschwerpunkt Ihrer Studienrichtung?

Ja; Nein

37. Hatten Sie schon einmal eine Voll- oder Teilzeitanstellung in einem der folgenden Medienunternehmen?

Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Nationale Presse
- Regionale Presse
- Lokale Presse
- Nationaler öffentlicher Rundfunk
- Regionaler öffentlicher Rundfunk

- Nationaler privater Rundfunk
- Regionaler privater Rundfunk
- Presse / Fotoagentur
- Ich habe noch nie eine Voll- oder Teilzeitanstellung in einem der vorher genannten Bereiche gehabt.

38. Haben Sie schon einmal ein Praktikum in einem der folgenden Medienunternehmen absolviert? Kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Punkte an.

- Nationale Presse
- Regionale Presse
- Lokale Presse
- Nationaler öffentlicher Rundfunk
- Regionaler öffentlicher Rundfunk
- Nationaler privater Rundfunk
- Regionaler privater Rundfunk
- Presse / Fotoagentur
- Ich habe noch nie ein Praktikum in einem der vorher genannten Bereiche absolviert.

39. Haben Sie enge Verwandte oder eine*n (Ehe)Partner*in, die als Journalist*in arbeiten oder gearbeitet haben?

Ja; Nein

40. Wenn Sie an die Vergütung Ihrer journalistischen Arbeit denken, was war Ihr Jahreseinkommen nach Steuern und Arbeitsausgaben im vergangenen Geschäftsjahr?

- 0-8,000 EUR
- 8,001-16,000 EUR
- 16,001-24,000 EUR
- 24,001-32,000 EUR
- 32,001-40,000 EUR
- 40,001-48,000 EUR
- 48,001-64,000 EUR
- More than 64,001 EUR

41. In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren?

42. Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?

Weiblich; Männlich; Nicht-binär; Keine Angabe

43. Bitte geben Sie die Region oder Stadt an, in der Sie die meiste Zeit Ihrer Kindheit verbracht haben.

44. Wo wohnen Sie derzeit? Bitte geben Sie die Region oder den Ort an.

45. Was war der Beruf Ihres Vaters als Sie aufgewachsen sind?

46. Was war der Beruf Ihrer Mutter als Sie aufgewachsen sind?

47. Was ist der höchste Bildungsabschluss, den Ihr Vater abgeschlossen hat?

- Pflichtschule
- AHS, BHS, BMS oder gleichwertig
- Bachelor-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Master-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Doktorat
- Studium begonnen, aber keinen Abschluss

8. Was ist der höchste Bildungsabschluss, den Ihre Mutter abgeschlossen hat?

- Pflichtschule
- AHS, BHS, BMS oder gleichwertig
- Bachelor-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Master-Abschluss oder gleichwertig
- Doktorat
- Studium begonnen, aber keinen Abschluss

49. Wohnen Sie mit eine*r (Ehe)Partner*in zusammen?

Ja; Nein; keine Angabe

50. Haben Sie Kinder?

Ja, bitte geben Sie an, wie viele: ____; Nein

51. Und wie viele Kinder leben derzeit bei Ihnen?

52. Gibt es noch etwas, das wir in unseren Fragen nicht angesprochen haben und Sie gerne hinzufügen möchten?

Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie!

Wenn Sie mehr über die Ergebnisse erfahren möchten, hinterlassen Sie uns bitte Ihre E-Mail-Adresse. Sie werden auf eine separate Website weitergeleitet, wodurch wir sicherstellen, dass diese Information anonym sein wird und nicht mit Ihren vorherigen Antworten in Verbindung stehen wird. Alle E-Mail- Adressen werden separat

gespeichert und dienen nur dazu, nach Abschluss der Studie einen kurzen Bericht über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse zu versenden.

Danish Version

Kære deltager

Tak fordi du har valgt at deltage i denne undersøgelse om atypisk journalistisk arbejde. På grund af de enorme ændringer inden for journalistik i de seneste årtier findes der nu en række nye typer journalister, hvoraf mange arbejder uden for etablerede nyhedsrum. Disse omfatter freelancere, kontraktarbejdere, iværksætterjournalister, bloggere, journalister inden for sociale medier og mange andre, der producerer mere og mere journalistisk arbejde. Selvom journalistisk arbejde i stigende grad foregår uden for nyhedsrum, omfatter arbejdet dog stadig de samme grundlæggende rutiner såsom at udvælge og undersøge emner samt sammensætte og skrive nyhedsartikler og historier.

Vi har dog ikke en fuld forståelse af sådanne journalisters arbejdsvilkår. For at kaste lys over denne vigtige tendens har denne undersøgelse derfor til formål at sammenligne producenter af atypisk journalistisk arbejde i seks europæiske lande (Østrig, Danmark, Frankrig, Polen, Holland og Storbritannien). Med din hjælp kan vi bidrage til at få en bedre forståelse af journalistisk arbejde uden for nyhedsrum og gøre din daglige arbejdsdag og vilkår mere synlige.

Vi beder dig om at deltage i følgende undersøgelse for at sikre, at vi dækker så mange producenter som muligt samt en bred vifte af arbejdsformer. Vi vil stille spørgsmål om din arbejds erfaring, arbejdsrutine, arbejdsvilkår og din opfattelse af journalistisk arbejde. Det tager cirka 15-20 minutter at besvare alle spørgsmål.

Din deltagelse er helt frivillig. Bortset fra de to første spørgsmål i denne undersøgelse behøver du ikke at udfylde spørgsmål, som du ikke ønsker at besvare. Du kan når som helst trække dig tilbage fra undersøgelsen under din deltagelse. Eftersom spørgeskemaet er helt anonymt, er det imidlertid ikke muligt at trække et svar tilbage, når det er blevet indsendt. Alle svar vil være anonyme og gemmes sikkert.

Hvis du har spørgsmål eller har brug for yderligere oplysninger, er du velkommen til at kontakte os på phoebe.maare@univie.ac.at.

På forhånd tak!

1. Hvilke af følgende beskriver bedst din nuværende beskæftigelse? Markér alle relevante svar.

- Fuldtidsansat, permanent kontrakt
- Deltidsansat, permanent kontrakt
- Fuldtidsansat, midlertidig kontrakt (f.eks. 6 måneders kontrakt)
- Deltidsansat, midlertidig kontrakt (f.eks. 6 måneders kontrakt)
- Freelancer
- Kontraktarbejder
- Andet. Angiv venligst:

2. Har du i de sidste seks måneder tjent penge på journalistisk arbejde mindst én gang om måneden?

Ja; Nej

3. Der er mange måder at beskrive journalistisk arbejde på. Hvordan vil du beskrive din nuværende beskæftigelsesmæssige rolle?

4. Hvor længe har du produceret journalistisk arbejde? ____ år

5. Og hvor længe har du produceret journalistisk arbejde i din nuværende beskæftigelsesmæssige rolle (f.eks. freelancer osv.)? ____ år

6. Hvilke områder dækker du generelt? Nævn op til fem emner, som du oftest arbejder på (dvs. politik, kultur, økonomi osv.)

7. Hvilke medieplatforme producerer du indhold til? Markér alle relevante svar.

Aviser og ugeblade

Magasiner

Kun online nyhedsrum (f.eks. Zetland)

Kun onlinemedier såsom blogs

Sociale medier såsom Facebook, Twitter, Instagram Offentlige udsendelser

Kommercielle udsendelser

Nyhedsbureauer

Fotoagenturer

Andet. Angiv venligst:

8. Hvis du tænker på din gennemsnitlige daglige arbejdsrutine, hvor meget tid bruger du så på arbejde i følgende sammenhænge?

100-76%; 75-51%; 50-26% ;25-1%; Aldrig

- Arbejder hjemmefra.
- Arbejder på et lejet kontor.
- Arbejder på et åbent kontorlandskab
- Arbejder fra en café.
- Arbejder i et nyhedsrum.

9. Hvis du tænker på dit gennemsnitlige daglige arbejde i de sidste seks måneder, hvor ofte sker følgende?

Dagligt; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig

- Jeg kommunikerer med nyhedsredaktører via e-mail eller telefon.
- Jeg taler med nyhedsredaktører personligt.
- Jeg taler med andre ansatte journalister personligt. Jeg taler med andre freelancejournalister.

10. Deltager du jævnligt i redaktionelle møder?

Altid; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig

11. Hvis du tænker på feedback på dit arbejde, hvor ofte gælder følgende så for dit journalistiske arbejde?

Dagligt; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig

- Jeg modtager feedback fra andre journalister.
- Jeg modtager feedback fra chefredaktører.
- Jeg modtager feedback fra læsere / seer / lytter / bruger.

12. Hvis du tænker på din adgang til ressourcer, hvilke af følgende gælder så for din nuværende arbejdssituation?

			Begge dele lige meget.			
Jeg bruger min egen hardware (computere, lydudstyr).						Jeg har adgang til hardware (computere, kameraer, lydudstyr) fra en nyhedsorganisation.
Jeg bruger min egen software (software til lyd-/billedredigering mv.).						Jeg har adgang til software (software til lyd-/billedredigering mv.) fra en nyhedsorganisation.
Jeg bruger kun mine egne netværk af kilder og eksperter.						Jeg har adgang til et netværk af eksperter og kilder i nyhedsrum.

13. Hvor ofte bruger du følgende som kilder til historier?

Dagligt; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig

- Blogs, der er skrevet af journalister eller andre eksperter (f.eks. forskere, advokater).
- Blogs, der er skrevet af almindelige borgere. Websteder til mikroblogging, f.eks. Twitter.
- Websteder til visuel mikroblogging, f.eks. Instagram eller Tumblr.
- Websteder til sociale netværk, f.eks. Facebook.
- Websteder til professionelle sociale netværk, f.eks. LinkedIn.
- Websteder til deling af lyd- og billedindhold, f.eks. YouTube eller Flickr.
- Websteder til deling af lydindhold, f.eks. Apple Podcast eller SoundCloud.
- Værktøjer til personlige beskeder, f.eks. WhatsApp eller Snapchat.
- Websteder til indholdsgrupper og crowd-sourcing, f.eks. Wikipedia.

14. Hvor ofte bruger du følgende til at udbrede dit journalistiske arbejde?

Dagligt; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig

- Din personlige blog
- Websteder til mikroblogging, f.eks. Twitter.
- Websteder til visuel mikroblogging, f.eks. Instagram eller Tumblr.
- Websteder til sociale netværk, f.eks. Facebook.
- Websteder til professionelle sociale netværk, f.eks. LinkedIn.
- Websteder til deling af lyd- og billedindhold, f.eks. YouTube eller Flickr.
- Websteder til deling af lydindhold, f.eks. Apple Podcast eller SoundCloud.
- Værktøjer til personlige beskeder, f.eks. WhatsApp eller Snapchat.

15. Hvis du tænker på, hvad der er vigtigt i din daglige rutine, hvor meget er du så enig i følgende aspekter af dit journalistiske arbejde?

Meget enig; Temmelig enig; Hverken enig eller uenig; Temmelig uenig; Meget uenig

- En del af mit daglige arbejde er at levere nye ideer til nyhedsorganisationer.
- Jeg bliver ofte givet historier af en nyhedsorganisation.
- Når jeg producerer mine historier, tænker jeg på nyhedsorganisationen som kunde.
- Jeg genbruger interviews og forskning til flere artikler og nyhedshistorier.
- Jeg arbejder hver weekend i måneden.
- Jeg rapporterer regelmæssigt direkte fra min telefon (mobiljournalistik).
- Jeg producerer nogle gange historier, som jeg synes er vigtige, selvom jeg ikke bliver betalt for dem.
- For noget af mit arbejde bliver jeg betalt per modtaget antal klik i stedet for skrevne ord.

- Jeg vælger med vilje nyhedsorganisationer, jeg vil producere journalistisk indhold for.
- En del af mit job er at opretholde kontakt med nyhedsredaktører for ikke at blive glemt.
- Jeg kender mit marked, mine kunder og mine unikke salgspunkter.
- Jeg er villig til at producere historier til enhver nyhedsorganisation, der vil købe mit arbejde.
- Til de fleste af mine historier søger jeg kun information på internettet.
- Jeg foretager ofte live-tweet eller live-blog til nyhedsorganisationer.
- Hvis det er nødvendigt, arbejder jeg i lange perioder uden pause, indtil min deadline er opfyldt.
- Mit fokus er på dybdegående rapportering i stedet for at levere nyheder.
- Hvis den redaktør, jeg arbejder for, kontakter mig, reagerer jeg straks opkaldet uanset tidspunktet.

16. Hvis du tænker på din professionelle brug af sociale medier, hvor meget er du så enig i følgende?

Meget enig; Temmelig enig; Hverken enig eller uenig; Temmelig uenig; Meget uenig

- Brug af sociale medier giver mig mulighed for at fremme mig selv og mit arbejde meget bedre.
- På grund af sociale medier kommunikerer jeg lettere med personer, der er relevante for mit arbejde.
- Sociale medier har forbedret min produktivitet.
- Sociale medier har reduceret min daglige arbejdsbyrde.
- Sociale medier giver mig mulighed for at være hurtigere til at rapportere nyhedshistorier.
- Sociale medier giver mig mulighed for at dække flere nyhedshistorier.
- Jeg bruger sociale medier til professionelt at opnå respekt og anerkendelse.
- Jeg bruger sociale medier til at danne relationer med modtageren.

17. Her er endnu en liste over ting, der kan være vigtige for dit daglige journalistiske arbejde. Hvor meget er du enig i disse udsagn?

Meget enig; Temmelig enig; Hverken enig eller uenig; Temmelig uenig; Meget uenig

- Min troværdighed er afgørende, og derfor accepterer jeg ikke ændringer foretaget af min redaktør, der rækker ud over omfanget af min historie.
- Jeg vælger mine klienter med omhu og accepterer aldrig opgaver fra organisationer med tvivlsomme mål.
- Jeg foretrækker at trække historier tilbage frem for at offentliggøre dem, hvis redaktøren ændrer dem for meget.
- Jeg ville aldrig engagere mig i andet kommunikationsarbejde såsom virksomhedspublikationer eller PR.
- Jeg modsætter mig ikke ændringer foretaget af redaktøren, fordi jeg er bange for, at jeg vil miste en klient.
- Der forekommer alligevel etiske overtrædelser, så modsatrettede kritiske ændringer foretaget af redaktøren gør ikke en forskel.
- Når jeg deltager i andet kommunikationsarbejde (f.eks. PR eller virksomhedspublikationer), skader det ikke kvaliteten af mit journalistiske arbejde.
- Det er vigtigt for mig at fortælle, hvor mine fakta stammer fra.
- Jeg viser enhver, at jeg omfatter alle berørte parter i mine nyhedshistorier.
- Jeg inkluderer brugergenereret information i mit arbejde.
- Jeg skriver historier, der er baseret på verificerbare fakta.
- Så længe jeg ikke forsætligt undertrykker relevant information, vil jeg skrive sandfærdige historier.
- Det er ikke acceptabelt at få læsere til at danne en mening for eller imod.
- Måden, som jeg skriver historier på, bør ikke lede læsere til at tage et bestemt standpunkt.

18. Hvis du har en god idé til et emne, som du mener er vigtigt og bør følges op på, hvor ofte kan du så få emnet dækket?

Altid; Ofte; Nogle gange; Sjældent; Aldrig; Jeg fremsætter ikke sådanne forslag

19. Hvis du tænker på dit arbejde generelt, hvor stor frihed har du så personligt til at vælge de historier, du arbejder på?

Fuld frihed; Stor frihed; En vis frihed; Lille frihed; Ingen frihed

20. Hvor stor frihed har du normalt til at bestemme, hvilke aspekter af en historie der skal understreges?

Fuld frihed; Stor frihed; En vis frihed; Lille frihed; Ingen frihed

21. Hvorfor begyndte du at lave journalistisk arbejde uden for fuldtidsbeskæftigelse? Markér alle relevante svar.

- Det giver mig frihed og fleksibilitet til at arbejde på de emner, jeg nyder.
- Jeg forsøgte at komme ind i journalistik og opbygge en portefølje med mit freelancearbejde.
- Jeg blev afskediget, og anden ansættelse var ikke mulig.
- Det gav mig mulighed for at se efter min familie og arbejde i journalistik.
- Andet. Angiv venligst:

22. Hvis du tænker på alle de journalistiske historier, du producerede sidste år, hvor mange producerede du så i gennemsnit per måned?

23. Hvor mange timer i en gennemsnitlig uge arbejder du med journalistik?

24. Udfører du andet arbejde end journalistisk arbejde?

Ja. Angiv venligst: ____; Nej

25. Hvorfor udfører du et andet arbejde? Markér alle relevante svar.

- Min indtægt fra journalistik er ikke tilstrækkelig.
- Jeg nyder det andet arbejde.
- Det andet arbejde hjælper mig med at opretholde en tilstrækkelig indtægt, når jeg ikke har nok kontraktarbejde inden for journalistik.
- Andet. Angiv venligst:

26. Hvor meget tid bruger du i en gennemsnitlig uge på dit journalistiske arbejde i forhold til dit ikke-journalistiske arbejde?

0-25 % på journalistisk arbejde; 26-50 % på journalistisk arbejde; 51-75 % på journalistisk arbejde; 76-100 % på journalistisk arbejde

27. Afhænger du af andre indtægtskilder?

- Nej
- Jeg modtager økonomisk støtte fra min ægtefælle/partner.
- Jeg modtager økonomisk støtte fra mine forældre.¶
- Jeg modtager økonomisk støtte fra statslige institutioner.
- Andet. Angiv venligst:

28. I hvilket omfang er du tilfreds med følgende?

Meget tilfreds; Temmelig tilfreds; Hverken tilfreds eller utilfreds; Temmelig utilfreds; Meget utilfreds

- Min daglige arbejdsbyrde.
- Variationen i journalistisk arbejde.
- De emner, jeg arbejder på.
- Tid brugt på forskning og undersøgelse.
- Karrieremulighederne inden for journalistik.
- Adskillelsen mellem erhvervsliv og privatliv.
- Min indtægt fra journalistisk arbejde.
- Min kontakt med nyhedsrum og nyhedsorganisationer.
- Friheden til at planlægge min egen arbejdsplan.
- Kvaliteten af den feedback, jeg modtager fra mit læser / seer / lytter / bruger.
- Mængden af kontakt til andre journalister.
- Anerkendelse af mit arbejde i journalistiske kredse.
- Den faglige sikkerhed.
- Den finansielle sikkerhed.
- Muligheden for at diskutere igangværende arbejde med andre journalister.
- Mine relationer til andre journalister.

29. Hvor tilfreds er du generelt med din nuværende arbejdssituation?

meget tilfreds - meget utilfreds

30. Hvis du blev tilbudt en permanent fuldtidskontrakt i en nyhedsorganisation, ville du så acceptere den?

- Ja
- Nej
- Det kommer an på (angiv venligst):
- Jeg har allerede fuldtidsbeskæftigelse.

31. Her er en liste over potentielle indflydelseskilder. Angiv, hvor meget indflydelse hver af følgende aspekter har på dit arbejde.

Enorm indflydelse – Ingen indflydelse

- Mine personlige interesser
- Mine venner, bekendte og familie
- Andre journalister
- Mine redaktionelle ledere, chefredaktører og andre redaktører
- Reklameovervejelser
- PR
- Gratis produkter og tjenester
- Mine egne økonomiske ressourcer
- Forhold til kilder
- Feedback fra læser / seer / lytter / bruger
- Læser-/seer-/lytter-/brugerforskning og -data, f.eks. webanalyse-/målinger
- Deadlines¶
- Konventioner og etik inden for erhvervet
- Medielovgivning og regulering¶
- Sociale medier

32. Hvis du tænker på, hvordan du identificerer dig som journalist, hvor vigtig er følgende aspekter så for dig?

Ekstremt vigtig; Meget vigtig; Noget vigtig; Lidt vigtig; Ikke vigtig overhovedet

- At være en neutral observatør.
- At rapportere ting, som de er.
- At give analyse af aktuelle anliggender.
- At overvåge og holde øje med politiske ledere.
- At overvåge og holde øje med forretningsverdenen
- At sætte den politiske dagsorden.
- At påvirke den offentlige mening.
- At være fortalere for social forandring.
- At være modstander af regeringen.
- At give et positivt billede af det politiske lederskab.
- At støtte regeringens politik.
- At levere underholdning og afslapning.
- At levere den slags nyheder, der tiltrækker det største publikum.
- At give råd, information og vejledning om det daglige liv.
- At levere information, som offentligheden har brug for til at træffe politiske beslutninger.
- At motivere offentligheden til at deltage i politisk aktivitet.
- At lade offentligheden udtrykke deres synspunkter. At uddanne publikum.
- At fortælle historier om verden.
- At fremme tolerance og kulturel mangfoldighed.

33. Har du personligt nogensinde modtaget en pris for dit journalistiske arbejde? Hvis ja, hvor mange?

Ja, ____; Jeg har ikke modtaget nogen priser.

34. Hvad er det højeste uddannelsesniveau, du har gennemført?

- Folkeskolen¶
- Gymnasiet¶
- Bacheloruddannelse eller tilsvarende¶
- Kandidatgrad eller tilsvarende¶
- Doktorgrad¶
- Fulgte nogle studier på universitet, men bestod ingen eksamen

35. Hvilket område specialiserede du dig i under din uddannelse? Markér alle relevante svar.

- Jeg specialiserede mig i journalistik¶
- Jeg specialiserede mig i et andet kommunikationsfag
- Andet. Angiv venligst:

36. Har du specialiseret dig indenfor et felt, der vedrører det område, du dækker journalistisk?

Ja; Nej

37. Har du nogensinde haft fuldtids- eller deltidsbeskæftigelse i en af følgende medieorganisationer? Markér alle relevante svar.

- National presse¶
- Regional presse¶
- Lokal presse¶
- Nationale offentlige udsendelser
- Regionale offentlige udsendelser
- Nationale kommercielle udsendelser
- Regionale kommercielle udsendelser
- Presse/fotobureau
- Jeg har aldrig haft fuldtids- eller deltidsbeskæftigelse i nogen af ovenstående.

38. Har du nogensinde afsluttet en praktikplads i en af følgende medieorganisationer? Markér alle relevante svar.

- National presse¶
- Regional presse¶
- Lokal presse¶
- Nationale offentlige udsendelser
- Regionale offentlige udsendelser
- Nationale kommercielle udsendelser
- Regionale kommercielle udsendelser
- Presse/fotobureau
- Jeg har aldrig afsluttet en praktikplads i nogen af ovenstående.

39. Har du nære slægtninge eller en ægtefælle/partner, der arbejder eller har arbejdet som journalist?

Ja; Nej

Dette sidste sæt spørgsmål har 31 hensigt at foretage nogle generelle statistiske sammenligninger i undersøgelsen. Ingen svar vil blive brugt 31 at identificere dig eller andre, der deltager i undersøgelsen.

40. Hvis du tænker på betaling for dit journalistiske arbejde, hvad var så din årlige indkomst det sidste regnskabsår efter skat og arbejdsudgifter?

- 0-70,000 DKK
- 70,001-140,000 DKK
- 140,001-210,000 DKK
- 210,001-280,000 DKK
- 280,001-350,000 DKK
- 350,001-420,000 DKK
- 420,001-560,000 DKK
- more than 560,001 DKK.

41. I hvilket år er du født?

42. Hvad er dit køn?

Kvinde; Mand; Non-binær; Ikke specificeret

43. Nævn det område eller den by, hvor du tilbragte det meste af din barndom.

44. Hvor bor du i øjeblikket? Angiv et område eller en by.

45. Hvad var din fars beskæftigelse, da du var barn?

46. Hvad var din mors beskæftigelse, da du var barn?

47. Hvad var den højeste uddannelsesgrad, din far gennemførte?

- Folkeskolen
- Gymnasiet
- Bacheloruddannelse eller tilsvarende
- Kandidatgrad eller tilsvarende
- Doktorgrad
- Fulgte nogle studier på universitet, men bestod ingen eksamen

48. Hvad var den højeste uddannelsesgrad, din mor gennemførte?

- Folkeskolen
- Gymnasiet
- Bacheloruddannelse eller tilsvarende
- Kandidatgrad eller tilsvarende
- Doktorgrad
- Fulgte nogle studier på universitet, men bestod ingen eksamen

49. Bor du sammen med en partner eller ægtefælle?

Ja; Nej; Ikke specificeret

50. Har du børn?

Ja. Angiv hvor mange: ____; Nej

51. Og hvor mange børn bor i øjeblikket sammen med dig?

52. Er der oplysninger, du gerne vil tilføje, som ikke er omfattet af ovenstående spørgsmål?

Tak fordi du deltog i denne undersøgelse!

Hvis du gerne vil høre om resultaterne, bedes du give os din e-mailadresse. Du vil blive henvist til et separat websted for at sikre, at disse oplysninger forbliver anonyme og ikke er forbundet til dine tidligere svar. Alle e-mailadresser gemmes separat og bruges til at sende en kort rapport om vigtige resultater efter afslutningen af undersøgelsen.

French Version

Madame, Monsieur,

Merci de contribuer à cette étude sur le travail journalistique atypique. En raison de changements massifs survenus dans le journalisme au cours des dernières décennies, de nouveaux types de journalistes ont vu le jour, dont beaucoup travaillent en dehors des salles de rédaction établies. Les personnes concernées comprennent des pigistes, des contractuels, des journalistes entrepreneurs, des blogueurs, des journalistes de médias sociaux et bien d'autres, qui produisent de plus en plus de travaux journalistiques. Bien que cela puisse se produire de plus en plus en dehors des salles de rédaction, le travail journalistique comprend toujours des routines de base similaires, telles que la sélection et la recherche de sujets, la rédaction et la production d'articles et de reportages.

Notre compréhension des conditions de travail de ces journalistes est cependant incomplète. Pour éclairer cette tendance importante, la présente étude vise donc à comparer les producteurs de travaux journalistiques atypiques de six pays européens (Autriche, Danemark, France, Pologne, Pays-Bas et Royaume-Uni). Avec votre

aide, nous pouvons contribuer à une meilleure compréhension du travail journalistique en dehors d'une salle de rédaction et rendre plus visible votre réalité quotidienne.

Pour nous assurer de couvrir le plus grand nombre de producteurs possible et un large éventail de types de travail, nous vous prions de participer au sondage suivant. Nous vous poserons des questions sur votre expérience professionnelle, vos habitudes de travail, vos conditions de travail et votre perception du travail journalistique. Il vous faudra environ 15-20 minutes pour répondre à toutes les questions.

Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. En dehors des deux premières questions de ce sondage, vous n'avez pas à répondre aux questions qui vous mettent mal à l'aise. Vous pouvez vous retirer du sondage pendant votre participation à tout moment. Cependant, comme le questionnaire est totalement anonyme, une fois commencé, il ne sera plus possible de retirer la réponse soumise. Toutes les réponses seront anonymes et stockées de manière sécurisée.

Si vous avez des questions ou souhaitez obtenir des informations complémentaires, n'hésitez pas à nous contacter à l'adresse phoebe.maares@univie.ac.at.

Un grand merci d'avance.

1. Lequel des énoncés suivants décrit le mieux votre emploi actuel ? Cochez toutes les cases F101 correspondantes.

- Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.
- Emploi à temps plein, contrat à durée indéterminée
- Emploi à temps partiel, contrat à durée indéterminée
- Emploi à temps plein, contrat à durée déterminée (p. ex. contrat de 6 mois)
- Emploi à temps partiel, contrat à durée déterminée (p. ex. contrat de 6 mois) Pigiste
- Travailleur sous contrat
- Autre, veuillez préciser:

2. Au cours des six derniers mois, avez-vous gagné de l'argent avec le travail de journaliste au moins une fois par mois ?

Oui; Non

3. Il existe de nombreuses façons de décrire le travail journalistique. Comment décririez-vous votre rôle professionnel actuel ?

4. Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous dans le journalisme ? ____ans

5. Et depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous dans le journalisme dans votre poste actuel (par KU02 exemple, pigiste, etc.) ? ____ans

6. Quels domaines couvrez-vous généralement ? Veuillez nommer jusqu'à cinq sujets sur lesquels vous travaillez le plus souvent (politique, culture, finances, etc.).

7. Pour quelles plateformes de médias produisez-vous du contenu ? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Journaux et hebdomadaires
- Magazines
- Salles de rédaction en ligne seulement (par exemple Mediapart)
- Uniquement en ligne, tels que les blogues
- Médias sociaux tels que Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
- Diffusion publique
- Diffusion commerciale
- Agences de presse
- Agences photo
- Autre, veuillez préciser:

8. Quand vous pensez à votre routine quotidienne de travail moyenne, combien de temps passez-vous à travailler dans les contextes suivants ?

100-76%; 75-51%; 50-26%; 25-1% ; Jamais

- Travail à domicile.
- Travail dans un bureau loué.
- Travail dans un espace de travail partagé flexible. Travail dans un café.
- Travail dans une salle de rédaction.

9. Quand vous pensez à votre travail quotidien moyen au cours des six derniers mois, à quelle fréquence les situations suivantes se produisent-elles ?

Quotidiennement; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais

- Je communique avec les éditeurs de la salle de rédaction par courrier électronique ou par téléphone.
- Je parle en personne aux rédacteurs en chef des salles de rédaction.
- Je parle en personne à d'autres journalistes employés.
- Je parle à d'autres journalistes indépendants.

10. Assistez-vous régulièrement aux réunions de rédaction?

Toujours; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais

11. Quand vous pensez aux commentaires sur votre travail, à quelle fréquence les éléments suivants s'appliquent-ils à votre travail journalistique?

Quotidiennement; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais

- Je reçois les réactions d'autres journalistes.
- Je reçois les commentaires des rédacteurs en chef.
- Je reçois des commentaires du public.

12. Lorsque vous pensez à l'accès que vous avez aux ressources, lequel des éléments suivants s'applique à votre situation de travail actuelle?

			Tous les deux, à parts égales.			
J'utilise mon propre matériel (ordinateurs, équipement audio).						J'ai accès au matériel (ordinateurs, caméras, équipement audio) d'une agence de presse.
J'utilise mon propre logiciel (logiciel de montage audio/visuel, etc.).						J'ai accès à un logiciel (logiciel de montage audio/visuel, etc.) d'une agence de presse.
Je n'utilise que mes propres réseaux de sources et d'experts.						J'ai accès au réseau d'experts et aux sources de ma salle de rédaction.

13. À quelle fréquence utilisez-vous les éléments suivants pour trouver des histoires?

Quotidiennement; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais

- Blogs rédigés par des journalistes ou d'autres experts (p. ex. scientifiques, avocats).
- Blogs rédigés par des citoyens ordinaires. Sites de micro-blogging, tels que Twitter.
- Sites de micro-blogging visuel, tels que Instagram ou Tumblr.
- Réseaux sociaux, tels que Facebook.
- Réseaux sociaux professionnels, tels que LinkedIn.
- Sites de partage audiovisuel, tels que YouTube ou Flickr.
- Sites de partage audio, tels que Apple Podcast ou SoundCloud.
- Outils de messagerie personnels, tels que WhatsApp ou Snapchat.
- Communautés de contenu et sites de crowd-sourcing, tels que Wikipedia.

14. À quelle fréquence utilisez-vous les éléments suivants pour diffuser votre travail journalistique?

Quotidiennement; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais

- Votre blog personnel
- Sites de micro-blogging, tels que Twitter.
- Sites de micro-blogging visuel, tels que Instagram ou Tumblr.
- Réseaux sociaux, tels que Facebook.
- Réseaux sociaux professionnels, tels que LinkedIn.
- Sites de partage audiovisuel, tels que YouTube ou Flickr.
- Sites de partage audio, tels que Apple Podcast ou SoundCloud.
- Outils de messagerie personnels, tels que WhatsApp ou Snapchat.

15. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les aspects suivants de votre travail journalistique au quotidien?

Tout à fait d'accord; Plutôt d'accord; Ni d'accord ni en désaccord; Plutôt pas d'accord; Pas du tout d'accord

- Une partie de mon travail quotidien consiste à proposer de nouvelles idées aux agences de presse.
- Souvent, je reçois des histoires assignées par une salle de rédaction.
- Quand je produis mes histoires, je pense à l'agence de presse en tant que client.
- Je réutilise des interviews et des recherches pour plusieurs articles et reportages.
- Je travaille tous les weekends du mois.
- Je rapporte régulièrement directement depuis mon téléphone (journalisme mobile).
- Je produis parfois des histoires que j'estime importantes, même si je ne suis pas payé(e) pour elles.
- Pour certains de mes travaux, je suis rémunéré(e) en fonction des clics reçus, plutôt que sur le nombre de mots écrits.
- Je choisis délibérément des agences de presse pour lesquelles je veux produire du contenu journalistique.
- Une partie de mon travail consiste à entretenir des contacts avec les éditeurs de la salle de rédaction afin de ne pas être oublié.
- Je connais mon marché, mes clients et mes arguments de vente uniques.
- Je suis prêt à produire des histoires pour tout organisme de presse qui achètera mon travail.

- Pour la plupart de mes histoires, je recherche des informations uniquement en ligne.
- Je fais souvent des tweets ou des blogs en direct pour des agences de presse.
- Si besoin, je travaille pendant de longues périodes sans pause jusqu'à ce que mon délai soit respecté.
- Je me concentre sur les reportages en profondeur et non sur les dernières nouvelles.
- Si mon rédacteur en chef me contacte, je réponds quel que soit le moment de la journée.

16. Quand vous pensez à votre utilisation professionnelle des médias sociaux, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec ce qui suit?

Tout à fait d'accord; Plutôt d'accord; Ni d'accord ni en désaccord; Plutôt pas d'accord; Pas du tout d'accord

- L'utilisation des médias sociaux me permet de mieux me promouvoir et de promouvoir mon travail.
- Grâce aux médias sociaux, je communique mieux avec des personnes en rapport avec mon travail.
- Les médias sociaux ont amélioré ma productivité.
- Les médias sociaux ont diminué ma charge de travail quotidienne.
- Les médias sociaux me permettent d'être plus rapide dans les reportages.
- Les médias sociaux me permettent de faire plus de reportages.
- J'utilise les médias sociaux pour obtenir professionnellement le respect et la renommée
- J'utilise les médias sociaux pour développer des relations avec le public.

17. Voici une autre liste de choses qui pourraient être importantes pour votre travail journalistique quotidien. Êtes-vous d'accord avec ces affirmations?

Tout à fait d'accord; Plutôt d'accord; Ni d'accord ni en désaccord; Plutôt pas d'accord; Pas du tout d'accord

- Ma crédibilité est essentielle. Par conséquent, je n'accepte pas les modifications apportées par mon rédacteur en chef qui vont au-delà de la portée de mon récit.
- Je sélectionne mes clients avec soin et n'accepte jamais les missions d'organisations aux objectifs discutables.
- Je préfère retirer des histoires plutôt que de les publier si le rédacteur en chef les modifie trop.
- Je ne m'engagerais jamais dans d'autres travaux de communication, tels que l'édition d'entreprise ou les relations publiques.
- Je ne m'oppose pas aux modifications apportées par mon rédacteur en chef, car je crains de perdre un client.
- Les manquements à l'éthique se produiront de toute façon, s'opposer aux modifications critiques apportées par mon rédacteur en chef ne fera aucune différence.
- Lorsque je m'engage dans d'autres travaux de communication (tels que les relations publiques ou l'édition d'entreprise), cela ne compromet pas la qualité de mon travail journalistique.
- Il est important pour moi de dire à tout le monde l'origine de mes faits.
- Je montre à quiconque que j'inclus toutes les parties concernées dans mes reportages.
- J'inclus des informations générées par l'utilisateur dans mon travail.
- J'écris des histoires autour de faits vérifiables.
- Tant que je ne supprime pas volontairement les informations pertinentes, j'écirai des histoires véridiques.
- Il n'est pas acceptable d'amener les lecteurs à se sentir d'une façon ou d'une autre.
- La manière dont j'écris des histoires ne doit pas inciter les lecteurs à prendre un parti particulier.

18. Si vous avez une bonne idée d'un sujet que vous jugez important et qui devrait faire l'objet d'un suivi, à quelle fréquence pouvez-vous le couvrir?

Toujours; Souvent; Parfois; Rarement; Jamais; Je ne fais pas de telles propositions.

19. Dans l'ensemble de votre travail, dans quelle mesure disposez-vous personnellement de la liberté de choisir les histoires sur lesquelles vous travaillez?

Liberté totale; Beaucoup de liberté; Un peu de liberté; Peu de liberté; Pas de liberté du tout

20. De quel degré de liberté disposez-vous habituellement pour décider quels aspects d'une histoire doivent être mis en valeur?

Liberté totale; Beaucoup de liberté; Un peu de liberté; Peu de liberté; Pas de liberté du tout

21. Pourquoi avez-vous commencé à travailler comme journaliste en dehors d'un emploi à temps plein? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Cela me donne la liberté et la flexibilité de travailler sur les sujets qui me plaisent.
- J'ai essayé d'entrer dans le journalisme et de constituer un portefeuille avec mon travail indépendant. J'ai été licencié et un autre emploi n'était pas possible.
- Cela m'a permis de prendre soin de ma famille et de travailler dans le journalisme.
- Autre, veuillez préciser:

22. Si vous pensez à tous les articles journalistiques que vous avez produits l'an dernier, combien en avez-vous produits au cours d'un mois moyen?

23. En moyenne, combien d'heures travaillez-vous dans le journalisme par semaine?

24. Faites-vous un autre travail en dehors du travail de journaliste?

Oui, veuillez préciser: ____; Non

25. Pourquoi faites-vous cet autre travail? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Mon revenu de journalisme n'est pas suffisant.
- J'aime travailler dans cet autre domaine.
- Cet autre travail m'aide à surmonter des moments où je n'ai pas assez de travail contractuel en journalisme.
- Autre, veuillez préciser:

26. En moyenne, combien de temps consacrez-vous à votre travail journalistique par semaine par rapport à votre travail non journalistique?

KK09

0-25 % de travail journalistique; 26-50 % de travail journalistique; 51-75 % de travail journalistique; 76-100 % de travail journalistique

27. Dépendez-vous d'autres sources de revenus?

- Non
- Je reçois un soutien financier de mon conjoint/partenaire.
- Je reçois un soutien financier de mes parents.
- Je reçois un soutien financier d'institutions gouvernementales. Autre, veuillez préciser:

28. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait des éléments suivants?

Très satisfait(e); Plutôt satisfait(e); Ni l'un ni l'autre; Plutôt insatisfait(e); Très insatisfait(e)

- Ma charge de travail quotidienne.
- La variété du travail journalistique.
- Les sujets sur lesquels je travaille.
- Le temps de la recherche et de l'investigation.
- Les opportunités de carrière dans le journalisme.
- La séparation entre vie professionnelle et vie privée. Mon revenu de travail journalistique.
- La profondeur du contact avec la rédaction commanditaire du sujet.
- La liberté de planifier mes horaires de travail.
- La qualité de commentaires que je reçois de mon public.
- La quantité de contact avec d'autres journalistes.
- L'appréciation de mon travail par la communauté journalistique.
- La sécurité professionnelle. La sécurité financière.
- L'occasion de discuter des travaux en cours avec autres journalistes.
- Les relations que j'ai avec autres journalistes.

29. En général, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait(e) de votre situation de travail actuelle?

très satisfait(e) – très insatisfait(e)

30. Si on vous offrait un contrat permanent à temps plein dans une salle de rédaction, l'accepteriez-vous?

- Oui
- Non
- Cela dépend (veuillez préciser):
- J'ai déjà un emploi à temps plein.

31. Voici une liste de sources d'influence potentielles. Veuillez indiquer l'influence de chacun des éléments suivants sur votre travail.

Extrêmement influent – Pas du tout influent

- Mes activités extra-professionnelles
- Mes amis et ma famille
- Les autres journalistes
- Mes superviseurs éditoriaux et rédacteurs en chef chargés de la mise en service
- Les considérations publicitaires
- Les relations publiques
- Les produits et services gratuits Mes propres ressources financières Les relations avec les sources
- Les commentaires du public
- La recherche d'audience et données, p.ex. analyse Web Les dates limites
- Les conventions et l'éthique de la profession
- Les lois et réglementation sur les médias
- Les médias sociaux

32. Lorsque vous réfléchissez à votre identité de journaliste, quelle est l'importance des aspects suivants pour vous?

Extrêmement important; Très important; Assez important; Peu important; Pas du tout important

- Être un observateur détaché / une observatrice détachée.
- Rapporter les choses comme elles sont. Proposer une analyse de l'actualité.

- Surveiller et examiner les dirigeants politiques. Surveiller et examiner les affaires.
- Définir l'agenda politique.
- Influencer l'opinion publique.
- Plaider pour le changement social.
- Être un adversaire du gouvernement.
- Transmettre une image positive des dirigeants politiques.
- Appuyer la politique gouvernementale. Proposer divertissements et détente.
- Proposer le genre de nouvelles qui attire le plus grand nombre de spectateurs.
- Proposer conseils, orientation et direction pour la vie quotidienne.
- Proposer aux personnes les informations dont elles ont besoin pour prendre des décisions politiques.
- Motiver les gens à participer à des activités politiques. Laisser les gens exprimer leurs points de vue. Éduquer le public.
- Raconter des histoires sur le monde.
- Promouvoir la tolérance et la diversité culturelle.

33. Dans le passé, avez-vous personnellement reçu un prix pour votre travail journalistique ? Si oui, combien?

Oui, _____; Je n'ai pas gagné de prix.

34. Quel est votre plus haut niveau d'études ou le niveau d'études que vous avez atteint?

- Pas fini le lycée
- Fini le lycée, baccalauréat, CAP
- Licence ou équivalent
- Master ou équivalent
- Doctorat
- Études universitaires, mais pas de diplôme

35. Pendant vos études, dans quel domaine vous êtes-vous spécialisé(e)? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Spécialisé(e) en journalisme
- Spécialisé(e) dans un autre domaine de la communication
- Autre, veuillez préciser:

36. Vous êtes-vous spécialisé(e) dans un domaine lié aux sujets dont vous parlez?

Oui; Non

37. Avez-vous déjà occupé un emploi à temps plein ou à temps partiel dans l'un des médias suivants? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Presse nationale
- Presse régionale
- Presse locale
- Émission publique nationale
- Émission publique régionale
- Diffusion commerciale nationale
- Diffusion commerciale régionale
- Agence de presse/photo
- Je n'ai jamais occupé d'emploi à temps plein ou à temps partiel dans les organisations ci-dessus.

38. Avez-vous déjà effectué un stage dans l'un des médias suivants? Cochez toutes les cases correspondantes.

- Presse nationale
- Presse régionale
- Presse locale
- Émission publique nationale
- Émission publique régionale
- Diffusion commerciale nationale
- Diffusion commerciale régionale
- Agence de presse/photo
- Je n'ai jamais effectué de stage dans les organisations ci-dessus.

39. Avez-vous des parents proches ou un conjoint/partenaire qui travaillent ou ont travaillé comme journaliste?

Oui; Non

Nous demandons ce,e dernière série de questions pour faire des comparaisons statistiques générales au sein de l'étude. Aucune de ces informations ne sera utilisée pour vous identifier ou identifier toute autre personne participant à l'étude.

40. Quand vous pensez à la rémunération de votre travail journalistique, quel était votre revenu annuel au cours du dernier exercice après impôts et dépenses de travail?

- 0 – 6,500 EUR
- 6,501-13,000 EUR

- 13,001-19,500 EUR
- 19,501-26,000 EUR
- 26,001-32,500 EUR
- 32,501-39,000 EUR
- 39,001-52,000 EUR

41. Quelle est votre année de naissance?

42. Quel est votre genre?

Femme; Homme; Non-binaire; Non précisé

43. Veuillez préciser la région ou la ville dans laquelle vous avez passé la majeure partie de votre enfance.

44. Où vivez-vous actuellement? Veuillez préciser une région ou une ville.

45. Durant votre jeunesse, quelle était la profession de votre père?

46. Durant votre jeunesse, quelle était la profession de votre mère?

47. Quel est le plus haut niveau d'études de votre père?

- Pas fini le lycée
- Fini le lycée, baccalauréat, CAP
- Licence ou équivalent
- Master ou équivalent
- Doctorat
- Études universitaires, mais pas de diplôme

48. Quel est le plus haut niveau d'études de votre mère?

- Pas fini le lycée
- Fini le lycée, baccalauréat, CAP
- Licence ou équivalent
- Master ou équivalent
- Doctorat
- Études universitaires, mais pas de diplôme

49. Vivez-vous avec un partenaire ou un conjoint?

Oui; Non; Non précisé

50. Avez-vous des enfants?

Oui, veuillez préciser combien: ____; Non

51. Et combien d'enfants vivent avec vous, actuellement?

52. Voulez-vous ajouter quelque chose que nous n'avons pas abordé dans nos questions?

Merci pour votre participation à cette étude!

Si vous souhaitez connaître les résultats, laissez-nous votre adresse e-mail. Vous serez dirigé vers un site Web distinct, pour veiller à ce que cette information soit anonyme, car elle ne sera pas liée à vos réponses précédentes. Toutes les adresses électroniques seront stockées séparément et utilisées pour envoyer un bref rapport sur les résultats clés à la fin de l'étude.

Dutch Version

Geachte meneer/mevrouw,

Hartelijk dank voor uw deelname aan dit onderzoek naar atypisch journalistiek werk. Journalistiek is in de afgelopen decennia enorm veranderd en er zijn verschillende nieuwe soorten journalisten ontstaan, waarvan er veel niet meer op een redactie werken. Het gaat om freelancers, medewerkers op projectbasis, journalistieke ondernemers, bloggers, journalisten die voor sociale media werken, enzovoort, die steeds meer journalistiek werk produceren. Hoewel het minder vaak op redacties wordt uitgevoerd, bestaat journalistiek werk nog steeds uit traditionele taken, zoals het selecteren van onderwerpen, onderzoek, en het schrijven en produceren van nieuwsberichten en artikelen.

We hebben echter een onvolledig inzicht in de werkomstandigheden van deze journalisten. Om deze belangrijke trend te belichten, worden in dit onderzoek de producenten van atypisch journalistiek werk in zes Europese landen (Oostenrijk, Denemarken, Frankrijk, Polen, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) met elkaar vergeleken. Met uw hulp kunnen we bijdragen aan een beter begrip van journalistiek werk buiten de redactieruimte en uw dagelijks werk zichtbaarder maken.

We willen zo veel mogelijk producenten van atypisch journalistiek werk en een breed scala aan werkzaamheden bestrijken. Daarom verzoeken we u vriendelijk om aan dit onderzoek deel te nemen. We stellen u vragen over uw werkervaring, werkroutine, werkomstandigheden en het beeld dat u van journalistiek werk hebt. Het kost u ongeveer 15-20 minuten om alle vragen te beantwoorden.

Uw deelname is geheel vrijwillig. We vragen u de eerste twee vragen volledig in te vullen. Daarna hoeft u de vragen niet in te vullen, mocht u zich daar niet prettig bij voelen. U kunt zich tijdens uw deelname op elk moment

uit de enquête terugtrekken, maar ingediende antwoorden kunnen niet meer worden teruggetrokken, omdat ze volledig geanonimiseerd zijn opgeslagen. Alle antwoorden worden anoniem en beveiligd opgeslagen. Voor vragen of meer informatie kunt u contact met ons opnemen via phoebe.maares@univie.ac.at.
Bij voorbaat hartelijk dank!

1. Wat van het onderstaande beschrijft uw huidige dienstverband het beste? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Fulltime dienstverband, vast contract
- Parttime dienstverband, vast contract
- Fulltime dienstverband, tijdelijk contract (bijvoorbeeld voor zes maanden) Parttime dienstverband, tijdelijk contract (bijvoorbeeld voor zes maanden) Freelancer
- Medewerker op projectbasis
- Anders, namelijk:

2. Heeft u in de afgelopen zes maanden minstens één keer per maand geld verdiend met journalistiek werk?
Ja; Nee

3. Er zijn vele manieren om journalistiek werk te beschrijven. Hoe zou u uw huidige journalistieke rol karakteriseren?

4. Hoe lang produceert u al journalistiek werk? ____jaar

5. En hoelang produceert u al journalistiek werk in uw huidige functie (bijvoorbeeld als freelancer etc.)? ____jaar

6. Welke onderwerpen behandelt u over het algemeen? Noem maximaal vijf onderwerpen die u het vaakst behandelt (bijvoorbeeld politiek, cultuur, financiën etc.).

7. Voor welke mediaplatforms werkt u? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Kranten en weekbladen
- Tijdschriften
- Nieuwswebsites (alleen online, bijvoorbeeld de Correspondent) Onlinemedi, zoals blogs
- Sociale media, zoals Facebook
- Publieke omroep
- Commerciële omroep
- Persbureaus
- Fotoagentschappen
- Anders, namelijk:

8. Als het gaat om uw normale dagelijkse werkzaamheden, hoeveel tijd besteedt u dan aan uw werk in de volgende omgevingen?

100-76%; 75-51%; 50-26%; 25-1% ; Nooit

- Vanuit huis werken.
- In een gehuurd kantoor werken.
- In een flexibele gedeelde werkruimte werken. In een koffiehuis werken.
- In een redactieruimte werken.

9. Als het gaat om uw gewone dagelijkse werk in de afgelopen zes maanden, hoe vaak gebeurt dan het volgende?

Dagelijks; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit

- Ik communiceer met redacteuren van de redactie via e-mail of telefoon.
- Ik praat persoonlijk met de redacteuren van de redactie.
- Ik praat persoonlijk met de andere journalisten die er in dienst zijn.
- Ik praat met andere freelancejournalisten.

10. Woont u regelmatig redactievergaderingen bij?

Altijd; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit

11. Als het gaat om feedback op uw journalistieke werk, hoe vaak geldt dan het volgende?

Dagelijks; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit

- Ik krijg feedback van andere journalisten.
- Ik krijg feedback van hoofdredacteuren.
- Ik krijg feedback van het publiek.

12. Als het gaat om de middelen waarover u kunt beschikken, wat is dan van toepassing op uw huidige werksituatie?

			Beide evenveel.			
Ik gebruik mijn eigen hardware (computers, audioapparatuur).						Ik kan beschikken over apparatuur (computers, camera's, audioapparatuur) van een nieuwsorganisatie.

Ik gebruik mijn eigen software (bijvoorbeeld voor beeld- of geluidbewerking).						Ik kan beschikken over software (bijvoorbeeld voor beeld- of geluidbewerking) van een nieuwsorganisatie.
Ik gebruik uitsluitend mijn eigen netwerken van bronnen en experts.						Ik heb toegang tot het netwerk van deskundigen en bronnen van mijn opdrachtgever.

13. Hoe vaak gebruikt u het volgende als informatiebron?

Dagelijks; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit

- Blogs van journalisten of andere deskundigen (wetenschappers, juristen etc.).
- Blogs van gewone burgers.
- Microbloggingsites, zoals Twitter.
- Visuele microbloggingsites, zoals Instagram of Tumblr.
- Sociaalnetwerksites, zoals Facebook.
- Professionele sociaalnetwerksites, zoals LinkedIn.
- Sites om beeld en geluid te delen, zoals YouTube of Flickr.
- Sites om audio te delen, zoals Apple Podcast of SoundCloud.
- Berichtendiensten, zoals WhatsApp of Snapchat. Community's en crowdsourcingsites, zoals Wikipedia.

14. Hoe vaak gebruikt u het volgende om uw journalistieke werk te verspreiden?

Dagelijks; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit

- Uw persoonlijke blog
- Microbloggingsites, zoals Twitter.
- Visuele microbloggingsites, zoals Instagram of Tumblr.
- Sociaalnetwerksites, zoals Facebook.
- Professionele sociaalnetwerksites, zoals LinkedIn.
- Sites om beeld en geluid te delen, zoals YouTube of Flickr.
- Sites om audio te delen, zoals Apple Podcast of SoundCloud.
- Berichtendiensten, zoals WhatsApp of Snapchat.

15. Als het gaat om wat belangrijk is in uw dagelijkse werk, in hoeverre bent u het dan eens met de volgende aspecten van uw journalistieke werk?

helemaal mee eens; enigszins mee eens; noch eens, noch oneens; enigszins mee oneens; helemaal niet mee eens

- Onderdeel van mijn dagelijkse werk is het opperen van nieuwe ideeën bij nieuwsorganisaties.
- Ik krijg vaak verhalen toegewezen door een opdrachtgever.
- Als ik mijn verhalen maak, beschouw ik de nieuwsorganisatie als klant.
- Ik hergebruik interviews en onderzoek voor meerdere artikelen en nieuwsberichten.
- Ik werk elk weekend van de maand.
- Ik rapporteer regelmatig rechtstreeks telefonisch (mobiele journalistiek).
- Ik maak soms verhalen die ik belangrijk vind, ook al krijg ik er niet voor betaald.
- Voor een deel van mijn werk word ik betaald op basis van ontvangen clicks in plaats van geschreven woorden.
- Ik selecteer welbewust nieuwsorganisaties waarvoor ik journalistiek werk wil produceren.
- Onderdeel van mijn werk is het onderhouden van contacten met redacteuren van de redactie, om in beeld te blijven.
- Ik ken mijn markt, mijn klanten en mijn 'unique sellingpoints'.
- Ik ben bereid om verhalen te produceren voor iedere nieuwsorganisatie die mijn werk wil kopen.
- Voor de meeste van mijn verhalen doe ik alleen online research.
- Ik tweet of blog vaak live voor nieuwsorganisaties.
- Indien nodig werk ik lang en ononderbroken tot ik mijn deadline heb gehaald.
- Ik richt me op diepgaande verslaggeving en niet op het laatste nieuws.
- Als mijn opdrachtgever contact met mij opneemt, reageer ik onmiddellijk, ongeacht het tijdstip.

16. Als het gaat om uw professionele gebruik van sociale media, in hoeverre bent u het dan eens met het volgende?

helemaal mee eens; enigszins mee eens; noch eens, noch oneens; enigszins mee oneens; helemaal niet mee eens

- Door gebruik te maken van sociale media kan ik mezelf en mijn werk veel beter promoten.
- Door sociale media communiceer ik beter met mensen die van belang zijn voor mijn werk.
- Sociale media hebben mijn productiviteit verbeterd.
- Sociale media hebben mijn dagelijkse werklast verminderd.

- Door sociale media kan ik het nieuws sneller brengen. Door sociale media kan ik meer nieuws verslaan.
- Ik gebruik sociale media om op professionele wijze aanzien en bekendheid te verwerven.
- Ik gebruik sociale media om relaties met het publiek te ontwikkelen.

17. Hier is nog een lijst met zaken die van belang kunnen zijn voor uw dagelijkse journalistieke werk. In hoeverre bent u het eens met deze uitspraken?

helemaal mee eens; enigszins mee eens; noch eens, noch oneens; enigszins mee oneens; helemaal niet mee eens

- Mijn geloofwaardigheid is van cruciaal belang. Daarom accepteer ik geen ingrijpende wijzigingen door mijn opdrachtgever.
- Ik selecteer mijn klanten zorgvuldig en accepteer nooit opdrachten van organisaties met twijfelachtige doelstellingen.
- Ik trek liever verhalen in dan ze te publiceren, als de opdrachtgever ze te veel verandert.
- Ik zou me nooit bezighouden met andere communicatiewerkzaamheden, zoals bedrijfspublicaties of public relations.
- Ik verzet me niet tegen wijzigingen door mijn opdrachtgever, omdat ik bang ben om een klant te verliezen.
- Er is hoe dan ook sprake van onethisch handelen, mijn verzet tegen zwaarwegende wijzigingen door mijn opdrachtgever zal geen verschil maken.
- Wanneer ik andere communicatiewerkzaamheden verricht (zoals public relations of bedrijfspublicaties), dan doet dat geen afbreuk aan de kwaliteit van mijn journalistieke werk.
- Het is voor mij belangrijk om iedereen te vertellen waar mijn feiten vandaan komen.
- Ik laat iedereen zien dat ik alle betrokken partijen in mijn nieuwsberichten betrek.
- In mijn werk gebruik ik informatie die door mijn publiek is gegenereerd.
- Ik schrijf verhalen rond aantoonbare feiten.
- Zolang ik niet opzettelijk relevante informatie weglaat, schrijf ik waarheidsgetrouwe verhalen.
- Het is niet aanvaardbaar om lezers met een bepaald gevoel op te schepen.
- De manier waarop ik verhalen schrijf, mag de lezers niet in een bepaalde richting duwen.

18. Als u een goed idee hebt voor een onderwerp dat u belangrijk vindt en dat aandacht verdient, hoe vaak wordt uw onderwerp dan behandeld?

Altijd; Vaak; Soms; Zelden; Nooit; Ik doe dergelijke voorstellen niet.

19. Als het gaat om het totaal van uw werk, hoeveel vrijheid heeft u dan zelf bij de keuze van de verhalen waaraan u werkt?

Volledige vrijheid; Veel vrijheid; Enige vrijheid; Weinig vrijheid; Geen enkele vrijheid

20. Hoeveel vrijheid heeft u meestal om te beslissen welke aspecten van een verhaal moeten worden benadrukt?

Volledige vrijheid; Veel vrijheid; Enige vrijheid; Weinig vrijheid; Geen enkele vrijheid

21. Waarom bent u journalistiek werk zonder een fulltime dienstverband gaan verrichten? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Het geeft me de vrijheid en flexibiliteit om aan onderwerpen te werken die ik leuk vind.
- Ik probeer(de) als freelancer voet aan de grond te krijgen in de journalistiek en zo een portfolio op te bouwen.
- Ik werd ontslagen en een ander dienstverband was niet mogelijk.
- Het stelde me in staat om voor mijn gezin te zorgen en in de journalistiek te werken.
- Anders, namelijk:

22. Als het gaat om alle journalistieke verhalen die u vorig jaar hebt geproduceerd, hoeveel hebt u er dan in een gemiddelde maand geproduceerd?

23. Hoeveel uur werkt u in een gemiddelde week in de journalistiek?

24. Doet u nog ander werk dan journalistiek werk?

Ja, namelijk: _____; Nee

25. Waarom doet u dat andere werk? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Mijn inkomsten uit de journalistiek zijn niet voldoende.
- Ik vind het leuk om op dat andere terrein te werken.
- Dat andere werk helpt me om tijden te overbruggen waarin ik onvoldoende journalistieke opdrachten heb.
- Anders, namelijk:

26. Hoeveel tijd besteedt u in een gemiddelde week aan uw journalistieke werk in vergelijking met uw niet-journalistieke werk?

0-25% journalistiek werk; 26-50% journalistiek werk; 51-75% journalistiek werk; 76-100% journalistiek werk

27. Bent u afhankelijk van andere inkomstenbronnen?

- Nee
- Ik ontvang financiële steun van mijn (huwelijks)partner.

- Ik ontvang financiële steun van mijn ouders.
- Ik ontvang financiële steun van overheidsinstellingen.
- Anders, namelijk:

28. In hoeverre bent u tevreden met het volgende?

Zeer tevreden; Enigzins tevreden; Noch tevreden, noch ontevreden; Enigzins ontevreden; Zeer ontevreden

- Mijn dagelijkse werklust.
- De verscheidenheid aan journalistiek werk.
- De onderwerpen die ik behandel.
- De tijd die ik heb voor (nader) onderzoek
- De carrière mogelijkheden in de journalistiek.
- De scheiding tussen werk en privé.
- Mijn inkomsten uit journalistiek werk.
- Mijn diepgaande contact met de redacties van opdrachtgevers.
- De vrijheid om mijn eigen werkschema te plannen.
- De kwaliteit van de feedback die ik van mijn publiek ontvang.
- Het aantal contacten met andere journalisten.
- De waardering voor mijn werk in journalistenkringen.
- De beroepszekerheid.
- De financiële zekerheid.
- De mogelijkheid om lopende opdrachten met andere journalisten te bespreken.
- De relaties die ik met andere journalisten heb.

29. Hoe tevreden bent u in het algemeen over uw huidige werksituatie?

Zeer tevreden – zeer ontevreden

30. Als u een vast fulltime contract op de redactie zou worden aangeboden, zou u het dan accepteren?

- Ja
- Nee
- Dat hangt ervan af (namelijk):
- Ik heb al een fulltime aanstelling.

31. Hier is een lijst met beïnvloedingsmogelijkheden. Geef aan hoeveel invloed elk van de volgende zaken op uw werk heeft.

Zeer grote invloed – Geen invloed

- Mijn persoonlijke interesses
- Mijn vrienden, kennissen en familie
- Andere journalisten
- Mijn redactievoorzitters, hoofdredacteuren en redacteuren die opdrachten verstrekken
- Reclame technische overwegingen Public relations
- Gratis producten en diensten
- Mijn eigen financiële middelen Relaties met bronnen
- Feedback van het publiek
- Publiksonderzoek en -gegevens, zoals webanalyses en -statistieken
- Deadlines
- Conventies en beroepsethiek
- Wet- en regelgeving voor de media Sociale media

32. Als u nadenkt over hoe u zich als journalist identificeert, hoe belangrijk zijn dan de volgende aspecten voor u?

Uiterst belangrijk; Zeer belangrijk; Enigzins belangrijk; Weinig belangrijk; Helemaal niet belangrijk

- Een objectieve waarnemer zijn.
- De zaken melden zoals ze zijn.
- Een analyse van de stand van zaken geven.
- Politieke leiders controleren en kritisch onderzoeken.
- Het bedrijfsleven controleren en kritisch onderzoeken.
- De politieke agenda bepalen.
- De publieke opinie beïnvloeden.
- Voor sociale verandering pleiten.
- Tegenstand tegen de regering bieden.
- Een positief beeld van politiek leiderschap uitdragen.
- Het overheidsbeleid steunen.
- Voor entertainment en ontspanning zorgen.
- Het soort nieuws brengen dat het grootste publiek trekt.
- Advies en richting voor het dagelijkse leven bieden.
- Informatie verstrekken die mensen nodig hebben om politieke beslissingen te nemen.

- Mensen motiveren om deel te nemen aan politieke activiteiten.
- Mensen hun mening laten uiten.
- Het publiek verheffen.
- Verhalen over de wereld vertellen.
- Tolerantie en culturele diversiteit bevorderen.

33. Heeft u ooit een onderscheiding voor uw journalistieke werk ontvangen? Zo ja, hoe vaak?

Ja, ____; Ik heb nooit een onderscheiding ontvangen.

34. Wat is het hoogste diploma dat u heeft behaald?

- Niet afgeronde middelbare school
- Voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs, hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, Middelbaar etc.
- Bachelordiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Masterdiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Doctoraatsdiploma
- Wel gestudeerd maar geen universitaire graad behaald

35. In welk vakgebied heeft u zich tijdens uw studie gespecialiseerd? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Gespecialiseerd in journalistiek
- Gespecialiseerd in een ander communicatievak
- Anders, namelijk:

36. Bent u gespecialiseerd in een vakgebied dat verband houdt met uw journalistieke onderwerpen?

Ja; Nee

37. Heeft u ooit een fulltime of parttime dienstverband gehad bij een van de volgende mediaorganisaties?

Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Nationale pers
- Regionale pers
- Lokale pers
- Nationale publieke omroep
- Regionale publieke omroep
- Nationale commerciële omroep
- Regionale commerciële omroep
- Persbureau/fotoagentschap
- Ik heb nog nooit een fulltime of parttime dienstverband gehad bij een van de bovenstaande organisaties.

38. Heeft u ooit stage gelopen bij een van de volgende mediaorganisaties? Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

Selecteer alles wat van toepassing is.

- Nationale pers
- Regionale pers
- Lokale pers
- Nationale publieke omroep
- Regionale publieke omroep
- Nationale commerciële omroep
- Regionale commerciële omroep
- Persbureau/fotoagentschap
- Ik heb nog nooit stage gelopen bij een van de bovenstaande organisaties.

39. Heeft u een naast familielid of een (huwelijks)partner die als journalist werkt of heeft gewerkt?

Ja; Nee

De onderstaande afsluitende vragen worden gesteld om enkele algemene statistische vergelijkingen binnen het onderzoek te maken. Niets ervan zal worden gebruikt om u of iemand anders die aan het onderzoek deelneemt te identificeren.

40. Als het gaat om de beloning van uw journalistieke werk, wat waren dan vorig boekjaar uw netto- inkomsten?

- 0-8,000 EUR
- 8,001-16,000 EUR
- 16,001-24,000 EUR
- 24,001-32,000 EUR
- 32,001-40,000 EUR
- 40,001-48,000 EUR
- 48,001-64,000 EUR
- More than 64,001 EUR

41. In welk jaar bent u geboren?

42. Wat is uw geslacht?

Vrouw; Man; Niet-binaire geslacht; Overige

43. Geef de regio of stad op waar u het grootste deel van uw jeugd hebt doorgebracht.

44. Waar woont u momenteel? Geef de regio of stad op.

45. Wat was in uw jeugd het beroep van uw vader?

46. Wat was in uw jeugd het beroep van uw moeder?

47. Wat was/is het hoogste diploma dat uw vader heeft behaald?

- Niet afgeronde middelbare school
- Voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs, hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, Middelbaar etc.
- Bachelordiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Masterdiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Doctoraatsdiploma
- Wel gestudeerd maar geen universitaire graad behaald

48. Wat was/is het hoogste diploma dat uw moeder heeft behaald?

- Niet afgeronde middelbare school
- Voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs, hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, Middelbaar etc.
- Bachelordiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Masterdiploma of gelijkwaardig
- Doctoraatsdiploma
- Wel gestudeerd maar geen universitaire graad behaald

49. Woont u samen met een (huwelijks)partner?

Ja; Nee; Overige

50. Hebt u kinderen?

Indien ja, hoeveel?; Nee

51. En hoeveel kinderen wonen er momenteel bij u thuis?

52. Is er iets dat u wilt toevoegen dat we niet in onze vragen hebben aangeroerd?

Bedankt voor uw deelname aan dit onderzoek!

Geef uw e-mailadres op als u de resultaten wilt ontvangen. U wordt daarvoor doorverwezen naar een aparte website, waardoor uw e-mailadres niet aan uw antwoorden kan worden gekoppeld en deze anoniem blijven. Alle e-mailadressen worden afzonderlijk opgeslagen en worden alleen gebruikt om na afloop van het onderzoek een kort verslag van de belangrijkste bevindingen te verzenden.

III. Additional Tables

Table 10.1: *Supplementary Variables for MCA*

	Categories	Modalities
Sociodemographic	Gender	Female Male Nonbinary
	Age	18-29 years 30-39 years 40-49 years 50-59 years >60 years
	Father's occupation	Father_Managers,politicians_and_legislators Father_Professionals Father_Skilled workers
	Mother's occupation	Mother_Managers_and_professionals Mother_Skilled_workers Mother_Homemaker
	Choice	low_choice high_choice
Choice and other work	Full-time work	Fulltime_y Fulltime_n
	Other work	no other work other work not PR and communication PR and communication work
	Access to Resources	Resources_++ (high) Resources_± (moderate) Resources_-- (low)
	Separation PR and Journalism	Doxa_PR_++ (high) Doxa_PR_± (moderate) Doxa_PR_-- (low)
Doxa	Objectivity	Doxa_Obj_++ (high) Doxa_Obj_± (moderate) Doxa_Obj_-- (low)
	Editorial Decision-Making	Doxa_Edit_++ (high) Doxa_Edit_± (moderate) Doxa_Edit_-- (low)
	Monitorial Role	MON_++ (high) MON_± (moderate) MON_-- (low)
	Accommodative Role	ACC_++ (high) ACC_± (moderate) ACC_-- (low)
	Interventionist Role	INT_++ (high) INT_± (moderate) INT_-- (low)
	Entrepreneurial Habitus	Entrepr_high Entrepr_low
	Marginalized Habitus	Marg_high Marg_low

	Categories	Modalities
Influences	Relationship influences	INF_PERS_++ (high)
		INF_PERS_± (moderate)
		INF_PERS_-- (low)
	Commercial influences	INF_ECON_++ (high)
		INF_ECON_± (moderate)
		INF_ECON_-- (low)
	Procedural influences	INF_PROCED_++ (high)
		INF_PROCED_± (moderate)
		INF_PROCED_-- (low)

Note. Digital Habitus and collaborative role perception were excluded as the variation between groups was not meaningful (Hjellbrekke, 2019, 37).

Table 10.2: *Overview of sociodemographic parameters by country*

	Austria	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK	All journalists
Gender (female)	43.6%	46.2%	57.5%	48.9%	27.8%	45.3%
Age in years	45.64	52.47	39.49	44.79	50.88	46.47
M (SD)	(16.03)	(11.89)	(12.16)	(12.98)	(12.11)	(13.95)
Experience in years						
As journalist	17.59 (13.37)	22.24 (12.42)	13.05 (10.17)	19.15 (12.48)	23.11 (11.34)	18.94 (12.53)
As freelancer	12.04 (11.38)	12.47 (9.19)	7.15 (7.24)	10.68 (9.5)	12.76 (9.32)	11.05 (9.69)
Education						
Completed high school	9.9%	1.3%	2.5%	4.4%	3.8%	4.7%
College/bachelor's degree or equivalent	18.8%	50%	13.8%	34.1%	48.7%	32.2%
Master's degree or equivalent	45.5%	42.3%	76.3%	50.5%	35.9%	50%
Doctorate	6.9%	1.3%	6.3%	3.3%	5.1%	4.7%
Specialized in journalism/communication	31.7%	65.4%	72.5%	51%	26.6%	48.6%
Specialized in their topic of expertise	33.3%	31.6%	43%	31.9%	38.5%	35.5%
Specializations						
Mixed beat	33.7%	41.3%	24.1%	39.1%	27.8%	33.3%
Hard news beat	12.9%	14.7%	13.9%	12%	29.1%	16.2%
Soft news beat	53.5%	44%	62%	48.9%	43%	50.5%
Platforms						
Newspapers and Weeklies	64.4%	50%	52.5%	59.8%	54.4%	56.7%
Magazines	63.4%	78.2%	80%	66.3%	73.4%	71.6%
Online only newsrooms	23.8%	14.1%	42.5%	48.9%	39.2%	33.7%
Blogs	19.8%	12.8%	10%	38%	55.7%	27.2%
Public Broadcast	14.9%	25.6%	17.5%	20.7%	11.4%	17.9%

	Austria	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK	All journalists
Commercial Broadcast	6.9%	29.5%	18.8%	5.4%	6.3%	12.8%
News Agencies	5.9%	2.6%	11.3%	4.3%	11.4%	7%
Photo Agencies	4%	7.7%	0	3.3%	5.1%	4%
Social media	27.7%	29.5%	7.5%	8.7%	30.4%	20.7%
Working hours						
> 20 hours/week	55.3%	50.7%	82.9%	76.4%	76%	67.5%
< 20 hours/week	44.7%	49.3%	17.1%	23.6%	24%	31.7%
Other paid jobs						
PR, advertising and communication work	22.2%	36.4%	31.4%	34.8%	25.6%	29.4%
Research and education	14.3%	13.6%	2.9%	15.2%	14%	12.6%
Translation, editing and proofing	9.5%	6.8%	2.9%	10.9%	16.3%	9.5%
Book writing and book publishing	6.3%	4.5%	11.4%	13%	9.3%	8.7%
Art and design	7.9%	11.4%		8.7%	7%	7.4%
Service industry	3.2%	2.3%	14.3%	4.3%	11.6%	6.5%
Union work	3.2%	13.6%	5.7%	0	0	4.3%
N	101	78	80	92	79	430

Table 10.3: *Yearly disposable income by weekly working hours*

	Weekly working hours	
	≤ 20 hours (N = 124)	> 20 hours (N = 265)
0-8.000 EUR #	47.6%	9.4%
8.001-16.000 EUR	21.8%	16.2%
16.001-24.000 EUR	8.9%	15.5%
24.001-32.000 EUR	8.1%	24.2%
32.001-40.000 EUR	5.6%	10.9%
40.001-48.000 EUR	.8%	9.1%
48.001-64.000 EUR	5.6%	7.9%
More than 64.001 EUR	1.6%	6.8%

Note. # Yearly disposable income is shown for Austria and the Netherlands. For the other countries the brackets were composed as follows: Denmark: 0-70,000 DKK; 70,001-140,000 DKK; 140,001-210,000 DKK; 210,001-280,000 DKK; 280,001-350,000 DKK; 350,001-420,000 DKK; 420,001-560,000 DKK; more than 560,001 DKK. France: 0 – 6,500 EUR; 6,501-13,000 EUR; 13,001-19,500 EUR; 19,501-26,000 EUR; 26,001-32,500 EUR; 32,501-39,000 EUR; 39,001-52,000 EUR; more than 52,001 EUR. UK: 0 – 6,000 GBP; 6,001-12,000 GBP; 12,001-18,000 GBP; 18,001-24,000 GBP; 24,001-30,000 GBP; 30,001-36,000 GBP; 36,001-48,000 GBP; more than 48,001 GBP. Yearly disposable income was measured in 10 income brackets, due to low frequencies, the last three brackets were collapsed to one for this table.

Table 10.4: *Yearly disposable income by gender*

	Women journalists (N=183)	Men journalists (N=219)
0 - 8,000 EUR	24.6%	19.6%
8,001-16,000 EUR	21.9%	15.5%
16,001-24,000 EUR	15.3%	11.4%
24,001-32,000 EUR	14.8%	21.9%
32,001-40,000 EUR	6.6%	11.9%
40,001-48,000 EUR	6.6%	5.9%
48,001-64,000 EUR	8.2%	6.4%
64,001-80,000 EUR	2.2%	7.3%

Note. # Yearly disposable income is shown for Austria and the Netherlands. For the other countries, see Table 10.3. Yearly disposable income was measured in 10 income brackets, due to low frequencies, the last three brackets were collapsed to one for this table.

Table 10.5: *Yearly disposable income by age*

	N	Mean	SD
0-8,000 EUR #	88	42.95	17.58
8,001-16,000 EUR	75	46	13.70
16,001-24,000 EUR	51	45	13.71
24,001-32,000 EUR	74	46.03	12.91
32,001-40,000 EUR	38	50.21	12.79
40,001-48,000 EUR	25	51.4	11.26
48,001-64,000 EUR	29	48.07	8.71
More than 64,001 EUR	20	52.2	9.36
Total	400	46.41	14.01

Note. # Yearly disposable income is shown for Austria and the Netherlands. For the other countries, see Table 10.3. Yearly disposable income was measured in 10 income brackets, due to low frequencies, the last three brackets were collapsed to one for this table.

Table 10.6: *Yearly disposable income by country*

	Austria (N = 92)	Denmark (N = 76)	France (N = 79)	Netherlands (N = 87)	UK (N = 73)
0-8,000 EUR #	46.7%	17.1%	15.2%	16.1%	11%
8,001-16,000 EUR	23.9%	19.7%	20.3%	12.6%	16.4%
16,001-24,000 EUR	9.8%	15.8%	10.1%	20.7%	8.2%
24,001-32,000 EUR	13%	15.8%	31.6%	19.5%	12.3%
32,001-40,000 EUR	5.4%	11.8%	6.3%	12.6%	11%
40,001-48,000 EUR	--	6.6%	7.6%	6.9%	11%
48,001-64,000 EUR	--	10.5%	6.3%	4.6%	16.4%
More than 64,001 EUR	1.1%	2.6%	2.5%	6.9%	13.7%

Note. # Yearly disposable income is shown for Austria and the Netherlands. For the other countries, see Table 10.3. Yearly disposable income was measured in 10 income brackets, due to low frequencies, the last three brackets were collapsed to one for this table.

Table 10.7: *Work in other areas by country*

	Work in other areas	
	N	%
Austria	100	68
Denmark	78	61.5
France	80	45
Netherlands	91	53.8
UK	78	55.1
All	427	57.1

Table 10.8: *Frequencies of other sources of income*

	N	%
No other sources of income	121	28,1
Work in another area	248	57,6
Financial support from spouse / partner	17	4
Financial support from parents	8	1,9
Financial support from governmental institutions	14	3,3
Financial support from other sources	22	5,1

Table 10.9: *Sources of financial support by gender*

	Women journalists (N =79)	Men journalists (N = 99)
No other sources of income	60.8%	70.7%
I receive financial support from my spouse / partner.	15.2%	5.1%
I receive financial support from my parents.	5.1%	4%
I receive financial support from governmental institutions.	10.1%	6.1%
Other, please specify:	8.9%	14.1%

Table 10.10: *Pairwise comparison of access to resources across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-3.394**	.969	3.900**	-2.173
Denmark		3.197*	6.963***	1.167
France			3.566**	-2.058
Netherlands				-5.790***

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. P values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.11: *Pairwise comparison of location of work: home across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-2.118	1.858	-2.471	2.219
Denmark		3.744**	-.229	4.076***
France			-4.144***	.349
Netherlands				4.490***

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.12: *Pairwise comparison of location of work: rented office across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	4.846***	.612	.388	-.502
Denmark		-4.012**	-4.382***	-5.016***
France			-.234	-1.049
Netherlands				.853

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.13: *Pairwise comparison of location of work: co-working space across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	3.414**	2.013	3.789**	1.057
Denmark		-1.341	.221	-2.207
France			1.611	-.885
Netherlands				-2.505

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.14: *Pairwise comparison of location of work: newsroom across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-3.161*	-.261	3.298*	-1.249
Denmark		2.749	6.157***	1.793
France			3.363**	-.030
Netherlands				-4.295***

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.15: *Tertiary degrees across countries*

	Austria	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK	ALL
Social Sciences	47.9%	28%	35.7%	46.8%	40.7%	41.8%
Arts and Humanities	25.4%	52%	21.4%	29.8%	30.5%	29.5%
Sciences	7%	8%	21.4%	4.3%	16.9%	11.5%
Economic Sciences	4.2%	8%	4.8%	8.5%	3.4%	5.3%
Law	7%	4%	9.5%	2.1%	3.4%	5.3%
Medicine and Health Science	2.8%	--	4.8%	4.3%	3.4%	3.3%
Engineering and Architecture	5.6%	--	2.4%	4.3%	1.7%	3.3%

Note. Specialisations without journalism and communication programs

Table 10.16: *Education of respondent' parents*

	Father's education	Mother's education
Mandatory school	30.8%	33%
Higher school diploma	21.5%	24%
Bachelor's degree or equivalent	18.8%	25.4%
Master's degree or equivalent	18.8%	12%
Doctorate diploma	7.3%	2.9%
Undertook some university studies, but no degree	2.7%	2.7%
N	409	409

Table 10.17: *Pairwise comparisons of mother's education level along respondents' age*

	high school diploma	bachelor's degree	master's degree	doctoral degree	some studies, no degree
mandatory school	4.294	6.803*	5.808*	4.412*	3.081*
high school diploma		2.252	2.32	2.471	1.234
bachelor's degree			0.538	1.437	0.236
master's degree				1.062	-0.059
doctoral degree					-0.871

Note: Dunn z-test after Kruskal-Wallis test with Bonferroni adjustment of p-values.

Table 10.18: *Pairwise comparisons of father's education level along respondents' age*

	high school diploma	bachelor's degree	master's degree	doctoral degree	some studies, no degree
mandatory school	2.305	3.052	2.648	2.345	1.061
high school diploma		0.77	0.395	0.774	0.035
bachelor's degree			-0.364	0.216	-0.339
master's degree				0.482	-0.157
doctoral degree					-0.441

Note: Dunn z-test after Kruskal-Wallis test with Bonferroni adjustment of p-values.

Table 10.19: *Fathers' occupation compared across countries, in per cent*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Managers, politicians and legislators	14.8%	13.5%	22.9%	24.7%	14.5%	18.1%
Professionals	26.1%	50%	41.4%	42.4%	37.7%	39.1%
Technicians and associate professionals	12.5%	6.8%	8.6%	10.6%	15.9%	10.9%
clerical support workers	4.5%	1.4%	1.4%	1.2%	1.4%	2.1%
service and sales workers	13.6%	5.4%	2.9%	3.5%	5.8%	6.5%
skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	4.5%	5.4%	4.3%	1.2%	--	3.1%
Craft and related trades workers	18.2%	8.1%	8.6%	9.3%	14.5%	11.9%
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	4.5%	4.1%	--	--	4.3%	2.6%
Elementary occupations	--	5.4%	5.7%	4.7%	2.9%	3.6%
Armed forces	1.1%	--	4.3%	2.3%	2.9%	2.1%
Homemakers	--	--	--	1.2%	--	0.3%
N	88	74	70	85	69	387

Table 10.20: *Mothers' occupation compared across countries, in per cent*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Managers, politicians and legislators	2.3%	2.7%	3%	5%	1.4%	2.9%
Professionals	23.9%	36%	51.5%	35%	39.1%	36.2%
Technicians and associate professionals	3.4%	5.3%	12.1%	11.3%	8.7%	7.9%
clerical support workers	12.5%	6.7%	13.6%	3.8%	11.6%	9.5%
service and sales workers	9.1%	12%	6.1%	3.8%	7.2%	7.7%
skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	2.3%	4%	--	--	--	1.3%
Craft and related trades workers	3.4%	4%	1.5%	2.5%	2.9%	2.9%
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	2.3%	--	--	1.3%	--	0.8%
Elementary occupations	4.5%	5.3%	4.5%	2.5%	1.4%	3.7%
Homemakers	36.4%	24%	7.6%	35%	27.5%	27%
N	88	75	66	80	69	378

Table 10.21: *Frequencies of digital platform use for sourcing purposes by country*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Blogs authored by journalists or other experts (e.g. scientists, lawyer)						
Daily	4.0%	1.3%	10.4%	2.2%	6.4%	4.8%
Often	28.3%	12%	15.6%	30.8%	26.9%	23.3%
Sometimes	30.3%	32%	40.3%	40.7%	33.3%	35.2%
Rarely	28.3%	30.7%	26%	16.5%	25.6%	25.2%
Never	9.1%	24%	7.8%	9.9%	7.7%	11.4%
Blogs authored by regular citizens						
Daily	--	--	1.3%	--	1.3%	0.5%
Often	4.1%	1.3%	10.3%	4.4%	7.9%	5.5%
Sometimes	19.4%	12%	19.2%	31.9%	21.1%	21.1%
Rarely	46.9%	42.7%	34.6%	37.4%	38.2%	40.2%

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Never	29.6%	44%	34.6%	26.4%	31.6%	32.8%
Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter						
Daily	9.2%	2.7%	21.5%	12%	12.8%	11.6%
Often	9.2%	5.4%	19%	23.9%	15.4%	14.7%
Sometimes	21.4%	23%	22.8%	35.9%	26.9%	26.1%
Rarely	25.5%	27%	15.2%	13%	32.1%	22.3%
Never	34.7%	41.9%	21.5%	15.2%	12.8%	25.2%
Social networking sites, such as Facebook						
Daily	6.3%	6.6%	6.3%	6.7%	6.4%	6.5%
Often	25.3%	11.8%	11.4%	22.2%	9%	16.5%
Sometimes	22.1%	30.3%	30.4%	34.4%	20.5%	27.5%
Rarely	25.3%	31.6%	27.8%	22.2%	32.1%	27.5%
Never	21.1%	19.7%	24.1%	14.4%	32.1%	22%
Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn						
Daily	1%	--	3.8%	4.4%	3.8%	2.6%
Often	3.1%	7.9%	11.5%	22.2%	16.7%	12.2%
Sometimes	24.7%	31.6%	29.5%	42.2%	33.3%	32.2%
Rarely	24.7%	23.7%	19.2%	23.3%	25.6%	23.4%
Never	46.4%	36.8%	35.9%	7.8%	20.5%	29.6%
Audio-visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr						
Daily	1%	--	5.1%	4.3%	2.5%	2.6%
Often	11.1%	6.6%	6.4%	12%	6.3%	8.7%
Sometimes	28.3%	14.5%	25.6%	40.2%	24.1%	27.1%
Rarely	38.4%	47.4%	24.4%	20.7%	31.6%	32.3%
Never	21.2%	31.6%	38.5%	22.8%	35.4%	29.2%
Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud						
Daily	1%	1.3%	--	2.3%	--	1%
Often	2%	6.5%	2.6%	9.1%	2.5%	4.5%
Sometimes	9.1%	9.1%	2.6%	12.5%	7.6%	8.3%
Rarely	25.3%	19.5%	21.8%	23.9%	30.4%	24.2%
Never	62.6%	63.6%	73.1%	52.3%	59.5%	62%
Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or SnapChat						
Daily	8.9%	2.6%	1.3%	17.8%	5.1%	7.5%
Often	18.8%	3.9%	6.3%	18.9%	15.4%	13.2%
Sometimes	14.9%	5.2%	20.3%	21.1%	14.1%	15.3%
Rarely	24.8%	19.5%	20.3%	23.3%	28.2%	23.3%
Never	32.7%	68.8%	51.9%	18.9%	37.2%	40.7%

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Content communities and crowd-sourcing sites, such as Wikipedia						
Daily	7%	1.3%	1.3%	9.8%	7.6%	5.6%
Often	33%	22.1%	13.9%	27.2%	17.7%	23.4%
Sometimes	4--	27.3%	26.6%	46.7%	34.2%	35.6%
Rarely	13%	24.7%	27.8%	12%	19%	18.7%
Never	7%	24.7%	30.4%	4.3%	21.5%	16.6%

Table 10.22: *Frequencies of digital platform use for distribution by country*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Your personal blog						
Daily	1%	--	5.1%	2.2%	6.5%	2.9%
Often	14.4%	6.8%	5.1%	14.4%	15.6%	11.6%
Sometimes	13.4%	15.1%	1.3%	11.1%	24.7%	13%
Rarely	9.3%	20.5%	5.1%	25.6%	22.1%	16.4%
Never	61.9%	57.5%	83.3%	46.7%	31.2%	56.1%
Micro-blogging sites, such as Twitter						
Daily	7.4%	5.3%	11.8%	5.6%	22.7%	10.2%
Often	17.9%	9.2%	23.7%	25.6%	37.3%	22.6%
Sometimes	13.7%	13.2%	22.4%	22.2%	16%	17.5%
Rarely	22.1%	17.1%	10.5%	2--	9.3%	16.3%
Never	38.9%	55.3%	31.6%	26.7%	14.7%	33.5%
Visual micro-blogging sites, such as Instagram, or Tumblr						
Daily	5.2%	4.2%	2.6%	2.2%	5.2%	3.9%
Often	17.7%	6.9%	3.8%	10.1%	10.4%	10.2%
Sometimes	11.5%	12.5%	11.5%	13.5%	18.2%	13.3%
Rarely	11.5%	22.2%	12.8%	20.2%	16.9%	16.5%
Never	54.2%	54.2%	69.2%	53.9%	49.4%	56.1%
Social networking sites, such as Facebook						
Daily	9.2%	2.6%	7.6%	2.2%	12.7%	6.8%
Often	36.7%	30.3%	13.9%	26.1%	20.3%	25.9%
Sometimes	18.4%	28.9%	22.8%	26.1%	21.5%	23.3%
Rarely	16.3%	26.3%	17.7%	19.6%	17.7%	19.3%
Never	19.4%	11.8%	38%	26.1%	27.8%	24.5%
Professional social networking sites, such as LinkedIn						
Daily	1%	--	2.5%	1.1%	7.6%	2.3%
Often	12.1%	13%	13.9%	26.1%	32.9%	19.5%
Sometimes	13.1%	28.6%	29.1%	39.1%	12.7%	24.4%
Rarely	18.2%	33.8%	19%	19.6%	22.8%	22.3%
Never	55.6%	24.7%	35.4%	14.1%	24.1%	31.5%

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	ALL
Audio-visual sharing sites, such as YouTube, or Flickr						
Daily	1.1%	--	--	--	1.3%	0.5%
Often	4.2%	--	2.5%	3.3%	5.1%	3.1%
Sometimes	7.4%	7.9%	3.8%	9.8%	10.1%	7.8%
Rarely	15.8%	21.1%	10.1%	17.4%	24.1%	17.6%
Never	71.6%	71.1%	83.5%	69.6%	59.5%	71%
Audio sharing sites, such as Apple Podcast, or SoundCloud						
Daily	--	--	--	--	--	--
Often	1%	2.6%	1.3%	3.3%	7.6%	3.1%
Sometimes	6.3%	3.9%	2.6%	6.5%	1.3%	4.3%
Rarely	9.4%	9.1%	3.8%	9.8%	8.9%	8.3%
Never	83.3%	84.4%	92.3%	80.4%	82.3%	84.4%
Personal messenger tools, such as WhatsApp, or SnapChat						
Daily	3%	1.3%	2.5%	3.3%	1.3%	2.3%
Often	12.1%	2.6%	3.8%	12%	8.9%	8.2%
Sometimes	17.2%	2.6%	6.3%	25%	13.9%	13.6%
Rarely	19.2%	10.4%	12.7%	26.1%	20.3%	18.1%
Never	48.5%	83.1%	74.7%	33.7%	55.7%	57.7%

Table 10.23: *Pairwise comparison of social media use for branding purposes by country*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-1.007	-.449	2.063	2.287
Denmark		.537	2.933*	3.118*
France			2.400	2.605
Netherlands				.303

Table 10.24: *Media platforms across age*

		N	Age		t-value
			Mean	SD	
Newspapers & Weeklies	No	180	48.1	12.91	2.123*
	Yes	235	45.23	14.60	
Magazines	No	116	45.03	15.21	-1.246
	Yes	299	47.03	13.42	
Online only newsrooms	No	276	47.89	13.80	2.935**
	Yes	139	43.66	13.86	
Blogs	No	302	46	13.85	-1.107
	Yes	113	47.73	14.20	
Social Media	No	331	46.24	13.69	-.650
	Yes	84	47.4	14.96	
PBS	No	339	46.04	13.82	-1.312
	Yes	76	48.42	14.43	
CBS	No	360	46.39	14.23	-.364
	Yes	55	47.04	12.03	
News agencies	No	386	46.72	13.931	1.284
	Yes	29	43.24	14.058	
Photo agencies	No	398	46.13	13.906	-2.649*
	Yes	17	54.59	12.855	

Note. Welch's t-Test. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 10.25: *Beats by gender*

	Men journalists (N=225)	Women journalists (N=192)
Hard	20.9%	9.9%
Soft	44.4%	58.3%
Mixed	34.7%	31.8%

Table 10.26: *Beats by country*

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK
Hard news	12.9%	14.7%	13.9%	12%	29.1%
Soft news	53.5%	44%	62%	48.9%	43%
Generalist	33.7%	41.3%	24.1%	39.1%	27.8%

Table 10.27: *Pairwise comparison of regular contact across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-1.488	2.660	3.145*	.487
Denmark		4.000**	4.516***	1.888
France			.358	-2.064
Netherlands				-2.496

Note. Standardized z-values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.28: *Pairwise comparison for regular feedback across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-2.045	1.415	2.325	.224
Denmark		3.290*	4.208***	2.153
France			.813	-1.128
Netherlands				-1.974

Note. Standardized z-values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.29: Intrinsic and extrinsic choice by gender

	Men (N=228)	Women (N=193)	$\chi^2(1)$
It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy.	59.2%	70.5%	5.774*
I tried to enter journalism and build up a portfolio with my freelance work.	21.9%	18.7%	.691
I was laid off and other employment was not possible.	15.4%	7.8%	5.736*
It allowed me to take care of my family and work in journalism.	18.4%	19.7%	.109
I wanted to be my own boss.	10.5%	12.4%	.377

Note. Frequencies and χ^2 to items from the question “Why did you start to do journalistic work outside of full-time employment? Tick all that apply.” Values indicate the percentages within gender, i.e., 59.2% of men journalists chose atypical work for its freedom and flexibility, while 70.5% of women journalists did.

* $p < .05$.

Table 10.30: Intrinsic and extrinsic choice by age

		N	Age		<i>t</i> -value
			Mean	SD	
It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy.	No	148	48.54	13.99	2.251*
	Yes	267	45.33	13.82	
I tried to enter journalism and build up a portfolio with my freelance work.	No	330	48.62	13.15	6.271***
	Yes	85	38.13	13.90	
I was laid off and other employment was not possible.	No	367	45.71	13.98	-3.425**
	Yes	48	52.29	12.31	
It allowed me to take care of my family and work in journalism.	No	337	45.95	14.56	-1.906
	Yes	78	48.72	10.73	
I wanted to be my own boss.	No	367	46.29	14.10	-.800
	Yes	48	47.88	12.74	

Note. Frequencies and Welch’s t -test from items to the question “Why did you start to do journalistic work outside of full-time employment? Tick all that apply.” * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 10.31: Intrinsic and extrinsic choice by country

	AT	DK	FR	NL	UK	All
It gives me freedom and flexibility to work on the topics that I enjoy.	64.4%	59%	67.5%	72.8%	55.7%	64.2%
I tried to enter journalism and build up a portfolio with my freelance work.	17.8%	17.9%	22.5%	26.1%	17.7%	20.5%
I was laid off and other employment was not possible.	8.9%	12.8%	7.5%	14.1%	15.2%	11.6%
It allowed me to take care of my family and work in journalism.	15.8%	24.4%	17.5%	15.2%	21.5%	18.4%
I wanted to be my own boss.	11.9%	12.8%	15%	10.9%	5.1%	11.2%

Note. Frequencies to the question “Why did you start to do journalistic work outside of full-time employment? Tick all that apply.” Values indicate the percentages within country, i.e., 64.4% of Austrian journalists chose atypical work for its freedom and flexibility while 59% of Danish journalist did.

Table 10.32: Means of different levels of job satisfaction

	Satisfaction with...			General satisfaction
	Contact to community	Content of work	Work-life balance & job security	
Austria				
N	98	101	90	101
Mean	3.04	4.24	2.70	7.06
SD	.93	.71	.81	2.15
Denmark				
N	77	76	71	75
Mean	3.24	3.86	2.85	6.68
SD	.75	.62	.73	2.46
France				
N	77	78	75	80
Mean	3.25	4.03	2.61	6.48
SD	.81	.66	.63	2.13
Netherlands				
N	89	89	88	92
Mean	3.59	4.10	2.95	7.51
SD	.79	.61	.71	1.78
UK				
N	78	75	74	79
Mean	3.16	4.04	2.84	7.13
SD	.79	.78	.73	2.28
All journalists				
N	419	419	398	427
Mean	3.25	4.07	2.79	6.99
SD	.84	.69	.74	2.18

Note. Mean and standard deviations to composite indices of job satisfaction *contact to community*, *content of work*, and *work-life balance and job security* measured with a 5-point scale, where 1 = *not satisfied at all* and 5 = *very satisfied*, and a scale of general satisfaction measured with the question: “In general, how satisfied are you with your current working situation?”, measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = very dissatisfied and 10 = very satisfied.

Table 10.33: Job satisfaction by high-choice and low-choice respondents

	N	Mean	SD	t-value
Satisfaction with contact				
low	242	3.12	0.86	3.969***
high	169	3.45	0.79	
Satisfaction with the content of work				
low	241	3.96	0.70	4.030***
high	169	4.23	0.63	
Satisfaction with job security and workload				
low	230	2.72	0.71	2.482*
high	160	2.91	0.76	
In general, how satisfied are you with your current working situation?				
low	245	6.59	2.30	-4.797***
high	173	7.57	1.87	

Note. Welch's t-Test. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 10.34: Perception of freedom and autonomy by choice

	N	Mean	SD	z
Get ideas covered				
low	248	2.23	1.24	-3.605***
high	172	2.65	0.94	
Freedom in selecting stories				
low	248	2.61	0.92	-4.725***
high	173	3.02	0.72	
Freedom in putting focus in stories				
low	247	2.85	0.72	-4.305***
high	173	3.15	0.64	

Note. Mann-Whitney-U test. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 10.35: Editorial autonomy of atypical journalists and all journalists (WJS)

	Freedom in selecting topics		Freedom in choosing angle		Editorial autonomy index	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
AT						
All journ.*	3.91	0.66	4.20	0.65	4.06	0.58
Freelancers	3.96	0.73	4.24	0.62	4.10	0.60
DK						
All journ.*	3.76	0.90	3.93	0.87	3.85	0.81
Freelancers	3.67	0.96	3.87	0.80	3.77	0.79
FR						
All journ.*	3.71	0.79	3.78	0.80	3.74	0.73
Freelancers	3.66	0.95	3.86	0.74	3.76	0.72
NL						
All journ.*	4.31	0.71	4.36	0.66	4.34	0.62
Freelancers	3.89	0.78	4.00	0.61	3.95	0.62
UK						
All journ.*	3.90	0.86	4.04	0.85	3.97	0.79
Freelancers	3.66	0.90	3.81	0.68	3.73	0.70

Note. *Comparison between answers from all journalists surveyed in the WJS (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019), and atypical journalists in this study. Mean and standard deviation to items measuring freedom in selecting topics and freedom in choosing the angle in a story and a composite index of both (editorial autonomy index), measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 = *no freedom at all* and 5 = *a great deal of freedom*.

Table 10.36: Perceived influences across gender

Influences	N	Mean	SD	t-value
Procedural				
Men	227	2.33	0.88	2.263*
Women	186	2.15	0.71	
Commercial				
Men	226	4.14	0.67	-.652
Women	184	4.19	0.73	
Relationship				
Men	226	2.90	0.61	.585
Women	183	2.87	0.64	

Note. Welch's t-Test. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 10.37: *Pairwise comparison of relationship influences across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-1,524	-2,79	-0,013	-0,515
Denmark		-1,206	1,479	0,946
France			2,719	2,141
Netherlands				-0,492

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.38: *Pairwise comparison of procedural influences across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-2.114	2.357	-0.46	2.144
Denmark		4.221***	1.632	4.02***
France			-2.735	-0.202
Netherlands				2.526

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.39: *Perceived influences of atypical journalists and all journalist (WJS).*

	Personal networks		Commercial		Procedural	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
AT						
All journ.*	2.27	0.76	2.22	0.87	3.46	0.68
Freelancers	3.18	0.63	1.81	0.77	3.72	0.83
DK						
All journ.*	2.38	0.75	2.22	0.89	3.44	0.69
Freelancers	3.05	0.55	1.86	0.70	3.44	0.88
FR						
All journ.*	2.50	0.72	2.17	0.81	3.59	0.71
Freelancers	2.92	0.64	1.68	0.65	4.02	0.65
NL						
All journ.*	2.50	0.72	2.41	0.94	3.05	0.69
Freelancers	3.22	0.57	1.89	0.67	3.71	0.67
UK						
All journ.*	2.65	0.78	2.72	0.92	3.80	0.71
Freelancers	3.12	0.71	1.93	0.67	3.91	0.88

Note. *Comparison between answers from all journalists surveyed in the WJS (Hanitzsch, Ramaprasad, et al., 2019), and atypical journalists in this study. Mean and standard deviation to compound indices of perceived personal network, commercial, and procedural influences, measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 = *not at all influential* and 5 = *extremely influential*.

Table 10.40: *Journalists' normative values across gender*

		N	Mean	SD	t -value
Editorial ethics	Men	224	3.75	1.22	.391
	Women	190	3.83	1.03	
Norms of objectivity and transparency	Men	217	2.39	0.71	1.496
	Women	182	2.29	0.60	
Separation from communication work	Men	215	2.16	0.77	-.779
	Women	187	2.13	0.64	

Note. Welch's t -Test.

Table 10.41: *Pairwise comparison of separation from PR work across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-3.976**	0.777	-2.395	-3.504**
Denmark		4.514***	1.654	0.461
France			-3.031*	-4.067***
Netherlands				-1.181

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.42: *Pairwise comparison of professional norms across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-4.186***	-2.215	-5.062***	-6.938***
Denmark		1.803	-0.626	-2.53
France			-2.496	-4.323***
Netherlands				-2.007

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni)

Table 10.43: *Pairwise comparison of the accommodative role across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-4.437***	-5.682***	-3.999**	-3.152*
Denmark		-1.207	0.581	1.228
France			1.827	2.431
Netherlands				0.69

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.44: *Pairwise comparison of the monitorial role across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	4.437***	5.682***	3.999**	3.152*
Denmark		1.207	-0.581	-1.228
France			-1.827	-2.431
Netherlands				-0.69

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.45: *Pairwise comparison of the interventionist role across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	0.829	4.43***	1.574	0.27
Denmark		3.433**	0.678	-0.527
France			-2.866*	-3.941**
Netherlands				-1.218

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.46: *Pairwise comparison of the collaborative role across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	-2.34	-1.988	2.785	2.009
Denmark		0.32	4.94***	4.139***
France			2.785***	3.791**
Netherlands				-0.666

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.47: *Role orientations of atypical journalists and all journalist (WJS).*

	Accommodative		Monitorial		Interventionist		Collaborative	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
AT								
All journ.*	3.60	0.83	3.31	1.12	2.54	0.80	1.31	0.57
Freelancers	3.11	0.94	3.43	1.01	3.09	0.93	1.41	0.73
DK								
All journ.*	2.47	0.69	3.89	0.61	2.76	0.82	1.17	0.37
Freelancers	2.43	0.97	3.16	1.14	2.98	0.99	1.17	0.48
FR								
All journ.*	2.63	0.86	3.50	0.84	2.44	0.90	1.23	0.52
Freelancers	2.26	0.87	2.81	0.96	2.45	0.83	1.18	0.42
NL								
All journ.*	3.37	0.79	2.75	0.94	2.49	0.76	1.58	0.61
Freelancers	2.53	0.92	3.11	0.95	2.88	0.88	1.65	0.78
UK								
All journ.*	3.08	0.92	2.99	1.12	2.57	0.91	1.41	0.66
Freelancers	2.61	0.87	3.21	1.16	3.05	1.04	1.56	0.76

Note. *Comparison between answers from all journalists surveyed in the WJS (Hanitzsch, Vos, et al., 2019), and atypical journalists in this study. Mean and standard deviation to compound indices of accommodative, monitorial, interventionist, and collaborative role orientation, measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 = *not important at all* and 5 = *extremely important*.

Table 10.48: *Differences of habitus across gender*

Habitus	N	Mean	SD	t -value
Entrepreneurial				
Men	222	3.38	0.84	.302
Women	184	3.35	0.87	
Digital				
Men	220	1.76	0.66	1.807
Women	190	1.65	0.55	
Marginalized				
Men	219	3.29	0.78	.777
Women	188	3.23	0.71	

Note. Welch's t -Test.

Table 10.49: *Pairwise comparison of entrepreneurial habitus across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	3.19*	-0.58	-2.043	-0.263
Denmark		-3.56**	-5.024***	-3.263*
France			-1.354	0.3
Netherlands				1.665

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.50: *Pairwise comparison of digital habitus across countries*

	Denmark	France	Netherlands	UK
Austria	2.018	-2.63	-1.129	-2.452
Denmark		-4.405***	-3.045*	-4.227***
France			1.513	0.152
Netherlands				-1.347

Note. Standardized z -values. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. p values are adjusted (Bonferroni).

Table 10.51: *MCA Austria decomposition of variability for the first 10 components*

	Eigenvalues	% of var.	Cumulative % of var.
Dim.1	0.195	12.299	12.299
Dim.2	0.181	11.442	23.741
Dim.3	0.135	8.495	32.236
Dim.4	0.127	7.996	40.233
Dim.5	0.114	7.230	47.462
Dim.6	0.099	6.245	53.708
Dim.7	0.092	5.822	59.530
Dim.8	0.088	5.528	65.058
Dim.9	0.082	5.195	70.253
Dim.10	0.075	4.723	74.976

Note. MCA of active variables.

Table 10.52: *MCA Austria description of the first dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Experience	0.42623609	3,90E-04
Journalistic_specialization	0.33223690	1,79E-02
EDU	0.34447287	3,69E-01
Age*	0.38776713	4,76E-01
Parent_edu	0.30328210	7,57E-01
Annual_income	0.29006729	1,58E+00
EXP_INT_National	0.23436025	4,67E+00
EXP_EMP_National	0.12795773	1,04E+03
Fulltime*	0.14450701	2,27E+03
Mother*	0.16917354	2,45E+03
Won_Award	0.07867088	1,12E+04
Income	0.07834726	1,14E+04
Father*	0.12044097	1,90E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.53: *MCA Austria description of the second dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Annual_income	0.46870951	1,94E-05
work_in_newsroom	0.40523140	1,69E-04
Attend_editorial_meetings	0.33125737	1,53E-01
EXP_INT_National	0.29135675	1,99E-01
Age*	0.25777205	3,70E+02
Experience	0.17645873	5,15E+02
Resources*	0.15311488	4,91E+03
Doxa_Edit*	0.13818273	9,21E+03
Journalistic_specialization	0.08088530	1,01E+04
PRWork*	0.11108399	1,01E+04
Father*	0.13389383	1,10E+04
Parent_edu	0.10911456	1,10E+04
EDU	0.13234334	1,17E+04
Income	0.06484716	2,18E+04
EXP_EMP_National	0.05928250	2,85E+04
Doxa_Object*	0.10821024	3,10E+04
Mother*	0.10028996	4,23E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.54: *MCA Denmark decomposition of variability for the first 10 components*

	Eigenvalues	% of var.	Cumulative % of var.
Dim.1	0.187	13.217	13.217
Dim.2	0.152	10.748	23.965
Dim.3	0.139	9.794	33.759
Dim.4	0.122	8.640	42.399
Dim.5	0.101	7.122	49.520
Dim.6	0.100	7.034	56.554
Dim.7	0.093	6.592	63.146
Dim.8	0.089	6.255	69.401
Dim.9	0.080	5.663	75.064
Dim.10	0.065	4.565	79.630

Note. MCA of active variables.

Table 10.55: MCA Denmark description of the first dimension by categorical variables

	R2	p.value
Annual_income	0.49748898	2,46E-05
Income	0.32911349	9,15E-02
EXP_EMPL_National	0.22528282	1,93E+01
Experience	0.26137888	2,13E+01
PRWork*	0.24220804	5,30E+01
Attend_editorial_meetings	0.23511741	7,37E+01
EDU	0.15351210	5,56E+02
EXP_INT_National	0.13135060	1,51E+03
Parent_edu	0.16270159	1,83E+03
work_in_newsroom	0.09947896	6,20E+03
Journalistic_specialization	0.07319575	1,97E+04
Resources*	0.11696476	3,25E+04
Fulltime*	0.08132840	4,92E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.56: MCA Denmark description of the second dimension by categorical variables

	R2	p.value
Journalistic_specialization	0.3988751	1,61E-03
Experience	0.2444822	4,76E+01
EDU	0.1912161	9,79E+01
work_in_newsroom	0.1796038	1,68E+02
Age*	0.2711869	1,89E+02
Beat	0.2145659	1,89E+02
EXP_INT_National	0.1640615	3,44E+02
Annual_income	0.1468830	3,55E+03
Choice*	0.1032629	5,24E+03
Parent_edu	0.1293019	7,33E+03

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.57: MCA France decomposition of variability for the first 10 components

	Eigenvalues	% of var.	Cumulative % of var.
Dim.1	0.187	13.227	13.227
Dim.2	0.154	10.878	24.106
Dim.3	0.132	9.325	33.430
Dim.4	0.123	8.699	42.129
Dim.5	0.114	8.069	50.198
Dim.6	0.095	6.673	56.871
Dim.7	0.092	6.466	63.337
Dim.8	0.086	6.067	69.403
Dim.9	0.081	5.713	75.117
Dim.10	0.061	4.321	79.438

Note. MCA of active variables.

Table 10.58: *MCA France description of the first dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Journalistic_specialization	0.49149778	3,52E-06
EXP_INT_National	0.42042193	4,21E-04
Age*	0.47383399	4,15E-03
Experience	0.37894207	4,53E-02
Beat	0.29124048	4,93E+00
EDU	0.16799127	2,87E+02
Annual_income	0.16711490	1,52E+03
EXP_EMPL_National	0.09665348	7,02E+03
Income	0.09033793	9,27E+03
INF_pers*	0.11135775	3,98E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.59: *MCA France description of the second dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Annual_income	0.41944560	4,13E-03
Experience	0.33672020	4,68E-01
work_newsroom	0.24361154	7,88E+00
Parent_edu	0.26151730	2,12E+01
Attend_editorial_meetings	0.23271564	8,24E+01
EXP_EMPL_National	0.13882784	1,08E+03
Age*	0.21623007	1,89E+03
EXP_INT_National	0.10616845	4,61E+03
Fulltime*	0.11784609	1,17E+04
Marg*	0.08269383	1,30E+04
Mother*	0.12999817	2,02E+04
PRWork*	0.08696206	3,96E+04
Beat	0.08237105	4,73E+04
INF_econ*	0.08202499	4,79E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.60: *MCA Netherlands decomposition of variability for the first 10 components*

	Eigenvalues	% of var.	Cumulative % of var.
Dim.1	0.174	12.289	12.289
Dim.2	0.157	11.066	23.356
Dim.3	0.129	9.120	32.476
Dim.4	0.127	8.990	41.465
Dim.5	0.106	7.487	48.952
Dim.6	0.101	7.129	56.081
Dim.7	0.084	5.949	62.030
Dim.8	0.080	5.653	67.683
Dim.9	0.078	5.475	73.158
Dim.10	0.062	4.384	77.542

Note. MCA of active variables.

Table 10.61: *MCA Netherlands description of the first dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Experience	0.3557506	1,48E-02
Age*	0.4010594	2,12E-02
EXP_INT_National	0.3105523	3,03E-02
Beat	0.2777460	1,61E+00
EDU	0.2235660	3,12E+01
Mother*	0.2389845	5,78E+01
Journalistic_specialization	0.1777549	5,86E+01
Attend_editorial_meetings	0.1603106	1,47E+02
work_newsroom	0.1583891	1,62E+02
Parent_edu	0.1773158	3,35E+02
Won_Award	0.1168809	1,36E+03
Gender*	0.1168335	1,37E+03
Income	0.0937785	4,37E+03
Resources*	0.1057914	1,02E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.62: *MCA Netherlands description of the second dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Annual_income	0.46355320	8,14E-06
EXP_EMPL_National	0.38514627	2,37E-04
Won_Award	0.31400309	2,45E-02
Fulltime*	0.17671054	3,45E+02
work_newsroom	0.14091523	4,00E+02
Experience	0.16770695	5,39E+02
Attend_editorial_meetings	0.12322820	9,88E+02
Income	0.11069893	1,86E+03
Choice*	0.06540158	1,82E+04
INT*	0.10855132	2,48E+04
PRWork*	0.08598985	2,51E+04
EXP_INT_National	0.05865765	2,55E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.63: *MCA UK decomposition of variability for the first 10 components*

	Eigenvalues	% of var.	Cumulative % of var.
Dim.1	0.180	12.022	12.022
Dim.2	0.164	10.913	22.935
Dim.3	0.142	9.483	32.418
Dim.4	0.138	9.226	41.644
Dim.5	0.124	8.294	49.938
Dim.6	0.111	7.372	57.310
Dim.7	0.095	6.358	63.668
Dim.8	0.085	5.677	69.345
Dim.9	0.074	4.955	74.300
Dim.10	0.069	4.625	78.925

Note. MCA of active variables.

Table 10.64: *MCA UK description of the first dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Experience	0.5863301	3,16E-06
EXP_INT_National	0.3625509	1,79E-01
Age*	0.4818278	3,14E-01
Parent_edu	0.2415029	2,50E+02
Journalistic_specialization	0.1853586	4,28E+02
Annual_income	0.2041340	1,06E+03
Beat	0.1931760	1,60E+03
INF_pers*	0.2237441	1,76E+03
Income	0.1373657	2,79E+03

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

Table 10.65: *MCA UK description of the second dimension by categorical variables*

	R2	p.value
Annual_income	0.4680802	5,96E-03
Beat	0.4458818	2,03E-02
Income	0.2909220	5,09E+00
Journalistic_specialization	0.2216864	9,85E+01
INF_pers*	0.2686758	3,29E+02
Won_Awards	0.1180490	5,83E+03
PRWork*	0.1540474	6,61E+03
INF_econ*	0.1259845	1,76E+04
Doxa_Edit*	0.1252330	4,69E+04

Note. Variables correlating with the first dimensions. *Supplementary variables associated with the first dimension

IV. Abstracts English and German

English

Journalistic work in the 21st century is increasingly flexibilised and casualized. Techno-economic processes have led to more competitiveness within the field, as less and less permanent employment is available and new technology allows anyone to produce journalistic content from their home. While there has been growing scholarly interest in freelance and other atypical journalistic workers in the past twenty years, most of it has been addressed through single-case studies. Moreover, research has primarily focused on the paradoxical tension between freedom, passion and precarity. Less attention has been given to the material contexts which allow journalists to pursue such underpaid work and to what extent atypical work might affect their understanding of professional ideology. This dissertation addresses these research gaps from a Bourdieusian perspective by examining the resources that atypical journalists have amassed to participate in the journalistic field and how specific economic and technological constraints shape their journalistic culture. By employing a cross-national survey in five European countries, the thesis offers more generalizable findings on atypical journalistic work in Western democracies. Drawing on the answers of 430 respondents from Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the UK, results indicate that despite being well-educated, atypical journalistic workers experience economic precarity, have little access to material resources, little contact with the professional community and occupy marginalised positions within journalistic field. Moreover, specific technological and economic constraints only slightly affect their perception of what journalism is about and what journalists should do. Most significant differences occur on the country-level, indicating that the historical genesis of the national field shapes atypical journalistic culture more profoundly than employment status.

Key words: atypical journalistic work, comparative research, precarity, doxa, Bourdieu

German

Journalistische Arbeit im 21. Jahrhundert ist zunehmend flexibilisiert und entgrenzt. Technisch-ökonomische Prozesse haben zu einem verschärften Wettbewerb im journalistischen Feld geführt, da Festanstellungen immer seltener sind und neue Technologien es jedem ermöglichen, journalistische Inhalte von zu Hause aus zu produzieren. In den letzten zwanzig Jahren ist zwar ein wachsendes wissenschaftliches Interesse an freiberuflichen und anderen atypischen journalistischen Arbeitskräften zu verzeichnen, doch handelt es sich bei den meisten dieser Arbeiten um Einzelfallstudien. Darüber hinaus hat sich die Forschung in erster Linie auf die paradoxe Beziehung zwischen Freiheit, Leidenschaft und Prekarität konzentriert. Weniger im Blickpunkt standen die materiellen Rahmenbedingungen, die es Journalist*innen ermöglichen, einer solchen unterbezahlten Arbeit nachzugehen, und die Frage, inwieweit sich die atypische Arbeit auf ihr Verständnis der Berufsideologie auswirken könnte. Die vorliegende Dissertation schließt diese Forschungslücken aus einer feldtheoretischen Perspektive, indem sie untersucht, welche Ressourcen atypische Journalist*innen angesammelt haben, um im journalistischen Feld mitzuwirken, und wie spezifische ökonomische und technologische Zwänge ihre journalistische Kultur prägen. Anhand einer Umfrage in fünf europäischen Ländern bietet die Arbeit außerdem generalisierbare Erkenntnisse über atypische journalistische Arbeit in westlichen Demokratien. Die Ergebnisse von 430 Fragebögen aus Österreich, Dänemark, Frankreich, den Niederlanden und Großbritannien zeigen, dass atypische Journalist*innen trotz ihrer guten Ausbildung unter wirtschaftlicher Prekarität leiden, kaum Zugang zu materiellen Ressourcen und wenig Kontakt zur Berufsgemeinschaft haben, und innerhalb des journalistischen Feldes eine Randposition einnehmen. Darüber hinaus wirken sich spezifische technologische und wirtschaftliche Zwänge nur geringfügig auf ihre Auffassung davon aus, *worum* es im Journalismus geht und was Journalisten *tun sollten*. Die deutlichsten Unterschiede treten auf Länderebene auf, was darauf hindeutet, dass die historische Genese des nationalen Feldes die atypische journalistische Kultur stärker prägt als der Beschäftigungsstatus.